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In April  1959,  the  Mines  Safety Commission  issued its First Report  on its 
activities,  covering the  period May  1957- December  1958~ 
This,  the  Second,  Report  covers the  years  1959  and  1960. 
Like  its predecessor,  it consists of  three parts  : 
1.  - The  Activities of  the  Commission, 
2.  - Developments  in the  field of  Mine  Safety  in the  Community  Countries, 
3.  - Safety Statistics. 
Annex  D reproduces  the  terms  of.reference and rules of  procedure  of  the 
Commission;  Annex  E  records  the meeting of  the Restricted Committee,  of  the full 
Commission,  and of  the  various working  parties and  sub-committees,  and contains a 
complete  list of  the  members  of  the Commission and  the  various outside experts 
called in to assist it in its work. 
The  second Report  (+}  was  duly  laid before  the Council of Ministers and 
the  High Authority,  in accordance  with Article  8  of  the Commission's  terms of 
reference. 
(+}  Copies  of this Report  may  be  obtained on  request  from  the Secretariat of  the 
Commission  (Secretariat  de  l'Organe Permanent  pour  la Securite dans  les Mines 
de  Houille,  Haute  Autorite  de  la C.E.C.A.,  29 rue Aldringer,  Luxembourg}. 
1 PART  ONE 
ACTIVITIES  OF  THE  COMMISSION 
The  Commission's activities during  the  period under  review related mainly 
to matters  discussed earlier at  the Conference  on  Safety in Coalmines  but  referred 
by  the Governments  to the  Commission  for  further attention. 
In addition,  as  requested  by certain of  the  competent  mining authorities, 
the Commission  studied certain urgent  problems,  including in particular  those arising 
out of accidents presenting special features. 
l.Technical questions were  handled  by  the working  parties referred  to the first report 
"On  Electricity", 
"On  Fires and .Underground  Combustion,"  and  on 
"Winding-Ropes  and Shaft  Guides" 
and  their various sub-committees. 
Points in connection with rescue  operations were  dealt with  by  the"Working 
Party on  Rescue  Organization." 
The  High  Authority~ competition for  the  improvement  of mine  safety equipment 
is being conducted  under  the  supervision of  a  panel  of  judges specially appointed  for 
the  purpose. 
2.  For  the  study of  problems  connected with  human  factors,  the  Commission  set up  work-
ing parties on  .• 
a)  Medical  Problems  of Safety Policy; 
b)  Psychologic~l and Sociological Factors Affecting Safety; 
c)  Effects of  Working  Hours  on  Safety; 
d)  Effects of  Methods  of  Payment  on  Safety. 
Each of  these working parties consists of Government,  employers'  and 
workers'  representatives  from each country,  with a  Government  representative  in  the 
chair. 
The  Working Party  on  Medical  Problems also includes a  medical expert  from 
each country. 
The  members  of  the  technical working parties are selected solely for  their 
technical knowledge  and experience. 
3 SECTION  ONE 
TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 
I 
WORKING  PARTY  on  ELECTRIFICATION 
A.- The  use of  non-flammable materials for the manufacture of electric cables and 
leads for  underground use 
The Conference  on Safety in Mines  put  forward the following recommendations 
with regard to cables and  leads,  to serve as a  basis for the issue of  ~ppropriate 
regulations 
1)  - "The  outer sheathing of  armoured cables must  be of  a  type which cannot 
possibly help to spread a  fire.  The  same  applies to the external sheathing 
of  leads.  All  new  cables and  leads should be constructed to comply  with 
these requirements." 
(Recommendation  6  - E,  page  63  of the Conference Report) 
This  recommendation  was  accepted at the time  by  all countries. 
2)  - In the section on  Research  of its Report  the Conference  furthermore  recom-
mended 
"In connection with the manufacture of  armoured  and flexible cables and 
their use  belowground,  research work  and  other efforts should be continued 
with  a  view to replacing flamntable  materials such as rubber,  jute and  im-
pregnated paper  by  non-flammable or flame-resistant  materials such as 
neoprene,  glass wool  or polyvinyl chloride." 
(Recommendation  12  - E,  page  147  of  the Conference  Report) 
In its first  report  the Commission stated that it was  concerned only  with 
Recommendation 2,  since Recommendation  1  was  approved  by  all the governments.  It 
also reported on the then state of  investigations,  its conclusions being that 
- a)  not  everyone  is convinced of the necessity of using non-flammable materials for 
the internal insulation of cables; 
- b)  no sufficiently conclusive experimental data are available,  which could have 
served to provide  a  clear picture of the danger which  might  in certain 
circumstances result  from  the use of  such substances. 
5 6 
The  cable-manufacturing firms  of the  individual countries were  consulted 
during the discussion of this problem.  The  aim of this recommendation  was  more clear-
ly defined as being to guarantee that electric cables and  leads  do  not_eropagate fire 
when  exposed to an  open  flame. 
With  this in mind  further consultations and  experiments  were  undertaken. 
The  Commission  formed  the view that  the stipulated non-flammability  or 
'flame-resistance of the ~casing  of the cables and  leads gives adequate protec-
tion against  propagation of the fire. 
It nevertheless decided to investigate,  by  means  of  suitable experiments, 
whether it is in addition necessary to use flame-resistant  materials in the interior 
of the cables and  leads. 
A large number  of  practical tests were  therefore carried out  under condi-
tions corresponding to those to which cables and  leads are exposed during an under-
ground fire,  to see whether the types of  cable and  lead at  present  in use underground, 
and  incorporating non-flammable  or flame-resistant  sheathings,  act  like a  slow-match 
and propagate the fire,  or whether,  on the contrary,  they  do  not  transmit  the flame. 
These tests were carried out  in such a  way  that the cables and  leads were  : 
a)  - exposed to the affects of  an  open fire  (coke fire,  gas-burner flame  or welding-
torch flame)  or 
b)  - heated to ignition in the heated section of  a  pipe  (ventilation duct),  or 
c)  - exposed to the effects of  a  fire in the timbers of  a  roadway,  as simulated  in 
the fire sections of  an  experimental gallery. 
The  intention in applying the method  under  c)  was  to simulate faithfully 
the conditions obtaining underground,  while test method  b)  was  intended to provide 
comparable  values  for  a  cable of the  same  manufacture in several different tests. 
During these tests it was  found that the types of cable and  lead investi-
gated  - and  in general use underground  - transmitted the fire only  a  few  metres  away 
from its source. 
In the case of  the cables and  leads investigated - the composition of  which 
is detailed below  - the outer sheathing consisted of  non-flammable or flame-resistant 
materials.  The  internal parts of the cables and  leads contained the usual types and 
quantities of  flammable materials. The  following cables and  leads were  investigated 
1)  - Lead-covered cable 
Insulation with oil-impregnated paper or else with rubber; 
lead sheathing; 
inner protective sheath of  bituminized textile or similar material; 
wire or tape armouring; 
without  external sheathing or with  a  PVC-based thermoplastic material  or flame-
resistant  wax  or varnish,  both as protection against  corrosion. 
2)  - Plastic-covered cable 
Insulation of  PVC-based  thermoplastic material,  common  conductor sheathing 
consisting of  a  rubber-containing filling compound; 
wire  armouring or braiding; 
external sheathing consisting of  PVC-based  thermoplastic material. 
3)  - Rubber-covered  lead 
Insulation of rubber; 
common  conductor sheathing of  rubber or of conductive rubber with or without 
wire braiding; 
outer sheathing of  Neoprene. 
The tests in the experimental  roadway,  which  are still in the initial 
stages,  are to be continued,  first  of all with the object  of determining with suf-
ficient  accuracy  under  what  conditions  (inter alia,  the duration of  pre-heating,  the 
temperature  and  the ventilation-air velocity)  a  given type of cable can  be  set  on 
7 
fire,  together with special,  systematic  investigations on the behaviour of certain 
types of  PVC-based  plastic-cov~red cables.  It is also intended to develop further  the 
heating system of this experimental  roadway  so that  in subsequent  tests the temperature 
gradient  produced will faithfully simulate real conditions. 
The  Comn1ission  has  formed  the  view that,  leaving out  of  account  the results 
(still not  available)  from  the projected wind-tunnel test  - the results obtained from 
the tests listed under a),  b)  and c)  allow it to make  the following declaration,  which 
it accepted  in its plenary session of  December  20,  1960. 8 
- DECLARATION  WITH  REGARD  TO  THE  USE  OF  NON-FLAMMABLE  OR  AT  LEAST  FLAME-RESISTANT 
MATERIALS  FOR  THE  l~NUFACTURE OF  ELECTRIC  CABLES  AND  LEADS  FOR  USE  UNDERGROUND 
"The tests carried out  have  shown  that  the  flanunable  materials ln the in-
terior of the cables and  leads do  not  increase the danger of  propagation 
of fire,  which  is principally  - if not  exclusively  - dependent  upon the 
characteristics of  the external sheathing. 
"There is therefore  no  necessity  - in the case of the investigated and 
above-described types  of  cable and  lead  - to reolace  in accordance with 
Reconunendation  E  - 12  the  flammable  materials by  non-flammable or flame-
resistant material." 
X 
X  X 
B.  - Requirements  which  must  be  met  by  electric shotfiring leads 
Experience  gathered in Belgium has  indicated the dangers  which  may  arise 
in the use  of  duplex  shotfiring  leads insulated with plastics.  Very  slight  damage, 
such that it is virtually  invisible to the  inspecting shotfirer and  cannot  be deter-
mined  by  the use  of  a  ohmmeter,  can  produce sparks which can ignite a  mixture of air 
and  firedamp  especially when  used  in moist  places. This risk occurs both with  improved 
igniters and those  in which the  igniting current  is of  longer duration.  Damage  of this 
nature frequently occurred to shotfiring leads after a  certain period of use. 
On  the basis of the study of  reports of accidents caused  by  shotfiring leads, 
the Commission concluded that  serious accidents of this kind could be attributed to 
damaged  shotfiring leads in which non-insulated parts came  into contact  with  pipes 
or metal  support  components. 
Without  wishing to trespass upon  the province of  inspectorate regulations, 
the Commission has  prepared recommendations for  minimum  standards,  which  should at 
all times  be fulfilled by  shotfiring leads and which should,  in the wiew  of the 
Commission,  be  the criterion by  which  shotfiring leads should be judged for certifi-
cation or acceptance. 
Several  recommendations  of  a  general nature applicable to all shotfiring 
leads are supplemented  by  recommendations  regarding permanent  and  temporary  shotfiring 
leads used  in gassy pits and,  finally,  by  further  recommendations  regarding fixed 
shotfiring leads  in gassy pits. 
In that  part  of the  recommendation which advised measurement  of the ohmic 
resistance of the circuit before firing each  round using several detonators,  the 
Commission  - bearing in mind  the possible results of  a  faulty  ignition - has confirmed the proposal  regarding the  same  question advanced  in the Conference Report.  This 
report  envisaged testing the total resistance only where  a  fairly  large number  of 
shots was  involved  (15  or 20 shots). 
The  Commission  emphatically points out  that  the precautions taken  in the 
manufacture  of shotfiring leads constitute only  a  part  of  the safety precautions 
which  must  be taken overall to avoid accidents during shotfiring.  Above all,  shot-
firing must  be  avoided  in places where  an explosible mixture of air and  firedamp  is 
present. 
In its plenary  session of April 8,  1960 the Conmission  accepted the fol-
lowing  recommendation  : 
RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  SHOTFIRING  LEADS 
1  DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes  of  the present  recommendation,  the  following terms are 
to be  understood as defined  below 
Shotfiring lead 
shot-holes. 
the  link hetween  the igniter and i  point  in the vicinity of the 
Temporary  shotfiring lead  :  a  shotfiring lead which  does  not  serve at  one  working-
place for  longer than  one shift; this designation does  not  apply  to extention  leads 
which  connect  shotfiring leads with  the detonator wires• 
Permanent  shotfiring lead  :  all other shotfiring leads. 
Conductor  :  the metal  part  of  an electric  lead.  The  conductor is said to be solid, 
if it consists of  a  single wire,  or multi-wired,  if it consists of several wires 
twisted together. 
Insulation  :  the sheathing around  any  conductor for  purposes of  insulation, 
Core  the entire conductor with  insulation, 
A distinction is drawn  between  ~!~~!~=~~~~ leads,  !!!~!~~ leads,  leads and 
cables  (or rubber-covered  leads). 
Cables or rubber-covered  leads  :  the totality of several electrically separated and 
mechanically solid cores,  surrounded  by  a  common  protective sheathing. 
Protective sheathing  :  the continuous  envelope with  which the cable or rubber-covered 
lead is provided as  a  protection against  damage, 
A  ~!~~!~=~~~~-~~~~ can also be  provided with  a  protective sheathing, 
2  :  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  ALL  SHOTFIRING  LEADS 
Every  conductor must  be  provided with at  least  one  good-quality  insulation, 
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All  connections 'must  be  properly  insulated. 
Every  shotfiring lead must  have  the appropriate degree of flexibility. 
The  conductors must  be  of  such cross-sectional area that  they  do  not  occasion 
an  excessive voltage drop. 
The  shotfiring leads must  be  made  up  and  laid in such  a  way  that the risk of 
any  fault  current  - especially resulting from  contact  with metal objects - is reduced 
to a  minimum. 
Before  any shotfiring operation in particular workings  and before  the simulta-. 
neous  firing of a  fairly  large  number  of shots  (to be  laid down  in each country by 
the  responsible authority),  the responsible shotfirer must  measure  the ohmic  resis-
tance of the circuit. 
The  movable shotfiring leads must 
1)  be  carefully  inspected before every firing,  by  the responsible shotfirer; 
2)  be  regularly subjected to thorough checking by  an  expert at the surface or in an 
underground workshop. 
A  thorough. checking must  consist  of at  least  : 
a)  a  careful inspection of  the shotfiring lead over its whole  length; 
b)  measurement  of the insulation between the two conductors,  if the shotfiring lead 
consists of  a  rubber-covered  lead; 
c)  measurement  of  the  ohmic  resistance of the shotfiring lead. 
Similarly the permanent  shotfiring leads must  regularly be  thoroughly checked 
by  an  expert.  The  insulation between the two  conductors  need  however  only  be  measured 
if the shotfiring lead is to be  re-used elsewhere. 
It is advisable to make  a  written record of  every  thorough check,  with the date. 
3  FURTHER  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  PERMANENT  AND  TEMPORARY  SHOTFIRING  LEADS  USED  IN 
GASSY  MINES 
The  shotfiring leads must  fulfil conditions which  ensure sufficient safety, 
with  regard to  : 
a)  mechanical strength and  in particular tensile strenght; 
bending and abrasion strength; 
b)  electrical insulation: 
c)  impermeability  (to moisture)  of the insulation and  the sheathing. 
It is advisable to prepare checking standards which  correspond to the conditions 
laid down. 
4  :  SUPPLEMENTARY  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  PERMANENT  SHOTFIRING  LEADS  USHD  IN  GASSY  PITS 
The  permanent  shotfiring  leads should  be  so arranged that,  as far as possible, 
damage  during firing of the shots or from  other causes is avoided. 
If the shotfiring lead consists of  two  separate conductors,  these  ~hould be ar-
ranged sufficiently far apart  and  in such  a  way  that  inspection is possible. 11 
In shafts and dipping roads,  the shotfiring leads must  have  an  adequate mechanical 
strength to withstand the strain put  on  them by  the method  of  arrangement  employed. 
X 
X  X 
These  recommendations  consequently  serve exclusively to the use of fairly fre-
quently-used shotfiring leads.  They  are completely  general  in  natur~,  and  do  not  go 
into details of construction or of  checking of the  leads.  Nevertheless they  emphatical-
ly  underline the  necessary  for the insulation to be  in good condition and  for  the 
points of connection to be satisfactorily insulated. 
Measurement  of the insulation is to be  included in the  tho~ough checks  of shot-
firing  leads which  have to be carried out  in regular intervals. This measurement 
cannot  be carried out  by  means  of  an  ohmmeter,  but  calls for  comparatively  high 
voltages which  may  cause dangerous conditions underground.  Consequently,  measurement 
of the  insulation must  only  be carr'ied out  at  the surface or in an underground work-
shop.  Regular  measurement  of  the condition of the insulation of  perman~ut shotfiring 
leads is not  possible.  In this instance therefore the measurement  should be carried 
out  only  when  the  leads are shifted. 
X 
X  X 
c.- Protection of the underground electrical network against the danger of electric 
shocks 
Investigations carried out  in Belgium after an accident  have  indicated 
that,  in spite of the familiar safety regulations normally  applied in the pits, 
currents which can  be  dangerous to the workers  can  be  produced in certain circumstances. 
This particular accident  was  caused because part  of the metal  equipment  in the face 
became  live. 
The Commission considered it necessary to investigate the possibility of 
providing protection against electric shocks  from underground  leads. 
In doing  so it concentrated on the medium-tension underground  networks 
(380-1,100 V),  which are principally used in coal-winning workings,  without  taking 
into account  the type of star connection employed.  These  networks  of  leads which 
have to be carried along in the  immediate vicinity of the working-places  and  faces 
are subject to far worse conditions when  faults arise than is tne case for  networks 
carrying higher voltages.  The  measures applied to the latter category of  network,  as 
also to the compulsory  shorter networks carrying voltages below 380 V,  can  be dis-
pensed with provided that certain simplified precautions based  on similar principles 
are taken.  The  investigations were therefore concerned solely with the voltage range 
indicated. 12 
After studying the measures taken to ensure protection against  electric 
shocks  from underground distribution networks  in various countries,  and the experience 
gained in recent  years with various technical  improvements  in this field,  the Conwis-
sion worked  out  in the  form  of  recommendations  various categories of protective 
measure to increase the protection of  underground distribution networks against  the 
risk of electric shocks. 
It further considered it necessary to provide  a  brief description drawing 
'clear distinctions between  low  tension,  medium  tension and  high tension;  this is 
included as  a  preface to ensure better understanding and to avoid  varying interpreta-
tions of the  recommendation  in the different countries of  the Community,  as these 
concepts are frequently  referred to in the text. 
These  prefatory remarks  must  however  not  be  considered as a  generally-valid 
series of definitions and are without  prejudice to the classifications normally  used 
in the individual countries. 
The  Commission  emphasises that the recommended  categories of  precautions 
will only  provide an adequate  degree of safety if they are applied simultaneously. 
No  single group of recommendations  applied alone is sufficient to guarantee 
that there is complete safety for the  workmen  against the dangers of electric shocks, 
although it must  be  borne in mind  that  the urgency  and  value  of these measures differ. 
In its plenary session of April  8,  1960 the Commission  approved the  following 
recommendatio~s  : 
R  E  C  0  M M E  N D A T  I  0  N S 
regarding the 
PROTECTION  OF  UNDERGROUND  DISTRIBUTION  NETWORKS 
AGAINST  THE  DANGER  OF  CAUSING  ELECTRIC  SHOCKS 
I.- DEFINITIONS  AND  GENERAL  REGULATIONS 
A - The  concepts used hereafter are  by  agreement  to be understood as follows  : 
Network  :  Any  installation of electically connected current  sources,  means  of 
transmitting current  and  current-consuming apparatus.  Thus  e.g.  the 
secondary winding of  a  transformer  (or the secondary  windings, if 
several transformers are present  with secondary  windings  in parallel) 
and  the components  fed  ther~by constitute a  network. 
Voltage  Effective voltage  between  phases  in the case of three-phase alternat-
ing current. 13 
Designation of  the Voltages 
N.B.  The  following designations are used solely for the purpose of the present 
recommendation and are without  prejudice to the classifications normally 
used  in the  individual countries. 
Weak  tension  (WT) 
Low  tension  (LT) 
Medium  tension  (MT) 
Voltage  range  which  may  be  considered safe  (generally 
between 40- 65  V according to country). 
Voltage  range  for  lighting purpose;  drilling operations, 
telephone  installations etc.  (65- 380 V). 
The  normal  voltage range  for  working  equipment  used under-
ground with three-phase A.C.  (between 380 and  1,100 V). 
The  normal  voltage range  for  the  primary  winding  (between 
1,100 and  12,000 V)  of the transformers supplying the  MT-
and  LT-networks. 
B  - The  following  recommendations  refer only to the  MT  networks defined above. 
These  networks  should fulfil all the recommendations  set  out  below. 
As  against this,  these  recommendations  refer neither to the  HT  networks, 
nor to .voltages  which  are  lower  than the medium-tension  range  and are used 
for  particular purposes  (lighting,  drilling apparatus,  telephone installations, 
etc.).  Some  easing of the restrictions may  be  allowed  in such cases.  Over-
headwire  networks  with bare trolley wires are also excluded. 
II  - PROTECTION  AGAINST  THE  RISK  OF  ELECTRIC  SHOCKS 
A - FIRST  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  -----------------------
(Protection against  direct  contact  with  a  live phase) 
1  - Every  chance contact  with  a  live phase should be  avoided as far as 
possible,  this being done  by  laying the conductor out  of the workmens' 
reach,  by  interposing effective barriers or even  by  sheathing the phase 
or  by  insulating it. 
2  - The  cables and  leads used  in medium-tension underground  networks  should 
be  protected either by  means  of  a  metal  armouring connected to the pilot 
lead,  or  given mechanical  protection by  a  flexible envelope of the best 
possible design.  Leads  without  metal  armouring must  be electrically pro-
tected by  separate or  common  protective screens,  which trip safety devices 
in the event  of  a  fault. 
3  - Only  trained men  should  be  allowed to open the housings  of accessible 
live parts  (medium-tension  voltage range)  and this only  under conditions 
which  have  been clearly  laid down  in advance. 
4  - The  repair and  maintenance  of  the electrical equipment  should  be  entrusted 
only  to trained personnel. 
B  - SECOND  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS  ------------------------
(Equipotential connection between conductive parts of the  installation) 
1)  All  underground  networks  must  be  provided with an equipotential connection 
between the conductive  (not  live in normal  operation)  components  of  the 
installation and  the other metal  elements connected thereto,  such  that  its 
conductance is sufficient to prevent  the occurrence,  between  any  two  points 
accessible to a  workman  simultaneously,  of  a  voltage higher than the  weak 
voltage. 14 
2  - This equipotential connection  (protective lead)  must  ensure electric connec-
tion between the conductive elements of the installation over the whole  length 
of the network.  It must  be maintained in satisfactory condition and must  be 
inspected as often as is necessary to ensure this. 
3  - The  above-mentioned equipotential connection  (protective lead)  must  be  earthed 
at at  least  one  point  of the network via an earth connection of the  lowest 
possible resistance. 
4  - This earth connection must  be  combined with the star-point earth connection, 
if a  star-point is employed. 
C - THIRD  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS 
(Reduction of fault  duration) 
1  - Any  fault  current  must  be considered dangerous  in underground medium-tension 
networks if - when  the fault  current  flows  through the protective lead and 
connected conductive  components  of the installation or earth - there is pro-
duced  between  any  two  points accessible to a  workman  simultaneously  a  voltage 
exceeding the  level of  a  week  voltage,  regardless of whether it occurs  only 
between  parts of the installation or between such parts and earth. 
2  - If the star-point  of  a  network  is earthed via a  weak  impedance  or without 
any  impedance,  so that the  presumed fault  current  is not  restricted to a  low 
value,  then the network must  be  provided with safety devices which  can at 
any  time automatically isolate the damaged  section of the  network  from the 
current  source  (or  render it completely dead)+,  before the  fault  current 
flowing  through the protective  lead and connected conductive components  of 
the installation or earth reach  a  dangerous  value. 
Only  when  the line has  been  repaired or the fault  eliminated,  or at 
the direction of  a  specialist  who  has  taken all necessary  precautions,  may 
that section of the network  be  brought  under  voltage again. 
3  - If the star-point of  a  network is insulated or earthed via some  impedance, 
which restricts fault  currents to a  low  value,  the network must  be fitted 
with supervising devices which  are always  in a  state of  readiness  and  which 
are suitable  : 
a)  either to check the  insulation of the various parts of the network  and  to 
indicate any  damage  they  may  have suffered or  - which  is preferable - auto-
matically to cut  off the damaged  section of the network  from its source 
of current  (or render the entire network  dead)+. 
If no  automatic  out-off device is installed,  the responsibility for cut-
ting-off should be  entrusted to an  expert  man,  who  can  intervene as soon 
as  the warning signal of  the supervisory system is tripped or the fault 
assumes  major  dimensions. 
If cutting-off has  been necessitated by  one  of  the  two cases cited 
above,  the restoration of  current  may  be  accepted only after repair of 
the  line or elimination of  the fault,  or only at  the direction of  an expert 
official,  who  has  taken all necessary  precautions. 
If no  automatic cut-off device is installed,  the rubber-covered  leads 
of  mobile  machines  must  be  fitted with  an  automatic  device which renders 
them dead  as soon  as  there occurs  a  fault  current  which  is caused  by 
+since the complete or partial cutting-off of  a  line voltage can have serious effects 
on  the current  supply  to important  equipment,  suitable preventive measures  should 
be  taken. damage  to  the external  installation or  by  damage  of the  insulation to an 
individual phase; 
b)  or automatically to cut  off the  damaged  section of  the network  from its 
current  source  (or render  the entire network  dead),  as  soon  as  a  double 
fault  occurs  leading to a  dangerous  fault  current  in the protective  lead 
and  connected parts of  the installation. 
In this instance the current  may  be  switched on  again only after 
the  line has  been  prepaired or the fault  eliminated. 
X 
X  X 
The  Working  Party feels it necessary to give the following explanations as  a 
comment  on  the present  draft  recommendation. 
The  recommendation  refers to the protection against  electric shocks  of  medium-
tension  (380 to  1,100 V)  electrical networks  installed underground,  whatever the 
star connection used.  Similar principles can if necessary also be  applied to other 
voltage ranges. 
In other networks,  e.g.  high-tension networks  (3  to 5  kV,  or even  in some 
instances  12  kV),  which  generally use  armoured cables and are almost  exclusively 
installed in roadways  which  have  been  in service for  longer  than is the case with 
medium-tension  leads,  there are far  fewer  possibilities of faults occurring.  In such 
cases an earth fault  is generally  only  possible if the cable  i~ broken or if moisture 
penetrates the connections.  If the star point  of the network  is earthed,  an  overload 
relay  inserted at this point  as  a  protective device can give timely  warning  of  faults 
and can  switch off the currents.  If a  network has  an  insulated star point,  the 
devices  normally  used with medium  voltages can  be  employed  (e.g.  testing by  means 
of an·earth voltmeter,  superimposition of rectified current  or directional protection 
relay). 
It must  however  be  pointed out  that at these voltages faults can very  quickly 
lead to open short-circuits,  which  can trip the adjustable protective devices with-
out  delay  and  much  more  easily than is possible in the medium-tension  range. 
Accordingly,  three categories of  precaution are here  proposed to ensure the 
safety of the workmen  handling apparatus in the medium-tension range. 
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The  purpose  of the first order precautions is to prevent all direct  contact  with 
a  live phase;  second order precautions are intended to make  any  possible contact  with 
a  conductive part  of the installation safe.  The  third order precautions are  intended 
to ensure that  the current  ls cut  off as quickly as possible if,  where  the  insulation 
is inadequate,  connection  between  the conductive parts of  the installation becomes 
imperfect  or  a  serious fault  occurs  (single faults  in the case of network with earthed 
star point  and  double faults  in the case of  networks with insulated star point). 
None  of the precautions proposed will be sufficient  by  itself to protect the 
workmen  at all times  from electric shocks;  only if all these precautions are applied 
in combination can  a  satisfactory degree  of safety be  guaranteed. 
Consequently it is essential that the precautions defined here as first order, 
second order and third order precautions should  be  applied simultaneously. 16 
A - FIRST  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS 
PROTECTION  AGAINST  DIRECT  CONTACT  WITH  A  LIVE  PHASE  (MEDIUM-TENSION  NETWORK) 
Direct  contact  with  a  bare  live  phase  in this range  of  voltages  is pratical-
ly  always  fatal.  The  fault  current  circuit is closed via the network capacities 
and  the other insulation faults.  However,  it is not  possible in the operating 
conditions which  obtain in a  pit to limit it to roughly  10 to  15  mA,  the figure 
which  a  man  of  normal  physical constitution can tolerate for  some  time. 
In practical conditions,  the danger  is  low  only  when  the voltage to which  a 
man  can  be subjected  drops  below  a  figure  of 40 to 50 V,  i.e. to a  voltage which 
his internal resistance is still high  enough  to meet.  Nevertheless,  direct  con-
tact with  live conductors  should  be  absolutely  avoided  in all networks  with  higher 
voltages. 
Consequently,  the underground electrical equipment  must  - regardless of  the 
star connection - be  so constructed or disposed that  direct contact  with  a  live 
phase  is impossible,  except  in the  event  of gross  neglicence.  For this reason 
use  is made  of  locked or armoured  switch boxes,  which  can  be  opened  only after 
the current  is cut  off or with special  keys  which  are entrusted to the trained 
operators,  and  opened  only  by  them,  in addition to insulating cut-outs,  cables 
with protective  leads or metal  armouring,  warning displays etc. 
If these regulations are observed,  the danger  of  fatal electric shocks  can 
occur  only  in the case of  earth faults  leading to a  local  increase  in the  voltage 
in the conductive parts of the installation which  can  be  touched  by  the  workmen. 
The  protection against  this "indirect" earth current  consists essentially in 
providing an  equipotential connection  between  the conductive parts which  can  be 
touched simultaneously  and  the earth,  and  naturally,  the quickest  steps possible 
to eliminate the fault. 
The  safety envisaged is based  on  two  main  principles  : 
- reduction to safe values  of  potential voltages  between  conductive  parts and 
earth in the  area where  conductive parts are simultaneously accessible to the 
workmen; 
- reduction of the fault  period,  achieved  by  switching off  the current  before 
the danger  increases. 
This  leads  again  to two  categories of  precaution  :  the first consists in 
forming  an  equipotential connection  between  the conductive parts  (second  order 
precautions)  and  the  second  limitation of  the duration of  the  fault  (third order 
precautions). 
B  - SECOND  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS 
EQUIPOTENTIAL  CONNECTION  BETWEEN  CONDUCTIVE  PARTS  OF  THE  INSTALLATION 
1)  When  contact  with  a  live phase  is possible only  via  a  conductive  part  of the 
installation,  the danger  of  an electric shock is in consequence  present  only 
if this part  is brought  to a  dangerous potential  \as  compared with the simul-
taneously  accessible conductors or the earth).  But  this happens  only if the 
electric connection  linking this part  with the other insulation faults,  with 
the star point  earthing  lead  - if one  is used  - and  with the  network capacities 
offers sufficient  resistance.  The  voltage of  electric shocks is practically 
only  a  function  of  the resistance of  the protective  lead circuit  between the 
fault  point  and  the star point  (or the other points,  where  the  insulation is 
faulty)  and  not  a  function  of the earth resistance as such. 
Put  in more  general  terms,  the total voltage gradient  in the  fault 
current circuit is proportional to the series of  successive  impedances.  This 
is where  the superiority of distribution networks  using an  insulated star point 
(or  more  precisely  a  star point  earthed via a  strong  impedance)  comes  out 
clearly.  Raising the star point  resistance can  reduce  the voltage gradient 
in the protective current circuit,  even if the  latter is incomplete,  because the fault  current  is restricted to very  low  values.  If on the other hand  the 
star point  earthing resistance is weak  and the total resistance of  the pilot 
lead and  the connected conductive parts  (or of the earth and the latter) is 
relatively high,  the conductive part  can be  brought  under  a  high potential. 
Whatever  the arrangement  chosen,  efforts must  in every case be  made 
to produce equipotential conditions as extensively as possible between earth 
and  the conductive parts which can be  touched simultaneously  by  the workers. 
It is therefore not  sufficient that  the earthing lead(s)  should have  low 
resistance values.  Above  everything else it is essential that the conductive 
parts should  be  connected satisfactorily to each other. 
Finally,  it would  be desirable to build in the desired connection 
of the conductive parts,  unless very  grave disadvantages should preclude it, 
e.g.  a  disturbance of the capacitive equilibrium which might  result  from  such 
measures. 
2)  Connection of  the protective lead and star point 
17 
In networks  in which the star point  is earthed via a  weak  resistance 
or without  any  resistance,  the question finally arises whether  the conductive 
parts and the star point  should be  connected to the same  earth lead. 
If they are kept  separate, 
- the star point  current will,  in the event  of  a  fault,  be  limited by  reason 
of the resistance of this earth lead and its connection to earth; 
- the danger of electric shock will increase,  if the ratio between  the earth 
resistance of the protective lead to the earth resistance of the star point 
becomes  too high.  In bad cases in fact  the conductive parts may  be  brought 
under  a  potential approaching the value of the voltage in the distribution 
network. 
If they  are connected, 
- the star point current  increases in the event  of  a  fault  (since the earth 
resistance are shunt  connected);  the risk of  an  increase in the potential 
of the conductive parts is however  reduced thereby,  except  when  very  heavy 
fault  currents occur; 
- the adjustment  and the tripping of circuit-breakers is made  easier  (star 
point  cut-out,  core balance,  etc.). 
The  special structure of our underground  networks,  in which the active 
conductors are surrounded by  sheathing connected to the freely-conductive 
protective lead,  and  in which protective lead and star point  lead cannot  ba 
very  widely  separated,  makes  it illusory to try to separate them  in practical 
operations.  Anyway,  this could in fact  be justified only  in the case of  a 
surface distribution network  which is subjected to atmosphere over-voltages 
or which  do  not  possess a  sensitive fault current circuit-breaker. 
If the two elements are not  separated,  the devices of the core balance 
type or the star point  relay can operate more  precisely  (because they are 
not  affected by  variations in earthing resistance).  Here  once again the 
deciding factor is that the continuous connection of the conductive parts 
should possess adequate conductivity to conduct  away  the maximum  possible 
short-circuit current  of  the network without  any  appreciable voltage increase. 
It is understandable that its value must  be restricted. 
It is also understandable that it is in everybody's interest to connect 
the earthing lead with the star point. 18 
C  - THIRD  ORDER  PRECAUTIONS 
REDUCTION  OF  FAULT  PERIOD 
1) The electrically continuous connection of the conductive parts is also the 
best  protection against electric shocks  in the event  of double earth connec-
tion in networks with a  star point  insulated via a  high resistance.  In this 
case there is no distinction between the maximum  value of the possible fault 
current  in the protective lead and the highest  possible short-circuit current. 
It is naturally possible that the conductivity of the protective lead circuit 
or the earth,  through which  such  a  current  must  pass,  is frequently  not  suf-
ficient to avoid dangerous  voltages in the conductive parts or between these 
and earth  (especially if we  bear in mind the other factors affecting short-
circuits). It is therefore important to maintain the maximum  possible fault 
• current  and its duration period within narrow limits. 
2)  In networks with a  star point  earthed via a  weak  resistance or without  any 
resistance,  the conclusion is the same,  but  the fault  current must  be restricted 
as soon as the insulation of  a  single-phase of the network drops too heavily. 
This explains,  e.g.,  the British practice which  envisages that the network 
must  automatically  be cut off  from current as soon as the fault  current  reaches 
either 15%  of the nominal  current  of the network or SA.  It is therefore suf-
ficient to provide  a  conductivity of the protective  lead sufficient  for the 
higher of these two values to ensure that the network is completely safe. 
The  same  is true for  a  500-V  network  in which an  impedance  of the star point 
of,  e.g.,  30 ohms  restricts the possible fault  current  :  in this case even a 
protective  lead of  inadequate capacity will be sufficient. 
D - CHOICE  OF  THE  TYPE  OF  STAR  POINT 
The  above  remarks  show  : 
1)  that the obligation to install protective devices  for all networks_ becomes 
even  more  binding,  the worse the electrical connection between the conductive 
parts; 
2)  that with comparable effectiveness of  the protective lead the average voltage 
distribution networks are,  in the event  of single faults,  so much  the less 
dangerous the stronger the  impedance  of the connection between star point  and 
protective leads.  Networks with  a  star point  insulated via a  strong  impedance 
are the least dangerous;  networks with  a  freely-earthed star point  are the 
least safe: 
3)  with networks with a  star point  earthed via a  weak  impedance  or without  any 
impedance,  in which  any  possible fault  current cannot  be restricted to safe 
values,  it is indispensable to provide automatic protective devices which 
are tripped as soon as the first fault  occurs; 
4)  with networks with an  insulated star point  (or a  star point  earthed via an 
impedance  which restricts the fault  current to a  safe value),  these networks 
corresponding to the first  two categories of  precaution defined above,  the 
danger of  an electric shock  on contact  with  a  mass  can  now  only  occur if an 
earth connection which  can  be classified as twice the true short-circuit 
value is present. 
There must  therefore  be  an  automatic cutting-off before the double-
value earth connection becomes  operative.  Such cutting-off can  however  be 
dispensed with  (solely with regard to the risk of electric shock)  as  long as 
there is only  a  single-value earth connection. These  facts must  be borne  in 
mind  in the choice of star point  and  of  precaUtions to be taken,  to ensure 
the appropriate degree of  protection in every case. 19 
As  can seen  from  the investigation described above,  it is consequently 
a  question of  seeing that  the  automatic  protection is tripped  immediately  the 
second  fault  occurs,  if the  networks  with  insulated star point  are  not  automati-
cally cut  off as soon  as the first fault  occurs  - and  one  of their advantages 
is after all precisely this possibility of  "working to the end  of the shifts  ." 
A general,  permanent  check of the insulation of  the  network with 
respect  to the protective  lead makes it possible to get  an  appropriate indi-
cation of  the  development  of  the first fault,  but  not  of  the occurrence of 
the second.  It is therefore necessary  - and this is the purpose of  the  pro-
posed  third order precautions  -
a)  either to check the insulation continuously  and,  if it is found  to be  too 
weak,  to cut  off the damaged  strand  (either automatically or not)  or to 
render  the  network dead).  This  amounts  to saying that  steps must  be  taken 
before the first  fault  becomes  too serious; 
b)  or to employ  an  automatic protective device  which cuts off the  damaged 
strand  (or renders the whole  network dead),  as  soon  as there is an  earth 
short-circuit. This  amounts  to saying that  steps are taken only  when  the 
second fault  occurs,  but  then  they  must  be  taken  immediately. 
Since there are other reasons  (danger of  fire)  favouring  the use 
of  automatic cutting-off,  it should  in fact  be  simplest  to ensure that  the 
automatic  fault  protection - even if it is resistance  loaded  - is tripped as 
soon  as  these faults  occur.  This will  give  in addition protection against  the 
danger  of electric shocks  which  could  be  caused  by  a  double  fault.  But  this 
is only  one  means  among  many. 
However  that  may  be,  this last  precaution gives  a  network with 
insulated star point  a  protection which  is comparable with the safety of 
networks  controlled by  core balance and  having  an  earthed star point. 
E  - RESTORATION  OF  CURRENT,  RESTRICTION  OF  FAULTS 
a)  If the fault  current  is not  restricted to a  safe value  by  a  suitable star 
point  resistance,  then restoration of  the current  after the occurrence of  a 
fault  should be  absolutely  forbidden.  If the  limitation of  the fault  does 
not  take effect  immediately,  attempts should  be  made  to reduce it by  the 
normal  means  (e.g.  using  an  ohmmeter).  For  practical reasons  however  it must 
be  possible to restore current after a  fault;  when  this is done,  however, 
special precautions must  be  taken  by  an  experienced official. 
b)  If the star point  is insulated  (or earthed via  a  strong resistance)  and if a 
single fault  is present  (e.g.  cutting-off by  an  insulation-checking device, 
which  functions  at  a  few  thousand  ohms),  then- provided that  the conductivity 
of the protective  lead is good  - restoration of  the current  is not  likely to 
have  serious disadvantages with  respect  to the  danger  of electric shocks. 
This step is not  to be  recommended,  but  neither should it be  forbidden:  among 
other things it is in fact  inevitable for  precise restriction of  the fault. 
c)  If the star point  is insulated  (or earthed via a  strong resistance),  and  there 
is a  double  fault,  restoration of the current after the occurrence of  a  fault 
should be  made  impossible or  should  be  forbidden.  The  responsibility for  res-
toration of current  should be  entrusted to an  expert,  who  will only  restore 
it once  the  fault  has  been eliminated or the damaged  component  has  been re-
placed. 
F  - PROTECTION  OF  MOBILE  UNDERGROUND  MACHINES  SUPPLIED  WITH  CURREWf  VIA  RUBBER-
COVERED  CABLES  IN  THE  CASE  OF  NETWORKS  WITH  INSULATED  STAR  POINT 
In the case of  rubber-covered  leads,  which  are  subjected to heavy 
stress  (mechanical stress,  danger  of  rupture  from  external  blows,  etc.)  and  are 20 
in addition set  in bad conditions  (steadily advancing faces,  dusty  or gassy  working-
points,  etc.),  one  generally tries to work with selective protection against  internal 
and external damage. 
This selective protection!)  frequently  consists of  a  protective pilot 
lead or control  lead around  each  individual  conductor or  around all conductors as 
a  group.  According to time or place,  this  lead  (in the case of  networks  with insulat-
ed  star point)  is used  in one  of the three  forms  described below  : 
1)  The  protective  lead connects only  the conductive parts of the machine  and  the 
switch box.  It is only  a  mechanical  protection  (like the armouring of cables), 
and  plays  no part  when  damage  occurs to the outer insulation,  while  in the case 
of  a  contact-phase protective  lead it breaks the circuit of  the insulation checking 
device  only  "upstream." 
If no  special device is provided  (e.g.  a  reactive wattmeter protection), 
it does  not  constitute a  selective protection. 
2)  The  control  lead is insulated  on  the machine side  (or connected to the conductive 
parts via a  sufficient  impedance)  and  subjected to a  certain voltage  on  the switch 
box  side.  The  fact  of  earthing it initiates the release of  a  relay  and  the cut-
ting off of  the  protection.  If the  impedance  of  the circuit  allows it,  a  contact-
phase control  lead can play the same  role  (ring connection via protective  lead, 
impedance  of  the star point,  capacities and  any  insulation faults which  may  be 
present). 
3)  The  control  lead is subjected to a  certain voltage,  but  the circuit is closed 
via a  rectifier to the machine,  which is shunted  by  any  fault  which  may  occur 
between earth and control  lead,  initiating the release of  a  fault  relay.  The  same 
tripping operation is produced  in the event  of  a  fault  between  phase  and control 
lead. 
This  supplementary "electrical"  protection of  the  lead quoted  in the 
last  two  paragraphs  may  in some  cases  seem superfluous  and  even  considered to 
represent  a  hindrance to operations  (e.g.  in wet  working-point),  particularly 
by  reason  of its sensitivity. It should therefore not  be  prescribed for  every 
eventuality.  The  connection of  the protective  lead with  the conductive parts in 
general supervision of the insulation does  in fact  provide sufficient safety,  at 
least  where there is automatic cutting-off from  the current  source  in the event 
of earth connections.  In the case of  a  network controlled only  by  signal apparatus, 
the electrical protection of  rubber-covered  leads would  nevertheless best  be  pre-
served as  a  precautionary measure. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  present  investigation leads to the following conclusions with 
regard to the protection of underground  networks against  electric shocks, 
1)  With all types of  network direct contact with  a  live  lead must  be  rendered  im-
possible. 
2)  All  low-tension  networks  must  have the best  possible equipotential connection 
between conductive parts and earth. This precaution is the most  important  of all. 
3)  To attain the  same  degree  of safety with all medium-tension  networks,  it is ne-
cessary  : 
a)  automatically to cut-off  from  the current  source all networks  (or parts of 
networks)  whose star point  is earthed via a  weak  impedance  or without  any 
1)  Independently  of the remote control of  the underground machine  being supplied 
with current  and of the electric interlocking of  the starting switch  - functions 
which  are often performed  by  the  same circuit. impedance,  so that the fault  current  is not  restricted,  as  soon as the fault 
current  reaches  a  value  of  a  few  amperes; 
b)  to check continuously the insulation of the networks with insulated star 
point  or  (either partially or completely)  to render  them dead automatically, 
as  soon as  a  double  faut  occurs. 
It goes  without  saying that  automatic cutting-off on  the occurrence 
of  a  single fault  would  make  the  networks even safer;  a  regulation to this 
effect  is however  not  necessary. 1) 
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It is obvious that  the protection must  come  into action automatically 
and  as rapidly as possible,  as soon as  a  double fault  occurs  in networks with 
insulated star point  and  a  single fault  in networks  with earthed star point. 
If in a  medium-tension  network2)  with  insulated star point  there occurs 
a  single fault,  the tripping of the protective device is desirable,  but  not 
indispensable,  except  perhaps  in very  extensive networks;  an absolute prere-
quisite for this is however that  there should  be  an effective automatic  pro-
tection against  double  faults,  acting as quickly  as possible.  If this is so, 
it is sufficient if the intervention takes place before the total insulation 
resistance of the  network  drops to too  low a  value.  It can on  occasion also 
be  accepted,  purely  and  simply  with regard to the danger  of electric)shocks, 
that  working of the shift  should be  completed with an  earthed  phas~ 
4)  Consequently,  three categories of  precautions can  be  derived  from  the  foregoing, 
these precautions providing an  adequate degree of  safety only if they are em-
ployed simultaneously.  No  single one  of. them- used alone  - is sufficient to 
provide full protection for the workmen  against  the danger of electric shocks. 
It must  however  be  emphasised that the urgency  and  value of these 
precautions differ. 
- the prevention of direct  contact  with  a  live phase  by  means  of 
insulation,  by  using barriers or  by  setting the cable at  a  suitable distance is 
one  of the most  important  protective measures to be  taken  in connection with 
electrical networks.  As  soon  as the voltage exceeds  the  limit  of  low-tension 
current,  no  other precautionary  measure  is suitable to protect  the  men.  The 
majority of  accidents caused  by  electric shocks  are  in practice due  to negligent 
handling of  these  protective devices or the failure  of the material  - with.the 
same  results;  this can  be  avoided  only if the workers  are  obliged to refrain 
from  touching the parts of  the  installation until they  have  checked  by  direct 
inspection that  they  are  not  live. 
- after this,  equipotential connection between  the conductive parts 
of  the installation is the  most  important  measure;  if this connection is suitably 
ensured  and continually maintained,  the risk is exceedingly slight of  an electric 
shock caused  by  a  fault  between  the  phase  and  the conductive  components  of  the 
installation resulting from  contact  with such  a  part  of  the installation,  at  the 
normal  voltages  and with the  normal  extent  of underground distribution networks. 
At  all events this connection of the conductive parts of the installation offers 
to those  members  of  the working  team who  do  not  have to maintain the  installations, 
but  only to use  them,  what  is virtually  an  absolute protection  (at  least  with 
networks  with  an  insulated star point,  as  long  as there is only  a  single fault). 
This  makes  the establishment  and  maintenance  of  this connection so much  the 
more  important. 
-rf  As  against  this,  with high-tension networks  it might  be  necessary  if the capacity 
currents reach too high  a  value. 
2)  In the sense defined earlier. in this recommendation. 
3 )  It goes without  saying that special precautions must  be  taken  in gassy  mines. 22 
A desirable precaution finally is to cut  off the  damaged  parts of  the 
network  from  the voltage source;  this is absolutely essential as  soon as the con-
ductance of  the fault  current  reaches  an  excessive value.  The  safety of the workers 
must  nevertheless not  depend  solely and exclusively  on  precautions of this kind, 
in which  one  is obliged to use  complicated technical devices which  often are not 
properly selected,  are incorrectly adjusted or are not  kept  in a  satisfactory 
condition and  which  cannot  function sufficiently rapidly.  It is therefore neces-
sary to be sure  in the first  place that  the first  and  second order precautions 
have  been actually taken  and  are fully effective at  any  time. 
5)  Some  of the third order protective devices already  on  the market  are of  new  design; 
their distribution in use  isuneven~  and  the tests carried out with  them were  not 
run  for  the  same  period of  time.  There is therefore no  question of prescribing 
their use  indiscriminately. 
Moreover,  in the present state of  technology it would  not  be  advisable 
to bring them  into service too quickly,  since the simple fact  of simultaneously 
applying protective devices does  certainly not  contribute to raising safety,  but 
may  on occasion rather reduce it. The  technological  imperfections of  t~e apparatus 
put  into service,  on  the one  hand,  together,  on  the other hand,  with their res-
ponse  time  (which  is frequently  considered  inadequate)  may  under certain circums-
tances oblige the user to circumvent  them,  a  procedure which brings far greater 
risks in its train than if the devices were  not  installed at all.  Every  adminis-
trative regulation must  take  account  of this danger  and  must  limit itself to 
codifying what  is possible in practical operations,  without  occasioning mistakes 
which might  have  regrettable consequences. 
6)  Finally,  there is one  thing which  must  not  be  forgotten  :the criterion of  the 
value of the best  installation is the  weakest  point  of  the installation and  the 
reliability of  the men  who  use  and maintain the  equipment. 
In other words,  the safety  of  the workers  depends  not  only  on  the safety 
precautions outlined above,  but  also to a  great  extent  on  the technical quality 
of the equipment  used  and  the care with which this equipment  is installed,  main-
tained and  employed.  It goes without  saying that  a  prerequisite is to give appro-
priate training to  a  sufficient number  of  electro-technical  staff,  altough this 
does  not  dispense with  the  need  for  expert  instruct~on ot  the operating personnel. 
X 
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D - Protection of  underground distribution networks  against  dangers arising from fire 
or firedamp 
When  the Commission  prepared the recommendations  on  the protection of under-
ground distribution networks  against  electric shocks,  it was  pointed out  that these 
networks  also require protection against  the risk of fire and  the danger of fire-
damp  explosions. 
The  occurrence of  a  serious accident  in Britain - due  to short-circuit which 
occurred at  the  damaged  part  of  a  cable - in which  a  firedamp explosion occurred 
despite the devices  installed to protect  the network against electric shocks, 
seemed  to emphasize this need. It was  therefore considered necessary to extend this investigation beyond 
undergroud medium-tension  networks,  which  were studied in connection with the 
risk of electric shocks,  so as to cover in particular networks with voltages 
above  1,100 V. 
On  the basis of  investigations into protective measures  against  firedamp 
explosions  as applied in various countries,  and  on the basis of  progress made 
in recent  years  in this field,  the Commission  is in  co~rse of  preparing recom-
mendations  on  the protection of  underground distribution networks  against 
- the danger of fire, 
- the danger of  firedamp  explosions,  and 
- the danger of explosions accompanying outbursts of  gas 
This  work  is nearing its· conclusion. 
E.  - Removal  of oil from electrical apparatus underground;  flameproof  electrical 
devices  for  nominal  voltages of  more  than  1,100 Volts 
Having  accepted  a  recommendation with regard to switches  and  protective 
relays for  underground use with  a  voltage of  less than  1,100 Volts,  the Commis-
sion stated in its first  report  (page  7)  that  "in the present  situation the use 
of  flameproof  oil switches and oil insulation at  places subject  to firedamp 
risk cannot  be  dispensed with when  working at  voltages  above  1,100 Volts,  by 
reason  of the advantages  of these devices with regard to safety in gassy con-
ditions." 
The  Commission  has  therefore come  to the conclusion that,  to do  away  with 
the risk of fire which  is occasioned  by  the presence of oil,  research into the 
manufacture of high-tension switches and high-tension relays,  etc.,  requiring 
little or no oil should be  continued,  such devices to have the required pro-
perties for  completely safe use in gassy  mines;  it further  recommends  in con-
nection with this a  detailed investigation into the  increasing of safety which 
can be  gained  by  using an  explosionproof housing  for  components  which  normally 
emit  sparks,  or  by  designs of  the "increased safety"  type for the remainder of 
the equipment. 
The Commission has  in the meantime  gone  into this question in detail,  on 
the basis of  data provided  by  all the countries of the Community  and  by  the 
United  Kingdom.  It is at  present  in course of  preparing the tabulation which 
takes into account  the present state of  development  and  research in the field 
of  flameproof  equipment  for  nominal  voltages above  1,100 Volts. 
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II 
WORKING  PARTIES  ON  FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION 
and 
CO-ORDINATION  OF  MINE  RESCUE  ORGANIZATIONS 
(Conunon  Working  Programme) 
A.- Fighting fires  in shafts by  bringing in water 
In  the  first  report  of its activities  (pages  11-13)  the  Commission  reported 
on  the tirst res-lts obtained  from  its investigations based  on  the  following  recom-
.nenda  t iou of  t :1e  Conference; 
"In all shafts,  and particularly in downcast  shafts,  it is necessary  to 
provide equipment  either for 
- permanent  spraying of  inflammable  sections,  or 
- for  instantaneous sprinkling operated  from  the  surface and  landings''. 
(Recommandation 2-b,  Page  54  of  the Conference Report). 
The  above-named  Working Parties are continuing their investigations into 
this question  - and  in particular with  regard  to the effect of  spraying in a  shaft 
on  the ventilation air - drawing  upon  the knowledge  of ventilation experts,  and  have 
also carried out  a  series of practical tests. 
On  the basis of  the test results,  the  Commission  came  to the conclusion 
that  a  continuous wetting of  the  combustible elements which  would  be  adequate to 
prevent  fires in shafts is difficult  to achieve  in practice and  is not  to be  gene-
rally  recommended,  in certain circumstances,  for  reasons  concerning  the mine  climate 
and  because of  its bad effect  on  the ventilation. 
It was  however  pointed out  that this constant wetting can  be  achieved  in 
shafts which  are  not  normally  moist,  without  continuous spraying equipment  having 
to be  installed. 
With  regard to the  spraying  down  of water  to fight  shaft fires,  the  Commis-
sion has  accepted  a  series of guiding principles  (which  are reproduced  in detail 
below)  as  a  supplement  to the  recommendation of  the Conference which  is under  review. 
In  these guiding principles no  attempt  is made  to deal  with  the basic 
question as  to whether  spraying is to be  used  in  a  shaft or  not  as  a  means  of fight-
ing a  fire. 
The  problem of  those shafts in which  the risk of  fire may  be  judged to be 
slight was  dealt with in particular.  This particularly refers to wet  shafts,  or to 
dry  shafts which  are  lined with  fireproof material. It was  pointed out  that  one could not  eliminate the  ~ossibility that  even 
in such shafts combustible or  ignitable  material might  be  present,even if this might 
happen  only  during  transport  in the shaft 1  and  that as  a  consequence it was  also 
impossible  to exclude  from  the very  beginning that 1  in certain  circumstances~  one 
might  be  obliged to resort  to spraying as  a  means  of  fighting fires  in  such shafts. 
Since the effect of  spraying on  the ventilation brings certain dangers  in 
its train,  it was  also emphasised that  in the event  of  a  linlited fire 1  one  must 
choose  the  lesser danger. 
In  the  light of  these considerations it was  agreed to include the remarks 
made  in the  introduction to the text of  the guiding principles1  these  remarks  making 
it clear that  the guiding  principle~ are  to be  observed only if the  necessity of 
spraying  from  an  installation erected at  the  surface was  not  expressly  excluded  by 
the-fire-fighting plans. 
These  guiding principles for  the  fighting of  fires  in shafts  by  sending 
down  water  represent  basic rules for  the serious emergency  of fires in downcast  and 
upcast  shafts.  The  principles contain descriptions of  the devices  to be provided. 
They  are explained  by  means  of  a  commentary  and  cite practical  examples  of  the deter-
mination  by  calculation of  the effect  of  falling water  on  the ventilation. 
It was  also pointed out  that  the first precautionary  measure  to avoid  the 
occurrence of  shafts fires is to remove  all ignitable or combustible materials  from 
the shafts.  It was  considered advisable that  in the  introduction to the guiding 
principles1  reference  should  be  made  to the text of  the  recommendation  agreed  in this 
connection  by  the  Conference,  as well  as to the explanations already  added  by  the 
Commission. 
It was  also  found  necessary  to state clearly that  the  term  ''leader of  the 
rescue operation" used  in the  Recommendation was  not  intended to be  taken to refer 
to any  particular person.  Not  only  could the designation of  leader of  the  rescue 
operation  be  defined differently in different  Member  Countries,  but  even  during  the 
course of  rescue operations an  entirely different  person might  be  involved.  The  in-
tention  in referring to this in the text of  the guiding principles was  simply  to  lay 
down  the possibility that spraying  with  a  large quantity of water  should be  an 
operation which  could only  be  set  in train  by one  person1  who  is capable of asses-
sing  the effect  of  such quantities of water  on  the ventilation;  this is the  reason 
for  providing that  the  amount  of water  released by  damming  device  should be restrict-
ed until the  leader of  the rescue operations has  been able,  with  full  knowledge  of 
all the  facts,  to decide  on  the  spot  whether  a  larger quantity  of water  should be 
released for  spraying. 
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The  proposal  of the Conference  recommended providing the possibility that 
the  spraying installation erected at the surface should be  capable of being control-
led  from  the pit bottoms  and also from  the surface.  The  guiding principles approved 
by  the Coautission  have  not  taken up  this proposal  again,  as far as the possibility 
of control  from  the pit bottoms is concerned.  This obviously  does  not  exclude the 
possibility of providing control  from  the pit  bottoms in a  given country,  as  long as 
this was  included  from  the beginning as  a  provision in addition to control  from  the 
surface. 
In addition these guiding principles are not  concerned with the spraying 
devices fitted in the pit bottoms;  they  refer to fire-fighting in shafts.  Normally 
this spraying is carried out  by  an  installation which  is erected at  the surface,  any 
spraying equipment  being installed in the draft itself.  The  recommendation  obviously 
does  not  exclude  the possibility that  - independently of this installation erected at 
the surface - other devices  may  be  provided and  installed in the pit  bottom.  Neither 
does it exclude the possibility that,  in certain circumstances,  the  equipment  install-
ed  on  a  lower  horizon in the  shaft should  be  brought  in service to fight  a  mine  fire 
which  has  broken out  in the  lowest  level  of the shaft but  has  not  spread to the whole 
shaft. 
The  recommendations  approved  by  the  Commission  on April 8,  1960,  had  the  following 
form  of words: 
G U  I  D  I  N G  P  R  I  N C  I  P  L  E  S 
FOR  FIGHTING  MINE  FIRES  BY  SENDING  DOWN  WATER 
Important  Preliminary  Remarks 
1)  These principles are to be  observed only  in cases  in which 
the spraying down  of water  from  a  surface installation has 
been  included  in the fire-fighting plans. 
2)  It was  pointed out with  the very  greatest  emphasis  that  the 
sending  down  of  a  large quantity of water  may  have  the most 
serious consequences  because of  the very  strong propulsion 
effect of  falling water. 
INSTALLATIONS  ------
1)  At  the  top of every shaft reaching to  the surface there must  be  a  device  wich  can 
send  down  at least 50 litres of water per minute  and per  square metre of shaft 
cross-section. 
2)  This  device  must  be  installed in  such  a  way  that  the  supply  of water  can at  no  time 
be  seriously affected  by  drawing-off  or  flowing-away  of water at other points. 
3)  The  water pipes and  the spray jets must  be  set  in such  a  way  that  they areprotect-
. ed  from  frost •. 
4)  The  danuuing  device(s)  must  be  set outside the shaft-top building in such  a  way 
that  they  can  be operated at any  time.  They  must  be  marked  by  means  of  an  instruc-
tion plate. A.  Immediate  meas~res 
BASIC  RULES  FOR  EMERGENCY 
I 
Fires in Downcast  Shafts  ------------------------
Independently  of  the regulations and  guiding rules which obtain in the 
Community  countries with respect  to fire-fighting,  it is essential to indicate at 
the earliest possible moment  in the fire-fighting plan laid down  for  each pit in 
respect of mine  fires the maximum  amount  of water which  can  be  sent  down  each of 
the downcast  shafts,  without  creating additional  dangers  for  the workers  by  its 
effects on  the ventilation. 
The  damming  device which  can be operated at this stage must  not  release 
more  than  this prescribed quantity of water. 
Until  the  leader of the rescue operations has  issued his instructions and 
as !ong as there has  been  no  reversal of ventilation,  water  may  be  sent down  by 
opening the  damming  device prescribed for this purpose. 
B.  Measures  to be  taken  on  the  instructions of the  leader of rescue operations 
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The  leader of  the  resc~e operations  must  therefore decide  - taking  into 
account all the circumstances - either to send down  an  increased quantity of water  -
or he  must  give orders that reversal of  the ventilation be  brought  about  or en-
couraged. 
To  facilitate the reversal of  the ventilation in the burning downcast  shaft, 
water can be  sent  down  the upcast  shaft,  once this has  been  open~d and the main 
fan  stopped. 
If reversal of the ventilation has already occurred - either as a  result 
of the upward  current produced  by  the heat  of  the fire or deliberately - downcast 
shafts should  be  treated as  though  they were  upcast  shafts. 
II 
!!~!~-!~-~~~!!!_~~~!!~-
In upcast  shafts water may  sent  down  only  on  the  instructions of  the  leader 
of  the  rescue operation. 
As  long as there are still any  workers in the pit,  only  so much  water  may 
be  sent  down  as will  allow  the  fumes  of  the fire to continue to be extracted whilst 
the water  is falling. 
X 
X  X 
C 0  M M E N T  A R Y 
1. -Pits,  Point  1  :  Quantity of water 
Detailed  experiments carried out at  the Tremonia  experimental pit in 
Germany,  have  shown  that  the discharge of  a  quantity of water of  50 litres 
per minute per square metre of shaft cross-section is sufficient to extinguish 
a  fire.  This conclusion is also confirmed  by  Russian technical  literature. 
The  experiments carried out  at  the  "Arenberg-Fortsetzung" pit on October  301 
1959,  gave  a  convincing picture of  the effect of  sending  down  a  quantity of 
water of this order of magnitude. 28 
2.  - Pits,  Point  4  :Damming  devices 
If  two  damming  devices are needed  on  the basis of  the directives contained 
in the  immediate  meas~res,  the  instruction. plates must  give clear indication as 
to which  damming  device  is to be  used  immediately  and which  to be  used only  on 
the instructions of  the  leader of  rescue  operations. 
3.  - Immediate  measures 
When  a  fire  has  broken  out  in a  downcast  shaft,  fumes  penetrate into the 
pit to  a  continuously-increasing extent with  the  fresh air drawn  in,  until the 
fire has spread so far that  the  thermal lift it produces causes reversal of  the 
ventilation or until reversal of the ventilation is produced  by  suitable 
measures. 
In  view  of  the continuously-increasing danger  to the men  underground  up  to 
this point  in time,  it is absolutely essential to counter this danger  by  the 
earliest possible action. 
It goes without  saying that these  "immediate  measures" are only provisional 
and  that  further  steps can  be  ordered only  by  the  leader of the rescue operation. 
Since the  leader of  the rescue operations is the only  man  who  can order the 
reversal of ventilation,  a  dangerous  spread of  the fire can  be  prevented by  the 
sending-down of water until  he  arrives. 
If there are several  downcast  shafts,  there is however  the possibility that 
the  sending-down of  an excessive quantity  of water  in a  downcast  shaft which  is 
on  fire will  allow  fumes  to penetrate into ventilation districts which  do  not  in 
the  normal  course of events receive fresh air  from  this downcast  shaft;  in the 
worst  conditions,  there may  even occur  a  reversal  of  ventilation in the other 
downcast  shafts. 
For  such cases the directives provide that  for  each  downcast  shaft  that 
quantity of water must  be calculated in advance  which  is the  maximum  quantity 
which  can  be  sent  down  without  causing additional  danger  to the  men  underground. 
As  the  following  remarks  show,  the quantity of water  for  each shaft  can  be 
calculated with  the aid of  the  nomogram  (see figure  1),  i.e.  the  quantit~)of 
water which  can  be  used without  a  deleterious effect  on  the ventilation. 
This  figure  indicates a  coefficient which  make  it possible to establish the 
characteristic curves of  the  impulsion  on  the ventilation air caused  by  a  given 
quantity of water  in a  given  shaft  (internal cross-section and  depth). 
To  calculate the  maximum  permissible quantity of water it is now  necessary 
to  have  only  those measurements which  are  normally  used  for  a  ventilation net-
work calculation.  These  are: 
- the ventilation-air resistance of  the mine  working, 
- the characteristic curve of  the  fan  and  (if required) 
·- the magnitude of  the "natural  impulsion". 
x)  The£ie  matheutatically-determined values were  checked  by  measurements  in  downcast 
shaft  A of  the  Arenberg-Fortsetzung pit  on  October 30,  1959.  The  result of this 
checking operation have  been  included  in the  nomogram  and  confinn - to  a  degree 
which  is sufficient  for practical purposes  - the  figures  given  in the range  of 
existing ventilation-air velocities and  quantities of  added water. The  calculations to be  perfonned are te  same  as  those which would  be  needed 
if an  additional  fan  were set  in the  ventilation network,  instead of the falling 
water;  they  are  thus  of  the  type  familiar  to every ventilation specialist. 
The  use  of  the  nomogram  and  the calculation of  the effect of  the falling 
water  on  ventilation networks  is explained in  the  Appendix  by  means  of  examples. 
Figure  2  reproduces  a  part  of  Figure  1  - namely  the pressure produced  in 
downcast  shat'ts  by  falling water,  per  lOO.m  of fall,  with ventilation-air velo-
cities of  up  to  12  metres/second. 
Figure  3  plots the pressure produced  by  falling water  in  a  downcast  shaft 
5.8  m.  in diameter  and  730  m.  deep;  Figure  3  is derived directly  from  Figure 2, 
in  the  following  manner:  the ordinate scale of Figure  2  is multiplied  by 
730  Ill 
100  111 
•  7.3 because  of  the  change  from  100m  of  fall;  the  abscissa of 
Figure  2  is multiplied by  the  internal shaft cross-section  F  • =  7r 4 
5
• 
82 
=26. 4m2 
60  s 
and  by  the  factor  min  - because  of  the  change  from  air velocity expressed in 
metres/second  to air quantity expressed  in cubic metres/minute. 
X 
X  X 
N  0  T  E 
It goes without  saying that  these directives refer only  to fires in the 
shaft itself,  and  cannot  without  modification  be  applied if the  fire has al-
ready  spread into the pit bottom. 
X 
X  X 
E  X A M P  L  E  S 
~-!_-~alculati_ng the effect of  falling water  on  the ventilation 
Fit-{ure  4  is a  schematic  diagram  of  a  pit with  one  downcast  and  one  upcast 
shaft.  This  example  was  chosen  because  the effect of water  on  the ventilation 
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in  a  pit  of this layout  is particularly easy  to explain.  The  pit  shown  in Figure  4 
has  a  downcast  shaft  5.8  m.  in diameter  and  730  m.  deep.  These  arc  the  same 
values which  were  used  for  Figure 3.  The  air resistance of  the mine  is taken as 
R  = 16.1  mWb  (0.0161  kg  x  s2jm8)  corresponding to an  equivalent orifice of  the 
mine  of  A  =  3  m2. 
The  characteristic curve representing this resistance is plotted  in Figure 5, 
as  is also the characteristic curve of  the  fan  which  produces  the  movement  of 
ventilation air in  the pit  drawn  in Figure 4.  Without  the addition of water  the 
nonnal  duty of  the  fan,  and  consequently  the  total water  quantity as well  as the 
total pressure gradient  of  the pit  (as  drawn  in  Figure  5)  lie at  the point  of 
intersection of  the  fan  characteristic with  the mine characteristic.  The  total 
water quantity is 8350 cu.m./min with  an  underpressurc of 312  kg/sq.m. 
If water is sent  down  the  downcast  shaft of  the pit to which  Figures  4  and  5 
refer,  the pressure produced  by  the falling water  is added  to the pressure pro-
duced  by  the  fan.  Figure  6  shows  the  cumulative characteristics of  the  fan  pres-
sure  (taken  from  Figure  5)  and  the pressure produced  by  the falling water  (taken 
from  Figure 3)  for  water  quantities of  10,  30 and  50  litres/min.m2.  The  total air 
quantities and  the total underpressure arc again  found  from  the point of 30 
intersection of  these cumulative characteristic curves with the characteristic curve 
of resistance of  the mine  (Figure 6).  The  total quantity of water  rises  from 
8350 cu.metres/min 
to 8450 cu.m./min.  with water sent  down  at  the rate of  10 litres/min/sq.m. 
to 8600 cu.m./min.  with water sent  down  at  the rate of  30 litres/min/sq.m. 
to 8800 cu.m./min.  with water sent  down  at  the rate of  50 litres/min/sq.m. 
Second  example 
For  the  second  example,  a  ventilation network  was  selected which  approximates 
to the actual  layout  of  a  coal  mine  (Figure 7).  This ventilation network  is assumed 
to have  two  downcast  shafts,  again of  5.8  m.  diameter  and  730  m.  depth  (shafts 2  and 
3)  and  two  upcast  shafts  (shafts  1  and 4). 
The  fan  mounted  on  shaft  1  is  as~umed to have  the  same  characteristic curve as 
that  shown  in Figure  5  for  the first  example.  Shaft  4  is assumed  to have  a  radial  fan 
which  produces  a  constant  pressure of  230 kg/sq.m.  The  ventilation-air resistance of 
the  individual  airways  is plotted in Figure  7  in Milliweisbachs or  Murgues 
(  1  •  kg  •  s2). 
1.000  -w-
The  calculations required for  working  out  this example  were carried out  by  us 
with  the aid of  an  analogue  computer.  In  making  ventilation network calculations,  the 
ventilation specialists tend to prefer different methods. 
Figure  8  shows  what  quantities of air the  fans  must  pass  through  the pit without 
the addition of water.  The  mass  unit  used in Figure 8  and  in the subsequent  illustra-
tions to express the quantities of air plotted is cubic metre/minute. 
Figure  9  shows  how  the quantities  become  distributed when  water  is sent  down 
downcast  shaft  3  to fight  a  fire at  the rate of  50  litres/min/sq.m.- this is the 
minimum  discharge  rate of  German  shaft-fire-fighting equipment.  The  quantity of down-
cast  air in shaft  3  rises from  5600 to 6610 cu.m./min.,  while the quantity  in shaft  2 
falls from  6160 to 5650 cu.m./min. 
It must  be  noted that the  fumes  occurring  in the event  of  a  fire  in downcast 
shaft  3  (Figure 9)  become  mixed with all the intake air in the mine  and  therefore 
penetrate to every district, whether  fire-fighting water  is sent  down  shaft  3  or  not, 
and  independently of  the quantity of water used. 
Figure  10 shows  the distribution of quantities in the case of  a  fire in downcast 
shaft  2  with water sent  down  at  a  rate of  50 litres/min/sq.m.  for  fire-fighting.  This 
quantity of water  produces reversal of the direction of ventilation in the  roadway 
connecting the  downcast  shaft.  Without  the addition of water,  a  quantity of  465 
cu.m./min.  is drawn  from  shaft  3  to shaft 2,  and  with  a  fire in shaft  2  only  the dis-
trict ventilated via shaft  2  becomes  filled with  fumes,  the district ventilated by 
shaft  3  remaining unaffected.  As  against  this,  sending  down  water at  the rate of 
50  litres/min/sq.m.  causes 390 cu.m.  per minute  of  fumes  to move  from  shaft  2  to 
shaft 3,  and  the~e fumes  become  mixed with  the  intake air coming  down  the  latter shaft 
shafts.  As  a  consequence  the  fumes  penetrate into all the working-points  in the pit. 
In order to avoid this,  care must  be  takenthatthereis no  reversal of  ventilation 
in the  roadway  connecting shaft  2  to shaft  3.  If  a  small  quantity  of air of  100 
cu.m./min.  is maintained  in the original direction of ventilation,  the ventilation-
network calculation shows  that  the pressure produced  by  the fire-fighting water  in 
shaft  2  may  be  allowed  to reach  23  kg/sq.m.  Figure  3  indicates that  this corresponds 
to a  quantity of water  of  25  litres/min./sq.m.  The  distribution of ventilation air 
when  this quantity of water is sent  down  is plotted in  Figure  11. Only  those districts which  are ventilated in the  normal  way  via shaft  2  are 
penetrated by  fumes 1  and  the quantity of fire-fighting water causes  no  further  spread 
of  the  fumes,  if it is limited to 25  litres/min/sq.m. 
In  the ventilation-network calculations carried out  here,  a  change  in the under-
pressure caused  by  the upward  impulsion  due  to the hot  fumes  from  the fire has  not 
been  allowed  for,  since it was  intended to discuss only measures  for  fighting fires 
in their initial stages.  Since the upward  impulsion of  the  fumes  counteracts the 
pressure produced  by  the falling water  in the case of  fires  in  downcast  shafts,  the 
calculation will  give 1  according to the extent  of  the fire 1  too  low  a  figure  for  the 
maximum  permissible quantity  of  fire-fighting watpr if this upward  impulsion is 
ignored;  in this way,  there is an  additional margin  of  safety against  obtaining 
excessively  high  figures  for  the quantity  of fire-fighting water. 
I  f  t  h  e  q  u  a  n  t  i  t  y  o  f  w  a  t  e  r  c  a  1  c  u  1  a  t  e  d  a  p  p  e  a  r  s 
t  o  o  1  o  w  f  o  r  i  m m e  d  i  a  t  e  e  x  t  i  n  c  t  i  o  n  o  f  t  h  e  f  i  r  e 
o  r  f  o  r  p  r  e  v  e  n  t  i  n  g  i  t  s  p  r  e  a  d  i  n  g  a  n  y  f  u  r  t  h  e  r, 
additional precautionary measures  must  be  included in the fire-fighting plans,  e.g.: 
- simultaneous  sending-down of water  in all downcast  shafts, 
- partial closing of  the  burning shaft at  the surface, 
- closing of fire-doors underground1  etc. 
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PRESSURE  PRODUCED  IN  DOWNCAST  SHAFTS  BY  WATER  FALLING  THROUGH  100  M. 
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Fig. 4 
DIAGRAM  OF  A  MINE  COMPRISING  A DOWNCAST  AND  AN  UPCAST  SHAFT 
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DETERMINATION,  BY  MEANS  OF  THE  CHARACTERISTIC  CURVES  OF  THE  FAN  AND 
OF  THE  RESISTANCE  OF  THE  MINE,  OF  THE  UNDER-PRESSURE  AND  OVERALL 
VOLUME  OF  AIR  IN  A  MINE  OF  THE  TYPE  SHOWN  IN  FIG.4. 4SO 
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DETERMINATION  OF  THE  OVERALL  UNDER  PRESSURE  AND 
OVERALL  VOLUME  OF  AIR  IN  MINE  OF  THE  TYPE  SHOWN 
IN  FIGS.  4  AND  5 
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B.- Sealing-off of  mine  fires  and  underground  combustion  by  dams 
Prompted  by  the occurrence of  a  group accident  in.the Sainte-Fontaine 
pit in the Houilleres du  Bassin de  Lorraine1  the  Commission  instructed the Working 
Parties to investigate the problem of  the erection of  dams  as  a  means  of  fighting 
mine  fires. 
The  experts considered that sealing-6ff of  mine  fires  by  means  of  dams 
involved certain risks for  the men  responsible  for  building the  dams.  They  there-
fore  came  to the view  that it was  advisable to prepare recommendations  regarding 
the erection of  dams  for  fire-fighting purposes. 
The  detailed investigations of this problem were  supplemented  by  prac-
tical explosion tests carried out  in the Tremonia  experimental gallery.  The  Work-
ing Parties prepared the  recommendations  which  are set  out  below  and  accompanied 
by  a  commentary;  their view was  that  the  assessment  of  the  problem of rescuing 
the men  and  the  question of whether  a  fire should  be  fought  directly or  by  means 
of  dams  should  be  left open 1  since the responsibility of  these  ques~ions should 
in detail  be  reserved  for  the  leaders of  rescue operations.  In addition  the quest-
ion of evaluating the  analyses of  the mine-air  samples  in the event  of  a  fire 1  and 
the measures  to be  taken after opening  a  fire  dam1  should  be  subject of  a  special 
examination. 
The  experts'  first  concern was  to give to those persons charged with 
fighting  a  fire  a  series of  indications - in the  form  of guiding principles -
to be  borne  in mind  in an  emergency.  They  should  be  put  into practice only  when 
direct  fighting of  the fire  by  means  of water1  sand1  fire extinguishers1  etc. 1 
had  been  found to be useless 1  and  no  other possibilities of  fighting the fire are 
left. 
The  experts were quite clear that  these recommendations  should  not  be 
made  binding1  by  reason of  the variety and  many-sidedness of  the  factors  involved 
in a  mine  fire  and  the  importance  to  be  given to peculiar characteristics in each 
case in the  individual pits. 
This raised the  problem as to whether  the  note  that  "the  following  re-
commendations  are not  to be  considered as  binding"  might  not  lead to certain dif-
ficulties  in interpreting the  recommendation  in the event  of  an  emergency.  This 
was  particularly true in respect  of  the application of  the proposal  (para.  Al. 
General  Considerations)  that  "when  a  mine  fire has  broken out it is indispensable 
to  take  the  necessary  preparatory steps  for  any  later sealing-off by  dams  which 
may  be  necessary while  the direct  fire-fighting  operations are still going  on~'. 52 
The  objection was  raised that  the proposal  quoted could  not  be  applied in 
all mine  fires,  especially not  in cases of  fires which  were  of  a  nature  such  that 
experience  taught  that  they  had  hitherto been  amenable  to successful  treatment  by 
direct  methods. 
On  the  basis of  the  discussions which  took place around this question,  the 
Commission  reached the conclusion that,  to clarify the question of  the application 
of  this recommendation,  it should clearly state its own  position,  namely  that  these 
recommendations  were  not  put  forward  with  the  intention of  providing the Mines  In-
spectorates with  a  "ready-made"  regulation.  On  the contrary,  the responsible  In-
spectorates must  themselves  decide  how  they  should bring these  recommandations into 
application  by  means  of  Regulations,  Circulars or Official  Instructions.  The  persons 
responsible  for  fire-fighting operations will,  as  a  result,  have  to apply  guiding 
principles or regulations which their Mines  Inspectorate would  have  issued in an 
appropriate  form  on  the basis of  the  recommendations  "in full  knowledge  of  the  fac-
tors affecting  a  mine  fire and  the peculiar characteristics in particular pits.'' 
The  Commission  approved  the  recommendations set out  below,  together with 
a  commentary,  in its plenary  session of  December  20,  1960. 
RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  THE  SEALING-OFF  BY  DAMS  OF  MINE  FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND 
COMBUSTION 
These  recommendations refer only  to the actual  fighting of  the fire or  com-
bustion;  they  do  not  refer to the measures  to  be  taken as  a  matter  of priority 
to rescue  men  following  the outbreak. 
A.- GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
1.- When  a  mine  fire has  broken  out  or underground  combustion  developed it is 
indispensable to take the  necessary preparatory steps for  any  later sealing-
off  by  dams  which  may  be  necessary while  the direct  fire-fighting operations 
are still going on. 
II.  - a) 
In  the event  of  sealing-off  by  dam  becoming  necessary,  as  a  general rule 
the first  stoppings  to be  erected must  be  advance  dams,  so as to allow  the 
main  dams  to be  built in safety  and without  disturbance. 
These  advance  dams  are  in fact  the real subject  of  the present  recommen-
dations. 
The  type  of  stopping is to be  chosen  according to whether there exists,  in 
the area to be  sealed-off,  a  risk of  an  explosion or  not. 
The  responsibility for  this exceedingly  important  decision depends  on: 
the conditions obtaining  in  the affected pit  (gas  emission,  type  of 
coal etc.)  and 
the results of  the  analyses of  the  samples of  fire  fumes,  which  mustbe 
taken continuously,  starting at  a  moment  before  the beginning of  the 
fire-fighting operations. 
b)  It is emphasized that  the erection of stoppings can,  in certain circum-
stances,  cause disturbances in the ventilation.  In the case of fierce 
fires,  there may  even  be  a  reversal of ventilation. B.- STRUCTURE  AND  ERECTION  OF  THE  ADVANCE  DAMS 
I.-.The important  thing is to make  the  advance  dams  themselves  as  impermeable 
as possible and  to create the closest possible seal  between  the  dam  and  the 
surrounding walls.  There  is nothing against shutting off first of all the 
intake air,  in which  the work  of erecting the  stopping can  be  perfo~med more 
easily. 
II.- If there is a  risk of  explosion,  the  important  tasks are, 
a)  to be at all times  in possession of the most  precise  information possible 
regarding the degree of explosion  ris~ in the fire zone,  to ensure  the 
safety of  the teams working  on erecting the stopping;  this may  make  it 
necessary to provide  the men  with fire-proof clothing; 
b)  to ensure that  the  advance  dams  are not  only  as  impermeable  as possible, 
but  also strong enough  to resist an  explosion; 
c)  to ensure that  for  the entire period during which  the stopping is being 
erected,  there is sufficient ventilation of the fire zone  to counter as 
far  as absolutely possible the formation  of  an  explosive gas mixture. 
This can  be  done  by  leaving sufficient openings  in the  dams; 
d)  to ensure that all suitable measures are taken to reduce  as far  as pos-
sible the effects of any  explosion which  may  occur; 
e)  to ensure that,  if at all possible,the dams  on  the  intake  and return sides 
are finally sealed simultaneously.  Since the erection of  the dams  on  the 
return side is generally more  difficult  and  time-consuming,  work  must  be 
done  on  them at the latest simultaneously with  the erection of  the  dams 
on  the  intake side. 
When  the  dams  are finally sealed,  only  a  small  group of workers  and 
officials should be  allowed to remain  in the vicinity of the  dam  - only 
those whose  presence is essential for  the work.  As  soon  as  the  dams  have 
been  sealed,  the  danger  area must  be  completely evacuated. 
C.- FINAL  DAMS 
The  final  dams  must  be  durable built of brick or concrete under  the pro-
tection offered by  the advance  dams. 
X 
X  X 
COMMENTARY 
On  A.  General  Considerations 
1.- The  sealing-off operation is intended to extinguish the  fire  by  sealing-off the 
fire centre as tightly as possible. 
A sufficient degree of  impermeability can  be  achieved only if 
- the  surrounding  rock  itself is firm  and  durable;  fissured  rock  must  be  care-
fully  sealed  (wet  or dry), 
- the  dams  must  be  erected with  a  good  tight connection to the rock,  which 
must  be  trimmed if necessary  beforehand. 
The  operation of  sealing-off will,  in certain circumstances,  involve 
abandoning  a  fairly  large area.  Consequently,  the decision to proceed with 
sealing-off should  be  taken only when  no  other possibility exists,  i.e.  when 
all directs methods  of fire-fighting have  failed. 
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The  erection of  a  satisfactory stopping is a  long and difficult taskj  it is 
therefore advisable to reduce  the  number  of these  dams  to a  minimum,  to erect 
them at easily-accessible points and to begin the preparatory work  immediately, 
Advance  da111s  should 
- stop,  as far  as possible and  rapidly,  the  ingress of air into the fire zone 
or 
- where  there is a  risk of explosion,  protect  the  teams  working  on  the erection 
of the main  stoppings against  the dangers of  any  explosion which  might  occur, 
11.-a) When  a  mine  fire or underground  combustion is detected,  immediate measures  must 
be  taken to institute a  watch  on  the fire  by  means  of analysis of  the gases in 
the ventilation air,  in order to 
-1)  watch  the progress of  the firej 
-2)  observe whether  there is a  probability that  an  explosion will occur.  In 
assessing this,  it is,  however,  necessary  to take  into account  other factors, 
e.g.  gas emission,  type of coal,  working  method  used etc.j 
-3)  locate the danger  zone,  as well  as those zones which  can  only  be  entered  by 
men  wearing anti-gas respirators  (or,  if appropriate,  filter respirators). 
Consequently,  it is necessary to determine  as precisely as possible  from 
the earliest possible momentj 
1)  at what  points gas  samples  should be  taken.  These points must  themselves  be 
clearly marked,  and  indicated on  a  specially-prepared plan,  using the  same 
letters or other symbols. 
Samples of fire  fumes  may  be  drawn  from  the goaf  or  from  dry  stoppings 
only  by  means  of  tubes or flexible hoses,  which  should  be  let in to such  an 
extent  that  the  samples  are  not  affected  by  the passing current of ventila-
tion airj 
2)  at what  intervals of  time  the  samples of  fire  fumes  are to be  taken at  each 
individual point. 
At  each  base underground  and at the working points threatened  by  noxious 
gases,  the  following  devices  must  be maintained:  at  least  1  carbon-monoxide 
indicator,  1  mine-gas  analysis apparatus,  1  flame  lamp  and,  if required,  1  air-
quantity meter. 
The  flame  lamp  must  not  be  taken  into region of  concentrated fire  fumes. 
Various mine-gas analysis devices are liable to  show  inaccurate readings if 
used  in concentrated fire  fumes. 
11.-b)Reversal of  the ventilation is particularly likely to occur with  descensional 
ventilation.  In addition,  it must  be  borne  in mind  that ventilation reversal 
can also occur if parallel air currents are present. 
On  B.- Construction and  Erection of the  Advance  Dams 
Independently of the  normal  fire-fighting measures,  the  following  precautions 
n1ust  be  taken for  any  sealing-off operation: 
1)  Determination of  the points at which  advance  dams  and  dams  are to be  erected  (Dam 
~!!!!~i:~!!~I--------------------------------------------------------------------
The  proper selection of  the points at which  dams  are to be built is of decisive 
importance  for  the further  development  of  fire-fighting operations.  It calls for 
very careful consideration and  must  therefore be  the subject  of  a  good  deal of 
clear thinking. The  following  data are necessary to enable the cor.rect  choice of  the stopping 
points to be  made: 
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- Complete,  precise and  absolute up-to-date plans of  the workings  proposed or  in 
course  in the  seam where  the fire has  broken out  and  in adjacent  seams.  Thirlings, 
faults,etc.,  through which  there might  be  a  connection  between  the workings  must  c 
be  indicated in these plans. 
Detailed information about  the types of  rock  in the roads  in the vicinity of  the 
access-ways  to the  zone  which  is to be  dammed  off. 
On  the basis of  these plans  and  data,  it is possible to decide  the points  for · 
the  advance  dams  and  for  the  permanent  stoppings. 
In  choosing these  locations,  one  must  be  guided  by  the  following  factors: 
- The  places chosen  for  the advance  dams  must  be  such  that  an  adequate degree  of 
impermeability  can  be attained. 
- The  permanent  stoppings  can  be  made  impermeable  only if they are built in firm 
rock or at points where  careful cementing will ensure that  the possibility of 
satisfactory sealing-off can  be  assured. 
There  should be  as  few  dams  as possible,  so that  the sealing-off of  the fire 
zone  - especially in pits with  a  risk of explosion,  where  the conditions are cor-
respondingly  more  difficult - can  be carried out  as quickly  as possible.  The  ideal 
solution is that only  one  dam  on  the  intake side and  one  on  the return side should 
be  needed. 
It is advisable to provide in the dam-sitting plan  from  the very  beginning 
points for  emergency  or substitute stoppings,  to be  used  in the event  that  the 
sites first  chosen  for  the erection of  dams  are unsuitable either because of  the 
nature of  the  surrounding  rock or because the fire or combustion has  developed  in 
an unforeseen manner. 
It is advisable to check the nature of  the  rock at  these points.  This  step is 
necessary  since the  nature of  the rock  can,  in certain circumstances,  even  bring 
about  fundamental  changes  in the dam-sitting plan. 
Since the  advance  stoppings - especially where  there is a  risk of  danger  - call 
for  large quantities of material,  it is important  to provide  the earliest possible 
inward transport of  everything that is needed. 
Steps  must  be  taken to guarantee  that  dam-building material  is held ready at 
each pit or at  a  central point  situated conveniently  near. 
The  storage points for  dam-building material  must  be  drawn  in or  indicated in 
the fire-fighting plan. 
I.-If no  risk of  explosion is to be  expected  the sealing-off operation can  be res-
i~I~i~a-i~-ifi~-ii1~~i~a-;~~~I~i-i~a-~~~-6e carried out  as  near  as possible to the 
heart  of  the  fire. 
The  advance  stopping can,  e.g.,  consist  of  a  simple  tamped  concrete wall  or  a 
filling of  loose  stone-dust  between  two  board partitions.  Very  good  results have 
also been  obtained with  "fire-stopping cushions"  made  of mineral  wool. 
Although  complete  sealing-off of  the fire zone  can  be  expected only when  the 
permanent  stoppings are  in place,  care must  be  taken to ensure that  the  advance 
dams  are as  impermeable as possible. 56 
In addition at least  one  sampling  pipe  should be  inserted in the  dam.  If in-
rushes of water  can  be  expected in the zone  which is being dammed-off,  a  tube 
fitted with  a  siphon  must  be set in the floor. 
11.-If a  risk of explosion can  be  expected,  the safety of  the dam-building  team re-
quires that  these  stoppings  should  - without  consideration of  any  material  losses 
which  may  occur  - be  further  away  from  the heart of  the  fire than  in the above-
mentioned case. 
a)  Up  to  now  the  aim has  been  to provide strength by  the mass  of  damming  material 
used  - the  minimum  thickness of  the  normal  sandbag stoppings being about  4  m. 
in  a  roadway  with  a  cross-sectional area of  8  sq.m.,  about  5  m.  with  a  cross-
section of  8  to  10  sq.m.  and  a  thickness of  about  6  m.  above  that.  Moreover; 
the stopping must  be  keyed very  firmly  into the  rock. 
(At  the present  time  experiments are being made  at  the Tremonia Experimental 
Gallery,  Dortmund,  to develop  a  stopping which  is at  the  same  time resistant 
to explosions,  and  can  be  erected more  easily and  more  quickly  than the  conven-
tial sandbag  dam.) 
Although  complete  sealing-off of the fire zone  can  be  expected only  when 
the permanent  stoppings are in place,  care must  be  taken  to ensure that  the 
advance  dams  are as  impermeable  as possible.  An  insufficiently  impermeable 
advance  dam  is capable  neither of  extinguishing a  fire by  stopping the penetr-
ation of  oxygen,  nor  of reducing  the risk of explosion. 
Impermeability  is achieved  by: 
1)  removing  the lagging as  far  as possible to provide  a  good  connection be-
tween  the stopping and  the rock; 
2)  emptying  some  of  the sandbags where  these are used to build the stopping, 
to fill up  the interstices between  the  bags  and  to make  it possible to tamp 
the sand tight at  the  roadway  walls  and  above all at  the roof; 
3)  inserting an  injection tube  in  the  stopping,  every  2  m.  round  the circum-
ference,  the far  end of  these  tubes  opening  around  the periphery of  the  dam, 
i.e.  at  the  roadway  walls  and  roof,  and at  a  depth  about  half way  into the 
dam.  These  injection tubes  can  be  used  to inject dust,  slurry or suitable 
sealing material  to ensure  a  tight  and  impermeable  connection with  the rock. 
When  slurry is being  injected,  however,  it is necessary  to make  sure that 
the  inner  face  of the  dam  is not  washed  away. 
b)  The  erection of such stoppings  is inevitably rather  time-consuming  and  explo-
sions during  the erection work  must  be  avoided.  Consequently,  for  the entire 
period of erection,  every care must  be  taken to provide  adequate ventilation 
of  the fire zone  to eliminate as far as is absolutely possible the  formation 
of an explosive mixture of gases.  This objective can  be  attained if one  or  two 
tubes of 0.6 to 0.8  mm.  diameter  are set  in each  dam  (It is recommended  to use 
special  dam  tubes  of at  least  60  em  diameter,  with  a  wall  thickness of  4  mm. 
Such  tubes can  be  negotiated by  men  wearing anti-gas respirators).  At  the worst, 
openings ofequivalent  cross-sectional area can  be  left in the stopping.  The 
first method is to be  reconunended,  since it allows  of  a  more  rapid and  stronger 
sealing-off, 
If it is intended to use  dam  pipes,  it must  be  remembered  during the  inward 
transport of material  that  two  runs  of pipe will  be  needed per  dam. 
In addition at  least  one  sampling pipe should be  inserted in the  dam.  If 
inrushes of water  can  be  expected  in the zone  which  is being  dammed-off,  a 
tube  fitted with  a  siphon must  be set in the floor. 
c)  To  reduce  as far  as possible the effects of  any  explosion which  might  occur 
during  the construction of the  advance  dams,  it is advisable either to erect 
between  the advance  dams  and the fire zone  a  stone-dust barrier carrying 100 kg of stone-dust per sq.m.  of  roadway  cross-section  or to cover the road-
ways  being sealed off very  thickly with  stone-dust. 
Water-trough·  barriers can  also be used,  if of adequate.size,  in place of the 
stone-dust barriers or stone-dusting. 
d)  Once  the  dams  on  the  intake and  return sides have  been finished - with adequate 
ventilation devices-- the openings must  be  closed up. 
Since it is from  this moment  onwards  that  an explosion can  occur very rapidly, 
everything must  be  done  to seal  the advance  dams  on  the  intake and return sides 
rapidly  and  simultaneously. 
A close approach  to simultaneity can be attained by  using watches,or,  even 
better,  by  employing  a  telephone connection. 
It is necessary to ensure that  the plugs closing the  dam  tubes are strong 
enough  to resist  any  explosion. 
No  one  must  enter the vicinity  of the sealed-off zone  for at least 8  hours. 
Only  after this period has elapsed may  the first samples  be  taken,  directly in 
front  of  the  dam  on  the return side,  at  the roof,  and  from  the sampling pipe.  If 
there are several  dams  on  the return side,  such  samples must  be  taken at  each  of 
these  dams. 
The  evacuated zone  can  only  be  entered  by  persons other than those engaged  in 
sampling if there is no  longer  any  risk of explosion in the sealed-off part of 
the district. 
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If it is not  possible to complete  the  dams  simultaneously  for overriding 
reasons  (if the sealing-off work  on  the return side is made  impossible  by  reason 
of  the heat  or if the fire is advancing  in the line of  the return air current,etc.) 
the  dams  on  the  intake side must  be  completed  and sealed-off,  after the  men  on  the 
return side have  been  evacuated. 
If, after the closing of the  dam  on  the  intake side,  t~ conditions on  the re-
turn side have  so far  improved  that  there is no  objection to resuming work  there, 
then the return-side  dam  should  be  finished  and  sealed-off as quickly as possible. 
On  C.- Permanent  Dams 
The  impermeability of  the advance  dams  must  be maintained during  the whole 
period of erection of the  permanent  dams. 
It is advisable to construct  the  dams  in such  a  way  that  they  can  be  sealed-
off  anew  from  time  to time,  experience having  shown  that the impermeability of  a 
dam  can  never  be maintained indefinitely. 
As  was  the case with  the advance  dams,  the  following  devices must  also be 
built into the permanent  dams: 
- sampling pipes,  connected to the  sampling pipes of the advance  dams; 
- if required,  water drainage pipe with siphon seals,  which  are accessible if they 
become  blocked. 
Finally,  it is advisable to build in dam  pipes or explosion-proof  dam  doors, 
to enable men  wearing anti-gas respirators to enter the fire zone without  having 
to break  up  the  dams  to do  so. 
After  the completion  and sealing-off of the permanent  dams,  tests should be 
made  to see whether  the ventilation pressure drop  between  the  individual stop-
pings can  be  reduced  by  suitable measures.  This objective must  not  be attained 
_by  stopping the main ventilator. 
The  stoppings must  be kept  under  continuous observation. 58 
c.- Execution of practical tests regarding the power  of resistance of certain•f  a 
materials.or of  a  given  type of fire stopping  __________________________________  __ 
The  above-listed recommendations  regarding  the  damming  of mine  fires 
have  - as has already  been pointed out  - left several questions open  to exami-
nation.Qne  such question is that  regarding the material to be used and  the de-
signs to be  employed  in erecting fire stoppings. 
The  Commission  has  come  to the  view  that practical conclusions regar-
ding  the resistance of  a  given material or  a  given design of  dam  can  be  drawn 
only after a  series of experimental  explosions. 
It directed the  Working  Parties on  Mine  Fires and  Underground  Combust-
ion  and  on  Co-ordination of  Rescue  Organizations to continue the practical tests 
already  begun~  and  further  suggested that  the High  Authority  should support 
these practical tests financially. 
The  Tremonia  Experimental  Gallery  of the Versuchsgrubenberggesellschaft 
m.b.H.  (Experimental  Gallery  Company)~  Dortmund-Derne~ which  had  already carried 
out on  the first  two  tests,  was  requested  to  draw  up  the necessary experimental 
prograoone  in conjunction with  the  Working Parties. D.- Determination of criteria for  flame-resistant  fluids  used for  power  transmission 
(hydraulic  fluids) 
The  Conference on  Safety  in Mines  emphasised  fhe  ~anger of fire which 
might  result  from  the use of  ignitable lubricants in machines used underground. 
In  the section on  "Research" of its Report  it recommended  that 
"research should be  continued with the object of developing 
fluids to be  used  in place of  inflammable oils for 
mechanical  purposes6  e.g.  in hydraulic equipment,  couplinge, 
decking gear,  props etc." 
(Recommendation  36-M1  page  150 of the Conference Report). 
In its efforts to reduce the danger  caused  by  the use of  combustible 
hydraulic fluids in coal mines,  the  Commission set up  a  Comani ttee6  consisting 
of well-known experts,  including among  others chemists and  doctors,  to study  the 
question of the determination of criteria for  non-flaanmable  fluids  and  for tests 
to apply  to such  fluids.  The  committee of experts presented an  interim report 
in December  1960 on its first discussions and  findings  regarding the criteria 
in respect  of 
- fire-resistance measuring technique 
- mine  safety  and 
- technical characteristics 
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to be  fulfilled by  non-ignitable or  non-flammable  hydraulic  fluids for  use under-
ground  ~~~~-!~~~~-!2 
The  tests referred to in the attached report,  which were  necessary to 
provide  a  basis for  the establishment  of criteria in respect of fire-resistance 
measuring technique1  were  designed to conform with safety requirements in coal 
mines. 
The  following  remarks are intended to serve as an explanation of the 
comments  made  regarding the criteria in respect of fire-resistance measuring 
technique. 
- With  regard to the test in which  dust  was  blown  through  a  flame,  the experts 
consider that  the requirements laid down  in the  information report  should  be 
supplemented by  stating that  the jet should not  in any  case continue  to burn 
once  the  flame  or heat  source  has  been  removed,  and  that as far  as  is possi-
ble the  igniting  flame  should not extend itself into the jet,  while  in  no 
case must  the  flame  in  the jet itself extend as far  as  the protective screen. 
- With  regard to the test intended to determine  the propagation of fire  in a 
mixture of coal  dust  and fluid,  it seemed  to the experts desirable to ensure 
that the  flame  did  not  spread beyond  some  70 rwn. 60 
No  precise test arrangements  have  been laid down  for  the determination of 
criteria affecting health  and  safety in mines.  The  health  and  safety experts took 
the  view  that  the execution of  such  investigations must  be  suited to each fluid 
examined  in turn. 
As  far as technical criteria are  concerned~  twelve different tests were 
necessary to assess the technological suitability of  the fluids.  The  major  part of 
these tests were  taken either from  extsting standards in the individual countries 
or existing standards were  slightly modified  to suit  them  for this particular pur-
pose.  In other  instances~ it was  however  necessar~ to develop  new  testing methods 
and  deviees. 
The  committee of experts is fully  aware  that  these  considerations~ cited 
in the  informative  report~  can  make  no  claim to completeness  by  reason of  the ex-
ceedingly complex  nature of the subject  and  that  a  further series of detailed in-
vestigations  and  experiments will  be  necessary. 
The  Commission attaches great  importance to the  implementation of this 
recommendation  - accepted  by  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Mines  - by  reason of its 
importance  in raising mine  safety to the highest possible level;  the  Commission  at 
its plenary session of  December  20~  1960~  came  to the conclusion that it would  be 
useful  to distribute this informative report to interested groups  1)  as  soon  as pos-
sible~  to keep  them  informed of  development  trends  in this field and of  the lines 
being  followed  by  the work  begun  by  this committee. 
The  Commission  charged the committee of experts to continue the work  it 
had  begun.  It is envisaged that this work will  be  terminated  by  the publication of 
a  compilation of stipulations and  of testing methods  (load records)  this compilation 
to be  supplemented  from  time  to time to bring it in line with the latest development. 
The  committee of experts hopes  that  the publication of its interim report 
will  prompt  others to make  useful  remarks  or  suggestions~ which  may  be useful  to 
the  Committee  in the continuation of its work. 
1)  E.g.  mines  inspectorates~ mining  companies~  lubricant manufacturers, manufacturers 
of  hydraulic  apparatus~  research  centres~  universities~ laboratories. III 
WORKING  PARTY  ON  CO-ORDINATION  OF  MINES  RESCUE  ORGA~IZATIONS 
The  Conference  on Safety  in Mines  paid special attention to the  problem of 
mine  rescue organisation,  and  adopted the following  recommendation  : 
- That  the rescue services be  organized  on  a  geographical bases broad  enough 
for  them to dispose  of  adequate  equipment  and  personnel; 
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- That  a  functional  liaison must  be  established first  between  the rescue 
services of the different  coalfields in each country,  and  then between  one 
country  and  another,  to enable the rescue services of ·the different countries 
to assist  one  another  and to ensure maximum  speed  and efficiency in any 
emergency; 
- That  a  regular  exchange  of  experience should  be  organized  among  the rescue 
centres .of  the different countries  in regard  both to the  improvement  and 
to the co-ordination of  t~e methods  and  means  employed  (training of  rescue 
personnel,  equipment  used,  etc.). 
(Page  162  of  the Conference  Report). 
At  the very  beginning of  its activity the Co1nmission  set  up  a  W~rking Party 
consisting of  the Directors of  the principal rescue centres  and  recognized experts 
in mine  rescue matters of the Community  countries  and  of the United  Kingdom.  The 
Working  Party visited the principal  rescue centres of the Community  countries  and  of 
the United  Kingdom  and  submitted  a  report  to.the Commission  ~s~e_A~n~x_B2. 
This  report  provided  a  comparative  survey  of the state at that  time of the 
technique  of  mine  rescue  work  in the Community  countries  and  in the United  Kingdom 
(organization,  training and  instruction,  preparatory measures for  emergency,  giving 
the alarm,  execution of  a  rescue operation,  rescue plans,  anti-gas and  closed-circuit 
respiratory apparatus,  rescue  equipment,  etc.). 
The  WorkingPartydiscovered  from  its visits to the  rescue centres  in the 
Community  countries  and  in the United  Kingdom,  from  the personal contacts made  during 
these visits,  and  from  the discussion  and  exchange  of  experience made  possible by 
this as well  as  the evaluation of the reports and  data presented,  that  the organiza-
tion of  mine  rescue operations  in the different countries  no  longer exhibits any 
marked  differences and  that  any  minor  deviations  which still exist are to be attribu-
ted to local conditions and  peculiarities. 
The  comparative tabulation of  the state of  the  technique of  mine  rescue  work 
at that  time  given  in the report  shows,  inter alia 
- that  the ratio of  the  number  of  mine  rescue men  to the total number  of  underground 
workers is roughly  the  same, 
- that  the training of  mine  rescue  men  is carried out  on  the  same  principles and 
that  the methods  used are similar,  although  local conditions have to be  allowed  for, 62 
- that the  r~~cue equipment  available is of the  latest kind provided by  the most 
recent  progress in techniques,  and 
- that the regional  plans for  giving the alarm and for calling for assistance are 
such as to meet  the requirements  of  an  emergency. 
The  Working  Party  noted with satisfaction that  various  improvements to 
rescue training and  equipment  have  been introduced as  a  result of the personal dis-
cussions which  have  taken place in recent years within framework  of the Working 
Party in different countries. 
The  Working Party came  to certain conclusions which the Commission discus-
sed  in its plenary session of  December  20,  1960.  The Commission directed the Working 
Party to examine  more  deeply  those conclusions which contain suggestions,  in order 
to convert  them  into recommendations. 
The  following  were the problems to receive detailed attention 
1.- Preparation of  a  supranational  plan for  providing assistance 
- For  each country or for  each  mining district,  emergency  plans must  be  drawn 
up for use  in the event  that supranational assistance was  called for  by  reason 
of  a  catastrophe,  the plans to contain the  following data 
- the  location of the central office of the mine  rescue organisation; 
- names,  official and  private addresses  and  telephone or teleprinter numbers 
of the Directors of the central offices and their representatives; 
- general  maps  of  the districts indicating the  location of collieries. 
Major  changes or  supplements to this plan should  be notified to the Secretariat 
of  the Commission without  delay,  so that this plan is always maintained comple-
tely up-to-date. 
2.- Improvement  of  breathing apparatus  for  mine  rescue teams 
The  Working  Party considered that it should suggest  offering a  prize for the 
development  of  a  freely-portable breathing apparatus  independent  of  the external 
air. 
This apparatus should  be  characterized by  considerable advances  in 
- simplicity of use, 
- reliability of  operation 
and  in particular 
- possibility of  extending the period of  use for special application. At  the same  time efforts should be made  to achieve  improvements  in 
- the breathing attachment  (mouth-piece or mask)  and 
- the possibilities of  cummunication. 
- In addition,  particular attention should be paid to the problem of  optimum 
adaptation to respiratory-physiological conditions. 
3.- Frontier formalities  and Customs duties for mine  rescue men  and  equipment 
The  Working  Party considers it very  important  role for  purposes of mine  rescue 
operations that action should be  taken 
- to facilitate frontier crossing for rescue  teams  and rescue apparatus in the 
event  of  a  catastrophe; 
- to abolish duties and simplify frontier formalities with regard to the  import 
and  export  of  rescue apparatus and  equipment. 
The  latter step would  help to ensure that  equipment  with the best  technical 
characteristics,  with  a  direct  influence on the further  improvement  of  mine 
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rescue techniques, could be  ordered as rapidly as possible and  at  the most  favourable 
prices;  it would also be of  great  value  in connection with the repairing of 
apparatus  bought  from  other countries. 
For these reasons the Working  Party considers it essential that  every  effort 
should be made  to secure the implementation of these proposals.· 
4.- Insurance of  mine  rescue  men 
The  Working  Party is convinced of the necessity of  studying the question of in-
surance of the rescue teams working  outside their own  country within the  framework 
of reciprocal assistance,  in order to reach a  uniform and  binding arrangement. 
X 
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In addition to this,  the Commission  instructed the Working  Party to maintain 
the contacts made  and to continue the discussion and  exchange of experience. 
This  was  to be  done  in particular by 
- exchanging and discussing the Annual  Reports  of  the central rescue stations; 
- holding meetings  in connection with particular occurrences  (accidents which 
might  provide  new  information,  new  technical developments  in equipment  and 
devices,  etc.); 
- preparing an  annual  report  on the state of  mine  rescue techniques  in the Com-
munity countries,  including reports on particular occurrences and an  account 
of the work carried on  by  the individual mine  rescue organizations. 64 
IV 
WORKING  PARTY  ON  WINDING  ROPES  AND  SHAFT  GUIDES 
A.  - Electro-magnetic  inspection of winding  ropes 
The  studies of this Working  Party  on  the Conference  recommendation  below, 
which  the Commission  had  directed it to consider are  not  yet  complete  : 
"Methods  of  inspecting winding ropes during operation,  e.g.  with 
electro-magnetic rope-testing devices,  should be  further  deve-
loped" 
(Recommendation  31-M,  page  148  of  the Conference Report). 
To  date several series of comparative tests on  winding  ropes  in use  have 
been carried out  at  one pit each  in Germany,  Belgium and France,  using three 
electro-magnetic  inspection devices,  the  ACMI  apparatus  of  AIB1),  the Integra 
apparatus of  AIF2)  and  the testing device  developed  in Bochum  by  the  Rope-Testing 
Station. 
The  experts'  discussions  revealed that  there were  broadly  speaking two 
basic principles  in the  assessment  of  the  inspection diagrams. 
With  the first  principle,  the  rope is judged principally  by  the  number  of 
internal and  external broken wires,  and  in addition the "disturbance  level"  of 
the diagram permits of  a  qualitative assessment.  In  making  this assessment, 
however,  it is not  assumed  that  there is any  relation between  the "disturbance 
level"  and  the rope'  s  loss of  load-bearing capacity,  since those  who  hold to 
this particular principle claim that  the "disturbance  level"  is built  up  of 
the  sum  of  several factors differing in nature  from  one  another,  it being 
impossible to distinguish these factors  individually  - quite apart  from  the 
characteristics of the measuring devices used  - so as to determine their pro-
portional effect  and  their general  importance. 
The  second  principle is that  of  assessing the  load-bearing capacity of  a 
rope  in essence  on  any  increase  in the "disturbance level," thus  assuming  a 
close relation between  any  increase  in disturbance  level  and  the rope's  loss 
of  load-bearing capacity. 
!)Association des  Industrials de  Belgique. 
2)Association des  Industrials de  France. Present  information indicates that  the electro-magnetic  inspection of  ropes  is 
an  exceedingly useful aid  in  inspecting and  assessing winding ropes.  True,  it cannot 
replace the conventional  visual  inspection of  the rope,  but  it.can provide  a  very 
valuable supplement.  The  Working  Party  came  to the wiew  that it would  be  premature 
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to  lay  down  regulations  regarding the  removal  of  ropes  or the extension of  the service 
time  on  the basis of results obtained by  electro-magnetic  inspection.  This method 
should  in the first  instance  remain  an  auxiliary method  in the hands  of  the experts. 
The  Commission  agreed during its discussions that continuation of  the practical trials 
would  be worthwhile  and  necessary. 
Accordingly,  it approved  an  experimental  programme  to this end.  The  objective 
of  these tests is to establish the correctness of  one  or other of  the principles of 
assessment  of  the  diagrams  on  the basis of  a  fairly  large number  of  investigations 
on  discarded winding  ropes  and to make  a  fundamental  investigation of  the factors 
influencing the  load-bearing capaci_ty  of  the  rope,  e.g.  rust,  wear,  indentations 
caused  by  pressure,  breakage  of  internal wires,  crystalline condition of  the wires, 
magnetic  condition of the ropes,  etc.,  by  ensuring that  electro-magnetic  inspection 
takes  in these factors  and  provides  a  means  of  distinguishing between  them. 
The  High  Authority  has declared its readiness,  in  accordance  with  the  proposal 
of  the Commission,  to finance  these practical tests, 
For the  purposes  of  these  investigations samples  from  some  30 discarded  ropes  -
from  Belgium,  Germany,  Great  Britain and  France  - which  had  already  been electro-
magnetically  inspected  in the country  from  which  they  came,  would  be  sent  to the 
Rope-Testing Station of  the  Westf~lische Berggewerkschaftskasse  in Bochum. 
These  samples  would  then  be  tested again  using the  Bochum  electro-magnetic 
apparatus,  After the  ropes  had  been  opened  up  to determine  which  conclusions  drawn 
from  the electro-magnetic  inspection diagrams  were correct, 
The  experimental  programme  was  drawn  up  as  follows  : 
1.  30 winding  ropes  to be  made  available in the Community  Countries  and  in Great 
Britain over  a  period of  some  6-8 months; 
2.  electro-magnetic  inspection to be carried out  shortly before the ropes  are removed; 
3,  the sample  pieces  (roughly  3  pieces per  12  m.  length)  to be  taken on the basis 
of  the recorded  inspection diagram; 
4.  the selected sample  pieces to be  marked  by  coloured rings  and  by  removing  one  or 
two  outer wires at  each  end  of  the piece; 
5,  fresh electro-magnetic  inspection of the rope,  especially of  the  sample  pieces, 
to determine the sections of  the diagrams  corresponding to the sample  pieces; 
6,  the sample  pieces to be cut  out  after the rope  has  been discarded,  the points 66 
where  the rope is cut  being  located so that the coloured rings and the artificial 
breakages of wires are about  0.5 m.  away,  bringing the total length of the sample 
pieces to roughly  13  metres.  The  ends  should be  whipped  very  firmly  or welded 
together,  so that the relative position of  the elements  of the rope does  not 
change  during transport,  by  loosening up.  The  beginning of each sample piece should 
be  specially marked,  e.g.  with  a  flag or tag; 
7.  the 3  samples  pieces of discarded rope to be sent to Bochum  with a  piece,  as far 
as possible,  of the same  length,  of the same  rope in new  condition  (as  a  check 
piece); 
8.  each  sample  piece to be electro-magnetically inspected using the Bochum  apparatus 
in the Rope-Testing Station at  Bochum; 
9.  a  piece of  rope  approximately  60 em.  long to be  removed  from  each test piece to 
allow inspection of the  individual wires  (for tension,  bending  and twisting); 
10.  a  further section of  rope  approximately  4  m.  long to be  removed  from  each  sample 
piece,  to allow of submitting the whole  strand to a  tearing test; 
11.  the remainder of each  sample piece to be  opened  up  and the individual wires 
inspected. 
This series of tests has  begun  and is continuing according to plan. B.  - Recording  accelerometer for  testing shaft-guides 
The  Recommendation· of  the Conference  : 
"The development  of devices for testing shaft guides should  be  aimed  at producing 
apparatus which can  be  easily handled  by  the personnel  examining the shafts" 
(Resolution 32  - M,  page  148  of  the Conference  Report) 
was  also studied by  the Working Party, which has  not  yet completed  its investigations 
into the problem. 
The  experts agree  that defects  in  the  lines of cage guides  (e.g.  misalignment 
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of  individual guides,  imperfect butting of  the ends  of guides,  wear,  etc.) give  rise 
to horizontal oscillations of  the cages  and skips  (designated  by  the  tel'ID  "conveyan-
ces" hereafter).  These oscillations produce  dynamic  forces  which  in  ti1ue  cause  not 
only deterioration of  the complete  installation of shaft guides,  but also favour  the 
occurrence of  hair-cracks or  fatigu~ breaks  in  the weight-carrying _parts  of  the 
conveyances  and  may,  in some  cases,  lead to damage  to  the winding  rope.  The  horizon-
tal oscillations may  produce vertical oscillations which  can also lead  to  1~pe damage. 
There are already several devices,  based  on  the accelerometer principle,  to 
measure  the horizontal oscillations;  these devices  are mounted  on  the conveyance. 
According  to the experts,  the  two  devices  already subjected  to practical tests are 
the  "Cambridge  Double  Accelerometer"  and  the  "Two-Component  Recording  Accele1~meter" 
developed  by  the Rope-Testing Stations  in  the Saar and at Bochum. 
The  Cambridge  Double  Accelerometer consists essentially of  two  mass-spring sys-
tems  set at 90°  to each other and  electro-magnetically damped,  an  electro-magnetic 
time marker - controlled  by  an additional Cambridge contact clock  - and  a  celluloid 
film which  is driven  by  a  clockwork mechanism. 
The  rate of  advance  depends  on  the  "winding-on" diameter,  i.e. it is not constant, 
so that equal  times do  not correspond  to equal  lengths of  recorded diagram,  nor,  in 
consequence of this,  to equal  lengths of travel of  the conveyance.  To  record  the 
length of the conveyance,  an  ancillary electrical apparatus  is used  in the winding-
engine  house  to record  a  travel/time diagram.  These  records  of travel  have  to be  trans-
ferred to the acceleration/measuring run diagram proper.  The  celluloid record is then 
examined  and  assessed  by means  of  a  mic1~scope or with a  special viewer-enlarger or 
by  a  photograph magnified  10 times.  (This device  is not  flameproof). 
The  Two-Component  Recording  Accelerometer of  the Rope-Testing Station at Bochum 
is a  purely mechanical  measuring device.  Two  spring-mass systems,  fitted with a  liquid 
damper  (silicone)  are fitted 90°  to each other.  The  accelerations arc  recorded  on  a 
band of paraffin-waxed paper which  advances at a  constant rate,  thus making it unneces-
sary to add  time marks,  because equal  times  correspond  to equal  lengths of  recordings 68 
and  to equal  lengths of travel of  the conveyance.  The  recording of  the  length of tra-
vel is made  directly on  the waxed-paper  band  of  the Two-Component  Recording  Accelero-
meter.  A flexible shaft,  which connects  the  accelerometer with  the device  (known  as 
the depth  inGicator)  which is also attached to the conveyor,  transmits  the  rotations 
of  a  wheel  running along the lines of shaft guides to the accelerometer.  A "length-
travelled" mark  is made  on  the acceleration diagram for each  10 metres  of  length of 
travel.  The  recordings  made  by  the Two-Component  Recording  Accelerometer can  be as-
sessed directly with regard to  the magnitude of the acceleration  and the length of 
travel  (depth). 
The  horizontal oscillatory accelerations of the conveyance  do  not  in general 
permit  of  any  conclusions  being drawn  as  to  the magnitude  of  the dynamic  forces. 
They  are neverthless an  index of  the disturbance of  the smoothness  of travel  of  a 
conveyance  and serve in particular for the comparison of  diagrams  recorded succes-
sively at  intervals of  time.  Suitable  treatment  of  the line of shaft guides  on  the 
basis of  the acceleration measurements  obtained can considerably  improve  the smooth-
ness  of movement  of  the conveyances.  In  the first place this undoubtedly  increases 
the  reliability of operation of  the  installation and  in addition  reduces  the outlay 
on  repair and maintenance  required  in  the future for both the shaft guides  and  the 
conveyances  themselves. 
A prerequisite for,  and at the same  time  a  useful supplement  to,  the accelera-
tion measurements  is the measurement  of  the static state of  the  guides  by  means  of 
purely mechanical guide-testing devices.  The  diagrams  produced  by  these devices 
give  indications of the degree of wear on the guides,  of changes  in the distance 
between  the guides,  and of faulty butting at the joints. 
The  investigations carried out hitherto using  recording accelerometers  and 
guide-testing apparatus have  given good  results and  proved  the value of such equip-
ment  for inspecting winding  installations. 
The  experts  on  the Working Party suggest,  as  their first conclusion,  that it 
is advisable to recorumend  these devices,  in the light of the operating conditions, 
especially in cases where external signs indicate that the smoothness of  travel of 
the conveyances is deteriorating. 
The  study of this problem is to be continued. v 
HIGH  AUTHORITY  COMPETITION  FOR  THE  IMPROVEMENT 
OF  SAFETY  EQUIPMENT  IN  COALMINES 
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As  was  noted  in  the  Commission's First Report,  the  prototypes were  required 
to be  in  the  hands  of  the  panel  of  judges appointed  by  the  High  Authority  by  not  later 
than  September  1,  1959. 
The  appliances entered were,  in accordance  with  the  rules of  the  competition, 
of  the  following  types: 
1.  portable methanometers, 
2.  portable  firedamp-limit  warning  devices, 
3.  portable oxygen-limit warning  devices, 
4.  carbon-monoxide  recorders, 
5.  self-rescue apparatus affording complete  protection against noxious 
gases  and  oxygen  deficiency  for at  least one  hour. 
The  panel were  supplied with  four  specimens  of each prototype,  which  were 
to  be  subjected,  in  two  separate Community  countries,  to six months'  continuous 
laboratory tests and  to six months' practicaltests below  ground. 
Test  procedures  and  directives were  drawn  up  by  the  panel  to ensure  that 
the  results would  be  properly  intercomparable. 
The  laboratory  tests were  completed  towards  the end  of  June  1960,  and  the 
appliances  thereupon short-listed are  now  undergoing their practicaltrials below 
ground. 
The  panel  hopes  to announce  its awards  by  abou~ the middle  of  1961. 
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SECTION  TWO  ------------
HUMAN  FACTORS  ------------
After considering various  possible methods  of  tackling  these  problems,  the 
Commission  set up  a  restricted working  party  to define  and  circumscribe  the  points 
to be  concentrated  upon  (see First Report,  end  of  p.  52). 
The  Working  Party,  which  was  composed  of  representatives of  the  Governments 
and  of  the employers'  and workers'  associations,  proposed  that  four  sets of questions 
be  studied,  namely  : 
a."effects of working  hours  on  safety" 
b."medical  problems  of safety policy" 
c."psychological and  sociological factors affecting safety" 
d."effects of methods  of  payment  on  safety. 
It further  proposed  that a  separate working  party  be  set  up  for  each  item. 
The  Commission  agreed;  it was  subsequently  found,  however,  that with  the  time  and 
facilities available it was  possible  to organize  only  the first  three  of  the  working 
parties suggested. 
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So far,  the  Commission  has  adopted three  recommendations  concerning medi-
cal aspects. 
The  remaining  problems  on  the  agendas  of all three  working  parties are 
still under examination,  and  the  Commission  has  therefore  not  yet  been called  upon 
to state its views  on  them. 
It feels,  however,  that it should  record  the  subjects discussed,  pending 
the  working parties'  ultimate  submission of  their findings. 
This  information as  to the  work  in progress  is not,  of course,intended in 
any  way  to auticipate  the  findings. I 
WORKING  PARTY  "  ON  MEDICAL  PROBLEMS  " 
The  working Party's objectives are as  follows: 
1°)  Organization and  operation of colliery medical  services. 
2°)  Arrangements  in  the  member  countries regarding specialization by  doctors  prac-
tising or  intending to practise occupational medicine  at collieries. 
3°)  a.  Functional rehabilitation of  workers  who,  after a  spell of disability can  be 
re-absorbed  into their former  occupation or  into similar work,  i.e.  who  do  not 
require  to undergo  a  fresh  apprenticeship. 
b.  Occupational  retraining of workers  who  for  medical  reasons  have  become  unfit 
for  their  former  occupation and  therefore require,  to be  taught  a  new  skill. 
c.  Re-employment,  preferably  in  the  same  colliery or otherwise,  in another 
colliery,  of 
- workers  who  have  undergone  occupational  retraining  (those  who  have  undergone 
functional  rehabilitation are  presumed  to be  suitable for  employment  in 
the  same  occupation,  and  in the  same  colliery,  as before), 
- workers  found  on  medical  examination  to be  unfit  for  their current occupa-
tion. 
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So  far,  the  Working  Party  has  been  engaged  in  the  examination of  item  (1): 
as  the  subject is of great  importance  to  the  improvement  of safety,  and  raises a 
considerable  number  of  practical  problems,  the  Working  Party has explored it in consi-
derable  detail. 
1)  As  the  Working  Party feels  that  an efficient contribution by  the  medical  services 
to  the  improvement  of safety depends  to a  very great extent  on  the  practical de-
tails of  their operation,  it has  drawn  up  a  detailed description of  these. 
The  description covers: 
- Laws,  regulations and  contractual provisions concerning medical  services and  medical 
examination  and  supervision; 
- duties and  responsabilities of colliery medical  services; 
- nature,  scope  and  object  of  examinations effected; 
- miners  required to undergo examination; 
- number  of  doctors  employed; 
- material  means  provided  for  doctors; 
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- measures  taken  to ensure  good relations between  medical  and other services of  the 
collieries and  between  the medical  services and  the  workers  and workers'  represen-
tatives; 
- status  and  terms  of  employment  of  the  medical  officer and  other members  of  the 
colliery medical  services,  arrangements ensuring their  professional independance. 
The  description will  be  found  in Annex  C. 
2)  In compiling this description and  making  the  relevant  country  by  country compari-
sons,  the  Working  Party came  to the  conclusion that it was  both feasible  and  desi-
rable to draw  up  a  general  summary  bringing out certain "minimum  principles",,  the 
comprehensive  application of  which  throughout  the  Community  it considers  would 
make  still more  effective the contribution of  the  medical  services to the  improve-
ment  of safety. 
3)  It was  decided  to go  in particular detail into a  number  of  points,  including the 
following  : 
the  requirement  that all collieries should  have  medical  services; 
the  duties and  responsabilities of  these services,  in particular with regard to 
pre~entive medicine  {pre-entry examinations,  periodic check-ups for all workers, 
and  special examinations  of  workers  whom  it is planned to assign to particular 
jobs); 
minimum  requirements  as  to what  these examinations  should consist of; 
qualifications  (degrees,  diplomas  and practical experience)  expected of colliery 
medical  officers; 
procedure  for  appointment  of colliery medical  officers and  role  of  workers'  re-
presentatives  in  this connection; 
status and  terms  of  employment  of  medical  officers and  arrangements  ensuring their 
professional  independance; 
association of workers'  representatives with the  running  of  medical  services and 
institutes of  mining medicine. 
So far  the  Commission  has  endorsed three  recommendations,  together with  a 
report containing supplementary details.  The  recommendations  relate specifically to 
- pre-entry medical examinations, 
- special medical examinations  for  particular workers, 
- routine medical  check-ups  (periodic examinations,  examinations  in connec-
tion with  a  change  of  job or  following  an absence). 
The  first  recommendation  lays it down  as  a  general  principle that all appli-
cants  for  employment  in a  colliery should  be  required  to undergo  a  pre-entry medical 
examination,  adds  some  notes as  to  the  form  which  the  examination  should  take  and  the 
points it should.be  designed  to establish,  and  emphasizes  that particular attention should  be  paid  to the  state of  the  lungs  in  the  case  of  workers  whom  it is planned 
to employ  below  ground  or in a  ~ob where  they will  be  exposed  to dust. 
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The  second  defines  the  object of special medical examinations  and  the cases 
in which  these  should  be  effected. 
The  third defines  the  object  of  periodic  check-ups  and  indicates at  what 
intervals  they  should  be  carried out:  distinction  is made  according as  the  subject 
is an  adult  or  a  juvenile,  while  with  regard  to changes  of. job it recommends  that an 
additional examination should  be  made  where  the  new  job entails a  hazard  to which  the 
subject  has  not  previously  been  exposed.  It further suggest  that  a  worker  returning 
after an  absence  should,  if necessary,  undergo  a  special medical  examination where 
his return  to work  represents a  danger  to his  own  safety or  to that  of  others. 
The  Commission  at its meeting  on  December  20,  1960,  adopted  these  recommen-
dations,  together with  the  introductory report  accompanying  them.  The  full  text 
follows; 74 
REPORT  -------
ON  PR!::.!!!!!!!L-SP!~IA~~ND_!!QUTI!!!_MED!CA~!XAMI!!~TIONS 
AND 
R E C 0  M M E  N D A T  I  0  N S  -----------------------------
PRE-ENTRY  EXAMINATIONS  FOR  ALL  PERSONNEL  ----------------------------------------
1.  There  were  three  schools of  thought on  this subject. 
a)Some  members  consider  that  the  pre-entry examination  should  be  conducted 
with  a  view  to assessing  the applicant's fitness  for  employment  as  a  hewer, 
this  being  the  underground  occupation  involving  the widest  range  of  physical 
aptitudes. 
They  further  argue  that,  for  the  pre-entry examination  to be  adapted  to 
the  particular requirements  of each applicant's prospective  job,  it would 
need  to  be  possible  to decide  beforehand  what  job was  to  be  assigned  him, 
whereas  in fact  this is not  always  possible,  nor  indeed  desirable.  After all, 
the  turnover  of  underground  personnel  is very substantial,  and  whatever  the 
management's  original plans may  have  been  the  worker  may  always  have  later 
on  to  be  put  on  to a  different  job  from  that for  which  he  was  recruited. 
Moreover,  the  less physically  demanding  jobs  below  ground  should  be  allotted 
to those  men  who  are  no  longer able  to perform  the  heavier  types  of work,  so 
that  the  latter can  be  given  to  new  entrants,  at any  rate as  soon  as  they 
have  received  the  requisite  training and,  in  the case  of  juveniles,  developed 
the  necessary  physique. 
The  members  taking this view  do,  however,  make  an exception with  regard  to 
specialized craftmen,  who  are  obviously  not  likely to  be  trans~e1red to other 
work.  In  their case,  therefore,  the  pre-entry examination can  and  should  be 
adapted  to the  specific requirements  of  the  job concerned. 
b)  Other  members  of  the  Working  Party maintain  that it is by  no  means  impossible 
to organize  the  pre-entry examination with  an  eye  to  the  subject's fitness 
for  the  particular work  to  be  assigned  him.  They  consider  this a  more  effi-
cient way  of  going  about  it;  in addition,  they  feel  that it would  be  extre-
mely  difficult to define  the  "craftsman" category  to be  excepted,  and  that  in 
any  case,  in view  of  the  increasing diversification below  ground  as  a  result 
of mechanization,  men  are  more  and  more  having  to  be  recruited.for parti-
cular duties. 
c)  The  suggestions  was  also made  that  the  medical  officer might  certify appli-
cants as "fit for all types  of  work"  or "fit for all but  a  few  types  of 
work."  Naturally,  he  could not  be  expected  to specify  the  exceptions  by  name, 
as  this would  mean  he  would  have  to  be  familiar  with  the  special features  of 
all the  different  types  of  underground  work:  he  could,  however,  quite well 
note  that  the  man  should not  be  employed,  say,  in very  hot  or  humid  workings, 
or on  jobs requiring keen eyesight  or hearing. 
2.  a)  If  the  pre-entry examination  is conducted with  a  view  to assigning the  sub-
ject to a  particular job,  certain criteria might  be  adapted  to the  special 
features  of  that  job,  as  for  instance  regarding eyesight,  hearing or  physi-
cal strength.  Even  so,  however,  all applicants without exception should  be 
required  to satisfy certain health standards. 
b)  Also,  all necessary measures  would  need  to  be  taken  to ensure  that  a  man 
initially examined with reference  to a  particular assignment  could  not 
subsequently  be  given  a  different  one  involving different hazards,  until  he 
had  first undergone  another examination. II.  PRACTICAL  DETAILS 
The  Working  Party would  emphasize  that  the  pre-entry examination must  in-
clude  a  general  examination  and all such  special examinations as  may  be  necessa-
ry  to ascertain whether  the applicant  is suffering  from  any  physical condition 
making  him  unsuitable  for  employment. 
It is,  of  course,  essential that  more  precise  indications  should  be  given 
as  to the  tests,  procedure  and criteria to  be  employed.  The  Working  Party strong-
ly urges  the  need  for  such  indications,  and  also holds  that  these  should  not  be 
given case  by  case,  but  should  be  fixed  beforehand  by  general  directives.  It 
feels,  however,  that  this is a  strictly medical  matter  in  which it is not  itself 
qualified to advise,  and  which  should  be  entrusted to medical  experts.  Nor  is 
it prepared  to  recommend  whether  the  indications should  be  drawn  up at  Community 
or at  national  level,  since it is felt  that  insistence  on  one  or  the  other might 
result  in undesirable  delays.  In any  case,  indications  drawn  up at national  level 
could  always  be  compared,  with  a  view  to standardizing  them  in so  far as  might  be 
deemed  advisable. 
A.  Particular  importance  of  these 
In view of  the silicosis hazard,  special attention must  be  devoted  to  the 
examination of  the  cardio-respiratory system  in  the  case  of all workers  who 
have  been  or will  be  exposed  to this. 
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B.  Method  to  be  employed  for  X-ray'  examinations of  the cardio-respiratory  s~tem; 
1.  The  Working  Party is unanimous  in considering mere  radioscopy,  without  an 
exposure,  to  be  insufficient;  its debates  turned  on  the  relative merits  of 
radiography,  giving a  1:1 plate or  film,  and  radiophotography,  giving  a 
reduced-format  film.  · 
a)  It should  be  noted that  the  two  methods  are  based  on quite different 
principles:  radiography  is effected  by  interposing  the  part  of  the 
body  to be  photographed  between  the  X-ray  tube  and  the  plate or  film, 
while  radiophotography consists  in  photographing  a  fluorescent  radio-
scopic  image.  Their  respective  advantages  are  thus  not  simply  a  matter 
of  the  size of  the  plate or  film  produced;  much  careful study  is needed 
to establish the  best  format  for  radiophotography. 
b)  The  two  methods  are  not  interchangeable.  The  supporters of  radiophoto-
graphy  claim that it is a  more  effective means  of  detection  than  radio-
graphy,  in  that certain small  opaque  patches can  be  seen  more  clearly 
thanks  to the  use  of  an  "intensifying screen".  On  the  other  hand,  once 
lesions or anomalies  have  been  so detected,  their closer study  is best 
effected by  standard-format  radiography,  supplemented where  necessary 
by  special radiological or other examinations. 
c)  It is agreed  that  where  radiophotography is used  the  format  should  be 
not  smaller  than  70x70  mm.,  and  that  special care  sho~ld be  taken  in the 
processing of  the  films. 
d)  Otherwise,  some  members  are  for  one  and  some  for  the  other.  It was  em-
phasized  that  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  an  X-ray  plate or  film, 
or  a  series of  plates concerning the  same  subject,  depend  to a  great 
extent  on  the  interpretation of  the  investigator.  This underscores  the 
importance  of  the  experience  accumulated  in the  individual coalfield 
with the  one  method  or  the  other. 76 
2.  In conclusion,  the  Working  Party is agreed: 
- 1°)  That  the  examination of  the  cardio-respiratory system can  be  effected 
either by  radiography  or  by  radiophotography; 
- 2°)  that  where  radiophotography is used  the  format  must  be  not  smaller  than 
70x70  mm.; 
- 3°)  that  where  radiophotography  is used it should always  be  possible  to 
supplement  this,  if necessary,  by  standard-format  (1:1)  radiography. 
The  Working  Party would  very  much  like to go  further  into this question, 
on  the  basis of  additional studies and  of  a  more  comprehensive  exchange  of 
information and experience,  with  the  object  of arriving at greater standar-
dization  of  the  methods  of  radiological examination  in  the different Community 
countries. 
C.  Requirements  to  be  laid down  as  to state of entrants'  cardio-respiratory 
system 
1.  In  what  ~ases should  a  nor~~!_ch~st_!ma~~~~ req~!red? 
The  Working  Party considers  that  a  normal  chest  image  should  be  required  in 
all cases  where  the  job to which  the  man  is to  be  assigned  involves  a  dust 
hazard,  i.e.  all occupations  below  ground,  and all surface occupations entai-
ling exposure  to dust. 
2.  What  constitutes a  "normal  chest  image"? 
The  term  does  not  necessarily ~ly an  image entirely free  of  any  anomalous 
features:  there is therefore  a  certain range  of  images  which  can  be  rated as 
normal  by  the  examining doctor. 
The  Working Party feels,  however,  that  precise  definition of  a  normal  chest 
image  is  a  highly  technical medical matter:  it prefers,  accordingly,  not  to 
attempt  such  a  definition itself,  but  to  leave it to the  competent authorities 
in each country  to do  so  by  such methods  as theyconsider  most  appropriate. 
IV.  PERSONS  REQUIRED  TO  UNDERGO  PRE-ENTRY  MEDICAL  EXAMINATION 
The  Working  Party considers  that all applicants for  employment,  whether at 
the  surface or  below  ground,  should  be  required to undergo pre-entry medical 
examination,  and  that  this should  in all cases  include  a  radiographic  or radio-
photographic chest examination,  even  though  not all surface workers  need  neces-
sarily be  certified as  showing  a  normal  chest  image  (see  above). 
As  regard surface  personnel  in jobs not  involving  a  dust  hazard,  it is em-
phasized that  they  do  nevertheless  run certain other risks  (e.g.  of  tuberculo-
sis),  and  that it is to the  interest of  both employer  and  employed  that  any 
lesions already existing at  the  time  of entry should be  detected beforehand. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS  TO  BE  REGARDED  AS  MINIMUM  STANDARDS  SUBJECT  TO  REVISION 
All  recommendations  by  the  Commission  are  to  be  regarded as  basic  minimum 
standards  •. 
Moreover,  rapid strides are  being made  in all fields connected with radiolo-
gical examinations  and  the  concept  of  the  normal  chest  image:  the  Working 
Party's present  findings  must,  therefore,  be  revised in the  future  as  and  where 
necessary. N.B.  The  medical  experts  on  the  Working Party emphasize  that,  although pre-entry 
medical  examinations  are extremely valuable  and  indeed  indispensable,  only 
relatively limited conclusions can  be  drawn  from  them.  Thus  the  doctor can 
report  only  as  to whether certain symptoms  are  present.:he  can conclude  that 
the  subject  shows  no  symptoms  which could be  a  reason  for  not  employing  him, 
but  he  cannot  predict with  any certainty  how  the man's constitution will 
react  to a  dusty environment. 
SPECIAL  EXAMINATIONS  --------------------
Some  jobs  demand  special endowments  on  the  part of  the  worker,  or make  it 
specially  important  that  he  should  possess certain physical aptitudes:  thus  keen 
eyesight is more  important  for  an engine-driver  than  for  most  other  underground 
personnel,  while  a  sudden  loss of  consciousness  could  have  the mostseriousconse-
quences  where  the  victim is a  winding  engineman. 
Hence  an ordinary examination is not  a  sufficient basis for assessing a 
man's  fitness for either of  these  jobs:  a  special examination,  undertaken with 
their particular requirements  in ·mind,  is essential.  Indeed,  even  this is not  in 
itself enough:  the  vocational  guidance  and  training departments,  the  psychological 
service  and  the  technical  departments all bear  their share  of  responsability  in 
the  ultimate decision,  whether  their function  is to determine  the  requirements 
which  the  man  must  satisfy or  the extent  to which  he  does  satisfy  them.  The  medi-
cal service's role  is,  however,  a  rather special one,  inasmuch  as  the  doctor  has 
to maintain  professional secrecy. 
Accordingly,  the  Working  Party's conclusion may  be  summed  up as follows: 
1)  It finds  that  the  object  of special medical  examinations is to ascertain  the 
subject's fitness  for certain specific duties. 
2)  While  it acknowledges  that  other  departments must  play  some  part in  the  matter, 
it makes  no  reference  to co-operation between  them  and  the  medical  service. 
3)  It confines itself to  laying  down  that  the  medical  service must  take  their 
views  into consideration. 
II.  CASES  REQUIRING  SPECIAL  EXAMINATION 
A.  The  Working  Party considers special examinations  to  be  called for: 
1)  when  the  job envisaged involves  a  particular hazard  to the  man  concerned 
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and  or  to others,  in  the  form  of either danger  of accident or danger  to 
health,  resulting either from  the  normal  performance  of  the  job or  from  the 
special conditions under  which  it is carried on  (as  for  instance  in  the  case· 
of duties which  involve  a  particular hazard  only if performed  in a  huanid 
atmosphere  or at  a  high  temperature). 
2)  Where  the  job requires special  physical  endowments  or qualities of  charac-
ter. 
B.  The  Working  Party is not,  in its view,  competent  under  its terms  of  reference 
to  draw  up  an exhaustive list of  the  jobs falling under  these  two  heads.  It has 
preferred,  therefore,  simply  to give  a  few  general  examples,  and  to  leave it to 
the  national authorities. 
1)  To  list the  jobs for  which  special medical  examinations should  be  effected; 
2)  to lay  down  what  the examination  for  each  such  job should consist of. 78 
The  Working  Party would  emphasize,  however,  that  upon  the  national autho-
rities'  deciding  that  given  jobs  do call  for  special prior examination,  it 
should  be  compulsory  for  the collieries,  to have  the  examinations  made. 
In  the  case  of  rescue  workers,  the  Working  Party is agreed  that  special 
examinations  should  always  be  made,  but  considers it to  be  a  matter  for  the 
Working  Party  on  Co-ordination of  Rescue  Arrangements  to decide  whether  it 
wishes  to  lay  down  details as  to  the  nature  of  these. 
ROUTINE  MEDICAL  EXAMINATIONS  ----------------------------
I.  PERIODIC  HEALTH  CHECKS  ----------------------
These  are  three  in  number: 
1°)  To  check whether  the  man's  standard of  fitness  for  his work  is still what 
it was  when  he  was  signed  on,  or alternatively what  his standard of  fitness 
is,  in order that  he  may  be  assigned  to duties appropriate  to that  standard; 
2°)  to detect  any  signs of  occupational  disease at as early a  stage as  possible; 
3°)  to help supervise  the  workers'  state of health. 
The  Working  Party considers  that all workers,  both  underground  and  surface, 
should  be  subjected  to periodic check-ups,  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  silicosis 
is not  the colliery worker's  only  occupational  hazard:  some  surface workers, 
such as  those  required  to handle  pitch or  hydrocarbons,  are exposed  to other 
risks.  Secondly,the  periodiccheck-ups are  not  confined solely  to detecting 
occupational  diseases:  they are also designed  to aid  in supervising  the  men's 
state of  health and  to establish how  far  the  latter are still fit  for  their 
jobs  (for example,  after a  certain age  has  been  reached,  some  jobs are  likely 
to  be  too  heavy). 
3.  !re~~~!!.~l 
a)  The  Working  Party  makes  a  distinction in  this  respect  between  juveniles 
(under  21)  and  adult  workers. 
1°)  In  the  case  of  adult  workers,  it was  unanimously  agreed  that  examination 
should  be  effected every  two  years.  The  Italian representatives mentioned 
that  in  Italy  the  interval was  fixed  at  one  year,  and  urged  that  the  same 
arrangement  should  be  made  in  the  other countries. 
2°)  In  the  case  of workers  under  21,  it was  also unanimously  agreed  that  the 
interval should  be  shorter  than  two  years.  Opinion  differed,  however,  as 
to  the  exact  frequency  desirable,  the  Netherlands  representatives main-
taining,  on  practical grounds,  that it was  not  possible  to reduce  the  period 
below  16-17 months,  while  the  other countries'  representatives accepted 
one  year  as  reasonable.  (16-17  months  is already  the  regular  period  in  the 
Netherlands,  and  one  year  in  Italy,  for  both adults and  juveniles). 
b)  The  various  figures  mentioned  are  of  course  the  maximum  intervals. 
c)  The  Working  Party  is also agreed  that  in  some  cases examination  should  take 
place  more  frequently,  where  warranted  by  certain health  symptoms  in  the  wor-
ker himself,  by  the  nature  of his duties,  or  by  the  type  of working  where  he 
is employed. Workers  should  be  medically  re-examined  whenever  it is proposed  to assign 
them  to different  duties involving hazards  not  taken  into account  in previous 
examinations  undergone.  This  is particularly  important  where  the  pre-entry 
examination was  conducted mainly  in  the  light of  the special  requirements of 
the  man's first  job. 
This is especially desirable  following  absence  on  account  of  illness or 
accident,  but  can  also be  so  in other connections. 
Where  the  man  was  absent  for  reasons other  than illness or accident,  the 
question arises whether  he  can  simply  be  judged fit to resume  work  on  the 
sttength of his pre-entry or  last periodic examination,  or whether  he  should 
be  specially re-examined first. 
Where  the  man  was  off sick or  injured,  he  cannot  in any  case  report  for 
duty until his doctor  passes.him as fit to resume  work.  The  problem is then 
whether his  own  doctor's opinion is sufficient with regard  to his fitness 
for  his  own  particular occupation at  the colliery,  or whether  the colliery 
medical  service  should  be  consulted  on  the  more  specific aspects.  While  the 
man's  doctor  may  be  a  member  of  the  colliery medical staff,  he  may  equally 
well  be  an  outside practitioner quite  unconnected with  the colliery or even 
with  the  coalmining  industry. 
It is felt  that  this question  does  not  really admit  of  one  comprehensive 
answer.  While  the  colliery medical  service's opinion is definitely to  be  re-
garded as  necessary  following  a  proJonged  absence,  it may  also be  needed after 
a  short  one,  for  instance,  where  due  to illness,  according to  the  nature  of 
the  illness concerned.  Similarly,  the  nature  of  such examinations  as  the 
colliery medical  service may  carry out  may  vary according  to  the  circumstances. 
The  Working Party  therefore  prefers simply  to  recommend  that  the colliery 
medical  service  be  notified of all absences,  their duration and  causes,  and 
of course,  where  the  absence  is the  result  of  illness or accident,  of  the 
nature  of  the  illness or accident  in question.  The  medical  service should 
then  make  its own  assessment  as  to whether  the  absentee  should  undergo exa-
mination  before  returning to work,  and  if so,  what  form  the examination 
should  take. 
R E C 0  M M E  N D A T  I  0  N S 
All applicants for  employment  at collieries should  undergo  a  pre-entry medi-
cal examination.  This  must  establish that  the  applicant  shows  no  symptoms  ren-
dering  him unfit  for  such  employment;  it must  include  a  general  examination and 
all such  special examinations as  may  be  deemed  necessary  for  the  purpose. 
The  examinations effected must  include,  as  regards  the  chest,  a  radiography 
or  radiophotography  of  format  not  smaller  than  70x70mm  ;  the  latter to  be  supple-
mented  if need  be  by  a  standard-format  (1:1)  radiography. 
The  nature  and  practical details of  these  examinations,  together with  the 
criteria on  which  the  doctor  should  base  his  findings,  should  be  defined  by 
medical experts.  In  the  case  of  recruitment  for  work,  whether  below or  above 
ground,  where  the  worker  will  be  exposed  to a  dust  hazard,  the  examination 
must  show  a  normal  pulmonary  image,  such  image  likewise  to be  defined  by  me-
dical experts. 
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These  are to be  regarded as  m1n1mum  recommendations.The  points concerning 
the  number  and  type  of examinations  to  be  carried out,  the effecting of  radio-
logical examinations  and  the  definition of  the  normalpulmonaryimage are sub-
ject to review  in each country whenever  this is felt  to  be  appropriate  in  the 
light of progress  in medical  and  radiological knowledge,  working  conditions 
and  preventive measures. 
1.  The  object of special medical  examinations  should  be  to establish  (taking 
into account,  according to circumstances,  the  opinions  of  the  training, 
vocational-guidance,  applied-psychology and  other services concerned)  a 
worker's  fitness  for certain specific occupations. 
2.  Such examinations are essential in  the case of jobs 
a)  which either in  themselves or  owing  to  the  conditions under  which  they 
are  performed  involve  a  special hazard  to  the worker  himself or  to others 
as  regards  health and/or safety; 
b)  or which  demand  particular physical aptitudes or characterological  qua-
lities. 
3.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to list in full  the  cases  in which  special exami-
nations  are necessary,  this being  left  to  the  competent  authorities in each 
country.  Examples  include: 
a)  winding enginemen; 
b)  staple-pit enginemen; 
c)  motormen  (drivers of  locomotives,  mobile  haulers  and  surface vehicules); 
d)  workers  assigned  to hot workings; 
e)  all those  employed  on  cage  handling. 
A.  Periodic health checks  ----------------------
The  object  here  is to establish whether  the  subject is still fit for  duty, 
to detect  any  symptoms  of occupational  disease at  the earliest possible 
stage,  and  where  appropriate  to help supervise  the  subject's health generally. 
All  personnel  should  undergo  such  check-ups at intervals of  not  more  than 
two  years,  or  less  in  the  case  of workers  under 21;  check-ups  may  also  be 
more  frequent  if the  individual worker's state of health,  the  nature  of his 
job or  the  type  of working  in which  he  is employed  makes  this desirable. 
Workers  whom  it is proposed  to assign  to jobs  involving hazards  not 
previously  taken  into account  for  the  man  concerned  should  be  re-examined. 
Where  a  man's  return to work  after an  illness or accident  involves risk 
to  the  safety of himself  or  others,  he  may  be  subjected to a  special 
examination  in accordance  with  the details of  his particular case. 
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X  X II. 
WORKING  PARTY  ON  "PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  SOCIOLOGICAL  FACTORS" 
1.  The  Working  Party  has  before it three  main .subjects: 
a)  Measures  to enable  personnel  to recognize  dangers  and  work  in such  a  way 
- as  to avoid  them; 
b)  training of  safety supervisors; 
c)  measures  to promote  co-operation  by all concerned  in securing  the  highest 
possible  safety standards. 
Up  to now  the  Working Party has  discussed  only  (a)  and  (b),  which  have  been 
taken as  including  the  possible contribution ofptuperly-conducted psychological 
examinations  to better safety.  It has  so far  been able  only  to rough  out  some 
ideas,  which  have still to  be  gone  over  by  it before  being submitted  to  the full 
Commission.  These  are as  follows. 
A.- Measures  to enable  personnel  to recognize  dangers  and  work  in such  a  way  as  to 
avoid  them 
2.  The  aim  must  be: 
a)  to work  out  in advance  the  risks entailed  by  operations  in.given circum-
stances; 
b)  to explain  these  to all who  are exposed  to  them  by  taking part  in  the  ope-
rations concerned; 
c)  to explain  how  the  work  is to  be  so  performed  as  to obviate  the  risks; 
d)  to see  to it that  this is in  fact  done. 
Taken  as  a  whole  these  measures will  ordinarily help to establish a  gene-
ral atmosphere  of  safety-mindedness,  and  convince all concerned  that emphasis 
on  output  is perfectly reconcilable with  emphasis  on  safety. 
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3.  With  regard  to detection of  danger,  the  Working  Party has  made  a  start on  the 
examination  of  the  following  arrangements: 
a)  Advance  study of  the  broad  group of general safety measures  forming  in  prac-
tice part  of  the  operational  regulations,  and  of  individual safety measures, 
prior  to any  opening-up of  new  workings  or notable  changes  in operating con-
ditions  (this to  be  effected as  a  regular addition to  the  advance  study  of 
the  technical and  economic  aspects of  the  projected operation); 
b)  submission  of  regular returns  to  the  colliery management  of  a.ll accidents, 
incidents and  dangerous  situations  (even  those  not  culminating in actual 
accidents)  which  have  occurred duringoperations.This.would enable  the  safety 
record  for  the  working  in question to  be  drawn  up  on  completion of  the 82 
operations  there  alongside  the  profit-and-loss record. 
4)  The  Working  Party  bas  further  discussed arrangements  to familiarize  personnel 
with prospective  dangers,  viz. 
a)  Examination  by  all concerned,  or  by  their representatives,  of  the  dangers 
liable  to arise  in  the  commencement  of operations  in a  new  working. 
This  would  enable everyone  to  be  made  familiar  with  the  situation and 
the  risks  to  be  expected,  and  also with  the  precise details of  the  work  to 
be  done; 
b)  Thereupon,  explanation  to all workers  concerned  regarding  the  methods  to 
be  employed,  such explanation  to  be  restated  and  supplemented  as  often as 
required. 
5)  Arrangements  to explain  to  the men  how  a  job should  be  performed  in such  a 
way  as  to  eliminate risk come,  of  course,  under  the  head  of  occupational 
training.  In  this connection,  attention may  be  drawn  to  the  recommendations 
adopted  on  training by  the  Conference  on  Safety  in Coalmines,  and  to  the 
valuable effects which  their  implementation may  be  expected  to have  on  safety. 
The  Working Party's discussions mainly  concerned  the  following  points: 
a)  Specialization of occupational  training 
The  Working Party  debated  the  question whether  general  training for 
work  below  ground  was  sufficient,  or whether  this should  be  supplemented 
by  special  training in  line with  the  particular  features  of each man's 
proposed  occupation  and  the  particular conditions under  which  he  is to 
work  (including  the  place at which  he  is to  do  so). 
b)  Importance  of  a  stable  labour  force 
If  the  latter thesis is accepted,  then quite obviously  training cannot 
achieve  its proper  object unless  the men  can  be  counted  upon  to  be  there 
for  a  sufficiently  long  time.  Moreover,  it is not  really enough  that  they 
should  simply  continue  at  the  same  colliery:  they  should continue  in  the 
same  job in  the  same  type  of working  unless  and  until given  the  requisite 
additional  training for  reassignment  to different duties  or  a  different 
locality. 
c)  Instruction on  safety measures 
This  should  be  given automatically as part of vocational  training as 
such.  It should bring home  to  the  worker  that  there is no clash between 
safety-mindedness  and  keenness  on  a  good  output. d)  Working conditions  for  instructors 
There  should  be  a  sufficient number  of  instructors,  who  should  be 
allowed all the  time  and  facilities  they  require  to  do  their  job properly. 
6)  As  regards checking  to ensure  that  the  work  is performed  in accordance with 
safety regulations,  it was  emphasized  that  this must  be  the  responsability of 
supervisory officials and under-officials. 
Other  ways  of  helping  to ensure  this  (without  prejudice  to  the  respon-
sibility referred  to)  will  be  discussed  in connection with  "measures  to pro-
mote  co-operation by  all concerned  in securing  the  highest  possible safety 
standards."  The  Working  Party has  not  yet  begun  its consideration of  this item. 
B.- Safe!~_!ra!~!~K sup~~~!sor~_off~~!al~~~~-~~de£-officials 
7)  Before  seeking  to state any  principles  on  the  subject,  it is necessary  to 
define  the  personnel  categories  to which  they  should  apply. 
"Supervisory officials and  under-officials"  is here  taken  as  meaning  those 
not  themselves  engaged  in  production work,  but  employed  specifically  to keep 
an eye  on  the  actions  and  reactions  of  others,  and  to discipline  any  breach 
of  regulations.  As  regards  the  training of  such  personnel,  the  Working Party's 
conclusions  to date  have  been  as  follows. 
8)  The  point  made  in A,5,b  above  concerning  the  need  for  a  man  to continue  some 
considerable  time  in  the  same  job if his  training is to  be  of  value  applies 
equally  in  the  case  of  the  special  training of  supervisory officials and 
under-officials. 
9)  Given  the  above  principles concerning occupational  training  for  personnel  in 
general,  it follows  that supervisory officials and  under-officials must: 
a)  be  sufficiently conversant with  the  instructions relating specifically  to 
the  jobs and  trades  they  are  required  to supervise,  and  with  the  instruc-
tions concerning  the  particular workings  under  their charge; 
b)  acquire  the  necessary  knowledge  to  be  able  to  draw  the  attention of  the  men 
they  are  supervising  to  the  hazards  of  their  jobs  and  show  them  how  these 
can  best  be  avoided.  They  should  also receive  instruction  in  leadership; 
c)  be  given  properly-diffenrentia  ted  training accm·ding  to  the  manner  in which 
they  are  appointed  to  their supervisory  duties.  Obviously,  the  same  trai-
ning  should  not  be  given  to  a  rank-and-file  worker,  to  a  man  who  has  gone 
on after a  brief period of  practical work  to attend oourS)s  at  a  specialized 
centre,  and  to  a  graduate  of  a  technical college  or  university.  In  the  case 
of  rank-and-file workers,  the  accent  should  be  on  theory  and  general 
training;  with  men  having already  received  more  advanced  technical 
education,  on  the  practical aspects; 
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d)  be  trained with special  reference  to  the particular requirements of  the 
supervisory grade  to which  they are  to be  appointed,  and  be  required  to 
show  before  promotion to a  higher grade  in  the  scale  of  supervisory per-
sonnel  that  they  do  in fact  possess  the  requisite qualifications for  their 
new  duties; 
e)  have  every  facility  for  refresher  and  follow-up  training,  to enable  them  to 
keep abreast  of  developments  in safety requirements  resulting from  the 
sweeping changes  in  techniques  and  working  methods. 
10)  In addition  to  being  thus  tailored  to  the  special  demands  of  their particular 
duties,  the  training of  supervisory officials and under-officials should con-
centrate  on  the  inculcation of safety rules.  In particular,  they must  be  able 
to submit  full and  accurate  reports on  accidents  and  any  other occurrences 
connected with  safety in  the  workings  they  supervise. 
Their  training should  therefore cover: 
- correct drafting of  accident  reports; 
-extraction of  instructive points suggested  by  these; 
- investigation of causes of  accidents; 
- indication of  possible corrective measures. 
Accident  reports  should contain all relevant  details as  to  the  causes, 
circumstances and  consequences  of  the  accident,  the character of  the  man 
or men  thought  likely  to  be  responsible,  and  any  suggested  future  precau-
tions against its recurrence. 
Accordingly,  the  wording  and  layout  of  the  report  form  should make  it 
perfectly clear what  information is required  from  each  person  concerned  in 
its drawing-up.  All  the  items  of  information  requested  should  be  obtainable 
in  answer  to a  straight,  unambiguous  question,  and  those  answering  the  ques-
tions  should  be  able  to  feel  sure  that  the  sole  object of  the  report is to 
assist accident  prevention. 
At  the  same  time,  the  supervisory  personnel  should also have  explained  to 
them  the  exact  purport  of  the various questions  on  the  form  and  the  way  to 
answer  them  correctly;  in particular,  they  should  be  enabled  to classify 
the causes of accidents  according  to  the  rating adopted  for  the  form,  and 
set practical exercices  to make  clear  to  them  the effects of  an  incon1plete, 
vague  or  inaccurate answer. 
These  accident  reports would  serve  as  the  basis for  the  safety record  to 
be  drawn  up  periodically  for  each  wo~king,  and  also for  the  study of ways  and 
means  of  preventing other accidents of  the  same  kind  and  of encouraging gene-
ral keenness  and  co-operation  to ensure  higher  standards  of safety. 11)  The  importance  to safety of maintaining an adequate staff of qualified fore-
men  and  supervis~rs alive  to  their responsabilities regarding both  the  safe-
ty  and  the  technical  side raises  the  problem of  an  appropriate selection 
procedure. 
Requirements  can of course  be  laid  down  in  theory with  regard  to  the con-
ditions and qualifications  for  appointment  to such  posts  and  promotion  from 
one  supervisory or  foremanship  grade  to another,  but  in practice allowance 
must  be  made  in each case  for all  the circumstances  involved.  Hence  it is ne-
cessary  to fix  the  procedure  for  these  appointments  and  promotions. 
In  some  countries,  all proposed  supervisory appointments  and  promotions 
have  to  be  notified in advance  to  the  mining  authorities,  with details of  the 
powers  the  nominee  is to  be  given  and  the  sphere within which  they will  be 
exercised,  the  appointment  or  promotion  cannot  become  effective until  the 
authorities have  given  their·consent,  which  they  may  do  subject  to certain 
provisos.  In one  Community  country it becomes  effective unless  the  authori-
ties actively object within  a  given  time-limit. 
While  there exist such  individual  national  arrangements,  the  procedure  to 
be  adopted  in respect  of  the  selection of supervisory  personnel  remains  a 
matter  for  some  attention. 
C.- ~~l£hOtechn!£al ex~minations 
12)  The  Working Party's discussions  under  this head  were  mainly  on  the  need: 
- To  study  how  such  examinations can  be  most  effectively conducted; 
- to establish how  they,  along with  the  medical  examinations  and  job fitness 
tests,  can aid  the  management  in deciding  on  a  more  informed  basis regar-
ding  the subject's recruitment,  assignment  to certain duties  or  promotion 
to a  supervisory post. 
13)  Psychotechnical examinations  for  colliery personnel  could  be  of  two  kinds. 
First,  a  fairly  summary  pre-entry examination,  designed  simply  to ascertain 
the applicant's general  intelligence,  in order  to weed  out  those  falling  be-
low  a  given m.inimum  standard:  it is a  fact  that quite  a  number  of accidents 
are caused  by  the  employment  below  ground  of  men  of  unduly  limited understan-
ding. 
Again,  a  man  whom  it is proposed  to assign  to certain duties  involving  a 
particular risk of group accidents  or calling for  special  intelligence or 
qualities of charachter could  be  required  to undergo  a  more  detailed psycho-
technical examination  to establish his suitability for  the  job.  It is felt 
that  this would  be  useful  in particular  in  the  case  of: 
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- loco-drivers; 
- signalmen; 
- winding  enginemen; 
- shotfirers; 
- haulage  foremen; 
- shaker-conveyor foremen; 
- face  deputies, 
and  other workmen  carrying out  supervisory  duties. 
14)  The·pre-entry psychotechnical  examination would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  selec-
tion  test,  i.e.  designed solely  to check whether  the applicant possesses  the 
right qualities for  underground  employment  generally,  or  for  employment, 
forthwith  or  later,  in a  specific capacity:  in view  of  the  increasing diver-
sification of  the miner's work,  the  latter would  be  preferable. 
Subsequentpsychotechnicalexaminations,  on  the  other  hand,  should as  far 
as  possible  be  more  for  the  purpose  of  vocational  guidance:  they  should  be 
aimed  at ascertaining not  merely whether  the  subject is suited for  a  par-
ticular job,  but  for  what  range  of  jobs he  is suited. 
15)  The  management  should  be  responsible  for  laying  down  the  requirements  to be 
satisfied by applicants  for  employment  and candidates  for  particular assign-
ments  or  promotions. 
In  the  case  of  some  occupations,  it might  be  useful  to have  the  psycho-
logist determine  these  requirements experimentallytby examining  men  who  have 
been  on  the  jobs  in question  for  some  time  and  given satisfaction. 
16)  The  psychologist  should  be  reasonably  familiar  with  the  nature  of  the  man's 
prospective  duties  and  the  conditions under  which  they will  be  performed. 
Also,  his conclusions would  apply  for  a  fixed  period  only. 
17)  A practice could  usefully  be  made  of  having  marks  awarded  at  regular  inter-
vals  by  their superiors  on  men  who  had  undergone  psychotechnical examination, 
and  comparing  these with  the  psychologist's findings. 
It should  be  noted,  however,  that  such  marking  systems  ordinarily cover 
all aspects  of  the worker's  occupational  conduct,  while  the  psychologist 
deals  only  with  some  of  these.  The  marks  could  not,  therefore,  be  simply 
condensed  into an  overall assessment  for  comparison with  the  psychologist's 
rating  :  they  would  need  to  be  awarded  on  the  basis of  a  set of  standard 
questions  framed  to elicit the  required  data.  The  marking  system would  need 
to  be  very carefully worked  out  to ensure  that it was  properly objective and 
comparable with  the  psychologist's report. III. 
EFFECTS  OF  WORKING  HOURS  ON  SAFETY  WITH  SPECIAL 
REFERENCE  TO  DIFFICULT  AND  UNHEALTHY  WORKINGS 
1)  In accordance with its programme,  the  Wor~ing Party first discussed which 
types  of working it would  consider  (wet  workings,  thin  seams,  hot workings), 
and  then went  on  to examine,  with  regard  to hot  workings,  what  method  could 
best  be  used  for  measuring  the effective heat,  and  beyond  what  temperatures 
special  precautions were  needed  or  operations must  cease  and  perhaps even 
the continued  presence  of  any  person  in  such workings  must  be  prohibited. 
2)  After  a  general  discussion of all  three  types  of difficult working  referred 
to,  attention was  concentrated  on  hot workings. 
3)  The  Working  Party first reviewed  the  regulations  in  force  in  the  different 
coal-producing countries of  the  Community. 
The  Mines  Act  provides  for  reduced  working  hours  above  a  dry  temperature 
of 28°C. 
The  normal  shift as  fixed  by  collective-bargaining ag1•eement  is eight 
hours,  but  the  maximum  time  which  may  be  spent,  at work  or  otherwise,  in 
a  hot  working  is six hours.  A "hot working"  is any  point at which  the 
temperature  exceeds 28°C.  The  six hours  include  only  such minutes  of  tra-
velling time  as are  spent  passing  through  temperatures  over  28°C.  The 
total duration of  the  shift  thus  amounts  to  the six hours  spent working 
in and  passing  through  hot  atmospheres  plus  the  rest of  the  travelling 
time  at  lower  temperatures;  it may  accordingly vary  from  one  worker  to 
another. 
As  the calculation is based  on  the  dry  temperature,  the  other  atmos-
pheric  factors  - humidity,air velocity and  radiation  - are  not  taken into 
account. 
Continued  study  is being given  to  the  regulation of work  at high  tempe-
ratures,  in order  to  take  account  of  improved  knowledge  of conditions  in 
hot workings,  and  also because it is now  felt  to  be  a  deficiency  that  no 
maximum.temperature  has  been  fixed  above  which  personnel  should  not  be 
present  in a  working at all. 
No  provision is made  in  the  regulations  as  to  the lengthof  time  to be 
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worked at particular temperatures,  but  the  Regional  Inspectors of  Mines 
have  power  to fix maximum  temperatures  beyond  which  work  must  cease.  For 
the  Campine  coalfield  the  maximum  is 30°C.  by  the  Belgian  formula  of 0.9 
wet  temperature  plus 0.1  dry,  and  for  the  Borinage 31°C.;  in  the  other 
Belgian coalfields  the  question  does  not arise. 
A proposed  new  regulation  on  ventilation further  provides  that at all 
points in  the  mine  the  temperature  must  be  kept within  limits involving 
no risk to health,  due  allowance  being made  for  the velocity and  moisture 
content  of  the air and  the  type  of work  to  be  done.  This  general  provision 
ought  to be  supplemented  by  more  specific detailed directives. 
The  overall regulations  make  only general  reference  to hot workings: 
except  in special cases,  the air velocity in workings  must  be  such  that 
the  dry  and  wet  temperatures are appropriate  to  the  work  to be  done. 
An  implementing order  provides  that,  where  it is absolutely vital  that 
a  particular activity should  be  carried  on  in  an  overheated  atmosphere,  it 
should  be  limited  to short periods with appropriate  breaks in less  uncom-
fortable  surroundings.  This applies  in particular to rescue  work  or  action 
to avert  imminent  danger. 
By  the  Decree  of  1936  the  Government  is empowered  to fix shorter hours 
for workings  where  the  atmospheric  conditions make  the  work  exceptionally 
arduous:  this has,  however,  never  been  done. 
The  relevant  portions of  the  mines  regulations are  in process  of  revi-
sion. 
Under  the  old  regulations: 
- No  persons  under 20 were  allowed  to  be  employed  in underground  workings 
where  the  temperature  was  over  30°C. ; 
- except  by  special authorization of  the  Inspector-General  of  Mines,  no 
persons were  allowed  to spend  any  time  in  temperatures  of  over  35  °C. 
unless  in cases of emergency  or  imminent  danger; 
- the  shift for  personnel  employed at points  below  ground  where  the  tem-
perature was  over  30°C.  must  not  exceed  six hours; - the  Inspector-General  was  empowered  to require shifts to  be  reduced 
down  to but not  below  six hours  in  the case  of certain workings  where 
the  temperature  was  over 28°C.  and  the  atmospheric  conditions excep-
tionally unfavourable. 
The  new  draft regulations provide,  inter alia,  that: 
- the  term  "effective  temperature"  shall  be  officially defined as  "the 
atmosphere  computed,  by  reference  to  a  given  nomogram,  from  the  dry  and 
wet  temperatures  and  the air velocity"; 
- the effective  temperature  beyond  which  persons  under  21  may  not  be  pre-
sent  in underground workings shall  be  28°C.  instead of 30°C.  as hereto-
fore; 
- the effective  temperature  beyond  which  personnel  may  work  only  in  the 
case  of  imminent  danger  shall  be  32°C.,  the  Inspector-General  to have 
power  to authorize exceptions; 
- the effective  temperature  beyond  which  the  l~ngth of  the shift is re-
duced shall  be  28°C.,  the  six-hour  limit  to apply notto  the  time  spent 
actually working  but  to  the  whole  time  spent  below  ground. 
e)_!TALY_ 
Where  the  dry  temperature exceeds  32°C.  the shift is limited  to five 
hours;  where  it exceeds  35°C.  operations must  cease. 
These  limits apply  to all mines:  the competent  authorities may  fix 
lower  temperatures  in accordance with  the  degree  of  humidity.  In point of 
fact,  the  temperature  in  the  coalmines  is appreciably  below  32°C. 
There  are  no  specific regulations  on  this point,  merely  a  general  re-
quirement  that  appropriate conditions must  be  maintained  regarding  tempe-
rature  and  humidity. 
So  far,  no  difficulties have  arisen. 
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The  matter is,  however,  receiving attention:  the  research establish-
ments  are at work  on  air-conditioning and  air-cooling systems,  while  hygro-
meters  installed in underground workings are  read  daily  so  that  the  precise 
humidity  figures are  regularly available. 
4)  The  Working  Party also noted  the  arrangements at various Belgian and  German 90 
collieries for  cooling the air in workings.  These  are  of  two  kinds. 
At  some  collieries a  powerful  refrigerating plant at  the  surface cools  the 
whole  ventilation air.  Part of  the  improvement  is lost in circulation:  the 
loss is very slight in  the  cross-cuts,  as  the  surrounding strata are cooled 
and  act as  insulators,  but is more  considerable  in  the  gate-roads,  where vir• 
gin  rock is constantly being  laid bare. 
At  one  colliery in Southern Belgium where  this method  is used,  wet  tempe-
ratures of 26-27°C.  have  been  obtained with  very high  dry  temperatures,  al-
though  the strata temperature  is about  52°C.  and  the  uncooled  dry  tempera-
ture might  be  as much  as 38-39°C.  in  the  return airways. 
In other cases,  it is considered useless  to pre-cool  the  ventilation air 
at  the  top of  the  downcast  shaft,  and  systems  have  therefore  been  installed 
whereby  fresh water  and  brine are  passed  through circuits to heat-exchangers 
at the  bottom gate.  Just  beyond  the  air-conditioners  (usually  placed  some 
50 metres  from  the  bottom gate)  the  temperature  may  be  brought  down  to a  mere 
l4°C. 
5)  a)  - Following this initial exchange  of  information,  the  Working  Party went 
on  to discuss possible measures  for  ensuring greater safety  in hot  wor-
kings  in  the  different Community  countries. 
It was  agreed  that  the  Working  Party  should  debate  not  the  member 
countries regulations as  such,  but  points  of  substaqce  and  medical  con-
siderations applying to all Community  countries.  This is did  in consi-
derable  detail,  producing  a  number  of highly pertinent observations;  it 
is felt,  however,  that  these  should  be  further  gone  over  in consultation 
with medical  experts before  they  are  offered in the  form  of  definite 
conclusions  to  the  full Commission. 
The  following is a  brief progress report  on  the  Working Party's dis-
cussions  to date. 
b)  - The  great  problem  of work  at high  temperatures is for  the worker  to keep 
his  thermal  equilibrium.  Beyond  a  certain effective  temperature  he  is 
liable  to fail,  to collapse  on  the  job and  suffer serious injury to his 
health:  with such  temperature conditions prevailing,  it is useless  simp-
ly  to allow breaks in  the work,  as  they  do  little to help restore  the 
man's  thermal  equilibrium.  Below  this maximum,  the  equilibrium can  be 
maintained,  provided special precautions are  taken  and  the worker  can 
get  rid of  the additional  heat  and  if necessary exert himself  less:  here breaks  can  be  helpful. 
c)  - The  Working  Party  preferred  to  base its discussions  on  the  concept  of at-
mosphere  rather  than  on  that of  temperature,  the  latter ordinarily rela-
ting to dry  temperature,  while  the  former  also covers  humidity,  air velo-
city and  (in  theory  though  often not  iri  practice)  radiation efects. 
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d)  - The  Working Party declines  to offer any  opinion  on  the  relative scientific 
merits of  the  various methods  so far  devised  for  measuring atmospheric  con-
ditions;  no  recommendation will  be  made  in this connection. 
e)  - It has  sought  to  view  the  problems  purely  from  the  practical angle.  These 
have  been  the  object  of detailed research  in various countries and  indus-
tries:  while  the  results ·are  not  yet  final,  they  provide  sufficient basis 
for  a  number  of conclusions suitable for  practical  implementation,  though 
subject  to later revision. 
Experience  latterly,  more  especially as coal-winning is having  to  be 
conducted  deeper  and  deeper  below  ground,  has clearly demonstrated  that 
certain precautions are  desirable and  should  be  introduced without  waitin~ 
for  the  final  research  findings. 
6)  The  Working  Party discussed  the  desirability of establishing  two  maximum  tempe-
ratures  beyond  which,  respectively: 
- Personnel  should,  for  health and  safety reasons,  not  be  allowed  to work  or even 
to  be  present at all; 
- operations should  be  allowed  only subject  to special  precautionary arrangements. 
a)  Urging  the  fixing of  (1),  the  German  delegates emphazided,  in addition  to  the 
medical  considerations just cited,  their own  experience  under  the  regulations 
in  force  in Germany:  despite  the  reduced  hour·s  workable  above  a  dry  tempera-
ture of 28°C.,  the  absence  of an  absolute maximum  was  felt  to be  infortunate. 
b)  Limit  (1)  might  vary considerably according as it was  based  practical experi-
ence  or  on  purely scientific calculations.  Scientifically speaking,  it is 
possible  to work  at compartively high  temperatures,  but  regulations  based  on 
these criteria alone  would  be  of little practical value  to  the collieries:  the 
conditions under which  work  would  have  to  be  carried on  at  the  highest  tempe-
ratures would  be  barely reconcilable with  operational  requirements,  and  any 
such regulations would  moreover  have  a  bad effect psychologically. 
The  Working Party intends  to base  itself on  these  points in determining  in 
due  course  the  temperature  limit it will  propose  to  the  Commission. 92 
c)  Beyond  this limit,  personnel  would  be  allowed  into the  workings  only  in excep-
tional circumstances or in  the  case of  imminent  danger,  on  the  following  con-
ditions: 
Prior permission  to  be  obtained  from  the  Inspectorate of  Mines,  such per-
mission  to  be  provisional  onl~;  the  work  to be  performed  under  medical  su-
pervision,. and  for  limited periods,  not  exceeding  one  hour without  a  break; 
assignments  of  this kind  to  be  given only  to men  passed as perfectly fit, 
and  not  over  a  certain age. 
In  the event  of  imminentdanger  work  could of course  be  undertaken with-
out  advance  notification of  the  Inspectorate of Mines  and  the medical ser-
vice  and  without special medical  examination of  the  personnel  concerned; 
such notification should,  however,  be  given without  delay  in order  that 
any  action necessary  on  the  part of  the  authorities could  be  taken as quick-
ly as possible. 
7)  For  the  reasons given under  5,  b  above,  special  precautions should  be  taken  to 
maintain  the  thermal  equilibrium of personnel working at  temperatures  between 
the  absolute maximum  referred  to under  6  and  a  lower ceiling level. 
a)  The  first precaution would  be  the  institution of special medical  checks  in 
connection with conditions  in hot workings,  to test  the  subjects'  ability 
to withstand  heat.  As  individual reactions to heat vary widely,  it is not 
enough  for  the  men  assigned  to such  duties  to  be  simply  in  good  health and 
suited to underground  duties in general.  Failing very careful selection based 
on  heat  tolerance,  the  accent would  need  to be  on  the  other precautionary 
measures  mentioned  below,  beyond  a  fairly  low  temperature ceiling,  so as  to 
allow  for  the  poorest  individual  resistances. 
The  selection should comprise  a  medical  examination specifically for  the 
purpose  just before  the man's  assignment  to a  hot  working,  followed  up  fair-
ly  soon afterwards by  a  check-up on his inurement,  and  subsequently  by  further 
checks at regular  intervals. 
As  well as effecting these selection tests for  work at high  temperatures, 
the  medical  service  should  be  entitled  to  propose  any  other  precautions  for 
taking into account all the circumstances  in any  particular working. 
b)  The  important question  ~rises whether  men  employed  in hot workings  should 
be  required  to work  shorter hours  or  to expend  less energy. 
c)  In  theory  reduced expenditure  of  energy  would  certainly be  the better alterna-
tive;  in practice,  however,  it is extremely difficult to gauge expenditure of effort,  either in  bot workings  or elsewhere,  besides which  the  amount  of 
effort required  to perform  a  particular job may  vary appreciably  from  one 
worker  to another.  Shorter working  hours  may  therefore  be  regarded as an  in-
direct  but  helpful  means  of avoiding overstrain at high  temperatures  and  the 
consequent  dangers. 
They  do  not,  however,  in themselves constitutea full  solution.  A man  has 
only  a  limited amount  of energy  to expend,  and  certain jobs can  demand  too 
much,  thereby  involving  danger  to health after very short exertions.  More-
over,  workers  may  step up  their expenditure  of energy  in  line with  the  reduc-
tion in working  hours,  and  so  be  as  tired after a  reduced shift as after a 
normal  one. 
It is therefore  desirab!'e  to have  recourse  to both  types  of arrangement, 
i.e.  shorter working  hours  and  precautions  to  limit expenditure of energy. 
8)  Although  the constitution may  be  differently affected by  regular  and  by  occa-
sional work at high  temperatures,  it would  appear  better to shorten  the  daily 
shift than  to reduce  the  weekly  total  by  granting off-days,  as  the  latte1· would 
tend  to  lessen  the  advantages  of heat  inurement. 
The  question  then  arises whether  the  reduction  should  be  in  the  statutory 
length  of  the  shift  (which  usually  includes winding  and  travelling time)  or  in 
the  amount  of  time  actually  to  be  spent  in a  hot  atmosphere.  The  latter appears 
more  to  the  point,  as  the  purpose  is  to limit  the  effects of heat  on  the  human 
frame.  So  understood,  the  maximum  fixed  would  apply  to  the  whole  period spent 
working,  any  breaks  taken also in a  hot  atmosphere,  and  time  taken  travelling 
through  such  atmospheres,  but  not  to  time  taken  travelling through  normal  at-
mospheres.  The  total  length  of  the  shift might  thus  vary  from  worker  to worker; 
obviously,  however,  each man  must  be  able  to return  to  the  surface  immediately 
his shift is over. 
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As  the  time  actually spent  at  work  in  normal  workings  very  often  comes  to 
about  six hours  out  of  the  regular eight-hour shift,  it bas  been  queried whether, 
to afford real protection,  the  maximum  period  to  be  spent  in hot  atmospheres 
should not  be  fixed at  less  than  six hours.  The  setting of  a  special  limit  for 
hot workings  does  of  course  ensure  that  the  six hours  cannot  be  exceeded even 
where  the  travelling distance  is exceptionally short;  in addition,  it implies 
a  ban  on  overtime  in hot workings.  However,  to make  for  really effective protec-
tion,  two  possibilities were  suggested. 
It was  felt  by  some  that,  over  and  above  the  time  limitation,  measures 
should  be  introduced  to  limit  the expenditure  of effort over  a  period,  in such 94 
a  way  that  the  men  in  a  hot working would  not  be  required  to expend  more 
energy  than  those  elsewhere.  In view  of  the  difficulty of calculating the 
energy  needed  to perform any  given  job,  it was  proposed  to  take  the  comple-
tion of a  normal  shift in  a  normal  atmosphere  as  representing a  reasonable 
burden  of  fatigue  for  a  normal  worker,  and  in  determining  the  length of  the 
shift to multiply  the  time  spent  in a  hot  atmosphere  by  a  factor allowing 
for  the extra fatigue  involved:  thus  an  hour  spent  in a  hot  atmosphere  would 
be  taken as equalling an  agreed  longer period  in a  normal  atmosphere. 
It is of course  a  fact  that,  even  where  everything is done  to,eliminate 
danger,  work  in hot  atmospheresis  liable  to be  more  arduous  than  work at 
normal  temperatures.  This  is,  however,  not  properly speaking a  safety problem, 
and  the  question of higher  pay  for  additional  fatigue  involving  no  risk 
either to safety or  to health would  be  a  matter for collective bargaining. 
9)  There  could  be  various possible  ways  of  restricting the  amount  of effort re-
quired of men  employe'd  in hot workings. 
a)  Thus,  piece work  could  be  barred,  either in all workings  rated as  "hot" 
or  beyond  an  intermediate  temperature  between  the  lower ceiling  (necessi-
tating special precautions)  and  the absolute ceiling  (necessitating dis-
continuance  of operations);  the prohibition could apply  to piece work  of 
all kinds  or  simply  to  individual  work at piece rates. 
b)  Piece work  could,  while  not  barred altogether,  be  made  subject  to special 
rules applying only  in  the  case of hot wprkings.  Thus,  the  piece  rates 
payable  for  work  there could  be  increased  to enable  the  worker  to earn 
the  same  amounts  as  his opposite  numbers  in normal  workings  for  less 
effort:  this would  however,  involve  some  risk,  inasmuch as  the extra pay 
might  tempt  the  men  to intensify their exertions. 
Alternative possibilities would  be  to restrict the  amount  of work  ac-
tually to be  done  (e.g.  by  giving instructions that  the  tonnage  to be  ex-
tracted during  the shift in a  hot  working  must  not exceed  a  specified 
amount),  or  to fix  a  ceiling to the  total wages  per  day  a  man  can earn at 
piece rates in a  hot working;  the  example  was  quoted  of rules  in  the 
German  iron and  steel industry whereby  earnings at  piece rates may  not 
exceed  a  standard  sum  by  more  than  10%. 
In coalfields where  there  are  committees  of workers'  and  employers' 
representatives whose  terms  of  reference  cover  piece work,  these  could 
see  to it that  the  piece-work arrangements,  especially in hot workings, are  such as  not  to make  for overstrain,  and  in fact  where  possible  to pre-
vent  it. 
The  Working  Party also noted  the  potential value  of scientific work or-
ganization methods  in this connection.  These  do  provide  for  breaks propor-
tionate  to  the  difficulty of  the  job and  the  environmental  conditions,  and 
properly applied should  therefore serve  to prevent overstrain. 
10)  It should  be  added  that  these  measures  to  limit working hours and/or expen-
diture  of energy  need  not all be  instituted as  from  the  same  temperature.  Ob-
viously,  appropriate  medical  tests should  be  carried out  before  the  atmosphe-
ric conditions start to affect  a  constitution reacting normally  to heat,  so 
that all workers  having  poor.reactions  in this respect can  be  weeded  out  be-
forehand.  The  precautionary measures  could  thereafter  become  stricter and 
stricter up  to  the  ceiling temperature  beyond  which  localities would  be 
barred  to  human  occupation. 
11)  Two  special  problems  were  also brought  up  in  the  course  of  the  discussions. 
a)  An  effective  temperature  may  represent  any  number  of different  dry  tempe-
ratures,  according  to  the  degree  of  humidity  of  the  atmosphere.  It may 
therefore  be  asked  whether,  in addition  to  the  ceiling effective  tempera-
ture  beyond  which  workings  must  be  evacuated,  a  ceiling dry  temperature 
ought  not  also  to  be  fixed  above  which  the  same  would  apply,  irrespective 
of  the  effective  temperature.  In a  high  dry  temperature  the  worker's  ther-
mal  equilibrium can  be  preserved  by  free  perspiration,  but  this necessi-
tates drinking  large  amounts,  which  involves  an  additional strain on  the 
heart. 
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Experience  elsewhere,  however,  more  particularly in  the  potassium mines, 
suggests  that  work  is possible at  dry  temperatures  seldom found  in coalmines. 
b)  Thequestion  was  also raised whether  special  precautions ought  not  to  be 
taken with regard  to juveniles and  middle-aged workers. 
In  the  case  of  juveniles,  the  danger  is not  so much  that  the  work  will 
be  too  much  for  them  as  that it will stunt  their growth.  However,  it was 
pointed  out  that all  the  Community  countries already  have  a  whole  series 
of  safeguards  for  juvenile workers  - in many  cases not  only  laws  and  re-
gulations concerning their working conditions,  but  also contractual  pro-
visions prohibiting  the  employment  of  persons  under  a  specified age  on 
piece  work.  It was  further  noted  that  to require  juveniles  to  be  actually 
barred  from  employment  in  hot  workings  might  mean  that  they  could  not  go up  for  their hewer's examination until  they  were  older,  and  indeed might 
substantially restrict  the possibility of employing  them at all.  In any 
case,  the  special medical  checks  for all workers  to be  assigned  to hot 
workings would enable  the appropriate action  to  be  taken in each  indivi-
dual  case. 
Similarly,  while after middle  age workers  are undoubtedly  likely  to be 
less suited for  work at high  temperatures,  it is felt best  that  the col-
liery medical service should  be  responsible  for  deciding case  by  case 
which  men  should  be  excluded. 
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DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  FIELD  OF  MINE  SAFETY  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  COUNTRIES; 
POSITION  REGARDING  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  CONFERENCE'S  RECOMMENDATIONS 
On  pp.  117 ff.  of its First Report,  the Commission set forth  the provisio-
nal position as  to  the steps  taken  by  the different Governments  up  to November  1, 
1958,  to  implement  the  recommendations  of  the Conference. 
The  tables on  pp.  146-170 of this Report  enable  a  comparison to be made 
between  the situation as at November  1,  1958,  and  that reached  by  December  31,  1960. 
The  indications  in the  column  headed  "31.12.60" represent action taken since 
November  1,  1958,  in respect  both of  technical aspects  and of  human  factors.  Those 
in the  column  headed  "1.11.58" which  have  remained unchanged  have  not  been transfer-
red  to  the  1960  column. 
By  comparing  the position as at November  1,  1958,  and December  31,  1960, 
respectively,  we  are able  to see what  progress has  been  made  during  the period under 
review;  it must  be  borne  in mind,  of course,  that  in adapting and  remodelling mine 
safety regulations experience has  shown  it to be  necessary  to dispose of  numerous 
problems  and in many  cases  to  overcome special difficulties. 
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The  abbreviations used in the  tables are as  follows. 
C - National regulations already  in conformity with  the Conference's Resolution. 
NRC  - New  regulations in conformity with  the Conference's Resolution have  been drawn 
up  and  promulgated. 
NRP  - New  regulations in conformity with  the Conference's Resolution are  in prepara-
tion. 
E- Question as  towhethernew regulations should be  drawn  up  is under examination. 
RB  - Conference's Resolution has  been referred back  to  the Commission  for  reconsi-
deration. 
N - Competent  authorities in the country  concerned have decided not  to bring their 
·regulations into line with  the Conference's Resolution. 
?  - Final decision still uncertain. 
C'  - Recommendation  not  embodied  in regulations but already  in force  in practice. 
(This  abbreviation is used for  the first time) 
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As  will  be  recalled,  the Governments,  meeting  in the Special Council  of 
Ministers  on  March  15  and April  15,  1957,  divided the Conference's  recommendations 
into four  categories,  viz. 
1.  Propcsals which  the Governments will  take  immediate steps  to. have  put  into effect 
in full; 
2.  Proposals which  the Governments will take  immediate steps  to have  put  into effect 
with minor  amendments  or with  an  intervening period of  grace; 
3.  Proposals  which  the Governments will adopt  in substance; 
4.  Proposals which  the Governments  consider to require closer examination. 
A recapitulation of  the Conference  recommendations  now  ratified by  the  laws 
or regulations of  the  member  countries must  thus  include 
- those already  shown  as such  in the  column  giving the position as at November  1, 
1958, 
- those  indicated in the  column  for  December  31,  1960, 
together with  those  given under  the latter date as  being applied  in practice though 
not  figuring specifically in regulations. 
Action  therefore remains  to  be  taken only  in respect of  those  recommenda-
tions regarding which either new  regulations are in preparation,  examination is still 
in progress  or  no  decision can as yet be  announced. 
Finally,  in a  very small  number  of cases,  the competent  national authorities 
have  decided against  implementing  the  recommendations  in question.  These  cases are 
duly  shown  in the  tables. 
In order to give  a  definitive picture of  the present position,  so  that  in 
future it will  be  necessary  only  to list changes  taking place  in relation to it, we 
have  felt it best  to summarize  the content  of  those  recommendations  which  at Decem-
ber  31,  1960,  had not,  in one  or more  member  countries,  been  embodied either in 
laws,  in regulations or  in mining  practice. 
All  recommendations  not  included  in the  following  summary  are  therefore 
to be  regarded as  having  been  implemented  de  jure or  de  facto  in all the member 
countries. 
I.- FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY,  LAND  NORTH  RHINE/WESTPHALIA 
In  5  cases  the question as  to whether  new  regulations should be  drawn  up  is 
still under  examination  (E);  in 7  cases  the present  arrangements  are  in part al-
ready  in line with  the Conference's  recommendations  while as  regards  the remain-
der  the  recommendations  are still under  examination  (CE). In  3  cases  the competent  authorities have decided not  to alter their existing 
regulations  (N),  an.d  in  2  cases  they are prepared  to a.lter  them  in part  (CN). 
In 1  case only  is the  outcome still in doubt  (?). 
Recommend~tions rated E 
Compressed-air ejectors 
- Compressed-air ejectors in use  underground to be  placed in appropriate 
ducts;  minimum  length of duct  between ejector and  discharge  point  to be 
fixed;  whole  apparatus  to  be  properly earthed. 
2)  !V~ ~,_6_(£o~f~r~n~e_R~p~r!  E·-3~) 
Minimum  air quantity per  independent ventilating district 
- To  be  based  not  only  on  the  number  of workers  in attendance,  but  also 
allowing  for  other factors  such as  the  tonnage  worked,  amount  of  firedamp 
emitted,  and  atmospheric conditions. 
Prevention of fires  in shafts 
In all shafts,  and particularly in downcast  shafts,  all wood  linings  and 
other wooden  equipment,  especially  in  ladderway  partitions,  portal head-
pieces over  landings,  etc.,  to be  replaced without  delay  by  fire-resisting 
material. 
4)  !X~ ~,_1!-~ iC~n!e~e~c~ ~eEo~t_p~ !42 
Locomotive  haulage  (improvement  of visibility and  protection of driver) 
- New  locomotives  to have  fixed covered cabs;  locomotives  already  in use  to 
be  converted to conform with  this requirement;  the  competent authorities 
to have  the  right  to exempt  certain types of  locomotive. 
(See alsop.  20  of  the Commission's First Report.) 
5)  !X~  ~~-39-~ iC~n!e!e~c~ ~eEo~t_p~  ~12 
Restriction of  use of  flammable  oils 
- Use  of  flammable  oils below  ground for mechanical  transmission purposes  to 
be  avoided. 
Recommendations  rated N 
Clearing-out of compressed-air mains 
- Compressed-air valve  to be  opened very gradually;  air jet not  to be direc-
ted towards  those  points where  firedamp  is most  likely to be  present;  care 
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to be  taken  to make  sure that  there is no  accumulation of  firedamp  in the 
area  immediately  in front  of  the  end of  the air pipe. 
2)  y,_BL  ~,_b_(£o~f~r~n~e_R~p~r! f·_4!) 
General  neutralization 
- Minimum  percentage of  incombustible matter  in dust  to be  fixed  in propor-
tion to amount  of  firedamp  present. 
3)  YI!IL  ~,_7:EL !a~t_t!o_w~r~s_o! first  ~e~t~n~e_(£o~f~r~n~e_R~p~r! e._6~) 
Restriction of  use of  flammable  oils 
- "Should it be  necessary  for  technical  reasons  to use  flammable  oil,  the 
amount  should be  kept  to  a  minimum,  and effective precautions  taken  to 
prevent  any  risk of  fire  from "oil leakages". 
Recommendation  rated ? 
- !X!.  ~,_22-~,_s~c~nd ea!:a~r~P!!  !C~n!e!:e~c~  ~eeo!:t_P.:.  76) 
Locomotive  haulage 
- New  locomotives  and other vehicles  to be  fitted with devices which will 
ensure that  they  can be set and kept  in motion only when  the driver is at 
his post. 
B.- RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  SAFETY  REGULATIONS,  SAFETY  SUPERVISION  AND  THE 
WORKER'S  PART  IN  SAFETY 
In  3  cases  the  competent authorities have  decided not  to alter their existing 
regulations  (N) 
1)  !,_GL !i!:S!  fa!:a~r!P!!  !C~n!e!:e~c~  ~efO!:t_P.:.  84) 
Safety departments  in enterprises 
- Specialist staff,  administratively  independent  of  the safety department, 
to  be  assigned to  inquire into certain matters of particular importance 
in connection with safety;  their activities to be  conducted  in close 
co-operation with  the safety department. 
2)  !IL  ~,_2L  !h!r~ ~e~t~n~e_(£o~f~r~n~e_R~p~r! f·_9~) 
Position of  Mines  Inspectorate personnel 
- Such  personnel  to be  required to work  in the Mines  Inspectorate for  a 
stated minimum  period,  and  to engage  full-time  on  their inspection duties. 
3)  !VL  ~,_B_(~o~f~r~n~e_R~p~r! f·_9!) 
Disciplinary action in the event  of  breaches of safety regulations 
- Indispensable,  but,  in  the Conference's view,  not  the most  effective 
method  of  improving safety.  Improvement  possible by  means  of careful study of working  methods,  proper  training of  personnel  and full co-operation by 
all concerned .in creating sa.fety-mindedness.  Also useful:  system of  bonuses 
for  personnelin sectionswith a  largely accident-free.record. 
One  recommendation  is under  examination  (E). 
Recommendation  rated  ? 
!I~ ~,_l_(£o~f~r~n~e_R~port f·_92) 
Councils  and  Committees assisting the Minister responsible for  the mines 
- Desirable  that  these should  include employer's  and workers'  representatives. 
C.- RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  HUMAN  FACTORS 
In 6  cases  the  competent  authorities have  decided not  to bring their regula-
tions  into line with  the Conference's  recommendations,  and  in  1  case  to do  so 
only  in part  (N).  In only  1  case  is the question of  drawing  up  fresh regulations 
still partly under  examination  (CE). 
The  recommendations  regarding medical  and  psychological examination  and 
supervision have  so  fa.r  been studied only  from  the medical  angle;  changes with 
regard  to the  psychologica.l  side will  be  considered only  when  the Working Party 
on  Psychological  and  Sociological Factors has  completed its assignment.  This  is 
also  the  position in most  of  the  other member  countries. 
Recommendations  rated N 
1)  !1!,_9_(~o~f~r~n~e_Report f·_l23l 
Practical reception methods:  organization 
- "Assembly  centres" to be  established where  la.rge-sca.le  recruitment  is being 
carried on  in countries having  a  manpower  surplus,  such centres  to be  res-
ponsible  for  giving material  and  moral  assistance,  medical  fitness  tests 
and  a  certain amount  of  guidance  as  to  the  job and  general  living and wor-
king conditions  a.wai ting  the  men  on  reaching their destination. 
2)  y,_2_(£o~f~r~n~e_R~p~r! f·_l!02 
Methods  of observing and assessing  individual miners at work 
- All  those  concerned with safety  (managerial  and  supervisory staff,  medical 
officers,  psychologists,  safety engineers,  etc.)  to  be  associated with  em-
ployment  of  special work-study  methods  (time  and motion study,  job analysis, 
job evaluation,  etc.). 
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3)  y~~  !2~  !a~t_s~n!e~c~ !C~n!e~e~c~ ~efo~t_p~l!52 
Intensified training of adults:  specialization of  instructors 
- Instructors  to be  full-time specialists and  to have  nothing  to do with  the 
production side. 
4)  - 5)  YI!I~  !0~  ~~~ !C~n!e~e~c~ ~efo~t_p~  !2~) 
Problems  in connection with  foreign workers 
- So  far as possible,  instructors training foreign workers  to have  an  ade-
quate  knowledge  of  the latter's language as well  as  of  the  language of  the 
country of employment;  every  team  to  include at least one  worker with  an 
adequate  knowledge  of both  languages. 
6)  !X~  ~  !C~n!e!e~c~ ~efo!t_p~  !2~) 
Method  of  payment  of  supervisory staff 
- Pay  of supervisory staff to be  so fixed as  to enable  them  to bear their 
full share of responsibility regarding safety without suffering any dis-
advantage  in regard to their wages. II.- FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY,  SAAR 
A.- RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
17  recownendations are still under study,  2  of them  in part only. 
In 2  cases it has  been decided  not  to accept  part  of the change  recommended. 
Recommendations  rated E 
Use  of millisecond detonators  in gassy  or dusty  workings 
- Period of delay  between  two shots liable to affect  one  another  not  to exceed 
three intervals of delay. 
2)  !IL6:SLaL  !h!r~ ~e~t~n~e_(~~~f~ ~eE._P~ !52 
Shot firers 
- On  completion of training,  shotfirers to be  issued with  a  certificate valid 
for  a  defined period only. 
3)  !VLAL3L  !h!r~,_f!f!h_a~d_s!x!h_p~r!g~ap~~ ~C~n!._R~p~  E·-2~~ 
Abandoned  workings  in gassy  mines 
- All  stoppings to be  fjtted with piping to enable gases  behind the stoppings 
to be  sampled;  the construction of  any  stopping  to be  notified to  the 
competent  authority and  its position marked  on  the  mine  plan;  stoppings 
to be  opened  only with  the  consent  of  the  competent  authority. 
Minimum  air quantity 
- Minimum  air quantity per ventilating district to be  based  not  only  on the 
number  of  workers  in attendance,  but  also allowing for  other factors  such 
as the  tonnage  worked,  amount  of  firedamp  emitted,  and  atmospheric  condi-
tions. 
General  neutralization 
- Minimum  percentage of  incombustible matter in dust  to be fixed  in proportion 
to amount  of  firedamp present. 
Construction of  flame  safety  lamps 
- Flame  safety  lamps  to be fitted with devices to prevent  opening by  unautho-
rized persons;  if equipped with  a  relighting device,  this to be  of  a  perfec-
tly safe type. 
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Prevention of  fires in the neighbourhood of shafts 
- Fireproofing to be  effected of all landings of shafts,  all roadways  leading up 
to them  over  a  distance of at  least  75  metres  from centre of shaft,  and connec-
ting roads  between  two shafts and  doors  in these roads. 
Prevention of fires  in workings 
Fireproof supports to be introduced during the drivage,  overhaul  and repair of 
main stonedrifts used for ventilating purposes,  and  particularly in the main 
intake airways;  brakes to be  fitted with flameproof  wide-rimmed  brake-drums, 
fireproof  brake-bands  and  fireproof  brake-linings. 
Restriction of use of  flammable  oils 
- Amounts  of  flammable  oil employed to be  kept  to a  minimum;  effective precautions 
to be  taken to prevent  any  risk of fire from oil leakages;  roof  linings,  support 
and  lagging to be  fireproof;  automatic  indicators to be  provided  showing  tempe-
rature of oil and emission of  decomposed  gases;  catch-drains,  collecting sumps 
and  fire-extinguishing devices to be  provided. 
Locomotive  haulage  (improvement  of visibility and  protection of driver) 
-New  locomotives to have  fixed·covered cabs;  locomotives  already  in use to be 
converted to conform with this requirement;  the competent  authorities to have 
the right to exempt  certain types of  locomotive. 
Locomotive  haulage 
- New  locomotives  and other vehicles to be fitted with devices  which will ensure 
that  they  can be set  and  kept  in motion  only  when  the driver is at his post; 
points  an~ ventilation doors to be  operable from  the  locomotive;  and ventila-
tion doors to be fitted with a  contrivance which will give warning of the ap-
proach of the  locomotive before they  open;  single-track haulage roads,  road-
way  crossings and  roadway  junctions,  and  approaches to stations,  to be  provided 
with visual signals;  reflector-type markers to be used to draw attention to 
obstructions or to work  in progress along the track. 
Man-winding  in staple-pits 
- All staple-pits to be  provided with man-winding apparatus,  and man-winding  in 
such pits to be subject  to prior authorization. 17)  !XL3~-~ ~C~n!·-~~P~  E·-~!~ 
Restriction of use  of  flammable  oils 
- Use  of  flammable  oils below ground for mechanical transmission purposes to be 
avoided. 
(See alsop.  116  above). 
B.  - RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  SAFETY  REGULATIONS,  SAFETY  SUPERVISION  AND  WORKERS'  PART 
5  recommendations  under this head  are still under  examination,  2  are partly so, 
1  is not  to be  adopted,  and  3  remain  in doubt. 
Recommendations  rated E 
Safety departments  in enterprises 
- An  Act  or Regulation to exist  making it compulsory  for  every  enterprise 
to have  at  least  one  safety department;  minimum  requirements to be  laid 
down  as  to that  department's duties  and  functions,  its general  organiza-
tion,  and  the qualifications and abilities needed  by  its staff. 
3)  !'~'-s~c~n~ pa~a~r~p~ ~C~n!._R~p~  p._S~) 
Powers  of safety department 
- Safety  department  to have  the  right  to decide  on  the action to be  taken 
in the  event  of  imminent  danger,  provided it notifies the management  later 
4)  !ILALl_(~o~f~ ~ep._P~  ~12 
Number  of  inspection officials 
If necessary,  number  of  inspection appointments to be  increased,  in order 
to enable more  inspections to be carried out. 
Participation by  foreign  workers  in safety  inspection 
- Foreign workers  to  be  allowed to participate in safety  inspection on  the 
same  terms  as  nationals  of  the country  concerned. 
Recommendation  rated  N 
!ILAL2L  !h!rd  sent~n~e_(~o~f~  ~ep._P!  ~22 
Position of  Mines  Inspectorate personnel 
- Such  personnel to be  required to work  in the  Mines  Inspectorate for  a 
specified minimum  period,  and to engag&  full-time  on their inspection 
duties. 
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Recommendations  rated ? 
1)  !!L~L!_1£~~!~-~~E~-E~-~~2 
Councils and Committees assisting the Minister responsible for  the mines 
- Desirable that these should  include employers'  and workers'  representatives. 
Effective participation by  workers  in safety inspection 
- Workers'  delegates engaged  on  safety inspection to be available in sufficient 
numbers,  to possess  adequate  knowledge  of mining conditions and regulations, 
and to have  the full confidence of their fellow-workers. 
- Such delegates,  moreover,  to work solely and wholly  on  safety  inspection,  to be 
independent  vis-a-vis the enterprise inspected,  to be  given thorough training 
and  regular refresher courses,  and to be  paid the  same  rates as operational 
underground workers with the same qualifications;  the  Mines  Inspectorate to see 
to it that these conditions are fulfilled. 
C.- RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  HUMAN  FACTORS 
18  recommendations are still under  examination  (7  of these in part  only);  1  has 
been decided against  in part;  in 2  cases the position is in doubt. 
Recommendations  rated E 
Reception of  new  entrants 
- Reception services to be  organized,  on the employers'  responsibility and  in 
co-operation with the trade unions;  every  enterprise to have  a  reception 
department;  this deparment  to work  in co-operation with the welfare services 
and with the training department. 
Practical reception methods:  organization 
- Reception centres in country  of  employment;  reception departments  in enterprise. 
Practical reception methods:  facilities 
- Newcomers  to be enabled to acquaint  themselves with the set-up and  working of 
the enterprise;  action to be taken to dispose ot  language difficulties and to 
facilitate adjustment  of  the men  to their new  living and working conditions 
and  environment. 
- Newcomers  to be  given every assistance in adapting themselves to work at the 
colliery  (by  the reception department,  the welfare services and their own 
superiors and  fellow-workers). 6)  !V~l~. ~i!s!  ~a!a~r~p~ ~C~n~._R~p~ E·-~262 
Medical  and psychological  examination and  supervizion:  General  Recommendation 
- Measures  concerning medical  and psychological examination and supervision of 
workers to be  introduced generally. 
7)  !V~l_f!f!h_~~r~g!a~hL .~i!s! !e! !~!d~ ~C~n!._R~p~ E•_JQ62 
- Workers  to be  given medical  and  psychological  check-ups at regular intervals. 
8)  !VLA_(£o~f~  ~ee._p~  !0~) 
Aims  and objects of medical  and psychological supervision 
- To  be conducted throughout  the worker's career,  in order to make  sure that  he 
is at all times fit for his job from the safety point  of  view. 
9)  !VLl~,_f!r~t_t!o_s~n!e~c~s_(~o~f~ ~e~·-P~  !0~) 
Practical methods  of medical  and  psychological supervision 
- Periodic re-examination of all adult  personnel;  especially frequent  and syste-
matic  checks  on those  employed  on strenuous,  dangerous or unhealth-y  work  and 
on  any  men  of  weakly constitution;  also re-examination prior to any  transfer 
or promotion. 
10)  YI~2~ ~C~n!._R~p~  ~._1!82 
Training of  instructors 
- Instructor training centre to be  established. 
11)  YI~2~  ~C~n!._R~p~  ~--1!82 
Participation by  workers'  organization in training 
- The trade unions to be  associated with the organization of vocational training. 
Recommendations  rated  ? 
Reception  arrangements:  responsibility 
- In the case of collective recruitment,  responsibility for  the reception organi-
zations set up  in the country  of recruitment  to be  shared  between the  local 
or national authorities and  the employers;  workers  preferably also to be  asso-
ciated. 
2)  !I!,~ ~C~n!._R~P~. ~  •. _1232 
Practical reception methods:  organization 
- "Assembly centres" to be established where  large-scale recruitment  is being car-
ried on  in countr1es having  a  manpower  surplus,  such centres to be  responsible 
for giving material and  moral  assistance,  medical  fitness tests and  a  certain 
amount  of  guidance as to guidance as to the job and  general  living and working 
conditions awaiting the men  on  reaching their destination. 
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III.- BELGIUM 
A.- RECOMMANDATIONS  ON  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
39  recommendations  are still under examination  (E).  In  1  case  the exis-
ting regulations are already partly in line with the corresponding recommendation 
(CE).  In  1  case  the competent authority is not  prepared to  amend  its present regu-
lations on  the subject  (N).  In  3  cases  the  issue is still in doubt  (?). 
Recommendations  rated E 
Protection of personnel during shotfiring 
Times  for shotfiring to be  chosen  so  that as  few  persons as possible are ex-
posed to  the danger of  an  explosion. 
Use  of  flame  safety  lamps 
Flame safety  lamps  to be  issued only to men  instructed in their use  and  em-
ploying  them  to detect the presence of  firedamp or deficiency  in oxygen. 
Prevention of fires  in shafts 
Electric cables with fireproof  sheathing to be  used  in  new  shafts and  in shafts 
being overhauled. 
Places where  combustible or  flammable  materials accumulate 
Places where  transformers or circuit-breakers  immersed  in flammable  oil are hou-
sed  to be  included under  the  above  head within the meaning of Regulation  54,4 of 
the  I.L.O.  Model  Code. 
Man-winding  :  signalling systems  in shafts 
Electric signalling devices  to be  installed in all main shafts and  in all 
staple-pits where  man-winding  is carried on regularly on  a  considerable 
scale,  and  also,  as far as possible,  in shafts where  this is not  the case; 
the signalling system to be  so designed that it is impossible to give  the 
"O.K."  signal at the  same  time  from  two  or more  landings;  new  electric si-
gnalling systen1s  in shafts to be  provided with a  continuously-operating recording or indicating instrument for  the testing of  insulation;  electric 
signalling systems  connected with  intermediate  landings  to be  provided with 
an  emergency  alarm device;  existing electric and mechanical  signalling sys-
tems  to be  supplemented  as far  as  possible by  telephone  installations. 
- Where  two  or more  floors at a  single  landing are used simultaneously  in 
man-winding,  the signalling devices at the main  loading point to be  auto-
matically  locked;  this requirement not,  however,  to apply  regarding depar-
ture signals,  in which case  the signalling devices  for.each  floor  must 
be  included  in the  general signalling system 
Winding  ropes 
Ropes  with galvanized wires  to be  used  in staple-pits and upcast shafts 
with  a  high relative moisture content,  and  in wet  shafts. 
- Fixed working  platforms  in shafts to be  assessed for  maximum  load plus  an 
adequate  safety margin  before  they  are  installed;  the material employed, 
especially timber,  to be  examined periodically for  quality  and safety. 
Conveyors 
- Man-riding on  armoured or similar conveyors  to be  prohibited. 
- Contrivances to be  developed enabling conveyors  to be  stopped  from  any 
point alongside;  conveyors  not  yet fitted with  these  to be  at any  rate so 
installed that  they  can  be  stopped at  any  time  by  a  signal. 
Internal-combustion engines below ground 
- Fixed  internal-combustion engines  to be  prohibited in underground  workings; 
movable  engines  to be Diesel only. 
- Where  Diesel  fuel  is used  in  locomotives  and  vehicles not  running on  rails, 
precautions  to be  taken  to ensure that no  fuel  is spilled during filling; 
in the case of  larger quantities of  fuel,  filling to be  carried out only 
on special fireproof  premises. 
- Exhaust  gases  to  be  checked regularly  to keep  them below  the danger  level. 
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Travelling below ground 
- Loading-points  and crossings,  and points where mine-cars  are constantly 
being moved  about  during coaling operations to be  bridged over  to  ensure 
safe crossing. 
- Every effort to be  made  to ensure  that  a  travelling road is at all times 
left along the face. 
"22)  - 23)  !X.!.  _!:7:M.!.  _!:8:M.!.  ~/~,_l~-!,_2~-!,_2!-!•_2~-!,_a!_b.z.  ~3:M.z.  !/~ 1 _2~-!,_a!_b_ 
~C~n!._R~p~ fP~ 74-79) 
Locomotive  haulage 
New  locomotives to have  fixed  covered cabs;  locomotives already  in use 
to be  converted to conform  •th this requirement;  the competent authori-
ties to have  the right to exempt certain types of  locomotive. 
(See alsop.  20 of  the Commission's First Report). 
- Maximum  load haulable by  any  one  locomotive  to be  so fixed  that the brak-
ing distance with a  mean  coefficient of friction of 0.17 does  not  exceed 
a  given  length. 
Locomotives  to be equipped for  travel in either direction with electric 
headlights which can  be  dipped. 
- All  locomotives  to be fitted with sandboxes  which will operate when  tra-
velling in either direction. 
- All  locomotives  to be fitted with devices ensuring that they cannot be 
set in motion,  by  any unauthorized person;  new  locomotives  to  be  fitted 
with devices ensuring that they  can be  set and  kept  in motion only when 
the driver is at his post. 
- Points  and ventilation doors  to be  operable  from  the  locomotive;  ventila-
tion doors  to be fitted with  a  contrivance which will give warning of  the 
approach of  the  locomotive before  they  open. 
- Single-track haulage roads,  crossings  and  roadway  junctions,  and  approaches 
to stations,  to be  provided with visual signals. 
- Reflector-type markers  to be  used  to draw attention to obstructions or to 
work  in progress along the  track. 
- Minimum  height of trolley wire  in  new  levels to be  fixed at 2.50 metres 
above  the  top of  the rails in the case of  installations of over 280  V, 
and  2.20 metres  in that of  installations under 280  V. 
- In gassy mines,  no  coal-winning to be  performed within  a  specified pro-
tective zone  (fixed in accordance with local conditions)  oneitherside of the  trolley-locomotive track. 
- Regular man-riding to be  by means  of minecars specially fitted out for the 
purpose;  in trolley installations, man-riding cars to.be covered over. 
- Minecars used exclusively for man-riding to be constructed to prevent 
leaning out. 
Authorization of man-riding 
Man-riding  on  continuous conveyors  in level or inclined roads  to be perait-
ted only subject to special rules laid down  by  the  competent  authorit~ 
Haulage of materials on  continuous conveyors 
To  be  subject to special rules. 
Precautions at loading-points and  landings 
Care  to be  taken  in planning and construction to ensure that the men  working 
at these points are not endangered  by  the  loading,  haulage  and winding ope-
rations. 
Man-winding  in staple-pits 
All staple-pits to be  provided with man-winding  apparatus,  and man-winding 
in such pits to be subject to prior authorization. 
Testing of guides in main shafts 
Guides  to be  examined at regular intervals with appropriate  testing apparatus. 
Restriction of use of  flammable oils 
Use  of  flammable. oils below ground  for mechanical  transmission purposes  to be 
avoided. 
Recommandation  rated N 
Prevention of underground combustion 
Retreating working to be employed,  for preference,  in pits or districts 
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subject to spontaneous combustion. 
Recommendations  rated? 
Method  of  payment of shotfirers 
To  be  fixed with due  regard for their position of responsibility. 
2)  y,_6L  2,_(£o~f~ !e~·-P~ ~9l 
Stone-dust barriers 
The  competent  authority to fix the maximum  number  of  men  to be  employed  in 
any  one  "isolated section". 
Man-winding  installations in shafts 
Shafts equipped with electric signalling systems  and used regularly for 
man-winding purposes to be  provided with a  device serving to lock the win-
ding-engin~ brake so long as  any  one  of  the shaft gates is  ope~. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  SAFETY  REGULATIONS,  SAFETY  SUPERVISION  AND  WORKERS' 
PART  IN  SAFETY 
In 9  cases examination continues;  in 6  it has  been decided not  to  issue 
revised regulations. 
Recommendations  rated E 
Safety departments  in enterprises 
Adequate  number  of safety personnel,  to be  employed full  time  on  safety 
duties;  rank  and  pay of safety personnel. 
Organization of safety supervision in enterprises 
Every  member  of the managerial  and  supervisory staff employed  on safety 
duties to possess  the appropriate qualifications as recognized by  the 
competent  authority. 
Exemptions  from safety regulations 
The  employers  to be  consulted regarding  any  exemptions;  workers' ·representatives within  the enterprise to be notified of exemptions granted. 
6)  !IL  !,_l_{~o~f~ ~ef._P~ ~1! 
Number  of  inspection officials 
If necessary,  number  of  inspection appointments  to be  increased,  in order 
to enable more  inspections  to be carried out. 
Position of Mines  Inspectorate personnel 
Mines  Inspectorate personnel to have  a  proper standing,  and  to be  required 
to work  in the  Inspectorate for  a  specified minimum  period and  to engage 
full-time  on  their inspection duties. 
Refresher  training for  inspectors'assistants and workers'  safety delegates 
Regular refresher courses to be organized by  the  Mines  Inspectorate. 
Recommendations rated N 
Safety departments  in enterprises 
115 
The  colliery manager  to consult the workers'  representatives in connection 
with the  appointment of  the officers and  personnel of the safety department. 
2)  !,_G_{~o~f~ !ef._P~ ~4! 
Specialist safety supervisors 
Specialist staff from outside the safety department  to be  appointed to 
deal with certain aspects of safety;  their activities to be  conducted  in 
close co-operation with the safety department. 
Organization of  inspection  arrangements 
Safety,  health and  technical  inspection to be  carried out by  one  and  the 
same  inspection service,  whose  members  must  have all the qualifications 
required for  this purpose;  the departments  responsible  for studying the 
inspection reports  and  taking  the necessary action to be  answerable only 
to  the Minister responsible  for  the  mines. 116 
Delegation of authority 
Any  delegation of authority concerning safety in mines  by  the Minister to 
be  to the Mines  Inspectorate only;  the  Inspectorate  to  inform  the national, 
regional or local authorities of action  taken  in virtue thereof. 
Disciplinary action  in the event of breaches of safety regulations 
Appropriate penalties to be  imposed  in the case of prosecutions requested 
by  the  Mines  Inspectorate following particularly flagrant  and clearly pro-
ven offences definitely affecting general safety. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  HUMAN  FACTORS 
In  12  cases the Conference's recommendations are still under examination 
(E),  in 5  the existing regulations are  already partially in line  with the 
corresponding recommendations  (CE);  in 2  it is not yet  known  what  the de-
cision will be  (?). 
The  great majority of the  recommendations under this head  are rated c•, 
i.e. while  not specifically embodied  in regulations  they  are  already obser-
ved  in practice. 
Recommendations  rated E 
Aims  and objects of medical  and  psychological examination 
Pre-entry examination to include  the use of applied psychology with the 
object of ascertaining the character and mental abilities of  the subject. 
Medical  and  psychological services 
Medical  examinations  to be carried out  by  qualified medical  practitioners 
experienced  in  industrial medicine  in collieries;  psychological examina-
tion to be carried out  by  experienced psychologists with adequate  know-
legde of  the structure of  the enterprise,  the environment  and  the working 
conditions. 
The  medical practitioners and  psychologists concerned  to have full pro-
fessional  independence  and  full responsibility  in the performance of their duties;  specialists to be  called in doubtful cases;  the employer to retain 
full responsibility as  to whether or not  he  engages  an  applicant on  the 
basis of  the fitness grading given. 
4)  - 6)  !V~ ~;_Iy,!o~ !i~s~ !n~ ~e~o~d_s!n~e~c!sl !V~l2,_t~i~d_s!n~e~c~ 
iC~n!._R!P~ EP~ !0~-!0~) 
Practical methods of medical  and  psychological supervision 
Juvenile workers  to undergo examination at least once  a  year,  the object 
being to watch  their physical development  and assess their adaptability to 
working conditions  in the pit. 
Periodic re-examination of all adult personnel;  especially frequent  and 
systematic checks  on  those  employed  on  strenuous,  dangerous or unhealthy 
work  and  on  any  men  of weakly constitution;  re-examination prior to any 
transfer or promotion. 
Should  any contra-indications be  found,  the worker  to be  given more  suit-
able  work at the  same  colliery. 
Methods of observing and  assessing individual miners at work 
All  those concerned with safety  (managerial  and  supervisory staff, medical 
officers,  psychologists,  safety engineers,  etc.)  to be associated with the 
employment of special work-study methods  (time  and motion study,  job ana-
lysis,  job evaluation,  etc.) 
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Attention of managerial  and supervisory staff to be  drawn  to their responsi-
bility for  keeping  a  check  on  whether  the  men  are properly placed in  and 
adapted  to their jobs;  these officials to be  accordingly permitted to make 
suggestions for  the  transfer of  a  particular man  to a  particular job,  or 
for his being given further training. 
Amount  of work  done 
Reductions  in working hours  not  to  involve  intensification of effort during 
the  hours so reduced;  methods of payment  to be  properly applied so as  to 
allow of short rest periods. 
Difficult and unhealthy working conditions 
Allowance  to be made  in the fixing of working hours for extra  fatigue due 118 
to the difficult or unhealthy character of certain workings,  particularly 
those where  the  temperature  is unusually  high. 
Special living and  working conditions 
- Efforts to be  made  to discourage  heavy drinking;  enterprise to make  non-
injurious beverages available for  their personnel. 
- Housing  conditions for all miners  to conform  to certain standards as re-
gards distance  from  the colliery,  social amenities,  allocation,  etc;  hos-
tels to be  provided for unmarried workers. 
Recommendations  rated? 
Medical  and psychological examination  and supervision 
General  Recommendation 
Measures  concerning medical  and psychological examination  and  supervision 
of workers  to be  introduced generally. 
Reassignment within the enterprise 
Workers  found unfit to perform their duties in  a  normal  manner  to be assi-
gned  to more  suitable jobs at the  same  colliery. 
IV.  FRANCE 
A.  RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
In  7  cases  recommendations  are still under examination  (E);  in  14  the 
existing regulations were  already partially in line with the  corresponding 
recommandations  (CE);  in 2  the competent authority has  decided not  to make 
any  changes  in  the regulations in force  (N). 
Reconwendations  rated E 
General  working plans 
General  long-term and  short-term plans of operations to be  drawn  up,  in-
corporating all details having  a  bearing on safety,  and  forwarded  in ad-
vance  to the competent authority;  any  amendments of  importance  to be 
similarly notified in good  time. Use  of  instantaneous or millisecond detonators  in coal and adjacent strata 
Where  used  in gassy or dusty workings,  number  of stages to be kept  to a 
minimum;  period of  delay  between  two  shots liable to affect one  another 
not  to exceed  three  intervals of delay. 
Permissible  number  of men  per separate ventilating district 
The  competent authority to specify a  limit to the  number of men  working 
on  the main shift in each separate ventilating district. 
Man-winding 
Where  two  or more  floors at a  single  landing are used  simultaneously  in 
man-winding,  the signalling devices at the main  loading point to be  auto-
matically  locked;  this requirement not,  however,  to apply  regarding syn-
chronized signalling systems,  in which case  the signalling devices at 
each floor must  be  included  in the  system. 
Locomotive  haulage 
New  locomotives  to have  fixed covered cabs;  locomotives already  in use  to 
be  converted  to  conform with this requirement;  the  competent  authority to 
have  the right to exempt  certain types of  locomotive. 
(See  also p.  20 of  the Comnlission's First Report.) 
Restriction of use of  flanuuable  oils 
Use  of  flammable  oils below  ground  for  mechanical  transmission purposes  to 
be  avoided. 
Recommendations  rated N 
1)  !XL  ~3:ML ~  !C~n!._Rep.  ~·-7!) 
Locomotive  haulage 
Minimum  height of  trolley wires  in  new  levels  to be  fixed at 2.50 metres 
above  the  top of  the rails in the case of installations of over 280  V, 
and 2.20 metres  in  that of  installations under  280  V. 
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Man-winding  in staple-pits 
All staple-pits to be  provided with man-winding apparatus,  and man-winding 
in such pits to be subject to prior authorization. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  SAFETY  REGULATIONS,  SAFETY  SUPERVISION  AND 
WORKERS 1  PART  IN  SAFETY 
7  recommendations are under examination  (E),  14  are under  examination but 
at the  same  time are in part already  observed in practice  (C'E). 
Recommendations  rated C'E 
include  : 
!,_ALBLCL  !h!r~ Ea!a~r!P~ ~/~1!/Q/~/!,_f!r~t_p~r!g!afh_ 
~o~f~ !ef._Pf._S~-~5! 
Safety departments  in enterprises 
- Enterprises to be  obliged to organize safety departments;  every colliery 
to have  a  member  of the staff or a  special department  responsible for 
safety. 
- Minimum  requirements to be  laid down  concerning the duties and  functions 
of the safety department. 
- Colliery managers to ascertain from  workers'  representatives whether  the 
safety personnel  proposed are acceptable to the men. 
- Numbers,  rank and  pay  of  safety personnel. 
- Jurisdiction of safety department. 
- Powers of safety department. 
- Co-operation with specialist safety supervisors appointed  from  outside the 
department. 
- Administrative position of safety department;  powers  of  management. 
- Exchanges  of  information  among  officials of safety departments of different 
collieries. 
Recommendations  rated E 
1)  - 3)  !,_CL !i!s! !n~ ~e~o~d_p~r~g!afh~/! 1 _s~c~n~ Ea!a~r!P~ iC~n!._R~p~ EP~ 
82-83/85)  - - - - -
Safety departments  in enterprises 
- Appointment  of officers and  personnel  of safety departments;  consultation of workers'  representatives. 
- Exchange  of  information at Community  level. 
- Every  member  of  the  managerial  or  supervisory staff employed  on  safety 
duties  to possess  the  appropriate qualifications as  recognized  by  the 
competent  authority. 
5)  B  :  !h!r~ Ea~a~r~p~ £o!f~ ~eE._P~ !9_ 
~!~~e!!on~-!~~~-~~!etr_~~Kulat!~~~ 
- The  employers  to  be  consulted  regarding  any  exemptions. 
- Study  to be  made  whether  it is desirable  to arrange  for  workers  to be 
associated with safety inspection  through  an  appropriate  representative 
body,  or,  where  this is already  the  case,  whether  the  arrangements  in 
question conform with  the  principles laid  down  by  the  Conference. 
- Foreign workers  to be  allowed  to participate in safety  inspection  on  the 
same  terms  as nationals of  the  country concerned. 
C.  - ~~CO~~~!~~!IO~~-~ON~~~~ING_~~MA~_!AC!QRS 
The  competent  authority has  decided  in a  large  number  of  cases not  to 
embody  the  Conference's  recommendations  in specific  regulations,  but  to see 
to it that  they  are  applied  in practice  (C'). 
30  recommendations  are still partially under  examination  (CE  or C'E). 
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V.- ITALY 
The  President of  the  Italian Republic  on  April  9,  1959,  promulgated Decree 
n°  128  (published  in n°  87  of  the Gazetta Ufficiale,  April  11,  1959),  providing 
for  the  coming  into force  on  January  1,1960,  of  the  new  mines  inspection regulations. 
As  was  noted  in  the Commission's First Report  (p.  115),  these regulations,  693 
in  number,  apply  to all mining activities. 
In most  cases  the  Italian Governement  has  duly  taken  account  of  the Conference's 
recommendations,  particularly as  regards  technical aspects and safety  :  these cases are 
denoted in  the  tables following  by  the  abbreviation  NRC. 
Otherwise,  the  position is as  follows  : 
A.- RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
2  recommendations  are still under examination  (E);  6  are  not  to be  implemented  (N); 
5  are  in doubt  (?). 
Recommendations  rated E 
Restriction of  use  of  flammable  oils 
- Oil-filled electrical equipment  not  to be  used either in coal-winning 
workings  or in their  immediate vicinity;  where  used  in roadways,  such 
equipement  always  to be  fixed. 
(See  also pp.  4-8 of  the Commission's First Report.) 
Traveling below  ground 
- Every effort to be  made  to ensure  that  a  travelling road is at all times 
left along  the  face. 
Recommendations  rated  N 
Compressed-air eiectors 
Compressed-air ejectors in use  underground  to be  placed in appropriate  ducts, 
minimum  length  of  duct  between ejector and  discharge  point  to be  fixed;  whole 
apparatus  to  be  properly earthed. 123 
Firedamp  drainage 
- Systematic  drainage  of  firedamp  from  adjacent strata to be  carried out  in 
in all mines  where  firedamp content  exceeds  the  permitted maximum  with nor-
mal  methods  of ventilation;  this  to  be  ~one by  means  of  a  network of special 
piping, 
Prevention  of  underground  combustion 
- Retreating working to be  employed,  for  preference,  in pits or districts 
subject  to spontaneous combustion. 
Prevention of  fires  in shafts 
- In new  shafts,  and where  possible in  those  being overhauled,  gas-drainage 
pipes preferably to be  sited in the  upcast shafts,  and  care  to be  taken 
to see  that electric cables are  laid well  away  from  compressed-air mains 
and  gas-drainage  pipes. 
Recommendations  rated  ? 
Method  of payment  of shotfirers 
- To  be  fixed with due  regard for their position of responsibility 
Face  supports 
- Increasing use to be  made  in future  of steel props  of  permanently uniform 
load bearing capacity. 
Gate-roads  (Yielding supports) 
- Supports  in gate-roads to resist the general  lowering of the rocks  only to 124 
the point  where it is still possible for  the whole  of  the strata to  lower 
together with the surrounding rocks,  without  bed separation. 
- Signalling  devices at different  floors  of  a  single  landing to be  included 
in general  signalling system. 
Locomotive  haulage 
- Points  and  ventilation doors  to be  operable  from  the  locomotive;  ventila-
tion  doors  to  be  fitted with  a  contrivance which will give warning  of  the 
approach  of  the  locomotive  before  they  open. 
Restriction of  use  of  flammable  oils 
- Use  of  flammable  oils below  ground  for  mechanical  transmission  purposes  to 
be  avoided. 
B.- RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  SAFETY  REGULATIONS,  SAFETY  SUPERVISION  AND 
WORKERS'  PART  IN  SAFETY 
In 2  cases  the  desirability of  framing  fresh  regulations is still under exa-
examination  (E);  in  9  it has  been  decided  not  to  do  so  (N);  in 2  the  outcome 
is still in  doubt  (?). 
Recommendations  rated E 
~rganiza  t ion  of  inspect  ion  ari·angemen ts 
- Departments  responsible  for  studying and  acting on  inspection reports  to 
be  answerable  only  to  the  Minister. 
Effective  participation by  workers  in safety  insP.ection 
- Workers'  delegates engaged  on  safety inspection to do  this and  nothing 
else,  to  be  independent  vis-a-vis  the enterprise  inspected,  to be  given thorough  training and  regular refresher courses,  and  to be  paid  the  same 
rates as operational-underground workers with  the  same  qualifications;  the 
Mines  Inspectorate  to see  to it that  these conditions are  fulfilled. 
Recommendations  rated  N 
~afety departments  in enterprises 
- The  colliery manager  to consult  the workers'  representatives  in connection 
with  the appointment  of  the officers and  personnel  of  the safety depart-
ment,  and  to ascertain  from  them whether  the  safety personnel  proposed 
are acceptable  to the  men. 
Powers  of  the safety department 
- Safety  department  to have  the  right  to decide  on  the action  to be  taken 
in the event  of  imminent  danger,  provided it notifies the  management  later. 
Specialist safety supervisors 
- Specialist staff from  outside  the  safety  department  to be  appointed  to 
deal with certain aspects of safety;  their activities to be conducted  in 
close co-operation with  the  safety department. 
Exchanges  of  information 
- To  be  organized  among  officials of safety departments  of  different col-
lieries,  the  Mines  Inspectorate  to take  part  in such exchanges. 
Exemptions  from  safety regulations 
- Workers'  representatives within  the enterprise  to  be at any  rate notified 
of  any  exemptions  granted. 
Consultation of workers 
- Where  anenterprise  draws up  special safety instructions of its own,  the 
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management  must  consult  the  safety committee  onwhichthe workers  are 
represented. 
Participation by  foreign  workers  in safety  inspection 
- Foreign workers  to  be  allowed  to participate  in safety inspection  on  the 
same  terms as nationals of  the  country concerned. 
Disciplinary action  in  the  event  of  breaches of  safety regulations 
- Indispensable,  but,  in  the Conference's view,  not  the most  effective me-
thod  of  improving  safety.  Improvement  possible  by  means  of careful  study 
of  working  methods,  proper  training of  personnel  and  full co-operation  by 
all concerned  in creating safety-mindedness.  Also useful  system of 
bonuses  forpersonnel  in districts with  a  low  accident rate. 
Recommendations  rated  ? 
Safety  departments  in enterprises 
- Rank  and  pay  of  safety  personnel;  Community-level exchanges  of  information 
among  safety  departments. 
~efrescher training for  inspectors'  assistants and  workers'  safety delegates 
- Regular  refresher courses  to  be  organized  by  the  Mines  Inspectorate. 
C.- RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  HUMAN  FACTORS 
Since  the  Italian authorities  had  first  of all to concentrate  on  the  Confe-
rence's  technical  and  safety  recommendations,  in connection with  the  remodelling 
of  the  mines  inspection regulations,  they  have  not  yet  completed  their examina-
tion of  40 of  the  recommendations  on  human  factors  (E);  in  8  further cases  a  ne-
gative  decision has  been  taken  (N);  in  1  the  position is not  yet  clear  (?). 
Recommendations  rated  E 
Practical  reception  methods  :  organization - Reception centres  in country of employment;  reception departments  in 
enterprises. 
3)-6)  !V~l~  £i~s!  fa~a~r~p~,~e£o~d~ !h!r~  ~n~ £o~r!h_p~r~g~aEh~ ~ £i~s!  Ea~t 
~f_f!f!h_p~r~g~aEh_/_s!c~n~ Ea~t_o!  £i!t~ Ea~a~r~p~ !C~n£._R!P~ E·_lQ6) 
~edical and  psycological examination  and  supervision 
- Measures  concerning medical  and  psychological examination and  supervision 
to  be  introduced  generally. 
- Medical  examination of mineworkers  prior to their engagement  and  to any 
important  change  of  job to be  made  compulsory,  such examination  to be 
supplemented  if necessary  by  a  psychotechnical examination before appoint-
ment  to certain special  jobs;  the  medical  examination to. 'be carried out  by  a 
specially-appointed doctor  possessing  the  requisite qualifications and 
working entirely on  his  own  responsibility and  in complete  independence; 
the  Governments  to encourage  the  establishment .  and extension of colliery 
medical  services. 
- Medical,  and  if necessary  psychotechnical,  supervision to be  carried out 
regularly and  systematically. 
- Workers  found  unfit  to perform  their duties  in a  normal  manner  to be  assig-
ned  to more  suitable  jobs at the  same  colliery. 
Methods  of  observing  and  assessing individual miners at work 
- All  those  concerned with  safety  (managerial  and  supervisory staff,  medical 
officers,  psychologists,  safety engineers,  etc.)  to be  associated with the 
employment  of special work-study  methods  (time  and  motion  study,  job ana-
lysis,  job evaluation,  etc.). 
- Attention of managerial  and  supervisory staff to be  drawn  to their respon-
sibility for  keeping a  check  on whetherthe  men  are  properly  placed  in and 
adapted  to their  jobs;  these officials to  be  accordingly  permitted  to make 
suggestions  for  the  transfer of  a  particular man  to a  particular job,  or 
for  his  being  given  further  training. 
Aims  and  objects of vocational  training 
- Each  individual worker  to  be  given  training appropriate  to  the  job assigned 
him;  all vocational-training  sche~es to  take  due  account  of  safety requi-
rements. 
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11)-14) 
Training  requirements 
- Training  to  be  systematic  and  carefully planned;  instructors to be  special-
ly-trained men  paid  to  teach and  only  to teach,  and having  no connection 
with  the  production side;  instructional facilities and  equipment  to be  such 
as will make  it possible  to provide  instruction in progressive stages; 
systems  and  methods  of vocational  training to be  based,  in particular,  on 
the  general  principles set forth in Resolutions  Nos.  13  and  46  adopted  by 
the  Coal  Mines  Committee  of  the  International  Labour  Organization at its 
Second  and  Sixth Sessions. 
Full systematic  training of  juyeniles  (apprenticeship) 
- Systematic  training to be  provided  in specialized apprenticeship centres 
for  a  minimum  period;  every colliery to have  an apprenticeship centre gi-
ving approximately  three  years'  training and  issuing a  proficiency certi-
ficate  on  completion of  this;  boys  having completed  their apprenticeship 
to  be  formed  into groups  from  time  to  time  to undergo  further  training. 
Shortened  training for  juveniles 
- Boys  who  for  any  reason  connot  be  sent  to an apprenticeship centre  to  be 
given systematic  training,  including theoretical instruction at the  sur-
face  and  practical instruction at reserved  training faces;  a  proficiency 
certificate to be  issued  on  completion of  this. 
Intensified training of adults  - specialist instructors 
- Training  to be  given  by  instructors who  are  full-time  specialists and  not 
connected with  the  production side;  every adult entrant  to be  given  syste-
matic  training in accordance  with a  detailed  three-stage  programme  drawn 
up  in advance;  a  certificate of competency  to  be  issued  on completion  of 
stage 2;  where  these arrangements  have  not  yet  been  introduced, 
"worker-and-mate"  system  (with a  senior worker  initiating newcomers)  to 
be  used as  a  temporaty  measure  only;  under  this system,  the  skilled worker 
employed  on  the  instruction of  the  newcomer  not  to be  connected with  the 
production side as  regards  his wages. Training of specialists 
- "Workers-and-mate"  training to  be  pJ,•ohibi ted  in  the  case  of electricians, 
locomotif-drivers 
sible work. 
and all other  personnel  doing particularly respon-
- Shotfirers  to be  given  systematic  training carrying a  certificate  valid 
for  a  specified period only,  the  tl·aining  having  thereafter  to be  repea-
ted at regular intervals;  training and  retraining ih shotfiring to be al-
so  p1·ovided  for  the supervisory staff immediately conce1·ned. 
Training of supervisory staff 
- A considerable proportion of the training ofsupervisory  personnel  to be 
aimed  at ensuring that  they are  thoroughly  familiar with  the  safety  regu-
lations and  accident-prevention arrangements. 
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- Training and  further  tl·aining of supervisory  personnel  to aim at  preparing 
them  to  take  their full share  of responsibility for  leadership and safety. 
- Appointments  to  the  supervisory staff to be  made  only  on completion of  a 
special  training course  and  receipt of a  certificate of  competency. 
- Promotion  to the  higher  grades of  the  supervisory staff to be  preceded 
by  special advanced  training,  given at training centres established  for 
this purpose. 
Training of  instructors 
- Trainig to be  provided only by staff trained in use  of  instructional 
methods  suitable for  teaching coalmining subjects. 
- These  staff to be  given special  training  by  highly-qualified teachers. 
- Instructor  training centre  to  be  established. 
Participation  by  workers'  organizations 
; 
- The  trade  unions to be  associated with  the  organization of vocational 
training. 1~ 
36)-38) 
39)-40) 
Occupational  diseases 
- Complaints attributable  to  the effects of  physical  factors  inherent 
in  the  environment  to rank  as  occupational  diseases. 
Method  of  payment  of  supervisory staff 
Pay  of supervisory staff to  be  so fixed  as  to enable  them  to bear  their 
full share  of responsibility  regarding safety without suffering any 
disadvantage  in regard  to  their wages. 
!X~9~a~  !i~s!  ~n~ ~e~o~d_s~n!e~~~sl !X~9~d~  ~e~o~d_p~r~g~aEh; 
!X~lQ;_I!,!l_(£o~f~ ~eE._PE·-1~6:1~7) 
Piece work 
- Piece rates  to be  fixed  allowing  for  the  time  taken  up  by  the  proper 
performance  of safety duties. 
- Where  many  foreign workers  are employed  on  piece work,  care  to be  taken 
that  they are appropriately  represented at any  management/union  dis-
cussions concerning piece  rates. 
- Training and  rates of  pay  of supervisory staff to  be  specially fixed 
to allow for  proper  performance  of  safety duties;  where  one  of  the  men 
is given special responsibilities for  a  team  in  regard  to safety,  the 
piece  rates paid  him  to be  adjusted so as  to allow for  the  time  spent 
by  him  on  safety duties. 
- Only  fully  trained men  to be  put  on  piece  work. 
~pecial living and  working conditions 
- Efforts to  be  made  to  discourage  heavy drinking;  enterprises  to make 
non-injurious  beverages available  for  their perssonnel. 
- Housing  conditions  for all miners  to conform  to  certain standards as 
regards  distance  from  the  colliery,  social amenities,  allocation,  etc.; 
hostels  to be  provided  for unmarried workers. Recommendations  rated N 
Practi_ca~---~eception methods  :  facilities 
- Newcomers  to be  enabled to acquaint  themselves with the workings  of  the 
enterprise;  action to be  taken to dispose of  language difficulties and 
to facilitate adjustment  to the  new  environment. 
- Foreign workers to  acquire  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  language  of the 
country  of  employment. 
- Foreign workers  to be  given  instruction in the  language  of  the country  of 
employment;  an  interpreter to be  available on  every shift onwhichforeign 
workers  are employed;  instructors training foreign workers  to have  an  ade-
quate  knowledge  of the  latter's language;  every  team to include at  least 
one worker with  an  adequate  knowledge  of both  languages;  enterprises to 
provide foreign workers with translations of  the safety and  operational 
rules  and regulations;  enterprises to provide  foreign workers with trans-
lations of  any  other technical matter of value  in connection with their 
further training. 
Recommendation  rated ? 
Reception  arrangements  :  responsibility 
- In collective recruitement,  responsibility for  the reception organizations 
set up  in the country  of  recruitment  to be  shared between the  local or 
national authorities and  the  employers;  workers  preferably also to be as-
sociated. 
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VI.- NETHERLANDS 
As  was  noted  in the Commission's First  Report,  a  Committee  has  been  working 
in the Netherlands since the  end  of  1955  on  the  remodelling of  the mines  inspection 
regulations.  The  Committee's  instructions are to base  itself on  the classification 
adopted  by  the Netherlands Government,  and  to take  due  account  of  the reconwendations 
of  the Conference. 
As  the Committee  is about  to complete its work,  the competent  authorities feel 
that  there is no  particular point  for  the present  in issuing or changing regula-
tions piecemeal.  In the meantime  they  have  requested the enterprises to apply cer-
tain of  the Conference's  recommendations  in practice forthwith,  without  waiting 
for  the  new  regulations to come  into force. 
A.- RECOMMENDATIONS  ON  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
1  recommendation  is still under  examination in its entirety  (E),  and  another 
in part  (CE). 
Recommendation  rated  E 
Restriction of  use of  flammable  oils 
- Use  of  flammable  oils below  ground  for mechanical  transmission purposes to 
be  avoided. 
B.- RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  SAFETY  REGULATIONS,  SAFETY  SUPERVISION  AND  WORKERS  1 
PART  IN  SAFETY 
1  recommendation  is still under  examination  (E);  1  is under  examination in part  (CE). 
Recommendation  rated E 
Position of  Mines  Inspectorate personnel 
- Such  personnel to be  required to work  in the Mines  Inspectorate for  a  stated 
minimum  period,  and to engage  full-time on their inspection duties. 
C.- RECOMMENDATIONS  CONCERNING  HUMAN  FACTORS 
The  recommendations with regard to psychological examination  and  supervision, 
and to psychological services,  are still under  examination. Conference Resolutions 
I  - General  working  plans  p.  8 
II- Shotfiring 
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c Conference Resolutions 
~~~!~~!!~~-~!-E~!~~~~~!-~~~!~g 
~!!~!!!!!~g 
A- 4  - S 
A- 5  - S 
officials 
p.  15 
p.  15 
A  - 6  - S  a  p.  15 
(third sentence) 
b 
c 
p.  15 
p.  16 
§!~!!g~-~!-~~E!~~!~~~-~~!~~ 
~!~~~~ 
B- 7  - S  p.  16 
B- 8  - S  p.  17 
B  - 9  - S  p.  17 
III-Strata control 
§~EE~!!l-~~~~!!!_ 
A - 1  - SC 
!'!~~-~~EE~!! 
A  - 2  - SC 
-x)  •  none 
p.  18 
p.  19 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
c 
c 
c 
l'H 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
C+ 
c 
c 
c 
E+ 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
E 
c 
NRP 
c 
c 
c 
c 
? 
c 
c 
NRC 
NRP 
NRP 
c 
c 
c 
c 
•C 
E 
NRP 
c 
c'+ 
NRC 
c 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
c 
? 
E 
E 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
E 
c 
c 
c 
c 
E 
c 
c 
c 
-x) 
c N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
Conference Resolutions  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12 1.11  31.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
A- 3  - sc  1st para  p.  19  c  c  NRP  NRP  E  NRC  c  c 
2nd para  p.  19  c  c  NRP  NRP  NRC  E  NRC  c  c 
A- 4  - sc  p.  19  RB.  RB  RB  RB  ?  c  c 
A- 5  - sc  p.  20  NRP  c  CE  NRP  NRP  c  E  NRC  - c 
A- 6  - sc  p.  20  c  c  NRP  E  c'  E  NRC  - c 
A- 7  - sc  p.  20  c  c  NRP  NRP  E  NRC  - c 
f~!~:!!~~!~i 
A - 8  - sc  p.  20  c  c  NRP  c  E  NRC  c  c 
A- 9- sc  p.  21  c  c  NRP  . NRP  NRC  E  NRC  - c 
A -10- sc  p.  21  c  c  NRP  NRP  E  NRC  c  c 
A -11  - sc  p.  21  c  c  NRP  c  E  NRC  c  c 
A -12  - sc  p.  22  c  c  NRP  c  E  NRC  c  c 
Gate-roads  ---------- A -13  - SC  p.  22  c  c  NRP  c  E  NRC  c  c 
A -14  - SC  p.  22  c  c  NRP  c  ?  c  c 
A -15 - SC  p.  23  c  c  NRP  c  E  NRC  c  c 
A -16 - SC  p.  24  E  CN  E  NRC  NRP  c  E  NRC  - NRP  c 
IV- Ventilation and  firedamp 
!!!~_!!~! 
A- 1  p.  26  c  c  NRP  c  E  NRC  - c 
(2nd para)  E  NRC 
-NRP  • N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
Conference Resolutions  1.11  31.1~  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  s1.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
~~~!!!!!X_.!!~~ 
A  - 2  p.  27 
(3rd para) 
~~!~9~~~9-!~!!.!~~~-.!~_g!~~~ 
mines 
A  - 3  p.  29 
f~~E!:~~~~~:!!!_~j~£~~!~ 
A - 4  p.  31 
f!~!!!~g:~~~-~!_£~~E!~~~~~:!!!: 
mains 
A- 5  p.  32 
y~~~!!!~!~~-!~~E~£~!~~ 
A  - 6  p.  32 
f~!!-~~!~~!~~-!!!~!~-~~-~~~~~~ 
~~~~~!~~~-~!_!!!:~~!~E 
B- 1  p.  33 
~=E~~~~~~~~-~~~E~!-2!-~~~-E=! 
~~E!!:!~~-!~~~!!!~!~g-~!~~!!£~ 
B  - 2  p.  34 
Classification  --------------
B- 3 
!!!:~~~~E-~!:~!~~g= 
B- 4 
p.  35 
p.  36 
E+)  = A-3,  3rd,  4th,  5th and  6th paras 
E++)  =  A-3,  3rd,  5th  and 6th paras. 
c 
c 
E+) 
E 
E 
c 
N 
c 
c 
c 
c 
E 
c'  c 
E++) 
E 
A  E 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRP  NRP  E  NRC  c 
NRP  NRP  NRC  E  NRC  c 
NRP  NRP  ?  N  c 
NRP  NRP  NRC  E  NRC  c 
NRP  c  E  NRC  c 
C./NRP  c  E  NRC  c 
NRP  E  E  NRC  c 
NRP  c  E  NRC  c 
NRP  NRP  NRC  ?  N  c 
• Conference Resolutions 
B- 5  p.  37 
M!~!~~~-!!!_9~!~!!!r 
B  - 6  p.  39 
~~~E~~-EE~~~~El~~-~~-E~~~E~-!~ 
~~~l:!~~~~~~ 
B- 7 
V - Combustible  dust 
Classification  --------------
B  - 3  a 
B- 3  b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
Prevention  ----------
B- 4  a 
B- 4  b 
General  neutralization  ----------------------
B  - 5  a 
b 
c 
p.  40 
p.  44 
p.  44 
p.  45 
p.  45 
p.  45 
p.  46 
p.  47 
p.  47 
p.  47 
p.  48 
p.  48 
E+) .-.  Re  amount  of  firedamp  present 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
1.11  31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11  31.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
c 
RB 
c 
c 
E+) 
c 
c 
E++) 
c 
c 
E 
c 
E 
c 
E 
c 
c 
c' 
N 
c 
RB 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
.c 
c 
c 
E 
NRP 
E 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
E++)- Re  regular  inspection 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
NRP 
c 
c 
c 
E 
E 
E 
? 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
c 
E 
c 
E 
E 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
c 
NRP 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
·c 
c 
c 
c Conference Resolutions 
Stone-dust  barriers  -------------------
B  - 6  a 
b 
c 
d 
VI  - Portable lighting 
p.  48 
p.  49 
p.  49 
p.  49 
~~~-~!_!!!~~-~!!~!~-!~E~ 
A- 2  p.  50 
f~~~!!~E!!~~-~!_!!!~~-~!!~!~­
!!~E~ 
A- 2  p.  50 
VII- Fires and underground  com-
bustion 
~!~Y~~!!~~-~!-~~~~!~!~~~~-E~~-
bustion  -------
B - 1  - 1  a 
- 1  b 
- 2 
B  - 1  - 3 
- 4 
p.  51 
p.  51 
p.  51 
p.  52 
p.  52 
~!~E!!~~-~!-~~~~!~!~~~~-E~~-
bustion  -------
B  - 2  - a  p.  52 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium 
1.11  31.1~  1.11  31.12  1.11 
58  60  58  60  58 
c 
RB 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
E 
E 
c 
c 
c 
c 
RB 
c 
c 
c 
E 
c 
c 
c 
c 
E 
E 
c 
CN 
NRP 
? 
NRP 
NRP 
E 
c 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
N 
NRC 
NRC 
~1.12 
60 
France 
1.11  ~1.12 
58  60 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRP 
NRC 
NRC 
Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
1.11 
58 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
? 
E 
E 
13 . 1~  1. 11  ~  1 • 12 
60  58  60 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
NRC 
N 
NRC 
NRC 
1.11  ~1.12 
58  60 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c. 
.... 
w 
00 N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
Conference Resolutions 
1.11  31.12  1.11. 31.12  1.11  31.12 _1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  50 
- b  p.  53  E  c  E  CN  NRC  NRP  E  NRC  - c 
~!~Y~~!!2~_2!-!!!~!_!~-!~!!!! 
B - 3  - 1  p.  54  c  c  NRC  NRP  E  NRC  - c 
- 2  a  p.  54  RB  E  RB  NRC  NRC  NRC  E  NRC  - c  -
- 2  b  p.  54  RB  c  RB  NRC  NRC  NRC  E  NRC  - c 
- 2  c  p.  54  RB  CE  RB  NRC  NRC  c  E  NRC  - c 
- 2  d  p.  54  RB  c  RB  NRC  NRC  E  NRC 
- 3  a  p.  54  RB  RB  NRC  NRC  NRP  E  NRC  - c 
- 3  b  p.  54  RB  RB  NRC  NRP  E  NRC  - c 
- 3  c  p.  54  RB  c  RB  c  .E  c  E  NRC  - c 
- 3  d  p.  54  RB  c'  RB  NRC  NRC  NRP  ?  N  - c 
- 3  e  p.  54  RB  c'  RB  NRC  NRC  NRP  ?  N  - c 
~!~Y~~!!~~-~!-!!!~!_!~-!~~ 
~~!i~~~~!~2~~-~!_!~!!!! 
B- 4  p.  55  E  c'  E  NRC  NRP  E  NRC  - c 
~!~Y~~!!2~-~!-!!!~!_!~-!~!!!~i! 
8- 5  - a  p.  56  E  c'  E  NRC  NRP  E  NRC  - c 
-bb  p.  56  c  c  NRC  NRP  c'  E-t  E  NRC  - c 
- c  p.  56  E  c'  NRP  NRC  E  NRP  E  NRC  - c 
- d  p.  56  E  c'  E  CE  NRC  NRP  E  NRC  - RB  c 
- e  p.  56  E 
NRP  E  NRC  E  C
1E  E  NRC  - c 
- f  p.  56  c  c  NRC  NRP  E  NRC  - c N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
Conference Resolutions  1.11  31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11  31.1~  1.11  31.1~  1.11  31.12  1.11  ~1.12  1.11 31.12 
58  60  58  660  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
Places where  flammable  ---------------------- -
materials accumulate  --------------------
B  - 6  - a  1st para  p.  57  c  c  RB  c  E  NRC  c  c 
2nd  para  p.  58  RB  RB  RB  RB  E  NRC  E  RB  c 
(last  sentence) 
!'!!~_!!~~!!~~ 
B  - 7 - a  p.  58  c  c  NRC  c  E  NRC  - c 
- b  p.  59  c  c  NRC  c  E  NRC  - c 
- c  p.  59  c  c  NRC  c  E  NRC  - c 
d  59  c  c  NRC  c  E  NRC  c  c  - p.  NRP 
~~~!~!_!!!~:E!~~~~!!~~-~~~  . 2nd 
!!!~!!~~!!~~-~~~~~!~~ 
para 
B  - 8  - 1st  para  p.  59  c  c  NRC  NRP  E  NRC·  - c 
- 2nd para  p.  60  c  c  NRC  c  E  NRC  - c 
!~!~£~~~~-~~~~~~!!~~= 
B- 9  p.  60  c  c  NRC  c  c  NRC  - c 
~III- Electrification 
!!!!£~-Y~!!~~~ 
A- 1  - E  p.  61  c  c  E  NRP  c  C'E  E  NRC  c  c 
Earth faults  NRP 
-------------
A - 2  - E  p.  61  c  c  E  NRP  c  NRP+)  E  NRC  E  c 
Circuit-breakers and  fuses  c+>  -------------------------- CE 
A  - 3  - E- a  p.  62  c  c  E  NRP  E  C1E  ?  NRC  c  c 
+)  2-E,  3rd para 
++)  2-E,  1st and  2nd  paras. N.R./Wph.  Saar 
Conference Resolutions  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12 
58  60  58  60 
A-3-E- b  P•  62  c  c 
- c  p.  62  c  c 
~!~~~£~!!~_!£!~~~! 
A- 4- E  p.  63  c  c 
!!!~~!~~-£!~!~! 
A- 5  - E  p.  63  c  c 
~~!!_!~!!!!~i-~!_!!!~~!~~-
cables  ------
A- 6- E  p.  63  c  c 
Use  of  flammable oil  -------------------- A- 7  - E  p.  63  c  E 
Restrictions of use of  ?  N+)  ---------------------- flammable oil  -------------
A - 8  - E  ·1st para  p.  64  c  c 
2nd  para  p.  64  RB  cc'  RB  NRC 
f!~!!_!!l!!!l 
A - 9  - E  p.  64  c  c 
!!!~!!!~!!~! 
A- 10 - E  p.  65  c  c 
~E!~!!!~!!!~!!!_!~!-£!~!!! 
B- 11  - E  p.  65  c  c 
IX  - Mechanization 
!!~:!!!!~!!!I_!!!_!~!!~! 
A-1- 14-a~  1st sentence  p.  67  c  c 
1)  Armoured  cables 
2)  Flexible cables 
Belgium  France  Italy 
1.11 31.12  1.11 131.12  1.11 131.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60 
E  NRP  E  CE  ?  NRC  C'E 
E  NRP  E  CE  E  NRC  C'E 
E  NRP  c  E  NRC 
E  NRP  E  c  E  NRC 
c  1) l  E  NRP  E  EC'E  E  NRC 
2)  ' 
E  NRP  c  E  NRC 
E  NRP  E  EC'  E 
RB  RB  E  NRC 
E  NRP  c  E  NRC 
E  NRP  c  E  NRC 
E  NRP  c  E  NRC 
E  NRP  E  NRC 
+)  2-E,  3rd para 
++)  2-E,  1st and  2nd  paras. 
Luxembourg 
1.11 31.12 
58  60 
c 
c 
E 
c 
E 
E 
E 
E 
c 
c 
E 
-
Netherlands 
1.11 31.12 
58  60 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
RB  c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
....  ..  .... N.R./Wph. 
Conference Resolutions  1.11 
2nd  sentence  p.  67 
-b  p.  67 
-c  p.  67 
-d  p.  67 
-e  p.  67 
A-2-M  1st para  p.  68 
2nd para  p.  69 
A- 3  - M  p.  69 
A- 4  - M  p.  69 
§~!!!_~~~~~~~ 
A- 5  - M  p.  70 
f!!?!~~ 
A- 6  - M  p.  70 
A - 7  - M  p.  70 
f~~Y~I~!:~ 
A- 8- M  p.  71 
A- 9- M  p.  71 
A -10- M  p.  71 
!~!~!:~!!=~~~!?~~!~~~-~~~~~~~ 
!?~!~!-~!:~~~~ 
A- 11  - M  p.  71 
A- 12  - M  P·  72 
A- 13  - M  P•  72 
C+)= only  remain winding shafts with 
signalling devices at landings 
58 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c  +) 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
E 
c 
c 
c 
c 
31.12 
60 
c'E 
Saar  Belgium 
1.11  31.12  1.11 31.12 
58  60  58  60 
c  E 
c  E 
c  E 
c  E 
c  E 
c  E 
c  E 
RB  ? 
c  c 
c  EC 
c  E 
c  E 
c  E 
c  E 
c  c 
c  E 
c  E 
c  c 
1)  1st para 
France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
E  c'  E  NRC  - c 
c 
~  E  NRC  - c 
c  E  NRC  - c 
c  E  NRC  - c 
c  E  NRC  - c 
c  E  E  NRC  - c 
c  E  ?  - cc 
RB  RB  NRC  - c 
NRP  ?  NRC  - c 
E  c  1)  E  NRC  - c 
c  2> 
c  E  NRC  - c 
c  E  NRC  - c 
c  E  NRC  c  c 
c  E  NRC  E  c 
c  E  NRC  E  c 
CE 1) 
E  c  2)  E  NRC  c  c 
c  E  NRC  c  c 
c  E  NRC  c  CE  c 
2)  = 2nd para N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
Conference Resolutions  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  ~ 1.12  1.11  31.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
A  - 14  - M - a  p.  72  c  c  E  c  E  NRC  E  c 
- b  p.  73  RB  RB  RB  RB  RB  - E 
!!!~~!!!~~-~~!~!_gr~~~~ 
A  - 15  - M  p.  73  E  CE  E  NRC  E  E  C'E/E  ?  RB  E  c 
A  - 16  - M  P·  74  E  c'  E  NRC  E  c  E  - c 
~~E~~~!!!~-~!~!!g~ 
A- 17  - M  p.  74  RB  E  RB  E  RB  E  E  ?  RB  c  NPJ>  c 
A  - 18  - M- a  75  c  c  c  E 
C'E 
?  RB  c  c  p.  NRP 
A  - - b  p.  75  c  c  E  E  C'E  ?  RB  c  cc 
- c  p.  75  c  c  E  E 
NRP  ?  RB  c  c  c' 
A  - 19  - M  p.  76  c  c  E  E  c'  ?  RB  c  c 
A- 20- M  p.  76  c  c  E  E  c'  ?  RB  c  C/B 
?+)  E+) 
A- 21  - M  p.  76  E  CE  E  E  E  C'E/E
1 
?  E  c 
A  - 22  - M  - a  p.  77  E  c'E  E  E  E  C'E  E  NRC  c  c  NRP 
- b  p.  77  E  C'E  E  E  E  C'E  E  NRC  E  c 
NRP 
A  - 23  - M- a  p.  77  c  c  E  c  N  E  NRC  NRP  c 
- b  p.  78  c  c  c  c  E  NRC  - c 
- c  p.  78  c  c  E  c  E  NRC  - c 
- d  P•  78  c  c  c  c  E  NRC  - c 
A  - 24  - ll - a  P•  79  E  c  E  .NRC  E  E  C'E/E  E  NRC  c  c 
- b  p.  79  E  c  E  NRC  E  E  C'E/E  E  NRC  c  c 
I 
:+) = 20 - M,  2nd para Conference Resolutions 
~!~:!!~!~~ 
B  - 25  - M 
~!~~!i~-~!-~!!~!!!~!-~~ 
~~~!~l~!! 
B  - 26  - M 
p.  79 
p.  80 
~!~£!~!!~~!-!!_l~!~!~i-E~!~!! 
!~~-~!~~!~~! 
B  - 27  - M 
B  - 28  - M 
!~!!!~~-~!_!~!!!!_~~!~~! 
B  - 29  - M 
Use  of  flammable  oils for  -------------------------
~~~~!~!~!~_!!~~~~!~!!~~ 
-E~!:E~~~~ 
B  - 30  - M 
p.  80 
p.  80 
p.  80 
p.  81 
N.R./Wph.  Saar 
1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12 
58  60  58  60 
c  c 
E  CN  E  NRC 
E  C'  E  NRC 
c  E 
c  c 
E  E 
Belgium 
1.11  31.12 
58  60 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
France 
1.11  ~1.12 
58  60 
c 
c 
c 
c  N 
NRP 
E 
Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
1.11  31.1:.2  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60 
E  NRC  c 
E  NRC  c  c 
E  NRC  c  c 
E  NRC  NRP  c 
E  NRC  c 
?  N  E  RB  E 
....  ..  .. N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
Conference Resolutions  1.11  31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12  1.11 31.12 
58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
I  - Safety departements  and  orga-
nisation of supervision within 
the enterprises 
1)  ~!!~!~-~~~!~!~~~!~-!~ 
~~!~~~!~~~ 
A - 1  p.  82  c  E  C'  c  E  C'E/E  E  NRC  c  c 
7.  p.  82  c  E  c  c  E  C'E/E  E  NRC  c  c 
B  - 1  p.  82  c  E  c  E  C'E/E  E  NRC  E  c 
2  p.  82  c  E  c  E  C'E/E  ?  NRC  E  c 
c - 1st para  p.  82  c  E  C'  c  E  E  NRC  c  c 
2nd para  p.  83  - E  - N  E  ?  N  E  c 
3rd para  p.  83  c  E  c  c  E  C'E/E  ?  N  - c 
D - 1  p.  83  c  E  C'  E  E  C'E/E  ?  NRC  E  c 
2  p.  83  ?  C'  ?  c  E  E  C'E/E  ?  E  c 
E  p.  83  c  E  C'  c  E  C'E/E  ?  NRC  E  c 
F  - 1st para  p.  84  c  E  C'  c  E  C'E/E  ?  NRC  E  c 
2nd  para  p.  84  c  N  E  c  E  C'E/E  ?  N  E  c 
G  p.  84  N 1)  E  c  1)  N  E  C'E/E  ?  N  c  c 
c  ~)  c  2) 
H  p.  84  c  E  c  c  E  C'E/E  E  NRC  c  c 
1- 1st para  p.  85  c  E  C'E  NRC  E  C'E/E  ?  N  E  c 
2nd para  p.  95  RB  RB  - E  ?  ?  E  RB  c 
l)G,  ~st para.  2)G,  2nd para. N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
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58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60  58  60 
2)  ~!1!~!~!!!~~-~!_!~P~!!!!!~~ 
~!-!!!~!l_!!!!~~~~~~!!_!~ 
~~!~!:P!!!!! 
A  - 1  P.  86  c  c  c  E  c  ?  NRC  c  c 
2  p.  87  c  c  E  E  ?  NRC  c  c 
II- Framing of  regulations  and 
inspection  for compliance 
with  them 
1)  ~!~!~!!!!!~~-~!_!~~e~~!!~~ 
!!!!!!~!!~!~!! 
A- 1-lst para  p.  88  c  c  c  c  E  NRC  c  c 
2nd para  p.  88  c  c  N  c  E  NRC  c  N  c 
3rd para  p.  88  c  c  N  c  E  c  N  c 
2)  E!!!l!!!~~-~!_e~!!! 
A  - 2  p.  89  c  c  N  c  c  c  N  c 
3)  !?!!!2!!~~! 
B- 1st para  p.  89  c  c  c  c  E  NRC  - c 
2nd para  p.  89  c  c  c  c  E  NRC  - c 
3rd para  p.  89  c  E  c  E  RB  E  ?  NRC  - E  c 
4th para  p.  89  c  E  c  E  c  ?  N  - E  c 
5th para  p.  89  c  c  c  E  NRC  ?  NRC  - c Conference Resolutions 
C  =  1st para 
2nd para 
3rd para 
4th para 
5)  Councils  and Committees 
~~~!~!!~~-!~~-~!~!~!~~ 
D - 1 
2 
3 
6)  ~~~~~!-~!_!~~~~~~!~~ 
~~~~!~!~~~! 
A - 1 
2 
p.  90 
p.  90 
p.  90 
p.  90 
p.  90 
p.  90 
p.  90 
p.  91 
p.  91 
7)  ~~~~~!~~~~-~~9~!!~~-~!_!~: 
~~~~!!~~-~~~~~~~~! 
A- 1  p.  91 
8)  ~~~!!!~~-~!-~!~~~-!~~~~~!~!!~~ 
~~!~~~~~! 
A - 2  - 1st and  2nd 
sentences 
3rd sentence 
p.  91 
p.  92 
N.R./Wph.  Saar 
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9)  ~=!~=~~=~-~~~!~!~~-!~~ 
!~~E=~!~E~~-~~~!~!~~!~ 
~~~-!~~~=!~~-~=!=~~!=~ 
A- 3 
III- Workers'  part in satefy 
A - 1st para 
2nd  para 
A- a/b 
B- 1 
2 
c 
p.  92 
p.  93 
p.  93 
p.  93 
p.  94 
p.  94 
p.  95 
IV  - ~~~~!E!!~~El-~~!!~~-!~-!~= 
=!=~E-~!-~E=~~~=~-~!-~~!=Er 
!=~~!~!!~~~ 
1) 
2) 
3)  A  - 1 
3  - A  - 2 
3  - B 
p.  96 
p.  96 
p.  97 
p.  97 
p.  97 
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CE 
C/E 
C' 
Italy 
1.11 31.12 
58  60 
? 
E 
E 
E 
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E 
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c 
E 
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NRC 
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I  - Reception  of  new entrants 
1)  ~~~E~~~!~!!!!~-!~~-~~~~~-
tion 
Par.  7 
Par.  8 
p.  102 
p.  103 
2)  ~~~!!~~!-~~~~E!!~~-~~!~~~~: 
~~~~~!!:~!!~~ 
Par.  9 
Par.  10 
Par.  11 
facilities 
Par.  12 
Par.  13 
p.  103 
p.  103 
p.  104 
p.  104 
p.  104 
II-Medical  and  psychological exami-
nat1on  and  supervision 
1)  Q~~~~~!-~~~~~~~~~!!~~ 
Par.l - lst para 
2nd,  3rd and 
4th paras 
p.  106 
p.  106 
lst part  of  5th para 
p.  106 
III 
HUl\IAN  FACTORS 
N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
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C'E 
? 
c 
c 
E 
E 
c 
c 
E 
E 
E 
N 
E 
E 
E 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
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+)Excepting psychological  examination. N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
Conference Resolutions 
1.11 
58 
Par.  1  - 2nd part  of  5th para 
p.  106  E 
2)  ~!~~-~~~-~~~~~!~-~!-~~~!~~!-~~~ 
E~~~~~!~~!~~!-~~~~!~~!!~~ 
Par.  3 
Par.  4 
4)  ~~~!~~!-~~~-E~~~~~!~~!~~! 
service 
~-----
Par.  5 
Par.  6 
Par.  7 
p.  107  E 
p.  107  E 
p.  107  C+) 
p.  107  C+) 
p.  108  C+) 
5)  ~!~~-~~~-~~~~~!~-~!-~~~!~!!_!~~ 
E~~~~~!~~!~!!-~~E~~!!~!~~ 
Par.  8  p.  108  E 
6)  £!!~!!~!!_~~!~~~~-~!-~~~!~!!_!~~ 
E~~~~~!~~!~!!_~~E~~!!~!~~ 
Par.  9  p.  108  c 
Pa~.  10 - 1st  and  2nd sentences 
p.  108  E 
Par.  10- 3rd and  4th  sentences 
p.  109  E 
Par.  11  p.  109  c 
+)  Excepting  psychological examination. 
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0 N.R./Wph.  Saar  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
Conference Resolutions 
work 
Par.  2 
Par.  3 
p.  110 
p.  110 
IV- ~~~~!!~~~!_!~~!~!~~ 
1)  Aims  and  objects;  general  recommenaations _________ _ 
Par.  1 
Par.  2  - 2nd  para 
p.  112 
p.  112 
2)  !~~!~!~~-~~g~!~~~~~!~ 
Par.  4  - 2nd  para  p.  112 
(schemes) 
3rd para 
(instructors) p.  113 
4th para 
(facilities)  p.  113 
Par.  5  p.  113 
3)  Full systematic training 
~!=~~!~~!!~~------------
Par.  8  p.  114 
Par.  9  p.  114 
4)  ~~~~!~~~~-!~~!~!~~-!~! 
;!~!~~!!~~ 
Par.  10  p.  114 
1.11 
58 
? 
? 
c 
c 
c 
c 
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c 
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c 
+)  Excepting psychological  examination. 
31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12  1.11  31.12 
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c 
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c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
E  CE 
1)  1st para. 
2)  2nd  para. 
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E 
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5)  ~EE~=~!!s=~~!E_S~~!~~S! 
Par.  11  p.  114 
6)  Intensified training of  aautts ________________ _ 
Par.  12  - 1st  and  2nd  sentences 
p.  115 
Par.  13 
Par.  14 
Par.  15 
Par.  16 
3th sentence 
7>  !~~!~!~~-~!-~E=s!~!!~!~ 
Par.  17  - 1st para 
2nd  and 3th 
paras 
p.  115 
p.  115 
p.  115 
p.  116 
p.  116 
p.  116 
p.  116 
8)  Training of  managerial  and 
~~E~~!!~~~~=E~~~~~~~!-----
Par.  18 
Par.  19 
Par.  20 
Par.  21 
9)  !~~!~!~~-~!_!~~!~~S!~~~ 
Par.  22 
Par.  23 
Par.  24  - 1st  sentence 
2nd  sentence 
p.  117 
p.  117 
p.  117 
p.  117 
p.  118 
p.  118 
p.  113 
p.  118 
+)  Instructors working full-time 
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10)  ~~~!~~~E~!~~~-~~-!~~~~~~' 
~!i~~!!!!!~!?~ 
Par.  25  p.  118  E·  c  ?  E 
V-Physical  aspects of  the 
environment 
Par.  4  p.  135  E  c  ?  CE 
VI-Psychological  and  sociological 
factors 
!'~!:!!i~-!~!:~!!:~ 
Par.  9  p.  123  c  c 
Par.lO- a  p.  123  C+)  c 
b  p.  123  c  c 
c  p.  123  ?  N  c 
d  p.  123  ?  N  c 
e  p.  123  c  c 
f  p.  123  ?  C'  c 
VII-Methods  of  payment 
1)  ~!l~!~!-~!-~~P!!:!!~~!l 
staff  ------
Par.  5  p.  125  ?  N  c 
2)  ~!l~!~!-~!-~~~!!!!:!!:~ 
Par.  7  p.  125  c  c 
C+  excepting last ten words 
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E  C'  c  C'  E  c  c 
1)  Supervisory personnel  are required to have 
a  knowledge  of  foreign  languages;  the regulations 
and  instructions are  printed and  issued in several 
languages. Conference Resolutions 
3)  Piece work 
Par.  9  - a  1st and  2nd 
sentences  pp.  126 
Par.  9  - b  p.  126 
Par.  9  - c  p.  126 
Par.  9  - d  1st para 
Par.  9  - e 
Par.  10 
Par.  11 
VII-Working  hours 
1)  !~E~~!_!~!~!~i-~~~E~ 
Par.  4 
Par.  5 
2)  ~~~!~-~~!~~!!!_!~!~~~ 
p.  126 
p.  126 
p.  127 
p.  127 
p.  128 
p.  128 
Par.  6  p.  129 
3)  Amount  of work  done 
Par.  7  p.  129 
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IX-Special  living and  working 
conditions 
Par.  5  p.  131 
2)  ~~~!~~g 
Par.  6  p.  132 
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PART  THREE 
SAFETY  STATISTICS 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
The  Conference  on Safety in Coalmines  went  in some  detail into the subject 
of  comparable  accident statistics.  While  admitting the difficulty of arriving at these, 
the Conference  emphasized that  they were  absolutely necessary,  for various  study 
purposes. 
To  this  ~end the  Conference  recommended  the  following  procedure  : 
"Until the statistics in the different countries have  been  lined up,  it 
would  be  best for  a  simplified. table to be  introduced,  to serve as  a  basis 
for  a  u.niform statistical system for  the  whole  Community. 
"In orde:r  that as  little additional work  as  possible may  be  involved  these 
statistics should be  such as  can readily  be  extracted from  the  more
1
de-
tail~d :figures currently compiled in the different countries,and should 
cons~st only of  a  summarized  breakdown of accidents  by  technical causes 
and degJree  of seriousness"  (Conference  Report,  pp.  159.160). 
The  Commission in its First Report  stated that it considered this matter 
could usefully  be  •examined,  with reference  in the first  instance  to underground acci-
dents  only.  It has  now  worked  out  a  uniform classification of accidents  by  serious-
ness  and cause. 
For  the  ]pUrposes  of  the classification, recordable accidents are  those 
either : 
1)  resulting in de:1th  within eight weeks; 
2)  preventing retu:rn to duty  below ground for eight weeks  or  longer 
Three  po:ints  may  be  noted in this connection: 
a)  The  criterion for accidents  of  type  (2)  is not  the  length of  time  before  the  man 
can resume  his original work,  but  the  length of  time  before  he  can  be  passed fit 
for  underground duties generally  :  it is common  practice for  casualties on re-
covery to be  assigned for  a  time  to other  jobs than those  they  were  performing 
when  the accident  occurred. 
b)  Accidents  not  coming  under either of  the heads  mentioned are  not  included in the 
Community  statistics. 
c)  The  Community statistics do  not  indicate whether  or  not  accidents  have  culminated 
in permanent  disability,  as  the  presence,  and  in particular the  degree,  of  such 
disability takes  so  long to establish that  the compilation of  the statistics would 
be  unduly  retarded. 
B.  £AUS! 
The  classification proposed by  the  Commission  recognizes  twelve  categories 
of causes. 160 
1)  Falls of  ground 
This  covers falls of stone or coal from  their natural position;  it does  not 
include falls  of  ground  due  to causes  coming  under  other  heads,  e.g.  use  of explo-
sives,  firedamp or dust  explosions,  sudden outbursts  of  firedamp  or underground 
combustion or fires,  which  should be  recorded under  the  head concerned.  Accidents 
caused  by  stowing material  are  shown  under  head  5,  "Falling objects". 
Accidents  caused  by  any  haulage  or  transport  installation,  stationary or 
in motion,  for  the carriage  of  personnel  or  of material,  in coal-winning or other 
workings,  roadways,  shafts,  staple-pits,  etc.,  including those  caused  by  the 
driving motors  of  such installations.  Accidents  under  this head  include,  for  ins-
tance,  those  caused  by  lumps  of coal falling from  the  conveyor belt,timber falling 
from  a  mine-car carrying  them,  or  lumps  of coal flying out  from  a  fixed.chute; 
also accidents caused by  the  transmission gear  or motor  of  a  transport vehicule. 
A distinction is made  between  those  coal-getting machines  which  are  prima-
rily means  of  transport,  such as  the scraper-box,  and those  which are primarily 
used for  the actual extraction,  such as  the  plough  :  accidents caused  by  the first 
type  are  shown  under  head 2,  "Haulage  and Tranport",  and  by  the second under  head 
4,"Machinery,  handling  of  tool~ and supports". 
Electrocution by contact with  trolley wires  falls under  head ll,"Electrici  ty". 
3)  Movement  of  personnel 
Falls  by men  in shafts or staple-pits,  stumbling,  tripping,  slipping,bumping, 
spraining,  etc.,  where  not  caused  by  haulage  or transport installations or other 
items  of  the classification. 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools and supports 
Accidents  caused  by  the  operation of  machines  other than those  mentioned  under 
head 2,  "Haulage  and transport",  or  by  the setting,  withdrawal  or resetting of 
supports.  Accidents  due  to the slipping or falling over  of  machines  in moving  or 
shifting are  to be  shown  under  head  5,  "Falling objects";  those  due  to the 
slipping or falling  of supports  or support elements  in transport or shifting under 
head 2,  "Haulage  and  transport",  or under  head 5,  "Falling objects". 
5)  Falling objects 
Accidents  caused  by  the falling or slipping of  blocks  from  loose  piles of debris 
or  in loading,  falling or slipping of shaft supports,  timber,  tools,  props,  piping, 
etc. 
6)  Explosives 
Accidents  resulting from  conveyance  of  explosives·,  charging of shotholes,  untime-
ly or  premature  detonation,  insufficient protection of personnel,  striking of 
drills or cutter picks  on undetonated explosive,  misfires,  retarded detonation, residues of explosives,  or shotfiring fumes.  Where  the  use·of explosives set off 
a  firedamp  or  d111st  explosi.on or caused underground  combustion or a  fire,  such 
accident is shown  under  the  head concerned. 
Unexpectc3d  detonations  of explosives  by electric current fall under  the 
present  head. 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal dust 
This  category includes  poisoning  or asphyxiation by  the  gases  released.  It also 
covers  firedamp  and  dust  explosions  caused  by electric current.  Where  an accident 
was  due  to several factors  one  of  which  is the  ignition or explosion of  firedamp 
or coal dust,  it is ordinarily recorded under  this head. 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  suffocation by 
natural gases  (C02'  CH4r  H2S)  and  oxygen  deficiency 
This  includes  ac:cidents  caused  by  flying objects or falls  of  ground  due  to sudden 
outbursts  of  firedamp.  For  the  purposes  of  this head,  suffocation is only that 
resulting from  the  gas  given off  in sudden outbursts or  from  other natural gases; 
suffocation by  fumes  due  to shotfiring,  to firedamp  or dust  explosions or to 
underground combustion or fire is to be  entered under  the  corresponding heads. 
As  just noted,  where  the  sudden outburst  was  followed  by  an explosion any 
accident  resul  t~.ng is to be  classified under  head 7,  "Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal dust". 
9)  Underground  combustion and fires 
161 
Includes  poisoning or asphyxiation by  gases  or fumes  so released.  Burns,  injuries 
by  falls  of  ground  or falling objects following  the  outbreak of  combustion or fire. 
Fires caused  by electric current  come  under  this head;  those  caused  by  firedamp 
or  dust  explosions,  however,  come  under  head 7,  "Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust". 
In general,  where  an accident was  due  to several factors  one  of  which  is 
underground combustion or fire,  it is shown  under  the  present head,  except  where 
another factor  was  the  ignition or explosion of  firedamp or coal dust,  in which 
case it is shown  under  head 7. 
10)  Inrushes  of  water 
Inrushes  due  to penetration of  old workings  or proximity of  overburden,  resulting 
in casualties  through falls  of  ground,  falling objects,  drowning,  etc. 
11)  Electricity 
Accidents  caused  by electricity,  such as  burns,  electric shock,  electrocution by 
contact with trolley wires. 
Firedamp and dust explosions,  underground combustion and fires  and unexpec-
ted detonations  of explosives caused  by electricity are  shown  under  the  respec-
tive heads  concc:!rned. 162 
12)  Other causes 
All accidents  not classifiable under  heads  1-11,  e.g.  those  caused by  com-
pressed air,  and those  to which  no  precise cause  can be  assigned. 
C.  COVERAGE 
Strictly,  the statistics relate to casualties,  not  to the actual incidents. 
This means  including in the  returns all casualties occurring  below ground,  ir~es­
pective of  the  grade  or function of  the person concerned,  and of  whether  he  is reg" 
ularly employed  on underground duties or not. 
D.  GROUP  ACCIDENTS 
Separate mention is made  of group accidents,  viz.  incidents resulting in 
the  death or disablement  as  defined above  of  five  or more  persons  :  the  number  of 
such  incidents  is given,  together with  the  number  of fatal and serious casualties 
caused.  The  latter figures  of course also appear  in the general statistics. 
E.  COMPARATIVE  TABULATION 
By  means  of  these figures it should  be  possible to work  out  the comparative 
casualty rate for  the different coalfields in each country and for  the different 
Community  countries.  The  casualty rate in each case  is the ratio of casualties to 
total hours  worked  (in million man-hours),calculated to the third decimal  place. 
F.  STATISTICS  ACCORDING  TO  THIS  CLASSIFICATION 
The  present Report  contains the first statistical summary  compiled in 
accordance  with this common  classification of  underground accidents  in 1958 and 
1959,  with separate figures  for each country and comparative  tables showing 
a)  the  number  per million man-hours  of  disablements  leading to eight weeks  or 
more  off work  below ground; 
b)  the  number  per million man-hours  of  deaths ensuing within eight weeks  of 
the accident; 
c)  the  number  of  group accidents  involving five  or  more  such  deaths and/or dis-
ablements  in the  Community  countries  in the  two  years covered. I.  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY 
OF 
UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES 
IN  1958 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements  fatalities 
as under  (a)  as under  (b) 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Coalfield:  Ruhr 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Man- Fatal- per million  per million  Number  CAUSE  Disable- hours  Number  Number  i'ties  man-hours  ments  as  as  under  worked  (to third  under  (a) 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  2,794  165  4.780 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,549  107  2.650 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,538  63  2.632 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports  480  6  0.821 
5)  Falling objects  1,525  40  2.609· 
6)  Explosives  6  4  0.010 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  8  8  0.014 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 2  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  3  - 0.005 
11)  Electricity  6  15  0.010 
12)  Other  causes  322  14  0.551 
TOTAL  8,231  424  584,511,733  14.082 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
man-hours  of dis-
(to third  of  ablements of fatal-
acci- ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.282  - - -
0.183  1  7  -
0.108  - - -
0.010  - - -
0.068  1  - 5 
0.007  - - -
0.014  1  7  8 
0.003  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.026  - - -
0.024  1  - 5 
0.725  4  14  18 CO~WON STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements  fatalities 
as under  (a)  as under  (b) 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Germany,  Land North 
Rhine/Wesphalia, 
Coalfield:  Aachen 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Man-
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  193  9  3.781 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  112  13  2.194 
3)  Movement  of personnel  80  3  1.567 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  6  1  0.118 
5)  Falling objects  65  1  1.274 
6)  Explosives  - - -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 2  -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes  of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  1  0.020 
12)  Other  causes  1  4  0.020 
TOTAL  458  34  51,040,329  8.973 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.176  - - -
0.255  - - -
0.059  - - -
0.020  - - -
0.020  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.039  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.020  - - -
0.078  - - -
0.666 COlBfON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  61  - 5.451 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  19  1  1.698 
3)  Movement  of personnel  15  - 1.341 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  9  - 0.804 
5)  Falling objects  14  - 1.251 
6)  Explosives  - - -
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of  wa~er  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  14  - 1.251 
TOTAL  132  1  11,189,880  11.796 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
-
·o.089 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.089 
Year: 1958 
Country: Germany,  Land  North 
Rhine/Westphalia 
Coalfield: Ibbenburen 
Group accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal- ablements  acci- as under  ities as 
dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
.. COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  3,048  174  4.713 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,680  121  2.598 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,633  66  2.525 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  495  7  0.765 
5)  Falling objects  1,604  41  2.480 
6)  Explosives  6  4  0.009 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  8  8  0.012 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 4  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  3  - 0.005 
ll) Electricity  7  16  0.011 
12)  Other  causes  337  18  0.520 
TOTAL  8, 821  459  646,741,942  13.639 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below ground for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.269 
. 0.187 
0.102 
0.011 
0.063 
0.006 
0.012 
0.006 
-
-
0.025 
0.028 
0.709 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Germany,  Land  North 
Rhine/Westphalia, 
All coalfields 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
1  7  -
- - -
- - -
1  - 5 
- - -
1  7  8 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
l  - -
4  14  18 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number. of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
Fatal- no  .......  ~,,~,..  .. 
c A  U s  E  Disable- hours  r  ........  •••••••"'•• 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  462  20  78,042,903  5.920 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  168  9  "  2.153 
3)  Movement  of personnel  175  2  "  2.242 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  61  - "  0.782 
5)  Falling objects  235  6  "  3.011 
6)  Explosives  5  2  "  0.064 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  16  - "  0.205 
TOTAL  1,  122  39  78,042,903  14.377 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.256 
0.115 
0.026 
-
0.077 
0.026 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.500 
Year: 1958 
Country: saar 
Coalfield: Saar 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as 
dents  as under  under  (b)  (a) 
- - -
- - --
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
.... 
en 
CD COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  3,510  194  4.843 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1,848  130  2.550 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,810  68  2.497 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  556  7  0.767 
5)  Falling objects  1,839  47  2.537 
6)  Explosives  11  6  0.015 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp or coal 
dust  8  8  0.011 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 4  -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  3  - 0.004 
11)  Electricity  7  16  0.010 
12)  Other  causes  353  18  0.487 
TOTAL  9,945  498  724,784,845  13.721 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.268 
0.179 
0.094 
0.010 
0.065 
0.009 
0.011 
0.005 
-
-
0.022 
0.025 
0.607 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Germany,  Land  North 
Rhine/Westphalia 
plus Saar 
All coalfields 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as 
dents  as under  under  (b)  (a) 
- - -
1  7  -
- - -
- - -
1  - 5 
- - -
1  7  8 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1  - 5 
4  14  18 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  558  18  12.187 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  377  4 
~  8.234  ::I 
(") 
3)  Movement  of personnel  116  - ......  2.533 
~ 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  c..  ..... 
and supports  265 
::I  5.788  - IJtl 
5)  Falling objects  9  - .......  0.197  0 
6)  Explosives  2 
~ 
0.044  -
(!) 
I"$ 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal  ..... 
::I 
dust  - - IJtl  -
8)  Sudden outbursts  of  firedamp, 
!lJ 
::I 
suffocation by  natural  gases  c.. 
1  - I"$  0.022 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - -
!lJ  - ..... 
tiJ 
10)  Inrushes of wa"ter  - - .....  - ::I 
11)  Electricity 
aq  - - -
t"t 
12)  Other  causes  11  1  ..... 
0.240  a 
(!) 
TOTAL  1,339  23  45,778,648  29.245 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.393 
0.087 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.022 
0.502 
Year: 1958 
Country: Belgiur.t 
Coalfield: Charleroi/Namur 
Group  accidents 
as  under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  162  10  4.606 
lo-4 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  118  2  =  3.355  0 
3)  Movement  of personnel  46  ..... 
1.308  - r::  g. 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  ..... 
=  and supports  64  -
IJ'Q  1.820 
5)  Falling objects  22 
1-' 
0.625  - 0 
::E 
6)  Explosives  3  1 
(b  0.035  '1  ..... 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal  =  IJ'Q 
dust  - - -
~ 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  =  g. 
suffocation by  natural gases  1  1  '1  0.028 
~ 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - .....  - Ul 
10)  Inrushes of 
..... 
water  - - =  -
IJQ 
11)  Electricity  - 1  r+  - ..... 
12)  Other  causes  5  - s  0.142  (b 
TOTAL  421  15  35,173,800  11.969 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.284 
0.57 
-
-
-
0.028 
-
0.028 
-
-
0.028 
-
0.425 
Year:  1958 
Country: Belgium 
Coalfield: Liege 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
c  .a.  u s  E  n.:--~,- Fatal- hours  per million 
U.LOCLU.L'C'- ities  man-hours  ments  as  as  under  worked  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  195  3  7.070 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  138  3  1-t  5.003 
::1 
3)  Movement  of personnel  28 
(') 
1.015  - ~ 
c 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  Q.  .... 
and supports  102  - :s  3.698 
~ 
5)  Falling objects  19  - I-'  0.689. 
0 
6)  Explosives  - -
~ 
(D  -
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
":!  .... 
dust  :s  - - U'Q  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  ~  ::s 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 2  Q.  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires 
":!  - -
p  - .... 
10)  Inrushes of water  2  rn  - ....  - :s 
11)  Electricity  2  3  U'Q  0.073 
12) 
r+ 
Other  causes  12  - ....  0.435 
=  <D 
TOTAL  496  13  27,580,896  17.983 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.109 
. 0.109 
-
-
-
-
-
0.073 
-
0.073 
0.109 
-
0.473 
Year: 1958 
Country: Belgium 
Coalfield: Borinage 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number  of dis- of  ablements  of fatal-
acci- as under  ities as 
dents  (a)  under  (b) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable-
Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  93  3 
~  4.208 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  82  1  ::s  3.711  n 
..... 
3)  Movement  of personnel  40  1  s::  1.810  0..  ...... 
4)· Machinery,  handling of tools  ::s 
(1Q 
and  supports  46  - 2.082 
..... 
5)  Falling objects  18  3  0  0.815  ~ 
(1) 
6)  Explosives  - - .,  - ...... 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or  coal 
::s 
(1Q 
dust  - - p  -
::s 
8)  Sudden outbursts  of  firedamp,  0.. 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - .,  - p 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires 
...... 
- - Til  - ...... 
10)  Inrushes of  wa'ter  - - ::s  - (1Q 
11)  Electricity  - - rot  - ...... 
12)  Other  causes 
n  -
!3  0.362  0  (1) 
TOTAL  287  8  22,097,792  12.988 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties  died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as  under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.136 
0.045 
0.045 
-
0.136 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.362 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield:  Centre 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as 
dents  as under  under  (b)  (a) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
c  A  u s  E  n.rr-ft"',""  Fatal- '--··-- per million 
,_,  ....  OQIJ~'I!Ii;ii- ities 
UVU.I.-1:11  man-hours  ments  as  as under  worked  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1,008  34 
t-4  7.711 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  715  10  ='  5.470  ()  .... 
3)  Movement  of personnel  230  1  =  1.759  p. 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  .... 
=' 
and supports  477  -
~  3.649  .... 
5)  Falling objects  68  3  0  0.520 
~ 
6)  Explosives  5  1 
c 
0.038  '1  .... 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal  ='  aca 
dust  - - - p 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  ='  p. 
suffocation by  natural gases  2  3 
'1  0.015  p 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  .... 
til  - - ....  -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  2  ='  - Otl  -
11)  Electricity  2  4  ""  0.015  .... 
12)  Other causes  36  1  s  0.275  c 
TOTAL  2,543  59  130,631,136  19.454 
(a}  Casualties were unable to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.260 
·o.o76 
0.008 
-
0.023 
0.008 
-
0.023 
-
0.015 
0.031 
o.oos 
0.452 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield:  South 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number  of dis- of  ablements of fatal-
acci- as under  ities as 
dents  (a}  under  (b) CO~WON STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements  fatalities 
as under  (a)  as under  (b) 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield:  Campine 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Man-
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  105  8  1.821  ..... 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  63  9  ::s  1.092  ~ 
3)  Movement  of personnel 
..... 
25  1  s::  0.434 
Q. 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
~ 
::s 
and  supports  51  1 
aq  0.884 
..... 
5)  Falling objects  10  - 0  0.173  :E 
6)  Explosives  1 
en  - '1  -
~ 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal  ::s  aq 
dust  - - ~  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  ::s 
Q. 
suffocation by  natural gases  - - '1  -
~ 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
~  - 00 
10) 
..... 
Inrushes of wa"ter  - - ::s  - OQ 
11)  Electricity  - - f"t  -
~ 
12)  Other causes  13  - 5I  0.226  en 
TOTAL  267  20  57,654,104  4.630 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.139 
0.156 
0.017 
0.017 
-
0.017 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.346 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1,113  42  5.911 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  .... 
778  19  ::s  4.132 
0 
3)  Movement  of personnel  255  2  ....  1.354  =  Q. 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  .... 
::s  and supports  528  1  OQ  2.804 
5)  Falling objects  78  3  .... 
0.414  0 
:E 
6)  Explosives  5  2 
(D  0.027  '1 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal  .... 
::s 
dust 
aq  - - - SD 
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp,  ::s 
Q. 
suffocation by  natural  gases  2  3  '1  0.011 
9)  Underground  combustion and fires 
~  - - ....  - rn 
10)  Inrushes of water  2  ....  - ::s  -
11)  Electricity 
aq 
2  4  r+  0.011 
12)  Other  causes  .... 
49  1  s  0.260 
(D 
TOTAL  2,810  79  188,285,240  14.924 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.223 
0.101 
0.011 
0.005 
0.016 
0.011 
-
0.016 
-
0.011 
0.021 
0.005 
0.420 
Year:  1958 
Country: Belgium 
All coalfields 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) COlWON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  776  33  4.889 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  269  25  1.695 
3)  Movement  of personnel  188  - 1.184 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  120  2  0.756 
5)  Falling objects  279  5  1.758 
6)  Explosives  2  - 0.012 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal 
dust  - -
;.. 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  428  6  2.696 
TOTAL  2,062  71  158,732,198  12.990 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.208 
0.157 
-
0.013 
0.031 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.038 
0.447 
Year:  1958 
Country:  France 
Coalfield: Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
1  - 11 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1  - 11 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  393  17  6.078 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  206  6  3.186 
3)  Movement  of personnel  160  - 2.474 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  77  1  . 1.191 
5)  Falling objects  162  - 2.505 
6)  Explosives  7  - 0.108 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  8  20  0.124 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  1  12  0.015 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  3  - 0.046 
12)  Other  causes  330  1  5.103 
TOTAL  1,347  57  64,662,785  20.830 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least.eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a}  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.263 
·o.o93 
-
0.015 
-
-
0.309 
0.186 
-
-
-
0.015 
0.881 
Year:  1958 
Country:  France 
Coalfield: Centre/Midi 
(less Provence) 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as  under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1  8  20 
1  - 9 
-.  - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
2  8  29 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements  fatalities 
as under  (a)  as under  (b) 
Year;  1958 
Country:  France 
Coalfield:  Lorraine 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Man-
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
below  (b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  227  15  4.195 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  75  2  1.386 
3)  Movement  of personnel  70  2  1.294 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  57  2  1.053 
5)  Falling objects  84  2  1.552 
6)  Explosives  3  - 0.055 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  5  12  0.092 
8)  Sudden outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.019 
12)  Other  causes  63  3  1.164 
TOTAL  585  38  54,105,896  10.812 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  dents  as under  under  (b)  place  (a) 
0.277  - - -
0.037  - - -
0.037  - - -
0.037  - - -
0.037  - - -
- - - -
0.222  1  5  12 
- - - -
- -- - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.055  - - -
0.702  1  5  12 
.... 
co 
0 COAThiON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
c  A  u  s  E  Disable~  Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1,396  65  5.027 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  550  32  1.980 
3)  Movement  of personnel  418  2  1.505 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  254  5  0.914 
5)  Falling objects  525  7  1.890 
6)  Explosives  12  - 0.043 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  13  32  0.047 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  1  12  0.004 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wat:er  - - -
11)  Electricity  4  - 0.014 
12)  Other  causes  821  10  2.956 
TOTAL  3, 994  165  277,500,879  14.380 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.235 
-0.115 
0.007 
0.018 
0.025 
-
0.115 
0.043 
-
-
-
0.036 
0.594 
Year:  1958 
Country:  France 
All coa.lfields 
(less  Provence) 
Group  accidents 
as  under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
1  - 11 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
2  13  32 
1  - 9 
- - -
- - -
- - .:.. 
- - -
4  13  52 
1-' 
00 
1-' COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements  fatalities 
as  under  (a)  as under  (b) 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Italy 
Coalfield: Sulcis 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Man-
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  8  1  1.335 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  8  - 1.335 
3)  Movement  of personnel  4  - 0.668 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  7  - 1.169 
5)  Falling objects  7  - 1.169 
6)  Explosives  1  3  0.167 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  2  - 0.334 
TOTAL  37  5  5,989,868  6.177 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements  ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.167 
-
-
-
-
0.501 
-
0.167 
-
-
-
-
0.835 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  86  17  1.326 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  98  5  1.511 
3)  Movement  of personnel  21  - 0.324 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  40  1  0.617 
5)  Falling objects  26  - 0.401 
6)  Explosives  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wat:er  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other  causes  17  - 0.262 
TOTAL  238  23  64,851,784  4.441 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.262 
. 0.077 
-
0.015 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.355 
Year:  1958 
Country:  Netherlands 
Coalfield:  Limburg 
Group  accidents 
as  under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as  under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1  - 7 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1  - 7 II.  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY 
OF 
UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  ---
IN  1959 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  2#437  145  4.768 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1# 306  88  2.555 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1,307  59  2.557 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  488  15  0#955 
5)  Falling objects  1,374  26  2.689 
6)  Explosives  3  2  0.006 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - .1  -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - 2  -
10)  Inrushes of wat:er  - 2  -
11)  Electricity  4  5  0,008 
12)  Other causes  293  15  0.573 
TOTAL  7#212  360  511#102#335  14.111 
(a)  Casualties were unable to  resume  work  below  ground for  a  least  e~ght weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
_as  under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.284 
0.172 
0.115 
0.029 
0.051 
0.004 
-
0.002 
0.004 
0.004 
0.010 
0_.029 
0.704 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Germany 1  Land  North 
Rhine/Westphalia 
Coalfield:  Ruhr 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1  - 7 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - --
- - -
1  - 7 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  170  17  4.088 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  114  10  2.741 
3)  Movement  of personnel  78  3  1.876 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  20  2  0.481 
5)  Falling objects  81  - 1.948 
6)  Explosives  2  - 0.048 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - 6  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.024 
12)  Other  causes  11  1  0.265 
TOTAL  477  40  41,585,700  11.470 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.409 
0.240 
0.072 
0.048 
-
-
0.144 
0.024 
-
-
-
0.024 
0.962 
Year:l959 
Country:Germany~  Land  North 
Rhine/Westphalia 
Coalfield:Aachen 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
1  8  -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1  - 6 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
2  8  6 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
as under  (to third  under  (a)  (b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  23  6  2.238 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  16  2  1.557 
3)  Movement  of personnel  14  - 1.362 
4)  Machinery,  handling of  tools 
and  supports  5  - 0.487 
5)  Falling objects  14  - 1.362 
6)  Explosives  - - -
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  1  - 0.098 
12)  Other  causes  16  - 1.557 
TOTAL  89  8  1012761374  8.661 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.584 
0.194 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.778 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Germany 1  Land  North 
Rhine/Westphalia 
Coalfield:  Ibbenburen 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal- ablements  acci- as  under  ities as 
dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-ho\lrs 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  2~630  168  4.672 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  1~436  100  2.551 
3)  Movement  of personnel  1~399  62  2.458 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  513  17  0.911 
5)  Falling objects  1~469  26  2.610 
6)  Explosives  5  2  0.009 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - 6  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 2  -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - 2  -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - 2  -
11)  Electricity  6  5  o.o11 
12)  Other  causes  320  16  0.568 
TOTAL  7~778  408  562~964~409  13.816 
(a)  Casualties were unable to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.298 
0.178 
0.110 
0.030 
0.046 
0.003 
0.011 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
0.009 
0.028 
0.725 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Germany~  Land  North 
Rhine/Westphalia 
All  coalfields 
G1·oup  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1  - 7 
1  8  -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1  - 6 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
3  8  13 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  418  17  5.591 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  202  7  2.702 
3)  Movement  of personnel  172  - 2.300 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  70  - 0.936 
5)  Falling objects  265  - 3.544 
6)  Explosives  2  - 0.027 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp  or coal 
dust  10  2  0.134 
8)  Sudden outbursts  of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa"ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  3  - 0.040 
12)  Other  causes  13  - 0.174 
TOTAL  1,155  26  74,769,582  15.447 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.227 
0.094 
-
-
-
-
0.027 
-
-
-
-
-
0.384 
Year:  1959 
Country: Saar 
Coalfield: Saar 
Group  accidents 
as  under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - --
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1  5  2 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- -
~ 
- - -
1  5  2 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.s.c.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  31048  185  4.779 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  11638  107  2.569 
3)  Movement  of personnel  11571  62  2.463 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  583  17  0.914 
5)  Falling objects  11734  26  2.719 
6)  Explosives  7  2  0.011 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  10  8  0.016 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 2  -
9)  Underground  combustion and fires  - 2  -
10)  Inrushes of water  - 2  -
11)  Electricity  9  5  0.014 
12)  Other causes  333  16  0.522 
TOTAL  81933  434  6371733,991  14.007 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.290 
. 0.169 
0.097 
0.027 
0.041 
0.003 
0.012 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
o.oos 
0.025 
0.680 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Germany~  Land North 
Rhine/Westphalia 
plus Saar 
All  coalfields 
Group accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
1  - 7 
1  8  -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
2  5  8 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
4  13  15 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  225  14  6,508 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  142  6  ~  4.107  ::s 
3)  Movement  of personnel  48  1  n  1.388  ...... 
~ 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  Q.  ..... 
and supports  93  1  ::s  2.690  (J'q 
5)  Falling objects  13  - .....  0.376 
0 
6)  Explosives  1  -
~  0.029  (t) 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
+1  ..... 
::s  dust  - - (J'q  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  Sl) 
::s 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 2  Q.  -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires 
+1  - -
~  - ..... 
10)  Inrushes of wat:er  - -
Ul  .....  - ::s 
11)  Electricity  - -
(J'q  -
12)  Other causes 
r+ 
10  - .....  0.289  g 
(t) 
TOTAL  532  24  . 34,573,888  15.387 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to resume  work  below ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.405 
0.173 
0.029 
0.029 
-
-
-
0.058 
-
-
-
-
0.694 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield:  Charleroi/Namur 
Group accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) • 
COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  136  5  4.470 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  74  3  ~  2.432 
::s 
3)  Movement  of personnel  32  1 
(":)  1.052  ..... 
~ 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
Q.  ..... 
and  supports  45  - ::s  1.479 
aq 
5)  Falling objects  12  - .....  0.394 
0 
6)  Explosives  - - ==  - CD 
11 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal  ..... 
::s 
dust  - - ~  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  ~ 
::s 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - a.  -
1 
11 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - ~  - ..... 
10)  Inrushes of water  - -
Ul  - ..... 
::s 
11)  Electricity  - -
aq  -
16 
r+  0.526  12)  Other  causes  - ..... 
a 
CD 
TOTAL  315  10  30.9424,312  10.353 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.164 
0.099 
0.033 
-
-
-
-
-
0.033 
-
-
-
0.329 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield:  Liege 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  120  6  6.500 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  87  3 
lo-4  4.712  :::; 
n 
3)  Movement  of personnel  22  2  ......  1.192  s:: 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
Q.  ..... 
and supports  so  -
:::;  4.333  o:; 
5)  Falling objects  9  - ......  0.487·  0  ::e 
6)  Explosives  - - 0  -
~ 
7)  Explosions  of firedamp  or coal 
..... 
:::; 
dust  - -
3-:j  -
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
~ 
:::; 
Q.  suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
M 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
~  .....  -
til 
10)  Inrushes of wa1:er  - - .....  - :::; 
11)  Electricity 
tr.;  - - - r+ 
12)  Other  causes  4  - .....  0.217  =  15 
TOTAL  322  11  18,461.,800  17.441 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least ei"ght  weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.326 
0.162 
0.108 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.596 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield: Borinage 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  {b) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  {a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  {a)  as  under  {to third 
below  {b)  decimal 
below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  69  2  4.633  .... 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  61  2  ::::;  4.096 
() 
3)  Movement  of personnel  27  .....  1.813  - ~ 
Q. 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  .... 
::::; 
and  supports  37  -
~  2.485 
5)  Falling objects  13  -
..... 
0.873  0 
~ 
6)  Explosives  - -
('D  - '1  .... 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal  ~ 
dust  - - - p 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
::::; 
Q. 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - '1  -
p 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - ....  - rtJ 
10)  Inrushes of  .... 
water  - - =  -
Gtl 
11)  Electricity  - - ~  - .... 
12)  Other causes  2  - 9  0.134 
C1) 
TOTAL  209  4  14,892,104  14.034 
{a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  {b) 
per million 
man-hours 
{to third 
decimal 
place 
0.134 
0.134 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.268 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield:  Centre 
Group accidents 
as under  {c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as 
dents  as under  under  {b)  {a) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements  fatalities 
as under  (a)  as under  (b) 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Belgiu~ 
Coalfield: South 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Man-
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  550  27  5.592 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  364  14 
+-4  3.701  :I 
129  4 
c 
3)  Movement  of personnel  .....  1.312 
~ 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
Q.  .... 
and  supports  255  1  :I  2.593 
~ 
5)  Falling objects  47  - .....  0.478 . 
~ 
6)  Explosives  1  - CD  0.010 
'1 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal  .... 
:I 
dust  - -
~  -
;_) 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  :I 
suffocation by  natural  - 2 
Q.  - gases 
'1 
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - 1 
;_)  - .... 
ttl 
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - ....  - :I 
~ 
11)  Electricity  - - -
"'  12)  Other  causes  32  - ....  0.325  e 
m 
TOTAL  1,378  49  98,352,104  14.011 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci·  ablements ities as  decimal  as under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.275 
. 0.142 
0.041 
0.010 
-
-
-
0.020 
0.010 
-
-
-
0.498 COl\1MON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  74  4  1.575 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  69  4  ~  1.469 
::l 
3)  Movement  of personnel  16  -
~  0.340  ..... 
c: 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  Q. 
and  supports  48  1  ..... 
1.022  ::l 
tr.i 
5)  Falling objects  7  - .....  0.149 
2 
0 
6)  Explosives  - E  - ('!) 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
'1  ..... 
dust  - - ::l  - tr.i 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  p 
::l 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - Q.  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - -
'1  - p  ..... 
10)  Inrushes of wat:er  - - Ul  - ..... 
11) 
::l 
Electricity  - - tr.i  -
12)  Other  causes  5  -
rot  0.106  ..... 
s 
('!) 
TOTAL  219  11  46,981,440  4.661 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.085 
0.085 
-
0.021 
-
0.043 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.234 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield:  Campine 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  624  31  4.294 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  433  18  C)  2.979  E 
3)  Movement  of personnel  145  4  '"  0.398  ~ 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools  bD 
=  and  supports  303  2  '"  2.085  Ul 
5)  Falling objects  54  .,.. 
- ~  0.371 
H 
6)  Explosives  1  2  '0  0.007 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or  coal  =  ~ 
dust  - - bD  - =  8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  '"  H 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 2 
Q)  - ~ 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 1  ....c  -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  -
btl  - =  -
'"  11)  Electricity  - - '0  - ::s 
12)  37 
....c 
Other causes  - 0  0.255  c 
1-4 
TOTAL  1,597  60  .145 '333 '544  10.989 
.. 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.213 
0.124 
0.027 
0.014 
-
0.014 
-
0.014 
0.007 
-
-
-
0.413 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Belgium 
Coalfield:  All coalfields 
Group  accidents 
as  under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0  0  0 COlUtON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  802  27  5.021 
2)  Haulage  and  transport 
)  272  13  1.703 
3)  Movement  of personnel  130  1  0.814 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  133  9  0.833 
5)  Falling objects  360  -- 2.254 
6)  Explosives  3  - 0.019 
7)  Explosions of firedamp or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 4  -
9)  Underground  combustion and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  -
12)  Other causes  366  1  2.291 
TOTAL  2,066  56  159,718,851  12.935 
(a)  Casualties were unable to resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
{b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
{to third 
decimal 
place 
0.169 
0.082 
0.006 
0.057 
-
-
-
0.025 
-
-
0.006 
0.006 
0.351 
Year:  1959 
Country:  France 
Coalfield:  Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Group accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements  fatalities 
as under  (a)  as under  (b) 
Year:  1959 
Country: France 
Centre/Midi 
Coalfield:  (less Provence) 
Group accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Man-
C A U S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as  under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  286  11  4.724 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  132  3  2.180 
3)  Movement  of personnel  118  - 1.949 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  94  1  1.553 
5)  Falling objects  152  - 2.511 
6)  Explosives  9  3  0.149 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp or coal 
dust  1  2  0.017 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 1  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  -
12)  Other causes  319  1  5.267 
TOTAL  1,111  23  60,544,438  18.350 
(a)  Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities  decimal  as under  as 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
0.183  - - -
0.050  - - -
- - - -
0.016  - - -
- - - -
0.050  - - -
0.033  - - -
0.016  - - -
- - - -
- - - -
0.016  - - -
0.016  - - -
0.380  - - -COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as under  (a) 
C AU  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of ground  181  14  3.497 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  57  7  1.101 
3}  Movement  of personnel  56  4  1.082 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  51  1  0.985 
5}  Falling objects  83  2  1.603 
6}  Explosives  2  4  0.039 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or coal 
dust  23  31  0.444 
8}  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - 2  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10}  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 1  -
12}  Other  causes  68  6  1.314 
TOTAL  521  72  51,765,240  10.065 
(a}  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.270 
0.135 
0.077 
0.019 
0.039 
0.077 
0.599 
0.039 
-
-
0.019 
0.116 
1.390 
Year:  1959 
Country:  France 
Coalfield:  Lorraine 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements  ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
2  23  31 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
2  23  31 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
C  A  U  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  1,269  52  4.665 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  461  23  1.695 
3)  Movement  of personnel  304  5  1.118 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and supports  278  11  1.022 
5)  Falling objects  595  2  2.187 
6)  Explosives  14  7  0.051 
7)  Explosions of firedamp  or coal 
dust  24  33  0.088 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural gases  - 7  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa"ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  - 3  -
12)  Other causes  753  8  2.768 
TOTAL  3,698  151  272,028,529  13.594 
(a)  Casualties were  unable to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.192 
0.085 
0.018 
0.040 
0.007 
0.026 
0.121 
0.026 
-
-
0.011 
0.029 
0.555 
Year:  1959 
Country: France 
All coalfields 
(less Provence) 
Group accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number 
of  of dis- of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
- - ·-
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
2  23  31 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
2  23  31 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements  fatalities 
as under  (a)  as under  (b) 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Italy 
Coalfield:  Sulcis 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Man-
C A u  S  E  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million  per million Number  Number  Number 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  7  - 1.378 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  5  1  """'  0.984  ::s 
(') 
3)  Movement  of personnel  2  - ....  0.394  s::: 
4)  handling of tools 
Q. 
Machinery,  ~ 
and  supports  5  ::s  0.984  - gq 
5)  Falling objects  10  1  ....  1.968 
~ 
6)  Explosives  - -
(!)  - loi 
7)  Explosions of  firedamp  or coal 
~ 
::s 
dust  - -
gq  -
~ 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  ::s 
Q. 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
loi 
9)  Underground  combustion  and fires  - -
~  - ..... 
rn 
10)  Inrushes of water  - -
~  - ::s 
11)  Electricity 
gq  - - - rl-
12)  Other causes  3  ..... 
0.591  - s 
(!) 
TOTAL  32  2  5,079,802  6.299 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than  five  casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
man-hours  of  of dis- of fatal- (to third  acci- ablements ities as  decimal  as  under 
place  dents  (a)  under  (b) 
-
0.197 
-
-
0.197 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.394  0  0  0 COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARY  OF  UNDERGROUND  ACCIDENTS 
AT  MINES  IN  THE  E.C.S.C.  COUNTRIES 
Number  of  Number  of 
casualties  disablements 
Man- as  under  (a) 
CAUSE  Disable- Fatal- hours  per million 
ments  as  ities  worked  man-hours 
under  (a)  as under  (to third 
(b)  decimal  below  below  place) 
1)  Falls of  ground  91  4  1.464 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  97  9  1.562 
3)  Movement  of personnel  24  - 0.386 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  25  1  0.402 
5)  Falling objects  32  1  0.515 
6)  Explosives  - - -
7)  Explosions  of firedamp  or coal 
dust  - - -
8)  Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by  natural  gases  - - -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - -
10)  Inrushes of wa'ter  - - -
11)  Electricity  - - -
12)  Other causes  10  - 0.161 
TOTAL  279  15  62,137,576  4.490 
(a)  Casualties were  unable  to  resume  work  below  ground  for  a  least eight weeks. 
(b)  Casualties died within eight weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
Number  of 
fatalities 
as under  (b) 
per million 
man-hours 
(to third 
decimal 
place 
0.064 
0.145 
-
0.016 
0.016 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.241 
Year:  1959 
Country:  Netherlands 
Coalfield:  Limburg 
Group  accidents 
as under  (c)  below 
Number  Number  Number  of dis- of  of fatal-
acci- ablements ities as  as under  dents  (a)  under  (b) COMPARATIVE  TABLE 
OF  COMMON  STATISTICAL  SUMMARIES 
1958  and  1959 Comparative  table 
of  numbers  of persons  incapacitated for eight weeks  or longer, 
1958  and  1959 
per million man-hours 
Germany  '  France 
(N.R./Wph.  +  Belgium  I< less  Provence)  Italy  Netherlands  Community 
Cause  Saar) 
1958  1959  1958  1959  1958  1959  1958  1959  1958  1959  1958  1959 
1)  Falls of ground  4.843  4.779  5.911  4.294  5.027  4.665  1.335  1.378  1.326  1.464  4.846  4.490 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  2.550  2.569  4.132  2.979  1.980  1.695  1.335  0.984  1.511  1.562  2.602  2.347 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  2.497  2.463  1.354  0.998  1.505  1.118  0.668  0.394  0.324  0.386  2.003  1.823 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
and  supports  0.767  0.914  2.804  2.085  0.914  1.022  1.169  0.984  0.617  0.402  1.098  1.064 
5)  Falling objects  2.537  2.719  0.414  0.371  1.890  2.187  1.169  1.968  0.401  0.515  1.962  2.161 
6)  Explosives  0.015  0.011  0.027  0.007  0.043  0.051  0.167  - - - 0.023  0.020 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  0.011  0.016  - - 0.047  0.088  - - - - 0.017  0.030 
8)  Sudden  outbursts of  firedamp, 
suffocation  by  natural gases  - - 0.011  - 0.004  - - - -- - 0.002  -
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - - - - - - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes of water  0.004  - - - - - - - - - 0.002  -
11)  Electricity  0.010  0.014  0.011  - 0.014  - - - - - 0.010  0.008 
12)  Other causes  0.487  0.522  0.260  0.255  2.956  2.768  0.334  0.591  0.262  0.161  0.985  1.012 
TOTAL  13.721  14.007  14.924  10.989  14.380  13.594  6.177  6.299  4.441  4.490  13.551  ~2.954 Comparative  table 
of accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
1958  and  1959 
per million man-hours 
-------- - -
Germany  France 
l  Netherlands  (N.R./Wph.  +  Belgium  (less Provence)  Italy  Conununity 
C  A  U  S  E  Saar) 
1958  1959  1958  1959  1958  1959  1958  1959  I 1958  1959  1958  1959 
I 
---- -~-------
1)  Falls of  ground  0.268  0.290  0.223  0.213  0.235  0.192  0.167  - 0.262;  0.064  0.253  0.242 
2)  Haulage  and  transport  0.179  0.169  0.101  0.124  0.115  0.085  - 0.197  0.077  0.145  0.147!  0.141 
3)  Movement  of  personnel  0.094  0.097  0.011  0.027  0.007  0.018  - - - - 0.057!  0.063 
I 
4)  Machinery,  handling of tools 
I 
and  supports  0.010  0.027  0.005  0.014  0.018  0.040  - - 0.015  0.016  0.0111  0.028 
5)  Falling objects  0.065  0.041  0.016  - 0.025  0.007  - 0.197  - 0.016  0.0451  0.027 
6)  Explosives  0.009  0.003  0.011  0.014  - 0.026  0.501  - - - 0.009  0.010 
7)  Explosions  of  firedamp  or 
coal dust  0.011  0.012  - - 0.115  0.121  - - - - 0.032  0.036 
8)  Sudden  outbursts of firedamp,  I 
suffocation  by  natural gases  0.005  0.003  0.016  0.014  0.0431  0.026  0.167  - - - 0.016  0.010 
9)  Underground  combustion  and  fires  - 0.003  - 0.007  - - - - - - - 0.003 
10)  Inrushes of water  - 0.003  0.011  - - - - - - - 0.002  0.002 
11)  Electricity  0.022  0.008  0.021  - - 0.011  - - - - 0.016  0.007 
12)  Other causes  0.025  0.025  0.005  - 0.036  0.029  - - - - 0.023  0.021 
TOTAL  0.687  0.680  0.420  0.413  0.594  0.555  0.835  0.394  0.355  0.241  0.610  0.590 Comparative table of  u~dergrou~d brc~p accidents  (see  (c)  below), 
1958  and  1959 
Germany  France 
(N.R./Wph.~ 
S  ar 
i.ielg::.-..:m  (less Provence) 
c  A  u s  E  1958  1959  1958  1959  1958  1959 
N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b 
1)  Fall·'  of  grou:~d  - - - 1  - 7  - - - - - - - - - - - -
2)  I-Iaulage  and  transport 
1  7  - 1  8  - - - - - - - 1  - 11  - - -
3)  Movement  of personnel  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4)  Machi~ery, handling of 
tools and  supports  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5)  Falling objects 
1  - 5  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6)  :Explosives  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'7\  Explosions  of  firedamp  •  I  1  7  8  2  5  8  - - - - - - 2  13  32  2  23  31 
or coal dust 
8)  Sudden outbursts of  firedamp,  - - - - - - - - - - - - 1  - 9  - -
suffocation by  natural gases 
9)  Uuder~;rou:;:ld combustion  and fires  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10)  Inrushes  of Water  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11)  Electricity  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
12)  Other causes  - - - 1  - 5  - - - - - - - - - - -
T  0  T  A  L  4  14 18  4  13  15  - - - - - - 4  13  52  2  23 
(a) Casualties were unable  to  resume  work  below  ground for at least eight weeks. 
(b) Casualties died within eight  weeks. 
(c)  Accidents  involving more  than five casualties of  types  (a)  and/or  (b). 
(N)  Number  of  grcup accidents. 
-
-
-
-
-
31 
Italy 
1958  1959 
N  a  b  N  a 
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
Netherlands  Community 
1958  1959  1958  1959 
b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b  N  a  b 
- 1  - 7  - - - 1  - 7  1  - 7 
- - - - - - - 2  7  11  1  II  -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - 1  - 5  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -.  - - - - - 3  20  40  4  28  39 
- - - - - - - 1  - 9  - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - ..  1  - 5  - - -
- 1  - 7  - - - • 
27  77  6  36  46 \ 
I  N F 0  R M A T  I  C N  R E P  0  R T 
on  the establishment of criteria for  fire-resistant  fluids 
used  for  power  transmission  (hydraulic  fluids)  and 
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8 INFORMATION  REPORT 
on  the establishment of criteria for  fire-resistant fluids 
used  for  power  transmission  {hydraulic fluids)  and  on  the 
tests to  be  carried out  for  that purpose. 
In Recommendation 36-M of  the  Conference.on Safety  in Coal  Mines  it 
is stated that  : 
''Research  should  be  continued with  the object of developing  incombustible 
fluids  to be  used  in place of  inflaoonable oils for  mechanical  purposes, 
e.g.  in hydraulic  equipment,  couplings,  tub-decking plant,  props,  etc.'' 
{Page  150 of the Conference Report). 
The  Working Party on Fires  and  Underground  Combution, whichwas  directed 
by  the  Mines  Safety Commission  to  investigate this problem,  set up at its Fourth 
Meeting on  November  23,  1958,  a  Couuui tt~e of  Experts  for  this purpose  and  instructed 
this Conuni ttee to work out criteria for  fire-resistant  fluids of this kind and  for 
appropriate tests. 
In  accordance with  these  instructions the  types of fire-resistant  hy-
draulic fluids suitable for  use  in  the  following  devices  and  apparatus were  studied: 
1.  ~~~~~~!!~~!!~:~E~~~!~~-~EE~~~!~~ 
a)  with mechanical  pumps, 
b)  without  mechanical  pumps. 
Lubricants,  e.g.  for  gears,  compressors,  diesel engines,  ropes,  guides, 
transformers,  etc.  were  not  dealt with. 
In detail the  folloving criteria and  tests can  be  recommended 
1.  CRITERIA  FOR  FIRE-RESISTANCE 
The  fire-resistant characteristics of the fluid were  determined  by tests 
a)  to c) 
This  test is used  as  a  matter of routine  in  the aviation industry to 
determine  non-flammability.  The  lubricant  to  be  tested is atomized  under  a  pres-
sure of 70 kg/sq.cm.;  the  atomized jet is then directed on  to an oxy-acetylene 
flame  calibrated to correspond  to  a  standard  flame.  Operating conditions are 
described  in Appendix  I. 
By  this test the  propagation of  a  flame  is measured  on  a  mixture of  75% 
by vol.  of coal dust  and  25t,t~  by  vol.  of fluid,  a  test piece 250  mm.  long,  20  mm. 
broad  and  2  mm.  thick  being held  in a  Bunsen-burner  flame  of  1,000  °C.  tempera-
ture  to heat  the  extreme end of the test piece.  When  the latter flares up,  t~e 
flame  should not  spread markedly  beyond  the  zone of effect of the  Bunsen-burner 
flame.  Operating  condit~ons are described  in Annex  II. 
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Hydraulic  couplings are protected against overloads  by  a  fusible plug, 
which  melts at approximately  140°C  ••  When  the  fusible  plug melts,  the pressure 
of the  fluid generally produces  a  ragged outlet orifice,  which  favours  oxida-
tion of  the jet accompanied  by  the  formation of peroxides.  If the  fluid used 
is flammable,  the peroxides  undergo  auto-ignition at  120°C.  Hydraulic couplings 
can  therefore constitute a  potential source of fire.  A device  was  developed which 
makes  it possible  to  test whether  the  fluid used  in the coupling can  ignite un-
der  the conditions obtaining when  a  fusible  plug melts.  The  test procedure,  and 
the plan of the apparatus are described  in Annex  III. 
2.  HEALTH  CRITERIA 
The  manufacturers of  non-flammable  fluids  must  provide  a  medical  report 
certifying that their product  is harmless.  This requires  the  fulfilment  of the fol-
lowing conditions: 
a)  Under  the  normal  conditions of use  and  dilution,  the product  must  not  cause  any 
harmful  effects on  the skin,  mucous  membranes  of the eyes,  nose  or throat (it is 
well-known  that e.g.  parasubstituted aromatic  compounds,  hydrazine  and  chlorine 
derivatives  can  cause  such  effects); 
b)  the  pH  value  must  not  be  above  10,  bearing in mind  the  tolerance of the skin to 
the product  (the  pH  limit values  in respect of metal  corrosion are 6.5  and  10); 
c)  inhalation of  vapours  oraerosolsmust  not  cause either acute or chronic  poisoning; 
d)  even  in the event  of  any  possible resorption via the skin or  damaged  tissues,  no 
poisoning must  occur; 
e)  toxicity tests  witpphosphate esters must  be carried out principally on cats and 
chickens. 
3.  TECHNICAL  CRITERIA 
a>  E~!~~~!~~!!~~-~!_!!~!_!~~E~!~!~~~ 
The  flow  temperature at which  the product  again reaches  a  certain degree 
of fluidity,  once it has  passed  from  the solid state,  must  lie sufficiently be-
low  the  lower operating temperature.  The  flow  temperature  is determined  in accor-
dance  with  the  Franch  Standard  NFT  60 - 122  of  June  1956.  The  device  used  and 
the method of operation are described  in Annex  IV. 
b)  ~~!~~~!~~!!~~-~!-!!~~~~!!~ 
The  non-flammable  fluids must  be  capable  of being pumped  in the devices 
with hydraulic control at operating temperatures  which  vary, according to  the 
place of use,  between  -20°C  and  +  20°C.  Consequently,  and  bearing in mind  the 
various  types of pump  used,  the viscosity at 50°  C  must  lie above  some  25  to 
30 centistokes and  in some  cases at about  80 centistoles.  The  viscosity must  be 
measured at at least three  temperatures,  namely  +  50°C,  +  20  °C,  ± 0°  C  and,  if 
required,  - 20°C.  The  viscosity is determined  by  the use of  a  viscosimeter  and 
the appropriate thermostats,  which  are described  in Annex  V. 
c)  ~~!~E~!~~!!~~-~!_!~E~~~-E~~~~~~~ 
The  non-flammable  fluids  recommanded  for  use  in hydraulic  couplings must 
not exhibit at a  temperature of 200°C  a  higher vapour  pressure  than that of normal 
mineral oils at  140°C.  Testing must  make  use of  the  vapour-pressure device des-
cribed  in Annex  VI. d)  ~~~~~~~~~~!-~!_E~-!~!~~ 
To  avoid corrosion of metals  and  in particular of bi-metal combinations, 
the  pH  value of  the non-flammable  fluids  must  lie between 6.  5 and 10.  The  mea-
surement  must  be  carried out  by  the  method outlined in Annex  VII. 
A test to determine  the  shear strength  is considered  necessary.  A method 
for  determination has  not  yet  been  finally established. 
f)  Determination of the anti-corrosion action 
The  anti-corrosion action of  the  non-flammable  fluids  is to  be  determi-
ned  by  the  method  described  in Annex  IX,  for  the  following metals:  Steel,  cad-
mium  steel  ,copper,  zinc,  aluminium,  brass. 
g)  !~~!_!~-~~!~~~!~~-!~~-~~~!~~-~!_!!~!~~ 
The  ~ethods for  determining the resistance  to ageing of 
i)  fluids containing  no  water  are  described  in Annex  X  (A)  and 
ii) water-containing fluids  in Annex  X  (B). 
In determining ageing,  the  test is carried out at  95"C  in  the  presence 
of  copper  and  iron as catalysts,  oxygen  being  led  in to  the  fluid continously, 
h)  M~!~~~-~!-~~!~~~!~!~~-~~~!~!~~~~-!~-~!~!!!~~-~!_E~~~!~~~-~~~-~~~!~ 
In order to avoid  losses of  non-flanunable  fluids  through  packings  and 
seals,  the  swelling of  the  packing or sealing material  must  not  exceed 4%. 
The  method  for  determining this swelling of packings  and  seals is des-
cribed in Annex  XI. 
The  provision of adequate  lubricating action is  intended  to eliminate 
excessive wear.  The  lubricating action is to  be  determined  with  the  four-sphere 
testing apparatus,  employing  the  method  of progressive  loading. 
At  the  moment  attempts are being  made  to simplify the  test method,  so 
that  a  precise description of  the  test  is not at present available, 
Non-flammable  fluids  should  have  the  lowest  possible  tendency  to  form 
foam,  The  method  of  determination  is described  in Annex  XIII. 
For  economic  reasons it must  be  possible, 
i)  to mix,  on the basis of miscibility,  products of similar composition  but 
of different origin,  and 
ii)  to mix,  on  the basis of compatibility,  a  new  product  with  a  similar product 
which  has  already been  in use. 
A method  for  testing these  requirements  is still in process of being 
worked  out. 
m)  ~!!!~~!~~!!~~-~!-~~~!~!~~-~!~~!!!!l 
The  test for  emulsion stability is described  in Annex  XV. 
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4.  CATEGORIES  OF  NON-FLAMMABLE  FLUIDS  AVAILABLE 
The  fluids available at the present  time  and  falling under  the heading 
of  non-flammable  fluids  can  be  divided  into the  following  categories: 
I.- Mineral-oil emulsions with a  high water  content  and containing additives to 
improve stability or  lubricating value; 
II.- ~~lyethylene glycols  in aqueous  solution; 
III.- Chlorinated hydrocarbons  or a  mixture of chlorinated hydrocarbons  and  phos-
phate esters; 
IV.- Phosphate esters. 
The  Conwittee of Experts has  not  yet  had  an opportunity of drawing  up 
a  list of the products at present offered on  the open market  and which  could be  sub-
jected to  the t:ests  listed above with  some  reasonable prospect of success.  A speci-
fication of these products will be  drawn  up  in common  accord  in the  light of tests 
which  are being pet•fonned  to provide  a  basis for  a  preliminary choice,  simultaneously 
in Germany,  Belgium and France,  the parallel tests being executed with portions  from 
the  same  samples. 
X 
X  X Annex  I 
SPRAY  IGNITION  TEST  WITH  A JET  ATOMIZED  UNDER  A PRESSURE  OF  70  KG/SQ.CM 
PRINCIPLE 
The  flame  of an oxy-acetylene  torch is directed on  to  an  atomized jet 
of the fluid under  test.  The  changes  in the  flame  are observed. 
APPARATUS 
1.  A container for  the test fluid under  atmospheric pressure,  with  a  minimum  capa-
city of  1  litre. 
2.  The  pressure required  for  the spray jet is produced  by  one of the  two  devices 
shown  in Diagrams  A orB (see  page  lO.a)  : 
Diagram  A  :  A  pressure device,  consisting of  a  nitrogen cylinder with  a  pressure-
reducing valve set  to  70  ±  3  kg/sq.cm., 
Diagram B 
a  hydraulic cylinder for  the  test fluid under  pressure, 
a  discharge-to-atmosphere  vent  for  the  nitrogen and  a  feed  connec-
tion to the atomizing spray  nuzzle. 
The  latter is directly connected to a  valve. 
A pressure device,  consisting of  a  pressure  pump  connected to  the 
atomizing spray  nozzle  via  a  metal  tube  on  which are fitted  the 
pressure  gauge  for  checking purposes  and  a  pressure regulator,  which 
forces  excess  fluid back  into the  tank. 
The  pressure regulator is set at 70 ± 2  kg/sq.cm.  The  atomizing spray 
nozzle  is connected directly to  a  valve. 
3.  A test spray nozzle  as  shown  in  the  drawing  (see diagram).  This consists of  a 
disc of hard steel with  a  0.4  mm.  diameter  discharge orifice in the  centre; 
the  edges of this orifice are sharp.  The  disc must  present  a  smooth  surface of 
10 nun.  diameter  to  the test fluid  (see  diagram,  detail R);  the plate with  the 
0.4  mm.  orifice is 1.6  nun.  thick.  It is advisable to make  the disc  forming  the 
nozzle easy to  remove,  to facilitate cleaning,  or if necessary,  to be able to 
clear the blocked  nozzle  without difficulty. 
4.  An  oxy-acetylene  torch  (800 litres),  which  must  burn with  a  blue  flame  adjusted 
to a  length of approximately  100  nun. 
5.  A metal  screen 75  em.  broad  and  100 em.  high,  set up at  right angles  to  the jet 
at a  distance of  170 to  180 em.  from  the  nozzle tip. 
TEST  PROCEDURE 
Once  the fluid,  which  must  be at a  temperature of between  +  l5°C  and 
+  35  °C,  has  been  put  into the  tank,  the pressure is adjusted  to  70 ± 3  kg/sq.cm. 
The  valve of the nozzle isthenopened,and  an  attempt  is n1ade  to ignite the atomized 
jet at the mouth  of the orifice by  means  of an oxy-acetylene  torch  flame  held at 
right angles  to  the axis of the jet.  If the  fluid cannot  be  ignited at the mouth 
of the orifice,  the test is repeated,  gradually moving  the torch  flame  away  from 
the tip of the nozzle,  to a  maximum  distance of 1.20 m. 
RECORDING  OF  TEST  RESULTS 
The  results must  be recorded as  follows 
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1.  no  ignition occurs, 
2.  very slow  flame  formation, 
3.  complete  flame  formation  (flui4 purns). 
In addition it must  be  indicate4 at what  4istance  from  the  top of the 
nozzle  the  flame  is carried away  by  the stream of fluid  in the atomized spray jet 
and whether  the  flame  dies out of its own  accord or whether it continues to burn 
after.the torch has  been withdrawn. 
Note  This  method  is based on  the American  Method  AMS-3150  B.  The  atomising pres-
sure  for  the fluid to  be  tested and  the dimensions of the  nozzle are  the  same 
as  in Method  AMS-3150  B. - 10 a  -
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FLAME-PROPAGATION  TEST  IN  A  MIXTURE  OF  THE  FLUID  WlTH  COAL-DUST 
PRINCIPLE 
The  propagation of  a  flame  is measured .in  a  mixture of  75%  by val.  of 
coal-dust  and  25%  by  val.  of fluid.  The  test is carried out  in  a  room  at  normal  air 
temperature  without artificial ventilation. 
APPARATUS 
1.  Adjustable  Bunsen  burner  (see  diagram  page  12  c) 
2.  Ring with  140 mm.  internal diameter 
3.  A stop plate 
4.  Support  for  items  (2)  and  (3) 
5.  Steel plates to carry the test pieces  (Page  12  b) 
6.  Thermo-couple  and  pyrometer 
7.  Graduated scale with adjustable support 
8.  Metal  frame  for  making  test pieces  (Page  12  b) 
9.  Slides  for  making test pieces  (Page  12  b) 
10.  Laboratory  timer or stop-watch. 
The  test piece must  be  250  mm.  long,  20  nun.  broad  an  2  mm..  thick. 
The  steel plates  (5)  have  a  datum  mark,  to facilitate keeping  the  length of  the 
sample  piece  to 250 mm.  measured  from  one  end.  Correct  adjustment  of the width  is 
obtained  by  using the slides  (9)  the jig for  making  the test pieces  is shown  in the 
attached drawing  (see diagram  page  12  b),  which  also  illustrates the plates,slides 
and metal  frames  used. 
The  mixture of coal-dust  and  fluid  - which  is a  mixture  by  volume  -
is to  be  prepared  in sufficient quantities  to  enable at  least 5,  or if required, 
10 tests to  be  carried out  - each with  some  120 to  130 cu.cm.  - allowing for  losses 
in handling.  In  the  case of mixtures of coal-dust  and water it is advisable  to  add 
to  the water one part per  1,000 of wetting agent.  The  mixture  is prepared  by  hand 
in a  mortar. 
COAL-DUST 
The  coal--dust  used  for  the tests is drawn  from  Montrambert  coal.  pre-
pared by  the  "Centre d'Etudes et de  Recherches  des  Charbonnages  de  France"(CHERCHAR) 
in Verneuil-en-Halatte  (Oise)  and  supplied by  them.  The  average characteristics of 
this dust  were  as  follows  : 
Moisture •.••.•.•..•..•  , . • • • • . . . . . . • • . . • .  1.  4% 
Ash  (dry basis) •.....•••••••..•••..•...•  9,6% 
Volatile matter  (dry  basis) ••••••.•••••  31  % 
Size consist  60 to  100 microns. 
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TEST  PROCEDURE 
The  test mixture  for  five  tests is prepared as  described above,  one 
hour  before  the beginning of  the test.  Each  test piece  is attached to  a  standarq 
ring  (2)  above  a  Bunsen burner of  a  design as  per  drawing  on  Page  12c.  The  longi-
tudinal stop  (3)  and  the stops on  the  ring hold  the test piece accurately in posi-
tion.  The  flame  must  be  adjusted to  a  height of approximately  140  mm. 
The  temperature of  the  flamen  measured approximately  5  mm.  below  the 
ring  (2)  must  be  1000 ± 30°C.  The  Bunsen  burner  is set up  insuch  a  way  that its axis 
lies under one  end of the test piece  (Page  12a);  the distance between  the tip of the 
flame  and  the bottom side of the test piece is 45  mm.  A  timer or stop-watch is swit-
ched on at the  moment  when  the  flame  is placed under  the test piece.  After  a  heating 
pe~iod of 5  minutes  the burner  is turned off.  The  factors  measured are 
1.  the spread of the extreme tip of  the  flame  each minute  (measured  in mm.  from  the 
datum mark  (7),  beginning at  the  zero  line on  the scale,  which  is also the  datum 
mark); 
2.  the  time  taken  for  the  flame  on  the test piece to die out; 
3.  the  farthest  distance  covered  by  the tip of the  flame; 
4.  the  anomalies  :  glowing after extinction of  the  flame,  renewed  ignition,  etc. 
Each  test with  a  given fluid consists of five  measurements,  but  each 
test piece is used  once  only. 
RECORDING  OF  THE  RESULTS 
The  results obtained are  expressed as  the  arithmetic  mean  of  the  five 
measurements.  The  tolerance between  two  successive tests is ±  7%  for  the  same  ope-
rator. 
NOTES 
a)  In preparing the test piece care  must  be  taken  to mix  the paste thoroughly. 
b)  The  steel support  for  the  test piece  is scraped clean after the  determination, 
cooled  and  used again.  Any  traces of  the earlier sample  remain\ng on  the plate 
are  removed  with emery  cloth  No.O.~ 
c)  It is advisable  to retrace  the  datum  mark  with  a  metal  scriber after every  10 
or  so tests. - 12 a -. 
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AUTO-IGNITION  TEST  IN  ATMOSPHERIC  AIR 
~.  PRINCIPLE 
The  object of the  test is to determine  whether  a  hot  liquid lubricant 
will  undergo auto-ignition on  contact with  the air,  when  it is forced  under  pres-
sure  through  an orifice in a  thin jet,  without  a  flame  or  a  hot point  being pre-
sent.  In this determination the test must  be  carried out  under  very carefully de-
termined conditions of  temperature  and  pressure. 
The  test sets out essentially to simulate  the  release of energy  bY  the 
hot  lubricant  when  a  fusible  plug melts.  The  test isr in principle,  carried out 
only on  fluids  which  do  not  contain water,  but  can be  applied if necessary to 
"water-in-oil"  emulsions. 
II.  APPARATUS 
The  apparatus consists essentially of  a  heated cylinder containing the 
fluid  to  be  tested  (approximately  250  cu.m.).  One  end of the cylinder is sealed 
with  a  fluid-tight piston,  the cavity behind which  is filled with  a  fluid under 
a  pressure of  7  kg/sq.cm.  The  other end of  the cylinder is closed  by  a  fusible 
plug consisting of  an alloy melting at approximately  140°C.  The  outlet orifice or 
neck  of  two  concentric cones,  whose  generating lines are parallel and at  a  maxi-
mum  of  1  mm.  apart.  The  inner  cone  is held  in place  by  a  ring of  insulating mate-
rial pierced by  eight  holes  approximately  1  mm.  x  6  1run. 
By  means  of  an electrical resistance all the surfaces of  the  cones are 
brought  to  the  same  temperature as  the  flu~d contained  in the  cyli~der.  The  sur-
face  of  the outer  cone  is connected  to earth,  while  the surface of the  inner  cone 
is electrically insulated against short circuits. 
In addition to  the apparatus  described  above,  the  test calls for  the 
following  devices  : 
- a  device  for  filling the cylinder with  the  test  fluid; 
- an  air-discharge vent; 
- a  pressure regulator with  discharge  device; 
- two  pyrometers  to measure  the  temperature of  the test fluid and of the oulet 
orifice  (neck); 
- the adjustable resistances  for  the electrical pre-heating devices; 
- a  device  for  feeding  the  fluid under  pressure with  a  pressure  gauge  for  checking. 
The  apparatus  is shown  diagrammatically  in the  accompanying sketch which 
also  includes  a  section through  the  neck. 
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lll. PREPARATION  OF  THE  FUSIBLE  PLUGS 
1.  Composition 
The  plugs  are  made  of  a  bismuth-tin alloy containing 60%  by  weight  of 
bismuth  and 40%  of tin.  With  cast  (not  cold-hammered)  metal  the melting point  lies 
around  140/142°C. 
2.  Preparation 
Starting with  the mixture  of  powdered metals,  strips  16  rnm.  wide  and 
1  mm.  thick are cast  in  the metal  mould  shown  in  the  sketch on  page  15b;  the  volu-
me  of one  such strip is approximately 1.7 cc. 
The  alloy is cast  by  placing the  filled mould  on  a  heating plate and 
bringing it up  to  180°C.  After this casting process  the mould  is taken off the 
heating plate to allow  the alloy to cool  slowly. 
3.  Cutting the plugs 
This  is carried out  on  the jig (mould  and  punch)  shown  in the sketch. 
Six plugs  can  be  cut  from  one  strip. 
IV.  PREPARATION  OF  THE  TEST 
1.  Cleaning 
The  outlet cone  (neck)  is removed  and  each  individualcomponent thorough-
ly cleaned.  The  bottom of  the cylinder on  which  the outled cone  rests  is also re-
moved,  to allow of  cleaning the cylinders.  For  this purpose  the piston is pushed 
back as  far  as  the  inlet  for  the  fluid under  pressure;  this is done  with  the  valve 
closed,  by  unscrewing  the  drain plug of pressure  fluid circuit,  so  that  fluid can 
flow out  without  any air entering behind  the piston. 
The  air inlet and  discharge  pipes are rinsed out  and  cleaned with car-
bon.tetrachloride.  It is strongly recomn1ended  to use  this particular solvent  for 
this purpose. 
2.  Assembly 
The  drain plug of  pressurized  fluid circuit is carefully screwed  home 
again.  The  bottom of the  cylinder is then  replaced  to  the  level of  the outlet 
cone  (neck)  and  the  fusible  plug also refitted.  The  outlet  cone  is replaced  and 
fastened;  it surrounds  the  fusible  plug and  bears  on  it once it is screwed right 
home.  The  neck  heater is then  connected up  and  the  two  pyrometers  replaced. 
3.  Filling 
The  air inlet valve  is opened first,  followed  by  the  filling valve.  The 
inlet valve  for  the  fluid under  pressure  is closed and  the piston pushed  right 
back  to allow of filling the cylinder.  The  test fluid is then slowly poured  in 
through  the  funnel,  until  it begins  to  flow  out  through  the air-discharge pipe. 
After this the filling valve  is closed first,  followed  by  the air-discharge valve. 
The  apparatus  is now  ready  for  use.  The  cylinder  has  a  capacity of approximately 
250 cc;  allowing for  the contents of the  piping,  quantity required for  the test 
samples  is about  350 cc. 
TEST  PROCEDURE 
The  inlet valve  for  the  fluid under  pressure  is opened,  care being 
taken to ensure  that 1.  the  pressure of  the  fluid is,  in fact,  7  kg/sq.cm., 
2.  the pressure regulator  does  not  allow  any  of  the  test fluid  to pass. 
The  electrical preheating device  for  the  test cylinder is  now  switched 
on,  the heater being adjusted  to  give  a  temperature rise of roughly  3°C  per  mi-
nute.  The  neck  heater  is then switched  on  and  set accurately  to  the  same  heating 
rate.  It is a  good  sign if a  small  difference of  temperature  is observed  between 
the  neck  and  the  test fluid,  since  this ensures  that  the  melting of  the  plug  is 
brought  about  by  the  fluid under  test;  a  lag of  some  20°C  in  the pre-heating tem-
perature of  the  neck  is sufficient. 
Once  the  temperature of  the  fluid under  test has  reached  l20°C,  the 
rate of  heating must  be  reduced  to  2°C  per  minute,  to ensure  a  continuous  tempe-
rature equilibrium  of  the  whole  apparatus.  Above  140 to  145°C  the entire appara-
tus  must  be  observed  more  closely,  so  that  the  temperature at which  the  fluid 
under  test begins  to  flow  out  can  be  recorded. 
The  jet of  fluid must  not  ingnite  on  contact with  the air if the  lubri-
cant  is to be  considered as  non-flammable.  In  the  case  of mineral oils ignition 
will  take  place at  a  distance of 0.20 to 0.30 m.  from  the  tip of  the outlet  cone. 
The  ignition is best  observed  against  a  black background,  so  that  any  possible 
effects can  be  recorded of  the  produ~tion of static electricity as  the  fluid pas-
ses  through  the outlet  cones. 
As  soon  as  the  plug  has  melted,  the  current  for  the electrical pre-hea-
ting apparatus  is switched off. 
Auto-ignition is not  absolutely certain to occur  (90% of cases with 
mineral  oil)  and  it is therefore  necessary  to  repeat  the  test five  times. 
VI.  REMARKS 
1.  Measurement  of static electricity produced 
If called for,  a  voltmeter  can  be  connected  between  the  axis suppor-
ting the  inner  cone  and  the  ring of  the  neck.  The  terminals are already  fitted; 
the  voltmeter  must  be  graduated  up  to  10 kilovolts. 
2.  Fusible alloys 
It is possible  to  use  with  higher  melting points  than  that described 
under  III  - 1;  the  latter is  in  fact  the  alloy used  for  the manufacture of fusi-
ble plugs  for  hydraulic  couplings. 
The  following  table  indicates the  composition of several  simple alloys 
with  melting points  between  140 and  183°C, 
- ··-------------.---------
Melting temperaturei------
Tin 
.. 
Alloy 
.. 
Lead 
------· 
140° 
144" 
151° 
168° 
183" 
3 
3 
l 
9 
1 
--------------~------------
3.  Tests with  a  smaller outlet orifice 
-
1 
1 
2 
2 
Composition 
Bismuth  Zinc 
2  -
- -
- -
- 1 
- -
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It is possible  to  intensify the  phenomenon,  and  especially its electri-
cal effects,  by  using cones  and  a  ring producing a  jet of  fluid 0,5  nun,  in diameter. - l5a• 
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Scale:  la 1 DETERMINATION  OF  FLOW  TEMPERATURE 
(Fretich  Standard  NF  T  60  - 122  - June  1956+) 
INTRODUCTION  REMARKS 
With  the  apparatus  used,  the  flow  temperature  can  be  determined  from  a 
very  thin  layer  of  the  lubricant;  this precaution is necessary  because of the poor 
conductivity of solidified lubricants;  the  test is carried out  in  a  heating bath 
of accurately-known  temperature  and  under  thermal  conditions which  allow  for  the 
structural changes  ocurring as  a  result of overheating or cooling and  avoid  any 
irregularities which  might  result  from  these  changes.  Variations  of  temperature 
between  successive tests should,  as  a  general  rule,  not  exceed a  few  tenths of  1°C. 
Particular attention  is drawn  to  the  fact  that  tests to  determine  the 
viscosity at  low  temperatures  on  the  one  hand,  and  tests to  dete~nin~the flow 
tempe~ature on  the other,  are essentially different  tests.  In  each  case  a  special 
test  1s  used,  and  the  measurement  results are  valid only  for  the  type of  t  t  · 
which  they were  obtained  es  ln 
The  flow  temperature  is applicable  to all  determinations  in the  low-
temperature  range.  However,  this  method  cannot  be  recommended  for  solid or  highly 
viscous  products -e.g.  petroleum jelly).  In  this  instance Ubbelohdc's  method 
(Standard  NF  T  60-102)  is preferable,  although  the  flow  temperature  method  yields 
more  or  less equivalent  values. 
I.  PRINCIPLE 
The  melting  temperature  is the  temperature of  the  lubricant at  which 
the  lubricant,  after having  been  thoroughly  and  rapidly  frozen  by suitable treat-
ment  and  then  gradually  warmed  up  again,  loses  its solidity in such  a  way  that it 
releases  a  movable  element,  which  is maintained under  constant pressare;  this mo-
vable  element  was  frozen  into the  lubricant at  the  moment  of  freezing. 
II.  APPARATUS 
The  apparatus  illustrated in  the  accompanying  diagrams  (pages  19a  =  b) 
consists of  a  ring-shaped  container  (A)  (which  represents  the  movable  element) 
for  the material  to  be  examined.  The  dimensions  of  this container are:  Internal 
diameter  between  inner walls  15  nun.;  internal  diameter  between outer walls  21  mm.; 
radial  distance  between  the  two  walls  3  mm.,wall  thickness 0.4  mm.,depth  11  mm., 
and  thickness  of  the  bottom  1.5  mm.  This  container is fastened  to  a  hollow  metal 
rod  (C)  by  means  of  a  disc  pierced at  (B)  - the  rod  tapering to  a  smooth  point 
(D).  The  vertical  metal  rod  can  be  inserted  in  a  brass  tube serving as  a  sleeve m>. 
The  brass  tube  has  an  internal diameter of  15  mm.,  an  external  diameter of  16  mm., 
and  is 234  nun.  long;  at  its  lower  end  is  a  cylindrical element  (F)  17  mm.  in  in-
ternal diameter,  18  mm.  in external  diameter· and 31.5  nun.  high,  which  slides into 
the  ring-shaped  container  A.  The  cylinder  F  is pierced  by  two orifices  (G)  which 
are diametrically opposed;  they  are  12  mm.  high  and  5  nun.  wide,  the bottom of  each 
orifice lies 13.5  mm.  above  the  bottom of  the cylinder. 
Rod  C  is set centrally and  is maintained  in  this position with  a  play 
of 0.1  mm.  in  the  lower part  of  the  sleeve  E  by  means  of  a  ring  (H)  and  in  the 
upper  part  by  tJ1e  locking  head  I.  To  reduce  the  conductivity of  the  metal  and  to 
avoid  the  formation of  rime,  sleeve  E  is provided with  six pairs of  10 mm.  holes, 
as  shown  in the  diagram;  rod  C  is also perforated,  by  17 pairs of holes,  each 
2,5  mm.  in  diameter.  The  middle of  the perforated part of  rod  C  bears  on  the  top 
of  locking  bead  I.  This  makes  it possible  to  inser  a  pin  (J)  in whicheven  hole  in 
rod  C  has  its edge  level with  the  top of  the  locking head  I,  and  thereby  lock  the 
movable  part  in  the sleeve;  a  fixed  arm  (M)  with  a  locking screw at  one  end  holds 
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sleeve  E  firmly  in its vertical position,  but  is  not  connected  ro  rod  C  nor· 
to container A.  The  weight  of  the  movable  element  is calibrated at  exactly 20 gr; 
this movable  element  moves  downwards  if not  retained.  At  the  beginning of the  test 
there  is rigid connection  between  container  A  which  is filled with  frozen  fluid 
and  element F  which  was  immersed  in  the  lubricant  before  the  latter was  frozen. 
As  soon  as  the melting process  begins,  the  movable  element slides  downwards  until 
it reaches  its end  position  fixed  by  pin  J  which  was  removed  from  its original 
position after the  freezing process  and  inserted  in  the  last hole  of  rod  C. 
The  whole  apparatus  is  now  immersed  in  a  double-walled vessel contai-
ning  0,13  litres of  acetone.  An  alcohol  rod  thermometer  indicates  the  temperature 
of  this bath.  The  upper  end  of  rod  C  can  be  brought  into contact  with  the  highly 
sensitive feeler  L  which  closes  an electric circuit as  soon  as  rod  C  begins  to 
move  downwards,  thus  making  it possible  to  operate an  acoustic signal. 
III.  TEST  PRGCEDURE 
1.- The  fluid  under  test  is maintained  for  15  minutes  in  a  water  bath at  5C°C, 
2.- The  test  fluid,  still warm,  is thenfilled into  into  the ring-shaped container 
A  of  the  apparatus,  after which  rod  C  is  immediately  inserted  in sleeve  E,  a 
process  which  is facilated  by  the  smooth  tip of  rod  C;  the  lower  end  of  the 
sleeve  is  now  placed  in  the  ring-shaped container until it touches  the  bottom. 
Any  fluid which  has  spilled over  from  the  ring-shaped container  must  be  dried 
off.  The  movable  element  is arrested by  placing  the  pin  in  the  hole  in  rod  C 
which  lies  immediately  above  locking  head  I.  All  these operations  must  be  car-
ried out  quickly. 
3,- The  fluid must  now  be  frozen;  this  is done  by  gradually  (but  without  stopping) 
immersing  the  lower  part of  the  apparatus  in  an  acetone  bath  containing  a  slight 
excess of  carbon  dioxide  snow.  This  low  degree  of saturation with solid carbon 
dioxide  must  be  maintained  for  5  minutes.  Moreover,  care must  be  taken  to en-
sure  that  the  vessel  containing  the  cooled  acetone  remains  filled up  to  the 
indicator mark:(corresponding  to approximately  130 cc). 
4.- Without  removing  the  ring-shaped container  from  the  bath,  the  apparatus  is  now 
fixed  in its stand,  The  thermometer  must  be  inserted  in such  a  way  that its 
bulb lies at  the  level of  the  ring-shaped container.  Pin  J  must  then  be  remo-
ved  and  placed  in the  uppermost  hole  of  rod  C.  The  temperature  of  the  bath  is 
now  allowed  to rise of  its own  accord. 
It is not  necessary  to stir the  acetone  bath,  since  the rising bubbles 
of  carbon  dioxide  produce  a  continously  homogeneous  temperature. 
5.- At  a  given  moment  the  ring-shaped container starts to  move  down  under  its own 
weight  and  thus  leaves  the  stationary sleeve.  I~nediately this movement  begins 
an electric circuit  is closed and  an  acoustic signal  given.  The  downward  move-
ment  of  the  container  is checked  by  the pin J,  on  the  latter's touching  the  top 
of  the  locking head  I  of  the  sleeve. 
IV.  EVALUATION  OF  TEST  RESULTS 
The  temperature at  which  the  ring-shaped  container  frees  itself from  the 
sleeve  is  taken  to be  the  normal  flow  temperature. 
If the  flow  temperature  is below  -40°C,,  the  test fluid  is left in  the 
saturated solution of  carbon dioxide  snow  for  60 minutes,  instead of  five. 
Special case of substances with  flow  temperatures  a~ove 0°C, 
If the  flow  temperature  of  the  test material  is above  0°C,,  the  acetone 
bath will  warm  up  only  slowly  from  this temperature.  To  counteract  this,  and  also 
to  permit  the  determination of  flow  temperatures  above  room  temperature,  a  heating 
plate  is  inserted between  the  base of  the  apparatus  and  the outer vessel.  Lamps  are used  to regulate  tne  intensity of  the  current  in the  heating coil  under  the plate 
in such  a  way  that "the  temperature  in the  acetone  bath rises evenly at approxima-
tely 0.8°C.  per minute. 
The  procedure  is similar to the  method  of operation  indicated above. 
However,  as  soon as  the  temperature  in  the  acetone  bath  has  reached 0°C.,  the cur-
rent  in  the  heating plate  should be  switched on;  the  test is then  continued  and, 
as stated above,  the  temperature  recorded at  which  the  ring-shaped container  frees 
itself completely under  the action of  its own  weight  from  the sleeve. 
V.  TESTS  TO  DETERMINE  THE  El''FECTS  OF  LONG  EXPOSURE  TO  COLD 
In certain cases  the  user  may  wish  to apply  a  cold test,  to  make  quite 
sure that,  down  to  a  given  minimum  temperature,  the  fluid will  in  no  circumstances 
show  any  signs of  paraffin crystallization,  will  remain sufficienthy liquid and, 
if solid substances are precipitated,  will retain mechanical  properties such  that 
the  fluid can continue  to circulate without  difficulty under  given conditions. 
It is therefore  necessary  to carry out,  for  each of  these special 
conditions  a  separate test  in which  the  fluid  is exposed  to  the required  tempe-
rature  for  an  appropriate  length of  time  and  then  tested  for  the  particular pro-
perty  in question. 
VI.  COOLING  TESTS 
A quantity of 0.05  litres of  the  test material,  when  poured  into  a 
glass  tube  of  15  mm.  internal diameter  and  exposed  for  two  hours  to a  temperature 
of  -l5°C,  must  not  precipitate more  than  2  percent  by  volume  of solid matter,  the 
remainder  of  the  fluid  remaining absolutely clear.  No  particles of any  appreciable 
size must  remain  adhering  to  the walls of  the  glass  tube. 
VII.  TEST  REPORT 
For  each  individual test,  all  the test conditions  must  be  recorded, 
as  must  also  any  occurrences  likely to affect  the  test result. 
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Scale  2al ANN~X V 
DETERMINATION  OF  KINEMATIC  VISCOSITY 
I.- PRINCIPLE 
A tube,  calibrated and  marked  with  two  measuring marks,  is filled with 
the  test fluid.  A calibrated sphere  is then  introduced  into  the  tube  and  the  fal-
ling time of the  tube  between  the  two  measurement  marks  is recorded.  The  falling 
time  so  recorded  can  then  be  used  to derive  the viscosity by  means  of the  following 
simple calculation: 
DENSITY 
N
0  Absolute viscosity of  the  fluid  in centipoises 
Nc  Kinematic  viscosity of the  fluid  in centistokes, 
K  Calibration for  the  measurement  unit 
"calibrated tube/drop-sphere  employed" 
T  Falling time  measured  in seconds, 
D  Density of  the sphere a.t  measurement  temperature, 
d  Density of  the test fluid at measurement  temperature. 
This  gives  us  the  formula  :  N
0 
Nc 
T  X  (D  d)  x  K 
No  D  - d  dl =  T  X ---d-- X  K 
The  densities  inserted  in this calculation are  the densities at  the  tem-
perature of measurement;  these  are  normally  indicated for  +  l5°C,  although  for  wa-
ter the value  is that at  +  4°C.  The  required corrections can  be  applied  only  for 
homogeneous  fluids,  and  this applies  in only certain special  cases with  non-flam-
mable  fluids.  For  these  fluids direct determination of  the density  is necessary. 
Conversion of  the  density: 
c  = Correction coefficient  for  density  for  a  deviation of  )°C, 
D =  Density at  +  l5°C 
0 
e  =  Difference  between  measurement  temperature at  +  l5°C  in degrees 
centigrade. 
This  gives us:  d  =  d
0  ±  c  x  e 
The  correction is positive if the  measurement  temperature  lies below 
+  l5°C  and  negative  if it lies above  this value. 
II.- APPARATUS 
- 1.  - Viscosimeter 
The  measurements  can  be  carried out  with  two  types ot apparatus  based on 
the  same  principle,  but of different construction: 
a)  The  HUppler  viscosimeter,  Type  BH,  with which  measurement  is carried out  in 
a  tube  inclined at an  angle of 20°  to  the vertical; 
b)  The  I  F  C viscosimeter  in which  the  measurement  is carried out  in a  tube  in-
clined at 30°  to  the vertical. 
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Since  the  number  of  measurement  operations possible depends  on  the  num-
ber of spheres  provided  in  the  individual  types  of  apparatus,  the  possible measu-
rement  ranges  are  given  in  the  following  table: 
Spheres 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Htlppler, 
0.3  to 
3  to 
25  to 
250  to 
2,500  to 
8,000  to 
Type  B  H 
3  est. 
30  est. 
250  est. 
2,500  est. 
25,000  est. 
80,000  est. 
----------·--------···-----·-------·······  •... 
----~--------~-··----·--
I  F  c 
l  to  50  est. 
50  to  2,500  est. 
2,500  to  25,500  est. 
Steel spheres are  used  in  the  I  F  C  apparatus,  while  in  the  Htlppler  ap-
paratus Type  B  H  they  are  made  of either steel or  glass. 
2.  - Thermostats 
The  accuracy of  the  ~easurements depends  on  the  accuracy  and  the  constan-
cy of  the  test temperature.  It  is virtually essential to operate with  a  ther-
mostat,  whose  temperature  must  be  maintained constant. 
a)  with  an  accuracy of  +  0.05°C at  measurement  temperatures  below+ 20°C; 
b)  with  an  accuracy of± 0.10°C  at measurement  temperatures below+ 20°C. 
For  a  measurement  range  from  - 20°C  up  to  100°C  it is  reconrnmnded  to use 
two  different bath  fluids  according to  the  measurement  temperature  required, 
c)  purified kerosene  (or aviation spirit)  for  temperatures  below  +  20°C; 
d)  pure  glycerine or  white  vaseline oil for  temperatures  above  +  20°C. 
3.  - Description of  the  apparatus  and  method  of  use 
The  Htlppler  apparatus  Type  BH  and  the  I  F  C  apparatus  are  diagrammatical-
ly  illustrated in  the accompanying sketches.  Detailed descriptions  are  given  in 
the  instructions  for  use  issued  by  the  manufacturers,  in  the  French Standard 
AFNOR  - T  42-011  and  in  the  corresponding  German  Standard  DIN  53015. 
Ill.- MEASUREMENT  PROCEDURE 
The  fluid  is poured  into  the  calibrated tube;  the  sphere  is also  inser-
ted  and  the apparatus  closed again,  once  any  bubbles  which  may  have  formed 
during filling have  been  removed.  The  fluid  is brought  up  to test temperature, 
and  six measurements  carried out.  The  time  T  quoted  in  the  formula  given  above 
is the arithmetic mean  of  the  times  recorded during six measurements.  These 
times  lie between  25  and  300 seconds. 
This  condition requires  the  use  of  various  spheres  for  the  same  fluid, 
and  in particular for  measurements  at  temperatures  below  +  50°C.  The  tube  must 
be  emptied  each  time  a  sphere  is changed  (40 cc.  with  the  Htlppler  BH  apparatus 
and 30 cc.  with  the  IF C  apparatus):  in this special case it is not  necessary 
to clean  the  interior of  the calibrated tube. IV  - NOTES 
l.  Constants  K 
The  constants  K are  independent  of  the test  temperature.  They  are deter-
mined  for  a  given calibrated tube  and  a  precisely-defined inclination of  the 
tube  (30°  for  the  I  F  C apparatus  and  20p  for  the Hnppler  BH  apparatus).  When 
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a  calibrated tube  or  any  of  the  spheres are  changed,  or when  measurements  are 
undertaken at an  angle  other  than 30°  (using the  I  F  C  apparatus)  these constants 
must  be  determined  anew,  using  a  calibration  f~uid. 
These  constants  must  be  indicated  in the  test report  for  each  individual 
apparatus. 
2.  Thixotropic  fluids 
In  the  case  of  thixotropic  fluids  the  measured  falling times will  become 
shorter,  from  the  first measurement  onwards,  until  they  reach  a  constant  mini-
mum  value at  the  end  of  the  measurement.  The  figure  to  be  accepted  is the mini-
mum  time  at which  the  gel  disappears.  The  difference  between  the first  falling 
time  and  the  minimum  time  is an  index  of  the  thixotropy of  the  test fluid. 
3.  Clean~ng the calibrated tube  and  the  spheres 
The  tube  is cleaned with solvents  and  pure ether.  In  the  case of aqueous 
solutions,  cleaning must  be  carried out  by  means  of  a  hot  solution of soda 
containing 5  % concentrated ammonia  to  remove  any  grease,  and  then  flushed 
with distilled water. 
Spheres  are  to  be  cleaned with  solvents  and  with ether,  and  handled with 
clean  tongs  to avoid  contact with  the  fingers. 
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ANNEX  V 
MEASUREMENT  OF  KINEMATIC  VISCOSITY 
~A~~  Viscosimeter 
I.F.C. 
During 
filling 
During 
filling 
During 1st 
measurement 
I 
During 2nd 
measurement 
During 
measurement I.  PRINCIPLE 
DETERMINATION  OF  THE  VAPOUR  PRESSURE 
OF  FLUIDS  FOR  HYDRAU~IC SYSTEMS 
ANNEX  Vl 
The  vapour  pressure of  fluids  used  for  hydraulic  systems  requires  to be 
determined  under  given  conditions at  temperatures  ranging  from  room  tempera-
ture  to  maximum  temperature of utilisation.  The  highest  testing temperature  is 
+ 80°C  for  fluids with  a  high water content  and  +  200°C, for  fluids  not  contai-
ning water  (less  than  1% water).  The  values  for  vapour  pressure are expressed 
in  kg/cm2. 
I I.  APPARATUS 
1.  A  bomb  which  can  be  dismantled, 
2.  a  mercury  pressure  gauge 
3.  a  thermostat, 
4.  a  thermometer. 
1- Dismantleable  bomb 
The  bomb  used  is derived  from  fue  Reid  bomb,  but  constructed  in such  a 
way  that it can  be  cleaned easily.  It consists of  two  connecting chambers 
with  the  following  figures  dimensions: 
a)  Chamber  for  test fluid 
internal  diameter  54  mm, 
height  of  the  inner  cylindrical portion 60 mm; 
b)  Air  chamber 
internal diameter  54  oon, 
height of  the  inner cylindrical  portion 250  mm. 
The  two  chambers  are  connected  by  an  intermediate piece with  a  lateral 
orifice serving as  a  vent  during filling,  and  as  a  level  indicator  for  the 
test fluid.  Above  the air chamber  is  the  connecting  tube  to which  the mer-
cury  is attached.  The  thermometer  is also attached  to  this  tube;  the point 
at  which  the  thermometer  is introduced is sealed off.  To  make  it possible 
to  isolate the  bomb,  a  tight  cock  is fitted  in  the  connection  between  the 
bomb  and  the  mercury  gauge. 
The  volumetric ratio between  the air chamber  and  the  fluid  chamber  is 
very  nearly 4.  The  diagram on  page  26a  shows  the  bomb  assembly. 
2- Mercury  pressure  gauge 
This  pressure  gauge  corresponds  to  the  accompanying  sketch.  At  the  lower 
end  is a  tight sealing-off cock  by  means  of  which  the  level of  the  mercury 
can  be  adjusted  to  the  zero point of  the  gauge.  The  mercury  gauge  is connec-
ted to  the air chamber  by  a  reinforced rubber  tube  which  is not  subject  to 
chemical  attack,  and  has  an  internal  diameter of roughly  3  mm.  The  gauge  is 
provided with  a  millimetre scale. 
3- Thermostat  bath 
The  thermostat  bath  must  be  big enough  to  allow of  the  completely assem-
bled  bomb  being  irnmers~d in it sufficiently deeply  for  the  upper  part of  the 
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air chamber  to be  at  least 30  mm.  below  the  level of  the  fluid bath. 
It is preferable to  use oil as  the  bath  fluid,  to facilitate reaching  a 
temperature  of 200°C. 
The  heating apparatus  must  be  such  that  a  stable temperature  can  be  main-
tained  for  each stage of measurement. 
4.  Temperature-measuring  device 
Bath 
The  temperature of  the  bath  in  the  thermostat  should  be  measured  by  means 
of  a  thermometer  with  a  centigrade scale. 
Test  fluid 
The  temperature-measuring  device  can  be either  a  thermometer  with  a  cen-
tigrade scale,  or  a  thermistor  pyrometer  housed  in  a  cylindrical sleeve with 
a  maximum  external  diameter of  8  mm. 
5.  Safety precautions 
Each  new  bomb  must  be  tested for  water- and  air-tightness,  by  being sub-
jected to  an air pressure of  7  kg/cm2.  No  air should escape  from  the  bomb 
when  it is under  water. 
III.  TEST  METHOD 
1.  Preparation of  the test 
The  individual components  of  the  bomb  should  be  thoroughly  cleaned,  rin-
sed  and  dried  and  then maintained at  a  temperature of  25°C. 
The  quantity of  fluid required  (approximately  160 cc.)  for  the  test  must 
be  kept  for at  least  one  hour  at  a  temperature of  25°C.±  l. 
2.  Filling the  fluid  chamber 
This  chamber  is to  be  filled before it is assembled  with  the other  com-
ponents.  The  piece  connecting it with  the air chamber  is  then  attached; 
during  this operation,  it is essential  not  to  forget  to  remove  the  screw 
which  closes  the air vent.  The  lower  chamber  should  then  be  further  filled 
until  the  fluid reaches  the  level of  the air vent.  At  this  moment  the air 
vent  should  be  closed  by  means  of  the  screw provided  for  the  purpose;  the 
air chamber  is  then set  in place  and  the  upper orifice closed.  The  cock at 
the pressure-measuring point  is meanwhile  left open,  to  avoid  the  occurence 
of any  initial excess pressure  in  the  bomb. 
The  temperature-measuring device  is  then attached;  the  measuring  head  must 
lie 30 mm.  from  the  bottom of  the  lower  chamber,  in  the  middle  of  the  test 
fluid. 
3.  Test  procedure 
The  bomb  is placed  in  the  thermostat  which  is maintained at  a  temperature 
of  25°C ± laC  and  the  mercury  gauge  connected.  When  the  cock at  the  pressure-
measuring point  is open,  the  mercury  gauge  must  indicate precisely zero. 
Heating  is carried out  in stages of  25°C~  measurements  are  taken at 50,  75, 
100,  125,  150,  175  and  200°C.  The  rate of heating  is adjusted  so  that  the 
temperature  rises  l°C  per minute  within each step of  25°C.  In  each heating 
stage  the  thermostat  bath  must  be  capable of  keeping  the  temperature  constant 
within +  5  minutes;  the  pressure should  be  read at  the beginning of this 
period  ~f 5  minutes  and  at  the  end  by  means  of  the  mercury  gauge. - 26a  .. 
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ANNEX  VI ANNEX  VII 
DETERMINATION  OF  pH  VALUE 
1.  FIELD  OF  APPLICATION 
The  method  serves  to  determine  the degree of acidity  (pll  value)  o:f  wa-
ter-containing fluids  employed  in hydraulic  systems. 
2.  PRINCIPLE 
The  pH  value  is obtained  by  means  of an electrometric determination of 
the potential difference  between  two  electrodes plunged  into  the  test fluid, 
Glass-calomel  elctrodes are used.  The  measurement  is carried out at  l8°C. 
3.  APPARATUS  AND  REAGENTS 
a)  pH-meter 
b)  Glass  electrode  (measurement  electrode) 
c)  Saturated  calomel  electrode  (reference electrode) 
d)  Buffer solution. 
I •  Buffer solution  pH  =  7 
1)  1.1876  g.  Na2  HP04  +  AH20  in  100 ml.  dist.  H2o 
2)  2.1008  g.  C6H807  +  H2o  (Citric acid)  in 
20 ml.  1  n  - NaOH  +  80 ml,  dist.  H20 
Mixture:  32.94  ml,  solution  1  + 7.06  ml., solution2 
II.  Buffer solution  pH  =  10 
1)  1.91  g  Na2B4o7  +  10 H2o  (borax)  in  100 ml.dist.  H20 
2)  0,1 n- NaOH 
Mixture:  59.5  ml.  solution1  +  40.5  ml.  solution2 
4.  PREPARATION 
The  two  electrodes are  connected  to  the  measuring  device  and  inserted 
successively  in buffer solutions  I  and  II  which  have  been brought  up  to  l8°C, 
The  actual readings  given  by  the apparatus are  compared with  the theoretical 
values.  If the  theoretical values  (pH  7  and  pH  10)  are  not  those  indicated  by 
the apparatus,  the actual readings are adjusted in accordance with  the  instruc-
tions  for  use of  the apparatus. 
5.  TEST  PROCEDURE 
The  test  fluid  is warmed  up  to  l8°C.in a  glass beaker.  The  electrodes 
(washed  clean with distilled water)  are  then  inserted and  the  pH  value  read 
off on  the  pH-meter. 
6,  PRESENTATION  OF  RESULTS 
The  results are  given  to  the  nearest  0.1  pH  unit. 
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ANNEX  IX 
DETERMINATION  OF  ANTI-CORROSION  ACTION 
1.  FIELD  OF  APPLICATION 
The  method  is employed  to  determine  the anti-corrosion action of  fluids 
used  in hydraulic systems.  The  method  can  be  applied  to all types  of hydrau-
lic fluid  (mineral-oil  products,  synthetic  fluids,  emulsions). 
2.  PRINCIPLE 
Samples of sheets of various materials are  immersed  in the  test fluid 
for  a  fixed  period of  time.  Changes  in  the  surface of  the material  and  changes 
in  the  colour of  the  test solution are determined  in relation to  time. 
3.  APPARA1'US  AND  REAGENTS 
a)  Glass  beakers,  400 ml.  capacity; 
b)  Glass  hooks,  from  which  the  sample  sheets can  be  freely suspended  in the 
beaker; 
c)  Thermostatically-controlled heating bath which  maintains  the test fluid  in 
the  beaker at  a  temperatureof  35  ±  0,2°C. 
The  heating bath must  be  provided with  a  stirring device  ensuring uniform 
temperature distribution throughout  the  bath. 
d)  Emery  paper  No.  0.; 
e)  Cotton  wool; 
f)  Normal  petrol,  boiling range  65  to  95°C.; 
g)  Pure  benzene; 
h)  Sample  sheet  100 mm.  x  20  nun.  x  1  mm.  thick,  with  a  4  mm.  diameter hole 
at  the  upper  edge  of  one  narrow side,  so  that  the plate can  be  hung  on  a 
glass  hook. 
The  following  materials  must  be  available  for  the  test: 
Steel,  strength 50  to 60 kg/mm2, 
Electrolytic copper, 
Zinc,  pure, 
Aluminium,  pure, 
Cadmium-plated steel  (steel with  a  cadmium  coating at  least  25u  thick 
Brass  (70% copper). 
4.  PREPARATION 
The  sample  sheets should  be  prepared with suitable emery  paper,  until 
finally  emery  paper  No.  0  gives  the  best  possible surface.  The  sheets are  then 
held  in tweezers  and  cleaned with  dry cotton wool,  followed  by  cotton wool  soa-
kes  in  normal  petrol;  the  traces of cotton wool  are washed off with  pure petrol 
and  then with benzene. 
As  soon  as  the  last traces of solvent  adhering  to  the  sample sheets  have 
evaporated,  tho  sheets  must  be  used  for  the corrosion test. 
10 beakers should  be  filled  for  the entire test  - each with  250 cc.  of 
fluid.  The  glass beakers  arc  then  placed  in  the  thermostatically-contolled 
heating bath  and  the  temperature of  the heating bath adjusted  to  give  a  constant 
temperature of 35  ± 0.2°C,  in  the test fluid. 6  of the  beakers  receive one  each of the  following  sample sheets  - steel, 
copper,  zinc,  aluminium,  cadmium-plated steel and  brass  - suspended  in such  a  w 
way  that approx.  60 wn.  of the sample  sheet  is immersed  in the test fluid.  To 
test the behaviour of pairs of substances sheets of the  following metals are 
immersed  in the  remaining  four  beakers, 
Steel/Cadmium-plated steel, 
Copper/Zinc, 
Aluminium/Zinc  and 
Steel/Aluminium. 
The  two  sample sheets should hang  approximately  1  mm.  apart. 
5.  PROCEDURE 
Care  nrnst  be  taken during the test to maintain the  temperature  in the 
heating bath constant.  Evaporation  losses should be  made  good  as  necessary. 
The  sample  sheets should  be  withdrawn  and  examined  every 8  days.  The  complete 
test must  run  for  a  minimum  of 40 days. 
6.  ASSESSMENT 
Changes  in the surface of  the test substance must  be  described,  with 
respect  to  any  oxidation colour or deposits.  In addition,  the  colour  and  appea-
rance of  the test solution at each separate examination of the  sample sheet  must 
be  recorded. 
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NOTE 
TEST  TO  DETERMINE  THE  AGEING 
OF  FLUIDS  CONTAINING  NO  WATER 
ANNEX  X  (A) 
This  method  uses  the apparatus  and  the  ageing  conditions  described  in  the 
standard method  ASTM  D 943-54.  The  method  used  to study the  aged  sample  has  been  mo-
dified to cover  the field of application of  fluids  containing  no  water, 
l.  FIELD  OF  APPLICATION 
This  method serves  to determine  the characteristics of ageing of  non-flammable 
fluids  containing  no  water  used  in hydraulic  systems, 
2.  PRINCIPLE 
The  sample  is subjected to  a  temperature of  95°C,,  in  the  presence of 
water  and  oxygen,  with  iron and  copper  present  to act as  catalysts, 
3.  APPARATUS  AND  CHEMICALS 
a)  Oxidizing cell  (fig.  1). 
b)  A thermostatically-controlled heatingbathwhich maintains  the  sample  in  the 
oxidizing cell at a  temperature of  95  ± 0.2°C,,  provided with  a  suitable stir-
ring device  to ensure  that  the  bath  temperature  is uniform. 
The  dimensions  of  the  bath  must  be  such  that  the  required  numbe1·  of  oxidizing 
cells 350  mm.  in height  can be  completely surrounded  by  the  fluid  in  the  bath. 
c)  Flow-meter with  a  minimum  capacity of 3  litres/hour and  an  accuracy of  fr  0.1 :Vh. 
d)  A device  for  winding  the catalysing coils  (fig.  2). 
e)  Thermometer  graduated  from  75  to  125°C, 
f)  A catalyst consisting of  low-alloy steel,  No,l6;  made  by  Washburn  and  Moen 
(low-alloy steel wire,  material  type  A,  specification ASTM  A  129,  lst part, 
ASTM  Standards  1955,  for  open metal  fire grids of ordinary quality),  the wire 
being 1.59  mm.  in diameter,  together with  a  wire  of electrolytic copper,  No.l4, 
made  by  the American  Wire  Company,  the wire  being  1.625  mm.  in  diameter. 
g)  Hydrochloric  acid,  concentrated industrial grade  (  =  1,18). 
h)  Hydrofluoric  acid,  co1~entrated industrial grade  (approx.  50%). 
i)  Ordinary petrol,  boiling range  65  to  95°C, 
j)  Nitric acid,  concentrated  industrial grade  (  =  1.42) 
k)  Oxygen  in a  container with  a  pressure regulator  to ensure  a  uniform  flow  of 
gas.  It is advisable  to use  an  oxygen bottle with  a  two-step  regulator, 
4.  PREPARATION  OF  THE  APPARATUS 
a)  Cleaning  the catalyst 
On  a  day  fixed  for  the start of  the test,  3  m.  of steel wire  and  3  m.  of  cop-
per  wire  are cleaned with cotton wool  soaked  in ordinary petrol;  the surface 
of  the wire  is then polished with  emery  paper  No.  100  (00) 
Any  traces of metal or  emery  are  then  wiped off with dry  cotton waste.  In all 
subsequent operations,  the wire  should  be  handled with cotton cloth or cotton 
gloves  to avoid contact with  the operator's skin. b)  Preparation of the  coils 
The  two  wires  are  firmly  joined at one  end  by  making  about  six twists,  and 
then  wound  on  a  threaded spindle.  The  free  ends of  the steel wire  and  copper 
wire are  then also attached  by six twists;  the  coils are  re~oved from  the 
spindle and  then  reduced  in  length until  the  top  edge  of  the coils - when 
placed above  the oxygen-inlet orifice - stands  13  nun.  above  the  boundary 
surface  between  the air and  the water,  when  the  latter has  been poured  in. 
This  adjustment of  length makes  it possible  to  take  samples  periodically 
from  inside  the oxidizing cell for analysis purposes,  without materially 
changing  the ratio of  the  volumes  to  be  examiqed  with respect  to  the active 
surface area  of  the catalyst. 
c)  Cleaning  the oxidizing cell 
The  inlet tubes  and  reaction vessels  are  cleaned  by  rinsing with  acetone, 
tap water,  chromo-sulphuric  acid and  again tap water,  until  the  latter 
contains  no  more  acid.  The  objects are  then  twice  rinsed with  small  quanti-
ties of  acetone  and  three  times  with destilled water.  Finally,  the  reaction 
vessel  is filled with distilled water,  the  oxygen  inlet pipe  is put  in place, 
together  with  the cooling jacket,  and  the  whole  assembly  is left in this 
condition  for  24  hours  before  geginning  the  test.  Shortly before  the  test 
begins,  the  vessels are emptied  and  dried,  and  the  outer walls of the  inlet 
pipe  end  the  cooling jacket dried with  cotton waste. 
d)  Cleaning  the  vessels after use 
After  the  reaction vessels should  be  washed  with  nonnal  petrol  and  wiped  with 
a  long-handled  brush.  This  cleaning process  is repented with  acetone replacing 
the  petro1,  after which  the  tubes  are filled with oxidizing mixture  composed 
of  three parts of  HCl  and  one  part of  HN03  which  is left  in the  apparatus  for 
at  least  24  hours  at  room  temperature.  The  aparatus  is  then  rinsed with  tap 
water  to  remove  all traces of acid and  the organic  products of  the  reaction 
are  removed  by  means  of acetone.  If  a  ring-shaped  mark  remains  in  the  interior 
of  the  vessel,  it should  be  rinsed with  a  mixture of equal  parts· of hydroflu-
oric acid and  hydrochloric acid.  This  mixture  af acids  should  be  left in the 
vessel  until  the  ring-shaped  mark  disappears  or dissolves,  and  the  acid  is 
then  rinsed  away  with  large  quantities of  tap  water.  The  final  cleaning 
is  then carried out  as  in paragraph b). 
5.  ANALYS  PROCEDURE 
a)  The  bath  is heated  to  a  temperature sufficiently high  to ensure  that  the  test 
fluid,  contained  in  the  required  number  of  reaction vessels,  reaches  the pres-
cribed  temperature  of  95  ± 0,2°C. 
~)  The  catalyzing coils are  then slid over  the  inlet orifice of  the  oxygen  inlet 
pipe  and  coil  and  pipe are centred.  A  4uantity of 300 ml.  of  test fluid  is 
poured on  to  the  coils until  they are  completely wetted.  The  reaction vessel 
is then  immersed  in the  heating bath  in such  a  way  that  the  fluid  in  the  bath 
stands at  least  75  mm.  above  the surface of  the oil.  'l'he  cooling jacket  is 
then  pushed  on  the  inlet pipe  and  connected  to  the  cooling water  supply  (the 
temperature of  the  cooling water  must  not  exceed  35°C,  during  the test). 
c)  The  oxygen  inlet pipe  is connected  to  the  oxygen bottle via  the  flowmeter,  the 
quantity of  gas  being adjusted  to  3  ±  litres/hour,  and  the  flow  of  gas  is al-
lowed  to continue  for  30 minutes  before  pouring  60 ml.  of distilled water  into 
the oxidizing cell.  The  time  when  this  is done  is recorded. 
It is essential  to adjust  the  volume  of oxygen at  least  twice  a  day  to  comply 
with  the  prescribed  tolerances. 
d)  At  least three hours  before  the  beginning of  tho  test  the  temperature of  the 
mixture  in  the reaction vessel  must  be  checked  every  hour until the  tempera-
ture measured  on  two  successive occasions  is constant at  95  ± 0.2°C.  Thereaf-
ter it is necessary  to  check  once  a  day  that  the bath  temperature  remains 
constant  over  the entire test period. 
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e)  By  constantly topping-up with distilled water  the  level of  fluid  in  the oxi-
dizing cell is maintained constant. 
In certain conditions,  because  of deposits or  the  formation  of  emulsions,  the 
fluid  cannot easily be  inspected or  checked.  For  this reason it is necessa-
ry  to  mark  the  fluid  level  before the  test begins.  If this  level  is maintai-
ned  by  periodic  topping-up  the  volume  of water  in  the cell remains  constant. 
If test samples  are  removed  from  the cell,  the total reduced  volume  obtained 
in this way  is marked  and  the  volume  of water  adjusted exactly  to this  mark. 
6.  ANALYTICAL  DETERMINATION  OF  THE  AGEING  PROCESS 
a)  During  the  ageing process,  a  sample  is  taken  roughly  every  8  hours  from  the 
centre of  the  fluid  in the  reaction vessel  - the  sample  quantity being  about 
10 ml.;  the  sample  is  intended  for  analysis and  the  oxygen  supply should be 
stopped while  the  sample  is taken. 
b)  The  sample of  10 ml.  is divided  into  two  parts,  one  (approx.  5  g.)  being used 
to  determine  the  neutralization  index,  the other  to  determine  the presence 
of substances  (particles of sludge)  insoluble  in petrol. 
c)  Determination of  the  neutralization  index 
This determination  is carried out  by  the  normal  commercial  method  using alka-
li blue as  as  a  coloured  indicator. 
d)  Determination of  the  proportion of particles insoluble  in petrol 
Some  5  g.  of  the  sample  are dissolved  in  a  flask  in  10  times  this quantity of 
pure petrol.  This  solution is filtered  under slight suction  on  a  membrane 
filter which  has previously been  weighed  (type  :  average  pore  diameter  0. 4 
microns,  filter diameter  40 mm.). 
Care  must  be  taken  to ensure  that the filter is  not  subjected  to  dry  soction 
because  this blocks  the  pores.  The  filter is then  washed  with  pure petrol 
until the filtrate is completely clear.  After it has  been  allowed  to stand 
for  an  hour,  the petrol  is completely  evaporated  from  the  filter.  The  membra-
ne  filter is then  placed  to  dry  for  half-an-hour  in a  desiccator  and  weighed. 
It is advisable  to carry out  a  blank  filtering test with  pure petrol,  since 
the filter itself may  undergo  a  weight  loss of  1  to  2  mg.  when  treated with 
petrol. 
e)  The  duration of  the  test must  not  exceed  1,000 hours  of  ageing.  Once  the  ageing 
is finished,  other tests of  many  different kinds  can  be  carried out  if this 
is desired. 7mm.Diam 
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TEST  TO  DETERMlNE  THE  AGEING 
OF  WATER-CONTAINING  FLUIDS 
ANNEX  X  (B) 
The  method  uses  the  apparatus  and  applies  the  ageing conditions laid dowq 
by  method  ASTM  D 943-54.  The  apparatus,  the  determination of ageing  and  the  exami-
nation of  the  aged  samples  have  been  modified  to suit the application to water-
containing fluids. 
1.  RANGE  OF  APPLICATION 
This  method  serves  to  determine  the  characteristics of ageing of water-
containing fluids  used  in hydraulic  systems. 
2.  PRINCIPLE 
The  test  fluid  is subjected  to  a  temperature of  95°C,,  in the  presence 
of  oxygen  and  after the  addition of  iron  and  copper  as catalysts. 
3.  APPARATUS  AND  REAGENTS 
a)  Oxidizing cell  (fig.  1). 
The  cooling jacket of  the oxidizing cell differs  from  that discribed  in Annex 
X  (A)  in that its envelope  is  not  100  mm.,  but  200  mm.  long  (fig.  1). 
b)  A thermostatically-controlled and  adjustable heating bath which  maintains  the 
fluid  in the oxidizing cell at  a  temperature of  95  ±  0,2°C,,  provided with  a 
stirring device  to  ensure  that  the  temperature of  the  bath  is uniform  throu-
ghout.  (The  dimensions  of  the  bath  must  be  such  that  the required  number  of 
oxidizing cells 350  mm.  in height  can  be  completely surrouded  by  the  fluid  in 
the  bath. 
c)  Flow-meter  with  minimum  capacity of 3  litres/hour and  an  accuracy of± 0.1  1/h. 
d)  A device for winding  the catalyzing coils  (fig.  2). 
e)  Thermometer  graduated  from  75  to  125°C, 
f)  A catalyst consisting of  a  low-alloy steel wire,  NO.l6,  made  by  Washburn  and 
Moen  (low-alloy steel wire,  material  type A,specification ASTM  A  129,  1st part, 
ASTM  Standards  1955,  for  open  metal  fire  grids of ordinary quality),  the  wire 
being  1. 59  mm.  in diameter,  together with  a  wire of electrolytic copper,  No .14, 
made  by  the American  Wire  Company,  the  wire  being  1.625  mm.  in diameter. 
g)  Hydrochloric  acid,  concentrated  industrial grade  (  =  1.18). 
h)  Hydrofluoric acid,  concentrated  industrial  grade  (approx.  50%). 
i)  Ordinary petrol,  boiling range  65  to  95°C, 
j)  Nitric acid,  concentrated  industrial  grade  =  1. 42) 
ld  Oxygen  in  a  container with  a  pressure regula  tor  to ensure  a  uniform  flow  of 
gas.  It is advisable  to  use  an  oxygen bottle with  a  two-step  regulator. 
4.  PREPARATION  OF  THE  APPARATUS 
a)  Cleaning the catalyst 
On  the  day  fixed  for  the start of  the  test,  3  m.  of steel wire  and  3  m.  of 
copper  wire are  cleaned with  cotton wool  soaked  in ordinary petrol;  the  sur-
flee of  the wire  is then polished with  emery  paper  No.lOO  (00).  Any  traces 
of metal  or  emery  are  then  wiped off with  dry cotton waste.  In all subsequent 
operations,  the wire  should be  handled with cotton cloth or cotton gloves 
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to avoid contact with  the operator's skin. 
p)  Preparation of  the coils 
The  two  wil·es  are  firmly  joined at one  end  by  making  about  six twists,  and 
then  wound  on  a  threaded spindle.  The  free  ends  of  the steel wire  and  copper 
wire  are  then also attached by six twists;  the coils are  removed  from  the 
spindle,  and  then  reduced  in  length until  the  top  edge  of  the coils  - when 
placed  above  the oxygen-inlet orifice  - stands  13  mm.  above  the  boundary sur-
face  between  the air and  the  water,  when  the  latter has  been  poured  in. 
This  adjustement  of  length  makes  it possible  to  take  samples  periodically 
from  inside the  oxidizing cell  for  analysis purposes,  without  materially 
changing  the  ratio of  the  volumes  to  be  examined with  respect  to  the  active 
surface area of  the catalyst. 
c)  Cleaning the oxidizing cell 
The  iLlet  tubes  and  reaction vessels are  cleaned by  rinsing with  acetone,  wiili 
tap water,  chromo-sulphuric acid andagain  tap water,  until  the }atter  co~tains 
no  more  acid.  The  objects are  then  twice  rinsed with  small  quantities of ace-
tone  and  three  times  with  distilled water.  Finally,  the  reaction vessel  is 
filled with distilled water,  the  oxygen  inlet pipe  is put  in place,  together 
with  the  cooling jacket,  and  the  whole  assembly  is left  in this condition for 
24  hours  before  beginning  the  test.  Shortly before  the  test  beginE  ,  the  ves-
sels are emptied  and  dried,  and  the outer walls  of  the  inlet pipe  and  the 
cooling jacket dried with cotton waste. 
d)  Cleaning  the vessels after use 
After use  the  reaction vessels should  be  washed  with  normal  petrol  and  wiped 
with  a  long-handled brush.  This  cleaning process  is repeated with  acetone  re-
placing the petrol,  after which  the  tubes  are filled with  an oxidizing  mix-
ture  composed  of  three parts of  HCI  and  one  part of  HN03  which  is left in  the 
apparatus  for  at  least  24  hours  at  room  temperature.  The  apparatus  is  then 
rinsed with  tap water  to  remove all traces of  acid  and  the organic  products 
of  the reaction are  removed  by  means  of acetone.  If  a  ring-shaped  mark  remains 
in  the  interior of  the vessel,  it should  be  rinsed with  a  mixture of equal 
parts of hydrofluoric acid and  hydrochloric acid.  This mixture  of acids  should 
be  left  in the vessel until the  ring-shaped  mark  disappears  or dissolves,  end 
the acid  is then rinsed  away  with  large  quantities of  tap water.  The  final 
cleaning is  then  carried out  as  in paragraph  b). 
5.  ANALYSIS  PROCEDURE 
a)  The  bath  is heated  to  a  temperature sufficiently high  to ensure  that  the  test 
fluid,  contained  in  the  required  number  of  reaction vessels,  reaches  the  pre-
scribed temperature  of  95  ± 0.2°C. 
b)  The  catalyzing coils are  then slid over  the  inlet orifice of  the  oxygen  inlet 
pipe  and coil and  pipe  are centred.  A  quantity of 300 ml.  of  test  fluid  is 
poured  on  to  the coils until  they  are  completely wetted.  The  reaction vessel 
is then  immersed  in  the  heating bath  in such  a  way  that  the  fluid  in  the  bath 
stands at  least  75  nm1.  above  the surface of  the oil.  The  cooling jacket  is 
then  pushed  on  the  inlet pipe  and  connected  to  the  cooling water  supply 
(the  temperature of  the  cooling water  must  not  exceed 35°C.  during  the  test) 
c)  The  oxygen  inlet pipe  is connected  to  the  oxygen bottle via  the  flow-meter, 
the  quantity of  gas  being adjusted  to  3  ± 0.5  litres/hour,  and  the  flow  of 
gas  is allowed  to  continue  for  30 minutes  before  pouring 60  ml.  of distilled 
water  into  the oxidizing cell.  The  time  when  this  is  done  is recorded. 
It is essential to adjust  the  volume  of oxygen  at  least  twice  a  day  to  comply 
with  the  prescribed  tolerances. 
d)  At  least  three  hours  before  the  beginning of  the  test  the  temperature  of  the 
mixture  in  the reaction vessel  must  be  chocked  every  hour  until  the  tempera-
ture measured  on  two  successive occasions  is constant at  95  ±  0.2°C. 
Thereafter it is necessary  to  check  once  a  day  that  the  bath  temperature 
remains  constant  over  the entire test period. 
e)  By  constantly topping-up with distilled water  the  level  of  fluid  in  the oxi-izing cell is maintained  in spite of evaporation  losses.  In certain condi-
tions,  pecause of deposits or the  formation of  emulsions,  the  fluicl  cannot 
easily  J:>e  inspected or  checked.  For  this reason it is necessary  to  mark  the 
fluid  level before  the test J:>egins.  If test samples  are  removed  from  the cell, 
the  total reduced  volume  obtained  in this way  is marked  and. tho  volume  of 
water  adjusted exactly to  this mark. 
6.  ANALYTICAL  DETERMINATION  OF  THE  AGEING  PROCESS 
a)  During  the  ageing process,  a  sample  is taken roughly  every  8  hours  from  the 
centre of  the  fluid  in  the  reaction vessel  - the  sample  quantity  being about 
10 ml.:  the  sample  is  intended for  analysis and  the  oxygen  should  be  stopped 
while  the  sample  is taken. 
b)  The  5  ml.  sample  is divided  into  two  parts,  one part  (approx.  5  gm.  being 
used  to determine  the neutralization  index  and acidity  (pH  value),  there-
mainder  to  determine  the  insoluble substances  (deposition of  sludge).  The 
determination of  these waste substances  is restricted to the solutions,  and 
does  not  apply  to emulsions. 
c)  Determination of  the  neutralization  index 
'  If it is not  possible  to determine  the  neutralization  index  by  the  normal 
conunercial  method  using alkali blue  as  a  coloured  indicator, .the  value  must 
be  determined potentiometricalli.  In  this case,  either the  total acid  number 
(TAN)  or  the  total base  number  (1BN)  must  be  determined as  laid down  in me-
thod  ASTM  D 664-54.  The  pH  value  is measured  by  means  of  a  compound  alkaline-
resistant glass electrode. 
d)  Detennination of  the  content of  insoluble matter 
Approximately  5  g.  of  the  fluid are filtered under slight  vacuum  using  a  pre-
viously-weighed  membrane  filter  (type:  average  pore  diameter  0.4  microns,  fil-
ter diameter  40 mm.).  Care  must  be  taken  to ensure that  the filter is not 
subjected  to dry suction because  this blocks  the pores.  The  filter is then 
washed  with distilled water until the  filtrate is completely  clear. 
The  membrane  filter is then placed  in a  desiccator  for  one hour,. after which 
it is weighed.  It is advisable  to carry out  a  blank,  filter test with distil-
led water,  and  determine  the variation  in weight. 
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e)  The  duration of  the  test must  not  exceed  1,000 hours  of ageing.  Once  the  ageing 
is finished,  other tests of many  different kinds  can  be  carried out  if this 
is desired. 7mm Dam. 
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turns APPLICATION 
METHOD  OF  DETERMIN.ING  THE  RESISTANCE  TO 
SWELLING  OF  PACKINGS  AND  SEALS 
ANNEX  XI 
This  method  is used  to  determine  the behaviour of  non-flammable  fluids  on 
contact  with  packing  and sealing materials. 
PRINCIPLE 
Sample  pieces of  the  packing material are  suspended  in the test fluid un-
der  clearly-defined conditions,  and  the resultant  change  in  vol~me is measured. 
DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  SAMPLE  PIECES 
Circular samples  - 40  mm.  in diameter  end  6  mm.  thick  - are cut  from  the 
packing material. 
TEST  PROCEDURE 
Two  sample  pieces  a1·e  prepared  for  each test.  For  the test,  the  samples 
are  cleaned with  a  rag  dipped  in anhydric alcohol,  The  volume  of  the samples  is 
then  determined.  This  is done  by  calculating the weight  of  the  samples,  first when 
exposed·to  the  atmosphere  and  secondly when  immersed  in water,  Before  the test,  the 
sample  pieces  must  be  dried and  subjected  for  a  long  time  at a  temperature of 20°C, 
A certain quantity of  fluid  is poured  into  a  beaker  so  that  the ratio be-
tween  the  volume  of fluid  and  the  volume  of  the  sample  is  1  t  15  (5  g,  of sample 
call  for  roughly  100  ml.  of  fluid). 
The  beaker  is maintained  for  168  consecutive  hours  (7  days)  at a  tempe-
rature of  70 ±  l°C,  Following this,  the  sample  pieces are  cleaned with  anhydric 
alcohol  and  dried  between  two  filter papers.  5  minutes after being dried,  the  vo-
lume  of each of  the  two  samples  must  be  determined  by  the  method  described  above. 
In  this way  the proportional  increase  in  volume  - which  is taken  as  the 
swelling  index  - can  be  arrived at  by  the  following  formula: 
v  X  100 
in which 
V  proportional  increase  in  volume  of  the  sample· 
v1  volume  of  the  sample  before  ioonersion· 
v2  volume  of  the  sample after  immersion. 
If the different  values  deviate  by  more  than  1  % (in absolute  figures) 
from  the  average  value,  the  test should  be  repeated. 
37 38 
1.  APPLICATION 
DETERMINATION  OF  TENDENCY  TO  FOAM  l"ORMATIOH 
EXTRACT  FROM  GERMAN  STANDARD  DIN  51  566 
ANNEX  XIII 
Homogeneous  hydraulic  fluids  with or without  addition of water. 
2.  PRINCIPLE 
To  determine  the  volume  of  foam  formed  by  introducing  into the  fluid,  at 
different  temperatures,  a  thoroughly  diffused current of air. 
3.  APPARATUS 
3. 1  1, 000 ml.  measuring cylinder 
The  graduated scale must  cover  :-165  mm.  ±  15  mm. 
3.2  Air  inlet tube with  diffusion plug of  alundum  (Norton  Company,  Refract. 
Division,  Worcester,  6,  Mass.,  USA  designation No.  ME-46239,  Grade  :  fine). 
The  air inlet  tube  is made  of  glass  and  is at least  450  mm.  long.  The  diffu-
sion plug,which  is spherical,  porous  and  made  of sintered aluminium oxide, 
and  25  mm.  in diameter,  is  fixed  to  the  lower  end of  the  inlet  tube. 
3.3  A  thermostatically-controlled bath,  consisting of  a  glass  vessel  filled with 
water,  provided with  a  heating device,  automatic  temperature  control  and  a 
stirrer.  The  glass vessel  should be  big  enough  to allow  the  measuring cylin-
der  to  be  immersed  up  to  the  900 ml.  mark.  The  temperature  of  the  heating 
bath must  be  adjustable  to 25°C.  ± 0.5°  or  95°C.± 0.5. 
3.4  Flowmeter  to  provide adjustment  of  the  prescribed  flow  of air. 
The  types  used are either the  normal  rotameter or  the  fluid-filled U-tube  type 
of  flowmeter  which  indicates  the  pressure difference upstream  and  downstream 
of  a  capillary  tube  inserted in  the air current.  (It is advisable  to  have  a 
capillary-likeconstrictionof the  bottom point  of  the  U-tube  to  damp  oscilla-
tions of  the  fluid  caused  by  pressure variations). 
3.5  Stop watch. 
3.6  Thermometer:  precision  thermometer  0  to  100°C.,  with scale divided  in  0,2°C, 
4.  CHEMICAL  REAGENTS 
4.1  Normal  petrol 
4.2  Chemically  pure  acetone. 
4.3  Pure  benzene. 
5.  PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  TEST 
5.1  To  eliminate all the  fluid  residues  from  previous  tests,  which  might  in cer-
tain circumstances distort the results,  it is necessary  to  clean  the  test 
apparatus  very  thoroughly.  This  obligatory cleaning process particularly 
applies  to 
a)  the measuring cylinder:  this must  be  very carefully cleaned with  normal 
petrol,  then with acetone  and  finally with distilled water,  after which 
it is dried with  a  current of dry,  pure  (oil-free)  air· 
b)  the  diffusion plug  in  the air inlet  tube:  this plug must  be  cleaned succes-
sively with  normal  petrol,  pure  benzene  and  finally with  a  fresh  supply 
of ordinary petrol,  the  plug being  immersed  in about  300 ml.  of each of 
these solvents  in turn,  the solvents being vacuum-aspirated  and  then  forced 
out  under  pressure  (repeated  5  times  for  each solvent).  The  tube  and  dif-fusion  plug are  then dried  in dry air  (oil-free).  Finally,  the  tube  is 
wiped with  a  clean,  dry  cloth. 
5.2  The  air inlet tube  is  then  introduced  into  the orifice of a  rubber  cork  (pier-
ced  by  two  holes)  which  seals  the measuring  cylinder,  the  tube  being so  in-
serted that  the diffusion plug just touches  the  bottom of  the  measuring cylin-
der. 
5.3  Then  some  200 ml.  of  the  sample  are  heated  to 50°C.±  2°  in a  clean glass 
vessel  and  then cooled  to  25°  ±  2°.  In addition,  the  heating bath  is adjus-
ted to  25°C,  ±  0.5°.  The  measuring cylinder  is filled up  to  the  190 ml.  mark 
with  the prepared  sample,  and  then  placed  in the  heating bath  in such  a  way 
that  the water  reaches at  least  the  900  ml.  mark. 
6.  TEST  PROCEDURE 
6.1  Once  the  fluid  in the  measuring cylinder  has  reached  the  temperature  of  the 
bath,  the  rubber  cork  carrying the air inlet tube  is placed  on  the  measuring 
cylinder  (the diffusion plug just touching  the  bottom of  the cylinder)  and  a 
period of  5  minutes  is allowed  to elapse  for  the  plug  to  become  saturated with 
fluid.  During this operation,  the air supply  must  not  be  opened.  The  tube  is 
then  connected to  the air supply  and  a  flow  of air of  94  ml.  ±  5  ml.  per  mi-
nute  introduced.(The air must  be  dry  and oil-free.  If necessary,  a  tube  contai-
ning  calcium chloride and  another  tube  filled with  cotton-wool  should  be  pla-
ced  in the air line).  When  a  period of 5  minutest 10 seconds  has  elapsed af-
ter the  appearance  of  the  first air bubbles  on  the  surface of  the diffusion 
plug,  the  flow  of air is cut off and  the  volume  of  foam  formed  immediately 
measured,  and  expressed  in millilitres,  The  term  volume  of  foam  should  be 
understood as  referring to  the  distance  between  the  upper  edge  (average  value) 
of  the  layer of  foam  and  the surface of  the  fluid  below  this. 
Without  removing  the air inlet,  the  measuring cylinder  is left for  a 
further  10 minutes  ±  seconds  in  the water  bath,  after which  the  foam  volume 
is measured  again. 
6.2  For  a  similar test carried out at  95°  C.,  the preparations are  identical with 
those  described  in section 5  above,  but  the  bath  is heated  to  95°C.  !  0.5". 
Of  course,  the  heating of  the  fluid  in  the  measuring cylinder  to  the  bath 
temperature  procedes  more  slowly. 
A freshly-cleaned air inlet tube  and  diffusion plug should  be  used  for 
the  introduction of  the air. 
The  measurement  is carried out  as  in section 6.1  above,  after the  neces-
sary  lapse of  time  for  bubble  formation  or  settlement. 
6.3  The  foam  remaining after the  test described  in section 6.2  is  then  broken  up 
by  light stirring.  The  fluid  is cooled  to  below 40"C.,  by  allowing  the  measu-
ring cylinder  to stand open  to  the air at  room  temperature.  Once  the  fluid 
has  reached  the heating bath  temperature,  a  freshly-cleaned air inlet  tube 
and  diffusion plug are  inserted.  Then  the  process  described  in section 6.1 
is repeated and  the  foam  volume  measured after  the  lapse of  time  for  bubble 
formation  or settlement. 
7.  RECORDING  OF  RESULTS 
Temperature  of  the 
samples  of  fluid 
25°C, 
95°C, 
25°C,  after 
determination 
at  95°C. 
TABLE 
Volume  of  foam  measured 
immediately after air 
introduction 
ml. 
ml. 
. . . . . . . .  ml. 
Foam  volume  after 
10 minutes 
ml. 
ml. 
•  • •••••.•  Dll • 
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ANNEX  XV 
DETERMINATION  OF  EMULSION  STABILITY 
PRINCIPLE 
To  check  that  the  emulsion when  ready  for  use  is stable when  stored at 
three  temperatures:  +  S°C.,  +  20°C,,  +  40°C, 
These  three  temperatures  represent  the conditions which  may  be  encoun-
tered  in colliery stores. 
APPARATUS 
-three cylindrical test tubes  each  of 2SO  cc,capacity 
-thermostats  for  temperatures  of  +  S  and  +  40°C,  ± l°C, 
TEST  PROCEDURE 
1.  Sample  preparation 
The  volume  of  the  sample  is to  be  approximately 800  cc.  Two  cases  may 
arise: 
a)  the  emulsion  is ready  for  use: 
b)  only  a  concentrate is provided,  and  the  emulsion  must  be  made  up 
before  use 
In  the  second  case,  the  emulsion  is to  be  made  up  using water  with  a 
hydrotimetric  total  value of 40 ± S,  by  means  of  mechanical stirring for 
at  least S  minutes. 
2.  Treatment 
The  sample  is distributed equally among  the  three  2SO  cc.  test tubes. 
These  are  then  subjected to  the  temperature  conditions  listed above, 
i.e.:  one  tube  in the  bath  thermostatically controlled at+ S°C,,  one 
tube  in  the bath at  +  40°C.  and  the  third  in an unventilated enclosed 
space at  laboratory  temperature. 
3.  Observations 
The  samples are  examined  every  24  hours.  No  oil should rise to  the sur-
face  after 
1,000 hours  for  emulsions  of  the oil-in-water type· 
600 hours  for  the  emulsions  of  the water-in-oil  type. 
Only  creamy  layer  not  exceeding  2  mm.  in  thickness  can  be  accepted. ANNEX  B 
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The  Conference  on  Safety in Coalmines  discussed the organization of mine 
rescue services in the Community  countries  and Great Britain,  and noted that were  a 
number  of differences  from  one  country  to another  (e.g.  national rescue headquarters 
as  against regional  rescue stations),  due either to the general overall organization 
of  the coalmining  industry or  to  the geographical  location and  layout  of  the coal-
fields  and pits. 
On  this point  the Conference arrived at the  following  conclusions: 
1.  The  Conference  recommends  that  the  rescue services be  organized on  a  geographical 
basis  enough  for  them  to dispose of  adequate  equipment  and personnel. 
2.  The  Conference  considers  that  a  functional  liaison should be established first 
between  the rescue services of  the different coalfiels of each  country,  and  then 
between  one  country  and  another. ·It recommends  that  a  system be  organized enabling 
the rescue services of  the different countries to assist one  another,  and to en-
sure maximum  speed and efficiency in any  emergency. 
3.  The  Conference  considers  that  a  regular exchange of experience should be  organized 
among  the  rescue services of  the different countries  in regard both 'to the  impro-
vement  and  to  the co-ordination of the methods  and  means  employed  (training of 
rescue personnel,  equipment  used,  etc.). 
The  Mines  Safety Commission  instructed the Working  Party  on  the Co-ordina-
tion of  Mine  Rescue  Arrangements,  comprising  the superintendents of  the Central Res-
cue Stations  in the different countries,  to establish the  necessary  contacts prepara-
tory  to going  in detail into these recommendations,  and where  appropriate submitting 
proposals  to the  Commission. 
At  an  introductory meeting  on  November  22,  1957,  devoted principally to a 
general  exchange  of  information,  it was  urged  that  the Working  Party  should tour  the 
centra.l  rescue stations in all the member  countries  and  in the United Kingdom,  in 
order  to observe methods  of using equipment  and  any  special features  of  rescue orga-
nization,  compare  notes with  the  personnel  of  the rescue stations visited,  establish 
friendly relations with  those  responsible for  rescue  arrangements  in the different 
countries,  and  finally work  out practical conclusions  from  the  information gathered. 
Visits were  duly  paid  to the  following  rescue stations: 
1.  Lens,  France  (March  23,  1958); 
2.  Friedrichsthal,  Saar,  Germany  (June  20,  1958); 
3.  Essen-Kray,  Germany  (September  25,  1958); 
4.  Heerlen,  Netherlands  (January  22,  1959); 
5.  Doncaster  and Mansfield,  U.K.  (June  3-4,  1959); 
6.  Sulcis,  Italy  (October 6,  1959); 
7.  Hasselt,  Belgium  (May  3,  1960). 
Having  completed its round of visits,  the Working  Party  now  submits  to the 
Commission  the  following  Report  on  present  rescue  arrangements  in the Community 
countries  and Great  Britain;  the Report,  which  follows  a  standard layout,  is inten-
ded  to afford a  comparison as  to  the main essentials in the respective cases. 
5 REPORT  ON  PRESENT  MINE  RESCUE  ARRANGEMENTS 
SECTION  I  :  ORGANIZATION 
A.  GENERAL  REMARKS 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
The  Federal Republic  has  five Central Rescue Stations:  two  in Land North 
Rhine/Westphalia at Essen  and  Aachen  {Dortmund  and  Bonn Divisional  Inspectora-
tes respectively),  one  in Land  Lower  Saxony  at Clausthal-Zellerfeld,  one  in 
Land  Bavaria at Hohenpeissenberg  and  one  in  the Saar at Friedrichsthal.  Land 
Hesse,  Land Rhineland-Palatinate  and  Land  Wllrttemberg  have  no Central Rescue 
Stations of  their own:  the first  two  come  under  Aachen  and  the third under 
Hohenpeissenberg. 
For  number  of  rescue  posts affiliated to these Central Rescue  Stations, 
see accompanying  table,  item  {h). 
k)  ~~l-~!!!~~!!:!!~!!_!!!!~~!!!~!!1_!!!!_!~~-~~J!~!!_!~!!!~! 
The  Central  Rescue  Stations have  regional responsibility only. 
Co-ordination among  all official quarters concerned with mine  rescue ar-
rangements  is assured  by  the  German  Mine  Rescue  Committee,  which  deals with 
all matters  in this connection and  decides  as  to  the suitability of  respira-
tors  and  reviving apparature  for  underground  and surface use.  These  are  then 
approved  by  the  Inspectorate. 
The  organiza.tiona.l pattern of  the rescue arrangements  is pretty well  iden-
tical in all coalfields.  Responsibility  for  the Central Rescue Stations lies, 
in Aachen,  Essen and Friedrichsthal,  directly with  the a.ffiliated collieries, 
in Clausthal-Zellerfeld and  Munich with  the regional authorities plus,  in the 
case of Munich,  the Association of Colliery Managements  {Bergbau-Berufsgenos-
senscha.ft). 
The  rescue regulations  are set forth  in each Divisional  Inspectorate's 
"provisions concerning rescue services." 
The  five Central Rescue  Stations all have  much  the same  responsibilities. 
Those  of  the  Essen Station,  which  has easily the  largest Division in the 
country  {with  130 of  the  232  rescue posts  and 5,625 of  the 8,490 rescue men), 
are essentially as  follows: 
1.  Organization of  rescue services  in the Ruhr; 
2.  Supervision of  rescue  personnel  and  rescue posts at the collieries; 
3.  Training of  brigade  leaders,  tea.m  leaders and  rescue equipment-maintena.nce 
men; 
4.  Organization of  gas-fighting,  arrangements at the surface  in the coking-
plants and by-products  installations; 
5.  Supervision of gas-fighting posts  and  personnel; 
6.  Training of officers,  team  leaders  and  equipment-maintenance  men,  of  the 
gas-fighting corps; 
7.  Testing of breathing apparatus  for  approval  by  the German  Mine  Rescue  Com-
mittee as suitable for  use  below  and  above  ground  {the Hohenpeissenberg 
Station has  been  appointed as  the Committee's  second testing point); 
7 Aa.chen  Ruhr  Lower  Saxon  s.  German  Saar  Total  coalfield  coalfield  coalfield  coalfield  coalfield 
a)  Central Rescue  Sta.tion  Aachen  Essen  Clausthal- Hoben- Friedrichs-
Zellerfeld  peissenberg  thal 
b)  Station officials  4  12  4  - 2  22 
c)  Permanent  rescue men  immedia-
+  9  ++  tely available in emergency  - 36  - - 45 
d)  Rescue  men  at collieries  794  5474  962  247  834  8311 
e)  Total,  rescue men  (c +  d)  794  5510  962  247  843  8356 
f)  Total underground personnel 
employed  24000  260000  22500  9650  38000  354150 
g)  Rescue  men  per  1000 under-
ground workers  33,2  21,6  42,9  25,7  22,4  24,0 
h)  Colliery rescue posts  24  130  47  11  18  230 
+)  12 men  each  form  the Rheinelbe,  Rheinpreussen  and Prosper rescue brigades,  whose  total strength is 135. 
++)  Those  on  duty  of the  20  full-time  rescue men  at the Central Rescue Station. 
N.B.  A number  of reserve personnel trained in the use of rescue equipment  are also  a~ailable. 8.  Research  on  possible  improvements  to all rescue·and gas-protection equipment; 
9.  Advising of collieries on fire prevention;  preparatory organization of mea-
sures to be  taken  in the event of major  accidents;  co-operation in framing 
and  implementation of  rescue and firefighting instructions; 
10.  Training of supervisory personnel responsible for  fire prevention and fire-
fighting; 
11.  Development  of  firefighting equipment,  installations and methods,  and tes-
ting of fire extinguishers  for official approval; 
12.  Analysis of  samples  of methane  and fire  fumes  and evaluation of results; 
13.  Testing of CO-filter self-rescuers for  approval  by  the German  Mine  Rescue 
Committee  (second testing point at Hohenpeissenberg); 
14.  Introduction of CO-filters self-rescuers at collieries,  and supervision of 
all matters  in connection with this equipment. 
2.  BELGIUM 
Belgium has  five coalfields,  the Borinage,  the Centre,  Charleroi-Namur, 
LieKe  a.nd  the Campine.  The first four  have. each  one Central Rescue Station;  in 
the Campine  each collierry has· its own  rescue service,  and  there is a  Rescue 
Services Co-ordination Centre  (Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen)  at Kiewit-
Hasselt which  is responsible for  the theoretical  and practical training and 
drilling of rescue men  and  for  research and documentation on rescue questions. 
The  Rescue Stations are  located as  follows: 
1.  Borinage coalfield at Frameries; 
2.  Centre coalfield at Ressaix; 
3.  Charleroi-Namur coalfield at Marcinelle; 
4.  Liege coalfield at Glain-lez-Liege; 
5.  Campine  coalfield,  at each colliery,  viz.  Beeringen,  Eisden,  Helchteren-
Zolder,  Houthalen,  Waterschei,  Winterslag and Zwartberg. 
The  rescue  personnel fall  into two  categories,  "permanent  rescue men"  and 
"rescue men".  For details see table following,  items  (a)-(f). 
g)  !~~!!_~~~~~~~~~~~-f~~~~~~~!-~~f!~~~~ (as at December  1,  1959) 
Borinage  . • • • . . • • • . • • • • • • • • . • • •  13.250 
Centre  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10.840 
Charleroi-Namur  ••.•.••••••••••  21.730 
Liege  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •  16. R70 
Campine  29.500 
TOTAL  92.190 
h)  ~~~~~~-~~~-F~~-!~Q-~~~~~~E~~~~-!~~~~E~ 
There are  1,395  rescue  men  to this total of  92,190 underground personnel, 
giving a  proportion of  15.13 per  thousand. 
i)  Rescue stations 
As  noted above,  there are four  regional Stations and seven  local stations 
with  a  Co-ordination Centre  (Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen). 
k)  !~~-~!!!~~!!:!~!~!-~E~~~~~~~~!~l-!!~~-!~~-~~J~~!~-!~~~~~! 
Rescue  arrangements  are governed  by  the Regent's Decree of September  25, 
1947,  which  provides  that  these may  be either local or regional. 
9 10 
Permanent  Total,  Grand  tota.l, 
Rescue  Station  rescue  men  Permanent  permanent  perma.nent 
station  officials  immediately  rescue men  rescue men  rescue men 
available  in  in reserve  (c+d)  and  rescue 
emer~ency  men 
---------·-
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f) 
- ----------- -~-------------r----
Borinnge  4  4  15  19  193 
··-· ----·---- ~--·- ·-
Centre  4  3  16  19  167 
-- ----------- -· 
Charleroi  4  4  14  18  309 
~------- ···--· . - ------···  --
Liege  4  3  32  35  290 
1--------------·---- __  ... _  -------------- ·-- --- ----------~----
Beeringen  3  - - - 57 
·-----
Eisden  3  - - - 56 
--- ------------- --
Zo1der  3  - - - 67 
--------- --
Houthalen  3  - - - 75 
-
Waterschei  3  - - - 72 
----------
Winters  lag  3  - - - 48 
Zwart  berg  3  - - - 61 
Co-ordination  5  Centre  - - - -
Belgium  42  14  77  91  1.395 
N.B.  These  figures  do  not  include supervisory  personnel  trained in rescue work. ~t national level,  there is also a  National  Rescue Stations Co-ordination 
Centre which  is required: 
1.  to conduct,  financially support and promote studies,  r~search and experi-
ments  of all kinds  connected with mine  rescue work  and accident  prevention, 
and disseminate  the results; 
2.  to co-ordinate the work  of  the different Rescue Stations in material,  tech-
nical and medical respects,  and organize relations with all authorities, 
institutions and bodies  (public and private)  whose  co-operation is needed 
in an emergency; 
3.  to give active assistance in any  emergency; 
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4.  to secure  a.nd  furnish all requisite services and to buy,  sell,  transfer,  hire 
or let all fixed and movable  property  necessary  to its object; 
5.  to act on  behalf of  the Belgian Rescue Stations collectively  in dealings 
with all regional,  national  and  international authorities and institutions, 
and  to co-operate with  them. 
3.  FRANCE 
The  French collieries in  ~he different coalfiels are grouped  in nine Divi-
sions  (houilleres),  which  have  full  technical and  financial  independence.  In 
addition,  there are  a  number  of small non-nationalized mines,  which  are  thus 
independent  altogether. 
Rescue  arrangements  hence  vary  a  good deal:  in  the Centre/Midi  in particu-
lar they differ substantially according to the size and dispersedness of  the 
coalfield.  The  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  and Lorraine Divisions and  the  three Centre/ 
Midi Divisions whose  operations are geographically co-ordinated have  each  a 
Central Rescue Station,  while  the  remaining  four  Centre/Midi Divisions  have 
only  local rescue posts.  The  following  particulars therefore apply only  to the 
first five  Groups;  omitted are: 
1.  the Aquitaine coalfield with  5  sub-posts,  each with  20-40 rescue men; 
2.  the  Provence coalfield with 4  posts,  each with  12-15  rescue men; 
3.  the Auvergne  coalfield with 5  posts,  each with  12-40 rescue men; 
4.  the Dauphine coalfield with  1  post. 
The  enactments  in force  concerning rescue posts are: 
the  "Code  Minier"  (Mines  Code),  Articles 87-90; 
the Decree  of  May  4,  1951  (General Regulations),  Articles  320-323; 
the Order  of  May  29,  1929,  as  amended  by  the Order of August  19,  1936; 
the Circular of August  19,  1936,  accompanying  the Order of  the same  date; 
any  Departmental Orders. 
As  a  rule there is one  rescue  post  per pit. There are  no  full-time rescue 
men  a.t  the colliery rescue posts,  except  in the case of Lorraine. 12 
Nord/Pas- Lorraine  c  E  N T  R  E  - M I  D I 
de-Calais 
Loire  Cevennes  Blanzy 
a)  Central Rescue  Lens  Merle  bach  St.  Etienne  La Grand'  Montceau-
Station  Combe  les-Mines 
b)  Station officials  4  6  2  2  2 
-
c)  Permanent  rescue 
men  immediately  0  12  0  0  0  available  in 
emergency 
d)  C.R.S.  rescue  men  38  0  20  54  44 
e)  Colliery rescue  704  +  men  618  230  150  80 
f)  Total,  rescue  men  742  630  250  204  124 
g)  Total underground 
personnel  employed  80078  24294  7910  7690  5444 
a.t  Jan.  1,  1960 
h)  Rescue  men  per 
•ooo  underground  9,2  25,9  31,6  26,5  22,7 
workers 
--·--·----·-- ------------ -··· ---·--·--
i)  Sub-posts  64  7  8  9  3 
+)  These  figures  do  not  include supervisory  personnel  trained in rescue  work. 
The  rescue  men  are all workmen  or supervisory personnel  employed at  the 
colliery.  They  are supposed  to be distributed proportionately over  the  three 
shifts. 
The  Central Rescue Stations  have  one  or more  full-time mechanics  employed 
on  the maintenance  of rescue  equipment,  and  a  Sta.tion head. 
There  is a  specia.l  team  for  burn cases  in Paris to co-ordinate  the  treat-
ment  and if necessary  the  transport  of burns  victims  in  the event  of major 
group accidents;  it is in direct contact with  the Air  Force  to ensure  their 
speedy evacuation. 
4.  NETHERLANDS 
The  Limburg collieries have  no Central Rescue  Station:  each has  its own 
rescue service,  so that the total for  the coalfield is 12,  which  come,  for 
the purposes of co-ordination,  under  the national Commission  of Safety Engi-
neers. In addition to the rescue  and  firefighting equipment available for  each 
mine's  rescue service,  the most  centrally-located colliery,  Oranje-Nassau Mijn 
I,  at Heerlen,  is· shortly to be  provided with  a  stock of material,  for  the 
erection of fire-stoppings,  which will  come  for  administ~ative purposes  under 
the  Commission  of Safety Engineers  and will be  permanently at  the disposal of 
all collieries. 
All  rescue men  are volunteers.  They  number  669,  as  against  a  total of 
30,179  underground workers,  giving  a  proportion of  22  per  thousand. 
The  enactments  governing rescue arrangements  are 
a.)  the  "Mijnreglement"  (Mines  Regulations)  of  1939,  Articles  172-173; 
b)  Directives Nos.  62-64  and  84-87 of the  Inspector-General of Mines. 
5.  ITALY 
The  Sulcis  (Carbonia)  coalfield has  no  central rescue organization.  There 
are  in all 68  trained,  non-permanent  rescue men,  as  against  2,560  underground 
workers,  giving  a  proportion of  26.6  per  thousand. 
B.  TRAINING  AND  PRACTICE 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
a)  Minimum  age:  usually  21 
b)  Maximum  age:  45;  for  the  heads  of  the Essen  and  Saar Stations,  50. 
c)  Minimum  service below  ground:  1  year;  in the Saar,  3  years. 
d)  Medical  examinations:  every  three years;  at Claustha.l  and  in the Saar, 
every  2  years. 
e)  Practices per  annum: 
Theory: 
Briga.de  leader 
Team  lea.der 
Rescue  man 
Maintenance  man 
2;  in the  Saar,  1. 
Smoke  chamber: 
Brigade  leader 
Team  leader 
Rescue  man 
Maintenance  ma.n  (if fit) 
Underground: 
Brigade  leader 
Team  leader 
Rescue  man 
Maintenance  man  (if fit) 
2.  BELGIUM 
a.)  Minimum  a.ge:  21 
b)  Maximum  age:  45 
4. 
Aachen,  Essen and Hohenpeissenberg,  1; 
Clausthal  2;  Saar  3. 
c)  Minimum  service below  ground:  3  years 
d)  Medical  exa.minations:  once  a  year,  and  a.fter  any  prolonged illness or 
serious  injury 
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e)  Practices per  annum:  Theory  Smoke  chamber  Underground 
Brigade  leader  20  12  8 
Team  leader  20  12  8 
Permanent  rescue man  20  12  8 
Rescue  man  8  4  4 
Maintenance  man  1 
Each  theory session  takes  place  on  the  same  day  as  a  practice  in  the  smoke 
chamber  or  underground. 
3.  FRANCE 
The  French  industry bas  no  standard nation-wide  system:  the  arrangements 
for each of  the  five Central  Rescue  Stations are  thus  given separately. 
1)  Lens 
a)  Minimum  age:  not specified. 
b)  Maximum  age:  not  specified;  employment  as  a  1·escue  man  is terminated as 
and  when  the medical  officer recommends. 
c)  Minimum  service below  ground:  not  specified. 
d)  Medical  examinations:  once  a  year  and after any  illness. 
e)  Practices per  annum: 
Rescue  post  personnel: 
- Brigade  leader 
- Team  leader 
- Rescue  man 
- Maintenance  man 
Central Rescue Station 
personnel 
Theory 
6 
6 
6 
2 
12 
Smoke  chamber 
2 
2 
2 
12 
There are  two  maintenance  men  on  full-time  duty. 
2)  Merlebach 
a)  Minianum  age:  21 
Underground 
4 
4 
4 
b)  Maximum  age:  40-45,  according  to medical  officer's recommendation. 
3) 
c)  Minimum  service below  ground:  3  years. 
d)  Medical  examinations:  once  a  year. 
e)  Practices  per  annum:  Theory  Smoke 
Brigade  leader  8 
Team  leader  8 
Rescue  man  8 
Maintenance  man  8 
There  are  two  maintenance  men  on  full-time  duty. 
St.  Etienne 
a.)  Minimum  age:  not specified. 
b)  Maximum  age:  not specified. 
c)  Minimum  service below  ground:  not specified. 
chamber  Underground 
4  4 
4  4 
4  4 
No  fixed  number 4) 
d)  Medical  examinations:  once  a  year  and after ·any 
e)  Practices per  annum:  Theory  Smoke 
Brigade  leader  4 
Team  lea.der  4 
Rescue  man  4 
Maintenance  ma.n  4 
C.R.S.  rescue  ma.n  8 
There  are  two  ma.i n tena.nce  men  on  full-time duty. 
La.  Grand'  Combe 
a.)  Minimum  age:  22. 
b)  Maximum  a.ge:  45. 
c)  Minimum  service  below  ground:  not  specified. 
d)  Medical  examinations:  every  three years. 
e)  Practices per  annum: 
Brigade  leader 
Team  leader 
Rescue  man 
Ma.intenance  ma.n 
C.R.S.  rescue  man 
Theory 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
Smoke 
5)  Montceau-les-Mines 
a)  Minimum  age:  not specified. 
b)  Maximum  age:  not specified. 
c)  Minimum  service below  ground:  not specified. 
d)  Medical  examina.tions:  once  a  year. 
e)  Practices  per  annum:  Theory  Smoke 
Brigade  leader  1 
Team  leader  1 
Rescue·man  1 
Maintenance  man  2 
There  is one maintenance  man  on  full-time  duty. 
4.  NETHERLANDS 
a)  Minimum  age:  not statutorily fixed;  usually  23. 
b)  Maximum  age:  not  statutorily fixed;  usually 45. 
illness. 
chamber  Underground 
4 
4 
8 
chamber  Underground 
4  Not  specified 
4  " 
4 
II 
4 
II 
4  " 
chamber  Underground 
1  1 
1  1 
1  1 
c)  Minimum  service below  ground:  not  statutorily fixed;  usually about  3  years. 
d)  Medical  examination:  on  joining the  rescue corps  and  thereafter once  a  year. 
e)  Practices per  a.nnum:  sta.tutory minimum  5  (3  underground  and  2  in the  smoke 
chamber);  various additional  theory  and  practical trai-
ning sessions are held as  need arises. 
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5.  ITALY 
a.)  Minimum  age:  24. 
b)  Maximum  age:  50. 
c)  Minimum  service below  ground:  not  specified. 
d)  Medical  examinations:  once  a  year. 
e)  Practices  per  annum: 
Brigade  leader 
Team  leader 
Rescue  man 
Maintenance  man 
Theory 
12 
12 
12 
12 
Smoke  chamber  Underground 
12 
12 
12 
12 
In addition,  all colliery managers,  under-managers,  overmen  and deputies 
(221  in all)  attend the practices of  the safety service  for  1-2 months. 
C.  ORGANIZATION  OF  RESCUE  OPERATIONS 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
a.)  Alarm 
By  whom  given 
Colliery-mana.ger,  under-manager  or his  nominee 
To  whom  given  and  in what  order 
No  prescribed order.  Master  rescue  plan  indicates all services  to be  aler-
ted for  immediate  and  subsequent  co-operation  in  the event  of  a  major  acci-
dent.  Central Rescue  Station must  in  any  case  be  alerted forthwith. 
How  given 
Individual verbal warning messages  by  runner or dispatch-rider,  distribu-
tion of  emergency  warning cards;  Aachen  and  Essen are also equipped with 
v. h. f.  radio-communication  a.nd  telephone,  teleprinter a.nd  electric signal-
ling links. 
b)  Direction of  rescue operations 
Under  Article 205,1 of  the  Mines  Act,  responsibility  for  rescue operations 
lies  in all cases with  the Divisional  Inspector.  The  colliery manager,  or 
fa.iling  him  the  under-manager  or senior officia.l present,  deputizes  for  him 
until his arrival. 
c)  Action  by  rescue  personnel 
~!!:~~~!~-~!_!~~!!! 
Rescue  teams  consist of  a  team  leader  (of supervisory  grade)  and  four  res-
cue  men  under  him.  In  principle action can  be  taken  only  by  the full  team; 
sma.ller  teams  of  a.  leader and  two  men  are  allowed  to operate only  where  the 
circumstances  are  known,  the distances  inconsiderable and  the conditions 
ea.sy. 
Relief  team 
Teams  must  not  act unless  a.  relief  tea.m  equipped with  respirators is either 
on  the spot  or directly  on  its way  to the standby  base. 
~!~·~~~~-~~·~~ 
Where  operations  have  to  be  conducted underground,  a  standby  base must  be 
installed at a  safe place  a.s  close as  possible to the scene of action;  a.t this  the relief  team wa.i ts and spare  equipment  a.nd  reviving  a.ppa.ra.tus  a.re 
held  in rea.diness,  with  a.  maintenance  man  to ma.ke  used  a.ppliances  promptly 
available for  further  use. 
2.  BELGIUM 
a.)  Alarm 
~l_!~~~-~!~~~ 
Whoever  observes  a.n  accident  notifies his superior,  who  in his  turn alerts 
the Central Rescue  Station and  the  Colli~ry manager  or his nominee;  the 
latter ha.s  action  ta.ken  in accordance with  the  general  instructions posted 
up  in all collieries. 
!~-!~~~-~!~~~-!~~-!~-!~!~-~!~~! 
Stage  1  to  the Central Rescue  Station serving the colliery; 
stage  2 
stage  3 
!!~!-~!~~~ 
to  the  next nearest Central Rescue Station; 
to Central  Rescue  Stations farther  away,  in order  of distance. 
By  telephone:  all collieries ha.ve  a.n  internal  telephone  system  (underground 
and surface),  and  several  lines  to  the  public system.  Rescue  workers  are 
alerted by  telephone,  siren,  messenger,  driver,  dispatch-rider,  etc. 
b)  Direction of  rescue operation 
Rescue  operations  are directed by  the  Inspector of Mines;  until his arrival, 
by  the Colliery Manager. 
c)  Action  by  rescue  personnel 
Rescue  teams  consist of  a.  team  lea.der  and  four  men  under  him,  usua.lly  a.ccom-
pa.nied  by  an  engineer. 
The  first  team  cannot start work until  the second  has  been alerted. 
Whenever  possible,  a.  standby  ba.se  is installed below  ground,  usually with 
servicing facilities  for  respirators.  Every  eight hours,  i.e. after being 
used  three  times,  respirators are sent  to the surface for  thorough  testing, 
cleaning and disinfection.  Each  rescue  man  has  his  own  mouthpiece,  reser-
ved  for  his  personal  use. 
3.  FRANCE 
a)  Alarm 
~l_!~~~-~!~~~ 
By  the colliery concerned. 
!~-!~~~-~!~~~-~~~-!~-!~~~-~!~~! 
May  be  given only within  the colliery or  to  the Central  Rescue  Station, 
according to  the seriousness  of  the occurrence. 
!!~!-~!!~~ 
By  various  means  depending  on  local conditions:  messenger,  telephone,  siren, 
electric signalling to  homes. 
b)  Direction of  rescue operations 
The Colliery Manager  ta.kes  charge until a  representa.tive of  the  Mines  In-
spectora.te  a.rrives;  the latter may  then  take  over if he wishes.  In  the ab-
sence  of  the Colliery Manager,  the senior underground engineer present de-
putizes  for  him. 
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c)  Action py  rescue personnel 
~!~~~~!~-~!_!~!~ 
4  men  and  a  team  leader,  who  is usually  a  deputy. 
Relief  team 
There  is ordinarily one  relief  team standing by  for  each  team  in action. 
Sometimes,  however,  if there are more  than  three  teams  in action,  only  two 
relief  teams  are maintained,  e.g.  one  in the  intake  and  one  in the return 
airway. 
~!!~~!?~_!?!~~ 
Not  always  provided.  If  found  necessary,  a  base is installed with  a  relief 
team,  rescue equipment  a.nd  spare parts,  a  telephone,  a  first-aid man,  a. 
maintenance-man,  and so on. 
4.  NETHERLANDS 
a)  Alarm 
Given  on  the  instructions of  the Colliery Ma.nager  or his nominee,  by  siren, 
telephone,  messenger,  alarm bells in homes,  radio calls. 
b)  Direction of rescue operations 
The Colliery Manager  or his  nominee  takes  ~ontrol, with  the agreement  of 
the Mines  Inspectorate. 
c)  Strength of  rescue  teams 
5-6  men. 
5.  ITALY 
a)  Alarm 
~~-!~~~-~!~~~ 
The  colliery concerned. 
!~-!~~~-~!~~~-!~~-!~-!~!!_~~~~~ 
No  special provisions. 
!!~!-~!~~~ 
By  telephone.  The collieries have  an  underground  telephone system connected 
to  the surface and  to other collieries in the  area. 
b)  Direction of rescue operations 
Rescue  operations are directed by  the Colliery Manager,  sometimes  together 
with  the Divisional  Inspector of Mines.  Before his arrival,  the under-mana-
ger  takes charge. 
D.  MUTUAL  ASSISTANCE  IN  MAJOR  EMERGENCIES 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
A master  rescue plan laying down  mutual-assistance arrangements exists at 
each Central Rescue  Station.  The  collieries have  underta.ken  to give one 
another all help required. 
The Central Rescue  Stations  a.re  notified of  any  rescue operation involving 
the  use  of breathing a.ppara  tus. 2.  BELGIUM 
Mutual-assist~nce arrangements  are defined in each colliery's own  regula-
tions,  and  co-ordinated by  the National  Rescue Stations Co-ordination Centre. 
In  the first stage,  the colliery alerts the Central  Rescue  Station to which 
it is affiliated,  or  in the case  of  the Campine,  the colliery's own  rescue sta-
tion and,  a.t  the  same  time,  the Coordinatiecentrum Reddingswezen;  in  the second 
stage,  notification also  goes  to the  next  nearest Station,  and  in the third to 
Stations  farther  away,  in order of distance. 
3.  FRANCE 
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In  the Nord/Pas-de-Calais  the Central Rescue  Station at  Lens  and  the various 
rescue posts have  a  mutual-assistance plan.  The  Merlebach Station and  the Lor-
raine rescue posts  have similar arrangements,  and  there is also a  mutua.l-assis-
tance  agreement  between  the Lorraine  and Saar coalfields. 
In  the Centre/Midi  neighbouring rescue posts may  be  alerted if need  be, 
starting with  the nearest at hand. 
4.  NETHERLANDS 
Any  colliery at which  a  major  accident  has  occured can  a.sk  any  or all the 
rest for  assistance. 
5.  ITALY 
Arrangements  exist  for  the Sulcis collieries to  aid one  another  in case of 
need. 
E.  STOCKS  OF  SELF-CONTAINED  OXYGEN  RESPIRATORS  GIVING  PROTECTION  FOR  TWO  HOURS  AND 
LONGER 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Two-hour  protec- Aachen  Essen  Clausthal- Hoben- Saar  Total  tion  Zellerfeld  peissenberg 
Drager  1924  4  - - 5  - 9 
Drager  160  4  - - 6  - 10 
Drii.ger  160A  194  1555  383  98  295  2525 
Auer  MR  11/32  58  214  - - - 272 
Sub-total  260  1769  383  109  295  2816 
Longer  protection 
Drager  170/400  22  758  27  40  - 847 
Drager  172  1  258  36  - - 295 
Auer  MR  54/400  1  66  - - - 67 
Auer  MR  56/400  5  35  - - - 40 
Sub-total  29  1117  63  40  - 1249 
Grand total  289  2886  446  149  295  4065 
Per  '000 under-
ground workers  12,4  11,1  19,8  15,4  7,8  11,5 
1--- -------·------ ------·-----'-· 20 
2.  BELGIUM 
Two-hour  protection 
~!:!i~!:_!~Q-~ 
Borinage 
Centre 
26 
20 
Charleroi-Namur  • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • . .  11 
Liege 
Campine 
Aerenchon  : 
Borinage 
Campine 
Per  '000 underground workers 
Longer  protection 
E!:!i!!:_!72~~2Q : 
Borinage 
Centre 
Sub-total 
Sub-total 
Grand  total 
1.83 
24 
84 
2 
2 
8 
6 
Charleroi-Namur  •.••••.••..•••..••.•••••  ,'·  • • • • • • • •  24 
Liege 
Campine 
Borinage 
Centre 
Sub-tota.l 
Charleroi-Namur  .................................  . 
Liege 
Campine 
Per  '000 underground workers  1.24 
Sub-total 
Grand  total 
6 
40 
4 
2 
8 
16 
165 
4 
169 
84 
30 
114 21 
3.  FRANCE 
a.)  Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Fenzy  56  (2  1/2 h.)  384  (incl.  20 at C.R.S.,  Lens); 
per  •ooo  underground workers,  4.5 
b)  Lorraine 
Fenzy  56  (2  1/2 h.)  38;  per  '000 underground workers,  1.52 
Drager  160A  (2 h.)  142;  per  '000 underground workers,  5.68 
Total  180;  per  '000 underground workers,  7.20 
c)  Loire 
Fenzy  56  (2  l/2 h)  66;  per  '000 underground workers,  7.7 
d)  Cevennes 
Fenzy  22  (2  l/2 h.)  27;  per  '000 underground workers,  3,5 
Fenzy  47  (2  1/2 h.)  13;  per  '000 underground workers,  1,6 
Fenzy  56  (2  l/2 h.)  53;  per  '000 underground workers,  6,9 
Total  93;  per  '000 underground workers,  12,0 
e)  Bla.nzy 
Fenzy  56  (2  1/2 h)  18;  per  '000 underground workers,  3.75 
4.  NETHERLANDS 
Two-hour  erotection 
Driiger  BG  160A  150 
Auer  MR  32  20 
Total  170;  per  '000 underground workers,  5.6 
Longer  protection  : 
Drager  BG  172  32 
Auer  MR  54/400  25 
Total  57;  per  '000 underground workers,  1.9 
5.  ITALY 
Two-hour  protection 
Drilger  BG  160  73;  per  •ooo  underground workers,  28.5 
Auer  MR  II  27;  per  '000 underground workers,  10.5 
Tota.l  100;  per  '000 underground workers,  39.0 
Longer  protection  : 
Dra.ger  170/400  13;  per  '000 underground workers,  5.1 22 
F.  OTHER  EQUIPMENT 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
a)  CO  recorders 
10  in  the  Ruhr. 
b)  CH4  recorders 
2  Mono  CH4  recorders  a.t  the Essen C.R.S.,  95  at va.rious  Ruhr collieries, 
1  in the  saar:  total,  98. 
c)  Materials  for  the erection of  fire-stoppings 
Collieries have materials available for  emergency  use,  e.g.  sandbags,  fire-
stopping cushions,  air-sampling  tubes  and steel doors.  Some  enterprises 
have  central stores  for  their collieries,  with  large quantities of fire-
fighting materials;  so also have  the Central  Rescue  Stations.  The  Essen  and 
Sa.a.r  Stations  ha.ve  30-40,000 sandbags,  5 ,000  kg.  Si llan rock wool,  steel 
doors  and  air-sampling pipes  for stoppings,  pumps  oi various kinds,  cement-
guns  and  cement  mixers,  etc. 
d)  Mobile  laboratories 
The  Essen  and  Saar  Stations each  have  a  mobile  laboratory equipped  to ana-
lyse mine  gases  and  fumes  on  the spot  in  the pits.  The  Essen  laboratory  has 
an Orsat apparatus  for  analysing carbon dioxide,  oxygen,  methane,  hydrogen 
and  nitrogen,  a  W3sthoff  CO  recorder  and  a  Maihak  CH4  recorder,  together 
with  equipment  for  analysing fire  fumes. 
e)  Motor  transport  for  personnel  and  equipment 
Each  colliery's own  fleet  of  vehicles  can  be  used  for  transporting  the res-
cue  personnel  and equipment.  The  Saar Central Rescue  Station,  and  the  three 
perma.nent  rescue  brigades  and several collieries in  the Ruhr,  have special 
vehicles of  their own  for  this  purpose,  and  the Essen Station has  a  special 
van  for  its mobile  laboratory.  All  the Central Rescue  Stations have  cars 
or station wagons  for  ca.rrying  personnel  and  equipment. 
2.  BELGIUM 
See  table  following. 
3.  FRANCE 
Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
The Division has  no  CO  or  CH4  recorders. 
~g~!~~~~!-~~~-~~!~~!~!~-~~~~~~~~l-!~~-!~~-~~~~!!~~-~!-!!~~=~!~~~!~~~ 
Sandbags 
Rock-wool  cushions  (1  m x  50  em  x  25  em) 
Cocoon  spra.yers 
Cement-guns 
Slurry  pumps 
Mobile  laboratories 
Permanent  laboratories 
Motor-cars  for  personnel  and equipment  : 
23,000 
200 
11 
7 
9 
none 
8 
Each colliery Group  has  a  sufficient number  of vehicles  to enable rescue 
workers  and  equipment  to be  moved  quickly.  The  Central Rescue Station ha.s 
vehicles  to carry  16  rescue  men  with full equipment  and  2  ma.intena.nce  men 
with all they  need  for  testing and servicing the rescue appliances.  Should 
it be  necessary,  each  Group  is required to put  any  vehicle asked  for at  the 
disposal of  the Central Rescue  Station. Lorraine 
The  Division possesses  one  Mono  CH4  recorder,  but  no  CO  recorder, 
Materials  for  stoppings:  6,000 sandbags,  glass wool,  cocoon sprayer,  iso-foam. 
A mobile  laboratory is in process of being fitted out,  Two  cars are  provided 
for  transporting personnel  and  equipment. 
Loire 
The  Division has  no  gas  recorders.  Materials  for  ~toppings: 5,000 sandbags, 
1  cocooner,  12  Projex slurry pumps  and one  cement-gun.  A car is regularly avai-
lable  for  carrying personnel  and  equipment. 
Cevennes 
6,000 sandbags  for  erection of stoppings:  1  car for  transporting personnel  and 
equipment. 
Blanzy 
Materials  for  stoppings:  sandbags,  a  cocoon sprayer and  12  slurry pumps. 
The  transport service provides  the vehicles  needed  for  moving personnel and 
equipment. 
4.  NETHERLANDS 
a)  CO  recorders  :  none. 
b)  CH4  recorders  :  10,  at the State Mines. 
c)  Materials  for  stoppings  :  each colliery has  cushions  for  two  stoppings,  and 
sand  for  bagging.  There  is a  central store containing,  for  the use of all 
collieries,  the  equipment  and materials  for  stoppings  listed in the Section 
following,  which  is dispatched  immediately  to  the colliery concerned on  the 
outbreak of  fire.  · 
d)  Mobile  laboratory  :  the  State Mines  central  laboratory holds  the  necessary  a 
unalysis apparatus at  the collieries'disposal;  in the event of fire  this is 
sent at once  to  the colliery concerned,  together with the appropriate per-
sonnel. 
e)  Transport  of personnel  and  equipment  :  each colliery has  a  sufficient  num-
ber  of cars and  lorries. 
5.  ITALY 
The  Sulcis coalfield has  two  mobile  laboratories and  a  stock of sandbags, 
steel doors,  etc.,  for  erecting stoppings.  The  vehicles  for  moving  the person-
nel  and  equipment  are supplied by  the  transport service. 
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F.  Other  equipment  Borinage  Centre  '  Charleroi- Liege  Campine  Total  I  I 
! 
Namur 
I 
CO  recorders  - I  - - - - -
CH4  recorders  -
I 
- - - 2  2 
Mobile  laboratories  2  2  2  2  I  9  17 
I 
co  detectors  4  3  4  1  I 
30  42 
I 
02  indica.tors  -
I 
2  - -
I 
8  10 
Methanometers  1  2  1  2  32  38 
Anemometers  1 
I 
1  1  1  10  14  ! 
Hygrometers  3  2  1  4 
I 
58  I 
48 
Reviving apparatus  1  4  7  4  12  28 
Materials  for  stoppings 
I  I 
Glass-wool  cushions  371  200  125  2.070  2.766  -
Inflata.ble brattice-cloth ba.lloons  30  - 19  - - 49 
Jute bags  10.000  5.055  5.037  6.500  33.732  60.324 
Ba.gging  machines  1  1  - 1  2  5 
Stone-dust  injectors  1  1  1  1  4  8 
Cement-guns  - - - 1  71  2 
Air-sampling pipes  17,5  m  11  m  25  m  14,4 m  72  m  139,9 m 
Grouting machines  - - - 1  2  3 
Cars  for  transporting 
personnel  and  equipment  3  ....  4  2  8  19  ..:.. SECTION  II  :  PREPARATORY  MEASURES  FOR  SERIOUS  CASES 
---------- ---------------------------------------
A.  EQUIPEMENT  AND  MATERIALS  TO  BE  HELD  IN  READINESS  UNDER  EXISTING  REGULATIONS 
{1li!:!her_!~ Y=v-----------------------------------------------
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY  --------------------------
The  Directives of  March  23,  1951,  concerning fire  prevention and  firefigh-
ting at collieries in  the  Dortmund  Division  provide  on  page  16  (II:  Stoppings,  1: 
Preparatory  Measures,  c)  as  follows: 
"At  each colliery  there  must  be  sufficient matet·ial  for  the erection of 
stoppings  and  seals,  e.g.  sandbags  and  dry  sand for  filling them,  stone 
dust  in  bags,  rock  or glass wool,  bricks and  cement.  The  amounts of  these 
and  the  points at  which  they are  stored must  be  indicated on  the  firefigh-
ting plan  (see Part  Two,  Section  II,  p.  22);  the  amounts must  be  determi-
ned  in  proportion  to  the  fire  hazard at  the  pit concerned.''  (They  natu-
rally also depend  on  the  size of  the pit.) 
The  Directives continue  on  the  page  22  referred  to  (Part  Two,  II:  Under-
ground  Fire Plan,  1-2): 
''1)  Each colliery must  have  an  Underground  Fire Plan,  forming  part  of its 
general  plan  of operations  (Article 250  of  the  Mines  Regulations). 
"2)  The  Underground  Fire  plan  must  give  particulat·s of  the  general  measures 
to be  taken  under  the  provisions referred  to.  It  must  also list all 
special measures  necessitated  by  conditions at  the pit concerned." 
Stores of material  for  stoppings  have  thus  to  be  shown  in  the  underground 
fire  plan;  they  may  be  established both  above  and  below  ground. 
Concerning actual  firefighting material  and  equipment to  be  kept  below 
ground,  the  Directives provide: 
- Sa~! 
"C.  Firefighting 
1°- Facilities 
e)  Fire posts  and  fire  fighting cars  : 
At  each  main  level  a  Fire Post  must  be  installed at a  suitable 
point close  to  a  main  shaft; at this must  be  kept  sufficient 
supplies of  items  of firefighting equipment  and  tools,  tapping 
appliances for water mains,  hoses  high-pressure jet nozzles, 
hose  couplings,  grappling-hooks,  and  mine  fire-extinguishers. 
Sub-posts  should also be  installed as  may  be  deemed  necessary 
or useful  in  individual districts. 
In or  near the Fire Posts a  fire-fighting car must  be  kept, 
with  the  items  necessary  for  firefighting  (in particular tools, 
spanners  and  wrenches,  bolts and screws,  packing,  etc.).  The 
fire-fighting car must  have sufficient space  to carry  the  tap-
ping appliance,  hoses  and  high-pressure jet nozzles kept at  the 
Fire Post.  Care  must  be  taken  to ensure  that  the fire-fighting 
car can be  brought at any  time as  rapidly as possible to  the 
scene of action." 
The  official regulations as  to equipment  storage,  fire  plans and  fire posts are 
the  same  as  those  for  the  Federal Republic.  The  Directives of  June  19,  1957,  con-
cerning fire  prevention and  firefighting at collieries in  the SaarbrUcken  Division, 
lay  down  in  Annex  3  the equipment  and  material  to  be  stored,  Sections  I  and  II lis-
ting the  items  to be  kept at fire posts and  sub-posts  below  ground  and  Section  III 
those at  the  surface. 
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These  are:  extinguishers,  fittings and appliances  for extinction with water, 
and materials  for  emergency  stone-dust barriers,  for  partitions,  and  for  forward  fire 
dams,  stoppings and  seals. 
2.  BELGIUM  ----
The  equipment  and materials  to  be  held  in  readiness  for  firefighting  purposes 
is prescribed  in the  Royal  Decree  of  November  3,  1958:  it comprises all items  ne-
cessary both  for  direct  and  for  indirect action. 
These  are  as  follows: 
- Direct action 
a)  Fire extinguishers; 
b)  sand  or equivalent  pulverulent matter; 
c)  a  system of water mains  with an  adequate  number  of  hydratant  points,  espe-
cially at all points liable  to outbreaks  of  fire; 
d)  rubber  hoses  and  high-pressure jet nozzles; 
e)  stocks of  other equipment  (picks,  axes,  spades,  drilling and  tapping  tools 
etc  ••• ). 
- Indirect  action 
All  material  needed  for  building stoppings (glass-wool  cushions,  sandbags, 
sand,  bricks,  walling,  blocks,  cement,  piping  for  air-sampling  pipes, 
covers etc. ) 
The  equipment  for  direct action must  be  stored  below  ground,  that  for  indirect 
action at  a  convenient  place  from  which  it can  be  moved  quickly  to  the  point  where 
it is to be  used  (in practice,  part  is kept  below  ground  and  the  rest at  the surface 
near  the  shafts). 
N.B.  In  the  Campine,  the  Mines  Inspectorate  requires special  firefighting arrange-
ments  to  be  made. 
3.  FRANCE 
- ~~rdLPas-~~-Calais 
In addition  to  the  firefighting equipment  kept  at specified points and  the 
water  mains  extending  up  to  the  workings,  there are: 
- 5-10 fire extinguishers at  the  landings  in  the  intake airways; 
- in each district or  group  of districts,  acco~ding to  their size and  fire 
hazard  a  stock of equipment  including 
- flexible  hoses at  least as  long as  the  permitted  distance  between  hydrants  in 
the  district, 
- a  high  pressure  jet nozzle, 
- a  coupling  for  connecting  a  flexible  hose  to a  standard  pipe  joint, 
-the spanners,  joints,  bolts,  etc.,  needed  for  connecting couplings  to hoses 
and  pipes; 
- at  the air-intake  landings of  the  winding shafts,  or at a  point situated cen-
trally in  relation  to  the  workings  and  in  the  air-intake  one  or  more  mine-cars with  fire-fighting equipment  always  in readiness  for  movement  to any  point  along 
a  haulage  road. 
Each  subsidiary rescue  post  has at  least  four  closed-circuit-respirators and 
enough  in reserve  to enable  a  first exploration  team  to operate  unaided  for  five 
hours. 
Each Colliery Group  has  a  central equipment  store with: 
1.  spare  parts  for  respirators; 
2.  various appliances  and  items  of  rescue  equipment  for  the  use  of subsidiary 
rescue  posts if required. 
The  Central  Rescue  Station  has  50  CO  filter appliances with refills,  and 
other equipment  of various kinds. 
- Lorraine  : 
Not  described  in  this and  following  Sections,  as at the  time  of writing  the 
Central  Rescue  Station was  undergoin~ reorganization. 
- Loire  : 
At  the  surface,  stpcks at  the  central store  include: 
a)  piping,  pipe  fittings,  collars,clips and  hangers,  taps,  joints; 
b)  rubber  hoses; 
c)  lining and  infilling materials  for  stoppings  and  seals. 
At  the  top of each pit's downcast  shaft,  fire-extinguishers. 
Below  ground  at each pit; 
a)  equipment  for  adapting  40  mm.  and  60  mm.  piping  (pipe  fittings,  collars,  clips 
and  hangers,  taps,  joints,  etc.); 
b)  rubber  hoses; 
c)  lining equipment  and  materials  for  stoppings  and  seals  (support  canvas,  pegs, 
staples,  wire,etc. 
Above  ground  at each  pit  (top of  downcast  shaft),  fire-extinguishers  and  un• 
filled sandbags. 
4.  ITALY 
Under  the  existing regulations,  the  following  firefighting equipment  must  be 
kept  in  readiness 
1)  Surface 
Asbestos suits,  rev~v~ng apparatus,  ladders,  ropes  and  other  rescue  equipment, 
brattice cloths and air pipes. 
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2)  !!!!~~!:i!:~~!!~ 
Water  laid on  under  pressure for  fire-fighting,  with  hoses  and  standard hydrant 
points;  fireproof  doors to isolate fire zones;  where  there are no water mains, 
sandbags  and  fire-extinguishers. 
5 •  NETHERLANDS 
Under  the  Mines  Regulations  of  1939,  adequate stocks of rescue equipment  must 
be  kept  available above  ground. 
In accordance with the arrangements  for co-ordinated rescue services  in the 
Limburg coalfield,  the colliery managements  have  laid down  that 
a)  each pit  must  have,  inter alia, 
- fully-equipped fire-fighting cars, 
- high-pressure jet nozzles,  spray  nozzles,  foam  blowers  and  foams, 
- movable  stone-dust  barriers, 
- sample containers, 
- Drager  CO  recorders  and self-rescuers, 
- fireproof  clothing, 
- sampling tubes, 
- matting,  glass wool,  sand and clay for  emergency  stoppings; 
b)  a  central store serving all the collieries must  have,  inter alia, 
- air-sampling tubes  for  stoppings, 
- plastic air ducts  and compressed-air fans, 
- cement-mixers  and  cement-pumps, 
- shale injectors and  cement-guns, 
- handling and transport  intallations. 
B.  SCHEDULE  OF  PERSONS  TO  BE  ALERTED  UNDER  EXISTING  REGULATIONS  (further to l,C/D) 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
The  following  procedure is laid down  in the official Special Instructions 
to Colliery Managements  for  Major  Emergencies. 
"A.  Immediate measures 
1.  Alarm 
Immediately  a  mine  accident  on whatever  scale is reported,  the  following 
must  be  alerted or notified in accordance with the alarm schedule set  forth 
in the colliery rescue  plan 
a)  the colliery's own  rescue corps; 
b)  the colliery manager  and the colliery undergroundmanager; c)  the colliery personnel mentioned under  B,3 
(B.  Direction of  rescue  operations 
3.  The  following  must  be  available to assist the direction of the rescue 
operations  : 
a)  the ventilation deputy,  with his ventilation log-books,  the  venti~ 
lation plan,  and his recording instruments; 
b)  the fire deputy,  with the firefighting plan; 
c)  the surveyor,  with all the plans of  the mine; 
d)  a  responsible official of  the underground mechanical-engineering 
staff,  with all the plans of  the mains-network; 
e)  the surface-installations manager,  and if necessary  the chief 
engineer; 
f)  the security officer; 
g)  the colliery medical  officer; 
h)  the chief safety officer; 
i)  a  competent  member  of the workers'  delegation. 
- See also Dortmund Divisional Inspectorate's instructions of 
July  1,  1953,  concerning colliery rescue  arrangements,  Annex  16, 
p.  69). 
d)  the District  Inspector of  Mines; 
e)  the Central Rescue Station 
(cf.  Article  265  of the Dortmund Division Mines  Regulations of 
May  1,  1935,  currently applicable revised edition of July  1,  1935 
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"The collierty manager  must  see to it that relief teams  with  equipment  are 
standing by  when  or  immediately after the rescue  teams  go  into action.  Should 
his  own  rescue  personnel  not  be sufficiently numerous,  he  must  apply,  at  the 
same  time as he  is mobilizing them,  for assistance  from  the  nearby collieries 
shown  in the master rescue  plan.  He  must  also,  in any  event,  inform the 
Central  Rescue Station at  once"). 
- Saar 
The  Directives of June  19,  1957,  concerning firefighting at collieries in the 
Saarbrllcken Division,  and the Directives concerning rescue preparations and  ope-
rations,  provide that the  following shall be alerted  : 
a)  by  responsible officials below  ground 
1)  the Central Rescue Station, 
2)  the underground manager; 
b)  by  the underground  manager 
1)  the rescue brigade,  ventilation deputy  and fire deputy, 
2)  the districts in danger, 
3)  the department  affected, 30 
4)  the  Regional  Mines  Inspectorate, 
5)  the central  laboratory; 
c)  by  the official in charge  of  rescue operations 
1)  any  neighbouring pits likely to be  endangered, 
2)  outside  rescue  brigades, 
3)  doctors,  ambulance  men,  hospitals, 
4)  the Divisional  Mines  Inspectorate, 
2,  BELGIUM 
The  persons to be  alerted are  listed in order in the General  Instructions for 
major  emergencies  liable to require the services of Central Rescue  Stations,  which 
provide inter alia as  follows, 
I.- Action to be  taken  by  officials present  at the  surface  on  being notified of  an-acciaent----------------------------------------------------------------
1)  Inform Central Rescue Station  (in the case  of  collieries not  possessing 
rescue  services of their own).  In the  case of collieries having their own 
rescue  services  (Campine),  this does  not  apply. 
2)  Inform colliery engineers,  underground manager,  chief safety officer,  chief 
security officer and  head  of  administration department. 
3)  Inform colliery rescue  team-leavers,  by  all means  available  (telephone, 
driver,  dispatch,  rider,  runner). 
II.- ~~!!~~-!~-~~-!~~~~-~~-~P~E~!!~~~!-~~P~E!~~~! 
1)  Inform  Managing Director. 
2)  Inform  Mines  Inspectorate,  Divisional Director,  Chief  Divisional  Engineer, 
District  Engineer,  Workers'  Delegate to Mines  Inspectorate. 
3)  Inform medical  service  (medical  officer,  first-aid men). 
4)  Inform chief deputies or overmen,  senior surface officials,  safety deputies, 
tallymen and assistant  tallymen,  the surveyor. 
III,- ~~!!~~-!~-~~-!~~~~-~~-~~!~!-~~!!!~E~-~~E!~~~-~~~!~~~E~ 
1)  If necessary,  inform technical  personnel  and  rescue  team  leaders of other 
pits of  the  company. 
2)  If necessary,  inform the  Red  Cross. 
The Central Rescue Station must 
1)  inform the medical  department  of  the Joint  Insurance Office; 
2)  inform surgical departments  of hospitals; 
3)  inform the National  Rescue Centre,  which will if necessary alert Central Rescue 
Stations elsewhere  in Belgium. 
3.  FRANCE 
- Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
The  official Instructions concerning underground  explosions  liable to involve 
rescue operations  (which also apply  in the case of  mine  fires  and  underground 
combustion)  lay  down  the following  alarm arrangements. Action to be  taken at  once  by  personnel present  at the surface  on  recei-
ving notification of  the accident,  and  thereafter by  engineers appointed 
to take control at the surface in emergency. 
Inform  : 
1)  colliery engineers,  if absent  : 
2)  central executive  of  the Colliery Group 
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3)  by  express messenger,  rescue  men  at  the surface whose  names  and addres-
ses are posted up  in the  lamp-room,  and  rescue-appliance maintenance 
man; 
4)  district medical  officer; 
5)  workers'  safety delegate. 
Action to be  taken forthwith  on  receiving notification of  the accident. 
Inform 
1)  Mines  Inspectorate.  If telephone  out  of  order,  send top-priority tele-
gram  (under Article  583  of Telegraph Service  Instructio~s); 
2)  Central Rescue Station, 
- preferably  by  inter-Group telephone, 
- failing that  via State telephone  Lens  129,  or failing that  via 
Lens  420  (Lens  Group  switchboard,  which will connect caller with 
Central  Rescue Station).  For all such calls,  specify 
"PRIORITY,  RESCUE  OPERATION", 
- failing that  by  top-priority telegram  (Article  533)  worded  as fol-
lows  :  "Central  Rescue Station,  Lens  :  Send help,  accident  at Blank 
Colliery,  Blank Group"; 
3)  Divisional  Board: 
4)  Group  rescue posts,  transport  service  (to take rescue  personnel  and 
equipment  to colliery affected),  central stores  (to prepare supply 
of  rescue appliances): 
5)  engineers appointed in advance to take control at the surface at  the 
surface at  the pit affected; 
6)  engineers appointed to be  responsible for testing and servicing of 
rescue appliances; 
7)  medical  service; 
8)  local authorities and  police; 
9)  in the case of  very  serious accidents,  neighbouring Groups. 
Very  similar procedure;  carried out  by  the colliery manager. 
4.  ITALY 
Alarm  goes first to head  of fire brigade;  then to Mines  Inspector. 32 
5.  NETHERLANDS 
Directive No.  86  of the Inspector-General of  Mines  lays  down  that  the fol-
lowing are to be  informed  forthwith  in the event  of  a  mine  fire or explosion  : 
1)  rescue service; 
2)  colliery engineers; 
3)  local  Inspector of  Mines; 
4)  colliery scheduled to assist; 
5)  Chief  Medical Officer; 
6)  Heerlen hospital. 
C,  PREMISES  AND  LOCATIONS  TO  BE  FIXED  IN  ADVANCE  UNDER  EXISTING  REGULATIONS 
1,  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
The Special Instructions to Colliery Managements  for  Major  Emergencies 
provide  in Section D  (Further  Rescue  Arrangements),  subsection  14  (Accom-
modation to be  Reserved)  that  premises must  be set aside to serve as 
a)  Incident  Headquarters; 
b)  control post; 
c)  assembly  base  for colliery's own  and  outside rescue teams; 
d)  canteen; 
e)  casualty station; 
f)  Press  information  room; 
g)  mortuary. 
- Saar 
The  Directives concerning rescue preparations and  operations  drawn  up  in 
agreement  with the SaarbrUcken Divisional Inspectorate require the  following 
premises  and  locations to be  fixed  in advance  : 
1)  incident  headquarters with office facilities attached; 
2)  casualty station with examination  room  for  medical staff; 
3)  mortuary; 
4)  assembly  base  for  outside rescue  teams  and  ambulance  men; 
5)  canteen for outside rescue  teams  and ambulance  men; 
6)  car park; 
7)  Press information room. 
2,  BELGIUM 
The  Decree  of  Se~tember 25,  1947,  in the Annexes  to Section  IV  provides 
that all collieries must  have rest  rooms  with  beds  and all necessary first-
aid equipment,  and  in addition a  casualty station for  medical  and  surgical 
treatment.  It further specifies the requirements to be fulfilled by  these, 
their equipment  and staffing arrangements. 
The  instructions for major  emergencies  require  in addition that  special 
extra accomodation  should  be  prepared for casualties;  this must  be  heated 
and  provided with first-aid boxes,  bedding,  blankets,  etc. The  instructions 
also require the installation  of 1)  incident  headquarters with telephone; 
2)  premises  fo~ setting up  mobile  laboratories; 
3)  a  rescue  men's rest  room; 
6)  premises  for storing and servicing rescue equipment. 
3.  FRANCE 
- Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
The  instructions concerning underground  explosions  liable to involve rescue 
operations require that  the following  acconwodation  be  provided 
1)  room  for  rescue  personnel  and their spare equipment; 
2)  casualty station  (motor transport  to be available to take casualties 
to hospital); 
3)  mortuary. 
All collieries have  permanent  medical  rooms;  in case of  need extra accom-
modation is prepared. 
- Loire,  Cevennes,  Blanzy 
All collieries have at  any  rate rooms  (medically  equipped or otherwise) 
which  can  be  reserved for  rescue  men. 
4.  ITALY 
Rooms  have  to be  provided  for first  aid to casualties. 
5 •  NETHERLANDS 
No  statutory provision is made  for  such  accommodation.  At  each colliery 
casualty stations,  etc.,  are installed at  the surface as required,  in addition 
to the  permanent  medical  rooms. 
D.  PLANS  (E.G.  FIREFIGHTING  PLAN,  PLAN  OF  TELEPHONE  SYSTEM)  TO  BE  AVAILABLE  UNDER 
EXISTING  REGULATIONS 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
The  Directives concerning fire prevention and  firefighting provide  (in 
Part  Two,  II  :  Underground Fire Plan,  3,  p.  22)  as  follows  : 
"The  Underground Fire Plan must  include  a  Firefighting Plan,  drawn  up  in 
accordance with the  Mine  Plan,  in simple perspective,  to scale with the 
Ventilation Plan,  and  appended as  a  detail to the  Mine  Plan.  The  Firefighting 
Plan must  show 
a)  the entire water-mains  network with indication  of  pipe diameters  and water 
preassures,  main  valves  and shut-off gates and air/water reversing valves, 
also all water-storage  tanks with  their contents,  and all reducing valves 
with  indication of both pressures; 
b)  points where  fire-fighting cars,  materials for building stoppings,  etc., 
are kept; 
c)  fire posts,  with  number  and type  of appliances  kept  there; 
d)  type of fire-protection in each staple-pit and built-in ventilation doors; 
e)  fireproof section of  roadways,  with  indication of their  length; 
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f)  automatic  fire-extinguishers; 
g)  all fixed extinguishers; 
h)  all underground telephone  installations. 
"The Firefighting Plan must  be  posted up  conspicuously  in the manager's 
office and  in the rescue  equipment  room." 
Inspectorate Directive No.  I  3604/65/52,  of January  21,  1952,  also provides 
that  in addition to the Firefighting Plan showing the water-mains  network  there 
must  be  a  plan of the normal-pressure compressed-air mains. 
- Saar 
In addition to the relevant  mine  plans,  collieries must  have 
1)  a  ventilation and stone-dust plan; 
2)  a  firefighting plan with aqnexed  tracings of  the water  and  compressed-
air mains  and of  the  gas  mains. 
The  firefighting plan contains the particulars listed in a)  - h)  above. 
2.  BELGIUM 
The  Royal  Decree of  November  3,  1953,  requires managers  to have  and  keep  up 
to date  a  "general action plan"  in respect  of fire,  showing  the ventilation 
circuits,  main  gradients,  volume  and direction of  air-currents,  CH4  contents 
in return airways,  location of  conveyors,  electrical installations,  electric 
cables,  ventilation doors,  fans,  stores,  telephones,  vehicle depOts,  etc. 
In addition,  the firefighting plan shows  the  location of all firefighting 
installations and appliances  (water mains,  hydrant  points,  stocks of  hoses, 
sand,  fire-extinguishers,  etc.). 
3.  FRANCE 
- Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Each colliery is required to keep the  following  plans  and to bring them up 
to date quarterly  : 
1)  plan of water-supply  system of underground workings,  where  appropriate 
showing storage tanks and  pressure and  volume  regulators; 
2)  plans showing 
- storage points for  firefighting equipment  and  extinguishers, 
- fireproof  zones, 
- telephones, 
- electricity networks. 
Ventilation plans are also kept,  showing  in addition to airways  and air-cur-
rents the position of stone-dust  barriers and  stone-dust  sections of  roadways. 
- Loire 
Plans are kept,  and  revised annually,  of 
1)  firefighting facilities  (showing  location of extinguishers); 
2)  water mains; 
3)  compressed-air mains; 4)  slurry-pumping systems; 
5)  telephone  network; 
6)  ventilation  (showing air-currents and  volume,  stone-dust  barriers and 
stone-dusted sections of  roadways). 
- Cevennes,  Blanzy 
Plans  are  kept,  and  revised at  intervals  (varying according to the instal-
lations concerned,  but  not  exceeding  one year),  of  the air dusts  and  water 
mains,  electrical installations,  telephones~  storage points for  extinguishers, 
ventilation  (showing air-currents and  volume  stone-dust,  barriers,  etc.)  and, 
at  some  pits,  slurry-pumping installations. 
4.  ITALY 
Collieries must  have  a  telephone  network  and  a  firefighting plan approved 
by  the  Inspector of  Mines. 
5.  NETHERLANDS 
All  collieries are or will shortly be  required  by  law to keep 
1)  a  ventilation plan with all relevant  particulars; 
2)  plans  of the  underground telephone  network,  fire-extinguishers available 
below  ground,  water mains  below  ground,  stone-dust  barriers below  ground, 
and  transformer  houses  below  ground. 
E.  ANY  OTHER  ARRANGEMENTS  TO  BE  MADE  UNDER  EXISTING  REGULATIONS 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GER~~NY 
The  Dortmund  Divisional  Inspectorate's rescue  instructions of July  1,  1953, 
in Annex  16,  p.  70,  require that  persons shall be  detailed,  inter alia,  to 
"supervise the  issue of  information; 
check  and  look after the colliery's own  rescue  personnel and  rescue teams 
sent  to assist  by  other collieries; 
control at colliery gates of  admission to colliery premises; 
control at pit  banks  of  persons entering and  leaving the mine; 
attend to dead  and  injured; 
supervise main  fans; 
man  the store; 
organize reserve supplies of  equipment; 
man  the  laboratory  on  a  continuous basis." 
- Saar 
Extra or special personnel to be  assigned to duty at 
1)  surface telephone switchboard,  and if necessary  important  telephone below 
ground; 
2)  colliery gates; 
3)  all points of  access to the underground  installations; 
4)  fans; 
5)  winding  engines  (personnel to be  doubled); 36 
6)  tally room; 
7)  lamp  room; 
8)  rescue post; 
9)  stores. 
The  decision whether to send for  the mobile  equipment  from  the central  labo-
ratory  for  analysing air samples  or to have  these analysed at  the central  labo-
ratory  is taken according to the particular circumstances. 
2.  BELGIUM 
In addition to the General  Instructions for all mines,  there are supplemen-
tary  instructions  largely similar to those  for Germany  and France;  these are 
embodied  in a  Schedule  of  Measures  to be  taken  in the event  of  an  emergency 
liable to require the services of Central  Rescue  Stations. 
3.  FRANCE 
- Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
The  instructions already  quoted also require the  following action to be 
taken 
1)  at  pit  bank,  control  persons  entering and  leaving the mine; 
2)  in  lamp  room,  control  of all  lamps  issued  and  returned; 
3)  fans to be  checked; 
4)  operation of air compressors  to be  checked; 
5)  electric and  flame  safety  lamps  to be  sent  for unless colliery has  substan-
tial numbers  in stock; 
6)  security  arrangements to be  instituted at  the surface; 
7)  all couununications  from  below  ground to be  channelled to the manager's 
office,  and  main  items of  information recorded  in writing,  with the  names 
of  those  supplying  them; 
8)  duty  rota of officials,  clerical staff and  workmen  to be  fixed  so that  rescue 
operations can  proceed continuously  without  undue  strain on  the personnel. 
- Loire,  Cevennes,  Blanzy 
The  above  arrangements also apply  in these coalfields. 
4.  ITALY 
None. 
5 •  NETHERLANDS 
Rules  Nos.  62  and  84-37  of  the  Inspector-General  of  .Mines  are to much  the 
same  effect  as the  above directives for  Germany,  Belgium and  France. SECTION  III  - MEASURES  TO  ENSURE  PERMANENT  AVAII.·ABILITY  OF  SERVICEABLE  RESPIRATORS 
AND  REVIVING  APPARATUS 
1.  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
The  Dort;nuud Divisional 1\lines  Inspcctol·ate' s  rescue regulations of 
July  1,  1953,  provide  under  lO,f that 
"the brigade  leader must  test  once  a  month all respirators 
and  reviving apparatus,  and  record  the results in the 
Test  Register," 
and  under  12,a/d that 
"the rescue-equipment maintenance man  is  responsible for 
the servicing,  testing and usability of all respirators 
and  reviving apparatus  he  must  test  and  service the applian-
ces  in accordance with  the relevant  instructions of  the 
Central  Rescue  Station.(Annex  15,  p.  65)." 
The  relevant  passage  in Annex  15 to the regulations runs as  follows 
"The  servicing and testing of  the above-listed appliances  must  be  effected 
in accordance with  the  following  instructions. 
Self-contained oxygen respirators 
The  exterior of the respirators must  be  kept  clean.  All  leather and  rubber 
parts must  be  regularly  tended to preserve suppleness.  When  stored the respi-
rator tubes  must  be  so hung  that  they  are not  subjected to stretching.  The 
container of  each respirator must  bear  on  the  lid a  serial number  and  the 
identification mark  of  the pit concerned.  A tag must  be  attached to each res-
pirator,  showing  when  last tested and  whether  serviceable.  Any  external  damage 
to the container or carrying device  must  be  repaired at  the first opportunity. 
The  oxygen cylindres must  be  subjected to the  regulation pressure test at 
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the prescribed intervals.  The  numbers  of  the cylindres and the dates and results 
of  the tests on  each  must  be  recorded  in a  register. 
All  reducing valves  must  be  listed and  must  be  returned to the manufacturers 
at  intervals not  exceeding five years for  complete  overhaul.  The  self-contained 
oxygen  respirators must  be  regularly tested,  and  any  defects made  good  as 
promptly  as  possible by  the replacement  of  the faulty parts. 
The  following tests must  be  made  : 
a)  weekly  test  for  leakage  and  of the pressure in the  oxygen cylinder; 
b)  monthly  test  for  leakage,  pressure in the  oxygen  cylinder and  functioning 
of all parts; 
c)  test before use; 
d)  test after use. 
Details of  the methods to be  employed  in testing the variuos types of 
breathing apparatus  follow  on  pp.  67-68  of the Annex. 
In addition,  the Central Rescue Station carries out  a  quarterly inspection 
of  the appliances stocked. 38 
B.  !~~!!~~-!~~~~!~!~!l_~~!~~~-~~~ 
The  Dortmund Division's rescue  regulations  provide  under  16,a that 
''a)  rescue  teams  must  operate  in  the  presence  of  noxious  gases or oppressive 
air conditions  only  with  respirators which  have  been  tested  immediately 
before  being  put  on  (cf.  Article  265  of  the  Dortmund  Division  Mines 
Regulations  of  May  1,  1935,  as reissued on July  1,  1953)." 
The  testing is effected  in accordance with the directives  laid down  in 
Annex  15  just quoted. 
Article  16  of  the  Dortmund Division's rescue regulations  further  provides 
in subsections  b)  and c)  that 
"b)  a  standby  base  must  be  installed at  a  convenient  spot  in a  fresh air current, 
- Saar 
and the necessary  respirators,  reviving apparatus  and  first-aid  equip~ent 
kept available there ...  the respirators must  be  taken  to  the  standby 
base  !immediately after use  and  there serviced and  made  re-usable;  the ser-
vicing and  care of  the appliances at  the  standby base are  the  responsibi-
lity of  the  maintenance  man  who  must  be  permanently  on  duty  there  (cf.  Ar-
ticle 12)." 
Appliances at  rescue  posts must  be  tested by  the maintenance  man  with  a  tes-
ting device after use,  or if not  used,  at  regular intervals not  exceeding  four 
weeks.  The  brigade  leader must  check  monthly  that  this has  been  done. 
At  the  permanently-manned Central  Rescue  Station and its sub-stations  (the 
so-called Group  Rescue  Stations with practice galleries)  respirators must  be 
regularly tested once  a  week,  and the results noted on  a  tag attached to the 
appliance  and  recorded,  individually  for  each appliance,  in  a  register  (printed 
form). 
Respirators must  also be  tested every six months  by  the Central  Rescue  Station. 
Every  respirator must  be  tested by  a  maintenance  man  with  a  testing apparatus 
whenever  issued  (for practice drill or actual  emergency),  and  the result  com-
pared to see whether it corresponds with the result  of  the  previous test.  Im-
mediately  before the user  goes  into action  (practice or actual  emergency),  he 
must  make  a  further test  (without  apparatus)  in accordance  with specified ins-
tructions. 
The  rules concerning the installation of  standby  bases  and  handling  and 
servicing of  used  appliances are similar to those  for  the Federal  Republic. 
The  components  concerned must  be  immersed  and  rinsed several times  in clean 
water,  well dried and  then reassembled.  Each  respirator must  be  checked with  a 
testing apparatus after reassembly,  and  the result  noted  on  a  tag attached to 
the appliance  and  recorded  in a  register. Strict care must  be  taken at  the stand-
by  base to keep  serviced and unserviced,  respirators apart. 39 
2.  BELGIUM 
A.  ~~~~!!~-~~~!!~!~~~!~~-!~~!!~~ 
All respirators must  be  kept  always  in serviceable condition. 
Immediately after use  they  are serviced and thoroughly tested by  a  maintenance 
man. 
B.  !~~!!~~-!~~~!!!~!~-~~!~~~-~~~ 
Immediately before it is issued to the  rescue man,  the respirator is given 
a  final quick check  by  the maintenance man  as to 
a)  adjustement of mouthpiece,  potassium cartridge,  breathing bag and control 
lever; 
c)  airtightness of  valves; 
d)  operation of  warning signal. 
Just  before going  into action the rescue  man  makes  the same test  once  more. 
These  very  rough  checks take only  a  few  moments. 
c.  ~~~~!!~g-~!-~~~E!~!!~~~-!~-!~~-~!!~~~~-~~~~-!~~!!!!~~-~~!~!_g~~~ri~ 
A standby  base  is usually  installed below  ground  for the servicing of 
respirators.  Every  eight  hours,  i.e. after being used three times,  the appliances 
are brought  to the surface for  thorough testing,  cleaning and disinfection. 
Each  rescue man  has  a  mouthpiece  reserved for his personal use. 
3.  FRANCE 
- Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
A.  ~~g~!~~-~~~~!~!~g_!~~-!~~!!~~ 
In addition to the servicing of respirators  immediately after use,  each 
rescue post  has  a  man  responsible for  keeping the appliances  in good  order 
and maintaining a  supply  of  accessories in accordance with  an  inventory 
posted up. 
Every  six months  the respirators of  each rescue  post  in the Division are 
tested at the Division's Central Rescue Station by  the Station maintenance 
staff in the presence of responsible officials from the rescue post. 
Immediately before a  respirator is issued to a  rescue  man  the  maint~nance 
man  must  make  a  quick test;  on  issue and  before use the rescue man  in his turn 
tests the apparatus for  leakage,  in fresh air. 
These tests take only  a  few  moments. 
If necessary,  forward  base is installed below  ground where  respirators can 
be  serviced;  an  adequate  number  of spares must  be  kept  there. 40 
-~ 
A.  The  equipment  of  each rescue post  is inspected at  least  once  a  month  by  or  on 
the  instructions of  the superintendent  of  the Central Rescue Station.  In ad-
dition,  the operation of respirators is tested at  least  once  a  quarter  in the 
smoke  chamber  in the course of  the rescue practice drills. 
B/C.  Testing before use  handling at  standby  base  :  as above  (Nord/Pas-de-Calais). 
- Cevennes 
A.  Each  rescue  post  has  a  specialized fitter responsible  for  the maintenance  of 
its equipment.  The  respirators are taken every  three months  to the Central 
Rescue Station and tested by  Station staff in the  smoke  chamber. 
B/C.  Testing before use handling at  standby  base  :  as  above  (Nord/Pas-de-Calais). 
- Blanzy 
A.  The  equipment  of  each rescue post  is inspected at  least  once  a  month  by  or  on. 
the  instructions of  the superintendent  of  the Central  Rescue Station.  In ad-
dition,  the operation of  respirators is tested at  least  twice  a  year,  including 
once  in the  smoke  chamber  in the course of  rescue  practice drill. 
B/C.  Testing before use  handling at  standby  base  :  as  above  (Nord/Pas-de-Calais). 
4.  ITALY 
A.  Respirators must  be  tested monthly. 
B.  Respirators must  be  tested before use. 
c.  There  is no  specific provision for  keeping  respirators  permanently  available 
below  ground. 
5.  NETHERLANDS 
A.  All  rescue equipment  must  be  kept  permanently  in usable  condition.  Appliances 
must  be  serviced and tested  immediately after use.  Any  appliance which  has 
not  been  in use  for  a  month  must  be tested again. 
B.  Testing only  on  oxygen  supply  and airtightness of  oxygen filter and  compres-
sed-air tube;  also on airtightness of mask. 
C.  No  specific regulations. 
SECTION  IV  - RESCUE  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 
A.  GENERAL  REMARKS 
The  National Coal  Board operates approximately  1,000 coalmines  which  reach  from 
Scotland to Kent,  a  distance of  about  500 miles.  The  coalfields are split into nine 
Divisions,  subdivided into 48 Areas. 
There are 3  Central Rescue Stations  located at strategic points throughout  the 
coalfields.  Each  mine  is affiliated to a  Central  Rescue Station.  Each Central Rescue 
Station normally  serves mines within a  radius  of  15 miles. 
There are  two  types  of Station  :  one with its own  permanent  corps  living in or  in 
the vicinity of the Station with  a  number  of  part-time rescue  men  at  the pits served 
by  it  (known  as  a  "Scheme  A"  Station)  and  one  with  no  permanent  corps which  operates entirely through rescue brigades maintained at the  mines  themselves  ("Scheme  B" 
Station).  There  are  15  Scheme  A Stations and  16  Scheme  B  Stations,  and  the  total 
number  of  permanent  corps  rescue  men  at the  former  is 240,  while  the  number  of part-
time  rescue  men  at  the mines  is 4,250. 
~~~-~~!~~~~!:!~~~!-~~~~~~=~~~!~ 
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There is no  National  Rescue  Headquarters,  but  in each Division there is a  Divis-
ional Rescue Stations Committee  responsible for  the rescue organization in the 
Division. 
In addition,  there is a  National  Rescue  Committee  under  the chairmanship of  the 
National Coal  Board's Chief Safety  Engineer,  the members  of  which are specially 
selected for their knowledge  of  rescue within the  industry.  This Committee deals 
with all aspects  of  rescue work,  including scientific research. 
B.  TRAINING  AND  PRACTICE 
All  rescue  men  have,  in the first  instance,  to undergo  preliminary training 
consisting of at  least  12  practices before being qualified,  and  then  have to at-
tend six statutory practices a  year,  two  of  which  must  be  underground at  a  mine. 
C.  ORGANIZATION  OF  RESCUE  OPERATIONS 
a)  Alarm 
Every  mine  is in telephonic  communication with the Central  Rescue Station 
to which it is affiliated.  The  majority  of  the Central Rescue  Stations are 
equipped with v.h.f.  radio communication,  which  enables them to keep  in touch 
with their mobile  rescue  vans  and  other  Rescue Stations in the vicinity• 
Rescue  operations are directed by  the colliery manager;  until he  arrives  on 
the spot,  the senior official present  takes charge. 
D.  MUTUAL  ASSISTANCE  IN  MAJOR  EMERGENCIES 
If in the case of  a  serious disaster at  a  colli.ery  any  Division requires further 
rescue facilities,  it calls on  any  other Divisions  for  help.  In the event  of  an 
emergency  arising in the small  isolated coalfields of  south-eastern England,  ar-
rangements  have  been  made  for  any  necessary  rescue  personnel  and  equipment  to be 
transported by  air from  Rescue Stations in the  nearest  Division. 
E.  STOCKS  OF  RESPIRATORS  GIVING  PROTECTION  FOR  TWO  HOURS  AND  OVER 
Two  types of  self-contained two-hour  breathing apparatus are  in general  use 
1)  compressed  oxygen  (Proto); 
2)  liquid air  (Blackett  Brown-Mills Aerophor  and  Aerencheon,  the latter being a 
lighter type). 
Of  the 31  Central Rescue  Stations,nine are equipped with  liquid-air apparatus 
and  22  with  compressed-oxygen apparatus.  The  Stations serving a  particular Division 
are equipped with  the  same  type  of  apparatus;  thus  the Northern  (Northumberland 
and  Cumberland),  Durham  and  East  Midlands  Divisions use  the  liquid-air type  and  the 
other Divisions the  compressed-oxygen type. 
In addition to the main  types of  apparatus just referred to,  each Central  Rescue 
Station is equipped with six sets of  an  emergency  lightweight  short-term compressed-
oxygen breathing apparatus  (Savox)  Which  has  a  duration of 30 minutes.  Although 
designed as an  emergency  apparatus,  the Savox  can  be  used with advantage  in connec-
tion with other work,  e.g.  the building of  stoppings  in irrespirable atmospheres. 42 
F.  PREPARATORY  MEASURES  FOR  SERIOUS  CASES 
With  regard to firefighting,  the National Coal  Board  has  issued instructions 
dealing with the provision of  water supply,  hydratants,  fire stations,  fire 
points,  fire hose,  portable extinguishers,  periodic tests,  recording of tests 
and  examinations,  and  firefighting plans. 
As  regards other equipment,  the Rescue  Advisory  Committee's,  Report  No.  2 
recommends  that  stocks be  kept  of materials,tools,  etc.,  for the erection of 
fire stoppings;  these are held both  above  and  below  ground,  the  amount  of 
equipment  kept  underground  depending  on circumstances. 
Further  recommendations  by  the report  include the  following. 
"50.  Stores for  rescue and  recovery  work. 
(a)  When  an  incident  occurs,  the Storekeeper or other  person  in charge of 
stores should submit  without  delay  to Incident  Headquarters  a  stock 
statement  in respect  of  sand,  sandbags,  stone-dust,  brattice cloth, 
pipes,  bricks,  cement,  fire-extinguishers spares and refills,  tools and 
any  other stores  likely to be  needed for  rescue  and  recovery  work. 
(b)  If there are any  shortages,  or if directed by  the  Manager  to increase 
his stock,  the Storekeeper should call at  once  for additional supplies 
needed  from  the Area Supplies Officer,  or arrange to get  them  from  a 
neighbouring colliery.  Even  if no  additional supplies are  immediately 
required it is desirable to make  contact  with the Area  Supplies Officer, 
so that  he  may  be  able subsequently to deal with demands  promptly. 
(c)  The  official in direct charge  of the surface  (para.  38)  or the Store-
keeper acting under his direction should organize any  special arrange-
ments  necessary  for the transport  of stores and materials from store 
to pit top." 
2)  ~~~~~~!~-~!_E~~~2~~-!~-~~-~!~~!~~-~~~~~-~~!~!!~g-~~g~!~!!~~~ 
Of  the  two  types  of Central Rescue Stations in Britain,  Scheme  A Stations 
are alerted at  once  and  a  team  - or teams  - of  Permanent-Corps  rescue  men  are 
dispatched forthwith to the colliery requiring assistance;  at the same  time 
the part-time rescue  men  are also alerted by  the Colliery Manager.  Scheme  B 
Stations are similarly alerted at  once  for provision of  the necessary  breathing 
apparatus  and  equipment,  and the part-time rescue men  summoned  by  the Colliery 
Manager.  The Colliery  Manager  must  make  all necessary  arrangements for  sum-
moning  the rescue workers  employed at his particular colliery in order to meet 
his responsibilities under the Coal  and  Other  Mines  (Fire and  Rescue) 
Regulations. 
Warning  devices  (bells,  and  in some  case telephones)  are installed at  the 
homes  of certain part-time rescue  men;  other ways  summoning  rescue workers  are 
by  messengers,  the police,  and  other available means.Arrangements are also made 
for the necessary transport. 
The  Rescue Advisory Committee's report  includes the following  further  recom-
mendations. 
"28.  Action messages. 
(a)  In drawing up  a  list of  the persons,  etc.,  to be  summoned  by  means  of 
action messages  (whether  by  telephone or by  messenger),  it will  be  found 
convenient  to commence  by  grouping  them  in three categories  : 
(i)  a  first-priority list of  the persons most  urgently required; {ii)  persons who  can  be called by  those notified under  {i)  under relay 
arrangements; 
{iii)  persons,  etc.,  to be  summoned  or  informed as  soon  as  those  in  {i) 
have  been called.  This  list should  not  be  too  long. 
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The  names  can then  be  arranged  in  due  order and  can advantageously  be set 
out  in the  form  of  a  chart  giving telephone  numbers.  Persons  who  cannot 
be  communicated with  by  telephone should be  noted  in  some  distinctive 
way  {e.g.  in red  ink)  with addresses  and  the word  "Messenger." 
{b)  Under  the  "Uniform Code  of  Rules  for  the Conduct  and  Guidance  of  Persons 
Employed  in Rescue  World''  in the Eighth Schedule to the Rescue  Regula-
tions,  the management  are under  a  statutory obligation in any  emergency 
likely to require the services  of  a  rescue  corps  or brigades to take the 
following steps  immediately 
{i)  telephone to Central  Rescue Station; 
(ii)  summon  the trained rescue  men  belonging to the mine; 
{iii)  telephone for medical  assistance; 
{iv)  telephone to H.M.  District  Inspector of  Mines,  the  local office 
of the  N.U.M.,  and  the  local office of the  N.A.C.O.D.S. 
"30.  Warning messages. 
As  explained above,  this heading covers messages  to persons,  etc., 
who  are not  required to attend the colliery forthwith  or to take  any 
other  immediate action,  but  who  are desired to prepare for  some  possible 
action later or on  receipt  of  a  further message." 
The  Rescue  Advisory Committee's  report  suggest  the  following. 
"36.  Incident  Headquarters. 
{a)  It will generally be  found  advantageous  to designate certain  rooms  in 
the colliery offices as "Incident  Headquarters,"  and  the  rooms  to be 
used  for this purpose  in an  emergency  should  be  thought  out  in advance. 
{b)  There  should  be  a  conference  room  {e.g.  the Manager's  private office), 
which  should  have  a  large table  on  which  plans can  be  laid out,  and  will 
be  occupied  by  the  Manager  or senior official on  duty. 
(c)  If available,  a  briefing room  is useful  for  instructing under-officials 
what  they  have  to do  in order to carry out  written orders  embodying 
decisions  taken at  conferences of  senior officials. 
(d)  A clerks'  office is indispensable,  for  the  Manager  or senior official 
on  duty  should at all  time  be  provided with  adequate clerical assistance 
for  recording events as  they  occur,  noting decisions  taken at  conferences, 
issuing instructions and  otherwise conducting the  large  amount  of clerical 
work  incidental to a  nerve centre of  operations. 
{e)  Copies  of  the  Emergency  Organization Plan  should  be  kept  in a  cupboard 
clearly  labelled "Emergency  Organization"  in the Manager's office or the 
room  designated as  Incident  Headquarters,  together with  the  Rescue  and 
Firefighting Plans  and  the special books,  charts,  Authorization Cards, 
and copies of  lists and  instructions prepared  in advance. 
"41.  Waiting  room  for  relatives,  etc. 
(a)  It is generally desirable to assign in advance  as comfortable  a  room  as 
possible where  relatives waiting for  news  can  be  accommodated.  The  room should  have  seating arrangements  and  provide facilities for  interviewing 
relatives and  for  dealing with  inquiries. 
(b)  Control  of  the waiting  room  when  in use,  and  the responsibility for dealing 
with  these  inquiries,  should be  undertaken  by  the  r.abour  Department. 
"43.  Car  parking. 
A  space should  be  set apart  for  the parking of  cars,  and  a  man  designated 
as  attendant,  with  authority to direct  the  placing of cars and  responsibi-
lity for  them  when  parked. 
"49.  Rescue  brigade  room,  etc. 
If rescue  teams  are called in from  outside the colliery,  they will  need 
a  rescue  brigade  room  for  their exclusive use,  and  messing  arrangements; 
they  may  also need  sleeping accommodation.  The  best  way  of  meeting these 
needs  should  be  thought  out  in advance  and  rooms  assigned or accommodation 
arranged. 
"52.  Sleeping accommodation. 
If transport  to and  from  their homes  is not  readily available,  sleeping 
accommodation  may  necessary  for  volunteer workers  and  perhaps  for  rescue 
men,  and  the  accommodation  that  can  be  made  available at  the colliery. 
If  large  numbers  of  persons  have to be  provided for,  however,  it will 
generally  be  found  best  for  the Area Welfare  or  the  Labour  Officer to ar-
range  local billets for  them  instead of  attempting to provide sleeping 
arrangements  on colliery premises. 
"54.  Medical  and first-aid services. 
(a)  The  Medical  Centre or First-Aid  Room  provided at  the colliery will  seldom 
be  adequate  in  a  serious  emergency.  The  need  for  additional  accommodation 
must  be  envisaged,  and  should be  provided  for  by  designating  a  room  or 
rooms  in advance.  Unless  the colliery is exceptionally  well  provided with 
qualified First-Aid men,  it is also well  to envisage the  need  for,  and  to 
.think out  plans  for,  obtaining the services of additional  First-Aid men. 
(b)  If there are  a  considerable  number  of  casualties,  additional supplies  of 
dressings,  antiseptics,  bandages,  splints,  etc,,  are  likely to be  required, 
and  plans  should  be  made  to obtain these without  delay  from  neighbouring 
collieries or Area Stores. 
(c)  The  possibilities should  be  considered of  having to set aside suitable 
accommodation  for use as  a  temporary  mortuary. 
(d)  All  these services should  normally  be  arranged  by  the Colliery  Medical 
Officer,  if any,  or under  the direction of  the Divisional  Medical  Officer, 
in consultation with the  Manager." 
4)  ~!~~~-!~-~~-~~~!!~~!~-~~~~~-~~!~!!~g-~~~~!~!!~~~ 
The  Coal  and  Other  Mines  (Fire and  Rescue)  Regulations  require the  prov1s1on 
of  proper  plans  in  a  form  suitable for  use  by  rescue  workers,  kept  corrected  up 
to a  date  not  more  than three months  previously.  These  show  the ventilation and 
all principal doors,  stoppings  and air crossings,  regulators  and  telephone 
stations,  with  intake airways  marked  in blue and  return airways  in red to 
distinguish  them. 45 
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The  Rescue  Advisory Committee's report  recommends  a  number  of  further 
measures  with respect  to telephone facilities,  surface control,  recording 
of  events,  keys  to offices and stores,  access to colliery premises, 
Press arrangements,  control of  persons  entering and  leaving the mine, 
lamp-room organization,  volunteer workers,  canteen facilities,  transport 
and  ambulance  transport,  identification of  the dead,  relations with 
workmen's  representatives,  relations with  Inspector of  Mines,  sign-
posting of  underground  roadways,  and.scientific services. 
C.  MEASURES  TO  ENSURE  PERMANENT  AVAILABILITY  OF  SERVICEABLE  RESPIRATORS 
All breathing apparatus  has to be  kept  at  a  Central  Rescue Station and 
has to be  examined  under  the Regulations  by  a  competent  person at  intervals 
not  exceeding 30 days.  A record of all the tests carried out  has to be  kept 
at all Central  Rescue Stations.  In  practice,  the testing of  equipment  is 
carried out  at  much  shorter intervals,  and  in fact  is being constantly 
done  at  the  Rescue Stations. 
Generally  speaking,  no  breathing apparatus is actually  kept  at  a  mine, 
but  this can  be  allowed  under  exemption  from  the  Inspectorate.  In such 
cases the apparatus has  to be  examined  every  30 days. 
2)  !~~!~~~-~~~=~~~!=~~-~=!~~~-~~~ 
Before  any  equipment  is put  into service it is tested. 
In the United  Kingdom  there are no  permanent  posts  installed under-
ground.  The  system after an  emergency  is to set  up Fresh-Air Bases  where 
arrangements are  made  for  the  equipment  to be tested and  examined after 
any  period  of  work. 
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LAWS,  REGULATIONS  AND  CONTRACTUAL  PROVISIONS  CONCERNING  MEDICAL  SERVICES  AND 
MEDICAL  EXAMINATION  AND  SUPERVISION 
A.  GERMANY 
1.  There are no statutory requirements  on the subject.  The  relevant  legally bind-
ing provisions are  laid down  in  : 
a)  an  agreement  between the national employers'  confederation,  the national 
trade union confederation and the industrial medical officers'  association, 
to which  are annexed  :  . 
1)  directives concerning the profession of  industrial medical officer, 
2)  model  contracts for full-time and part-time industrial medical officers; 
b)  Mines  Inspectorate orders. 
2.  The  agreement  referred to in a)  above  specifies,  inter alia,  that  : 
a)  employers'  associations undertake to recommend  their members  to organize 
medical  services where  warranted  by  the size and character of the enter-
prise; 
b)  these services must  be  placed in the charge of  approved members  of the me-
dical profession possessing appropriate qualifications; 
c)  works  medical services must  deal  with matters of  industrial and  social 
medicine arising out  of the particular requirements of the enterprise 
concerned,  advise both the management  and the works council concerning 
these matters,  and  give medical  attention in  urgen~ cases; 
d)  responsibility for appointing and  dismissing works  medical officers rests 
with the management,  in consultation with the works  council;  the chief me-
dical  inspector for the  Land  must  also be consulted; 
e)  the head  of the works  medical  service must  be directly answerable to the 
general manager  or his deputy; 
f)  industrial medical  officers~ contracts must  be so  framed  as to.guarantee 
them complete  independence  in the discharge of their duties; 
g)  members  of the medical  profession seeking appointment  to a  works  medical 
service must  fulfil certain requirements  (set  forth in section 7  of the 
agreement); 
h)  the industrial medical officers'  association undertakes to provide intro-
duction and advanced training for  works  medical officers; 
i)  a  committee of representatives of  the three signatory bodies must  be set 
up to supervise the  implementation of the agreement. 
3.  Mines  Inspectorate orders require 
a)  pre-entry medical  examinations,  it being carefully specified who  is en-
titled to perform these,  in respect  of  what  points the applicant is to be 
examined,  and  what  equipment  must  be available for effecting the examina-
tion; 
b)  periodic health checks,  to be carried out  annually in the case of  juve-
niles up to the age  of  18,  and  in the case of mineworkers  over  18  at  such 
intervals as the medical officer may  deem  advisable  on  the basis of his 
own  observations and of the type  of  work  performed  by  the man  concerned, 
the interval in no case to exceed three years. 
Both procedures are obligatory. 
Thus while the agreement  between the employers',  workers'  and medical 
officers'  assoc~ations recommends  the establishment  of works  medical services where 
justified, it nowhere  ~kes this compulsory;  the Mines  Inspectorate orders,  on the 
other hand,  do insist that medical examinations shall be carried out,  and carried 
out  in accordance with certain conditions,  but  do  not  require that this shall be 
done  by  a  works  medical officer. 
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Some  small collieries do  in fact  have their medical  examinations effected 
by  outside practitioners or health services. 
The provisions just listed do  not  apply  to  the Saar,although efforts are 
being made  there to bring arrangements  into line with those in the other coalfields 
of the Federal Republic.  Medical  examinations in the Saar are organized through the 
medical  department  of the Saarbergwerke. 
B.  FRANCE 
1.  The  ordinance of August  2,  1945,  making silicosis one  of the recognized compen-
satable occupational diseases  - since it necessitated action to ensure early 
detection and supervision of silicosis cases  - made  it essential,  in view of 
the high incidence of the complaint,  to institute more  medical services and to 
expand existing ones. 
Some  provisions in the decree of June  14,  1946,  concerning conditions for 
mineworkers are also to this effect. 
2.  The  decree of December  24,  1954,  concerning particular silicosis-prevention mea-
sures in the mines,  lays down  basic requirements  in respect  of  pre-entry medical 
examinations  and  periodic fitness checks  for  employment  in certain types of 
working  in coalmines.  All underground workers  have  by  the terms  of the decree to 
undergo medical  examination at  intervals of  not  more  than between six months  and 
two years  :  in practice the interval varies,  according to the collieries'  indi-
vidual arrangements under this rule,  from six months  to one year. 
The  order of  March  18,  1958,  lays  down  recommendations  to be  made  to the 
medical officers effecting these preventive  examinations,  and also requires that 
the equipment  used in radiological examination shall be  approved  beforehand as 
being in accordance with rules set forth in the order. 
3.  Legislative Ordinance  No.  59/46,  of  January 6,  1959,  lays down  detailed provi-
sions with regard to the organization of colliery medical  services.  These  in-
clude the following  : 
a)  collieries must  have medical  services  :  where  the  personnel is sufficiently 
numerous  the medical  officer must  be  a  full-time specialist,  otherwise  two 
or more  collieries may  operate a  joint medical service; 
b)  the main  function of colliery medical  services must  be to prevent  the men's 
health from undergoing  any  deterioration due  to their work,  more  especially 
by  supervising health conditions on the job,  risks of  infection,  and the in-
dividual worker's  own  state of health; 
c)  colliery medical officers must  hold  a  diploma  in industrial medicine,  in 
accordance with such conditions and  from  such time as shall be eventually 
fixed  by  implementing decree;  they will also be debarred by  decree  from under-
taking certain duties incompatible with their profession. 
C.  ITALY 
The  ordinance,  which has force  of  law,  will shortly be  supplemented by  the 
promulgation of  implementing decrees. 
The  decree of April 9,  1959,  which  came  into force  on January  1,  1960, 
includes the following provisions. 
1.  Mineworkers  must  undergo medical  examination 
a)  before engagement,  to ascertain their fitness for the job envisaged; 
b)  annually,  to ascertain their continuing fitness. 2.  Workers  on  jobs entailing certain  haz~rds (specified by  the  decree)  must under-
go  medical  examination at more  frequent  intervals,  and  also psychotechnical 
examination.  · 
3.  Mines  and  quarries  employing  100 or more  workers  on  the main shift must  operate 
a  medical service of  their own. 
4.  The  function of  the medical  service must  be 
a)  to  carry out  the medical  examinations just referred  to; 
b)  to give first aid; 
c)  to give medical  attention to casualties who  are  able  to continue working; 
d)  to draw  attention to  any  conditions liable to affect workers'  health,  and 
if possible suggest  appropriate action; 
e)  to encourage  workers  to be  attentive  to considerations of health  and  sick-
ness prevention. 
5.  Medical  services may  in certain cases be  run jointly by  two  or more  enterprises. 
6.  The  names  of  the  medical officers employed  must  be  submitted  to  the  competent 
authority. 
7.  In certain cases  the  Medical  Inspectorate may  require  an  enterprise to employ 
a  resident medical  officer. 
8.  First-aid facilities must  be  organized at all mines  not  having  a  medical ser-
vice  of  their own. 
The  decree  further contains  prov1s1ons  concerning obligatory attention to 
workers  involved  in accidents  (Section 659),  first aid  (Sections 660-665),  emer-
gency  measures  below  ground  (Section 666),  and  medical  equipment  (Section 667). 
Before  this decree  came  into force,  as  there  was  no  legislation relating 
specifically to  the  coal  mines,  medical  services there were  organized  in line 
with  that relation to  the extractive  industries  in general. 
D.  NETHERLANDS 
As  is explained  in more  detail under  II below,  Dutch colliery medical 
services are required: 
a)  to supervice  the health of  the  personnel; 
b)  to attend to casualties. 
1.  In  its capacity as  a  casualty department,  the medical  service must  satisfy the 
requirements  of  the  Accident  Insurance  Act  of  1921  and  be officially recognized 
as  a  medical  service fulfilling the  conditions  laid down  in Sections 80a  ff. 
of  the  Act,  viz. 
a)  the  department  must  be  under  the fully  independent  direction of  a  medical 
officer qualified under  the  Act  to undertake  on  behalf of  the Rijksverzeke-
ringsbank  the  medical or surgical care of  insured persons suffering injury 
in  industrial accidents,  and  must  be  staffed exclusively by  medical officers 
so  qualified; 
b)  it must  be  run entirely at· the  expense of  the colliery; 
c)  the  medical officers referred to  in  (a)  above  must  be  required by  the mana-
gement 'to give first aid  in  the event of  accidents,  to arrange  for  further 
medical  and/or surgical  treatment,  and  to certify when  a  man  must  be  granted 
sick leave  and  when  he  is fit to resume  work, 
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d)  the  appointment of  the  medical officer must  be  approved  by  the  Board of  the 
Rijksverzekeringsbank. 
The  Board  of  the Rijksverzekeringsbank  has  laid down  the  following  condi-
tions  for  admission  as  a  works  medical officer. 
"As  a  general rule,  candidates must  have  been  in  independent  general 
practice for  not  less  than  five  years,  though  in exceptional  cases this minimum 
period  may  be  reduced  to  three  years  where  the  candidate  has  additional specia-
lized or hospital experience,  or  has  spent  these  years  as  a  surgeon or assistant 
surgeon  in  a  hospital. 
"Where  a  works  medical  service has  only  one  medical officer,  a  second 
fulfilling  the  above  requirements  should  also be  available  to deputize  for  him. 
"Candidates not fulfilling these  requirements  may  nevertheless be  admit-
ted  if they  have  successfully completed  a  course  in  industrial medicine  at the 
Nederlands  Instituut voor  Preventieve Geneeskunde,  Leyden,  followed  by  a  term 
on  the  traumatological side at one  or  more  hospitals designated by  us,  or at 
large enterprises having  an  approved  medical  service  which  is called upon  to 
deal with substantial numbers  of casualties  :  this  term should  last between  five 
and  twelve  months" . 
. 2.  In  their capacity of  superv1s1on  the  health of  the  personnel,  colliery medical 
services  are  not  at present  covered  by  any  specific enactments or regulations, 
except with regard  to particular aspect  such  as  the  medical  examination of juve-
niles. 
Industrial health arrangements will,  however,  in  the  future  be  governed 
by  the  Act  of  February  19,  1959  (passed,  but  not  yet  in force),  an  instrument 
designed  to supplement  the  Safety Act  of  1934  and  the  Dock  Workers  Act,  and 
containing  a  number  of  provisions  concerning  sickness prevention  in enterprises. 
In  fact,  it merely  makes  statutory various  arrangements  which  in  the  main  are 
already standard practice  in the  larger enterprises. 
Sections 8a-8f of  the  new  Act  list the preventive  measures  to be  obser-
ved  in factories  and  workshops,  and  defines  the  functions  of  the  works  medical 
service as  follows  : 
a)  to  examine  new  entrants; 
b)  to examine  at regular  intervals men  whose  jobs expose  them  to particular 
hazards; 
c)  to examine  men  not  coming within categories  (a)  and  (b)  above; 
d)  to  submit  recommendations  concerning  prevention of occupational diseases; 
e)  to co-operate  on  accident  prevention; 
f)  to co-operate  on  functional  rehabilitation within  the enterprise; 
g)  to co-operate  on  prevention  and  suppression of  any  injurious effects to which 
workers  may  be  exposed  in  the  performance of  their duties  (e.g.  fumes,  gases, 
noxious  dusts or radiations); 
h)  to keep  a  check  on  working  conditions  (temperature,  humidity,  ventilation, 
dust concentration,  lighting,  noise,  cleanliness); 
i)  to keep  a  check on  any  injurious effects to which personnel  may  be  exposed 
as  a  result of  the  type  of  work  done,  the  hours  worked,  the  environment,  and 
the  pace  of  working  required  (effects of  team work,  of piece work,  and  of  the 
introduction of  automation); 
j)  to co-operate  towards  the  maintenance  of  good  industrial relations; 
k)  to be  available for  professional consultation at the enterprise; 
1)  to give first aid  in the event of  accident or illness,  submit  recommendations 
concerning  the organization of  and  recruitment of staff for  the first-aid 
service,  and  be  responsible for  the  training and  instruction of first-aid 
personnel; m)  to co-operate on  job analysis; 
n)  to co-operate  towards  reducing  absenteeism due  to illness; 
o)  to act  as  medical  advisers  to  insurance  and welfare organizations; 
p)  to  submit  any  other recommendations  and  take  any other action calculated to 
further  the  aims  and  objects of  Section  8  of  the  Act. 
The  Act  is not  actually to  apply  to  the  mining  industry,  but  the  latter 
is to be  covered  by  regulations  to  the  same  effect now  in preparation, 
E.  BELGIUM 
The  Act  of  July 15,  1957,  amending  the  consolidated Mines  and Quarries 
Acts  previously  in force,  includes  among  various other additions to these  a 
Section  76,  a  relating to  the organization of medical  services.  This provides 
that  the  King  may,  in order  to ensure that these operate correctly and efficiently, 
take all appropriate steps concerning the supervision,  control  and co-ordination 
of medical  services,  which  he  may  insist shall be  instituted at deep mines,  open-
cast mines  and  underground  quarries, 
The  Royal  Order  embodying  these measures  is in preparation,  but has not 
yet  been  promulgated.  At  present,  therefore,  there  is no  Act,  regulation or 
contractual provision concerning  the organization,  functions  and  departmental 
relations of  works  medical  services. 
Enterprises are,  however,  required to make  a  number  of  arrangements  in 
respect of  workers'  health under  the  Regent's Order  of  September  25,  1947,  laying 
down  general  rules as  to  industrial health arrangements  in deep  and  opencast 
mines  and  underground  quarries. 
In particular,  the order provides  that workers,  clerical and  technical 
personnel  and  apprentices  must  be  subjected  to health checks  under  the supervision 
of  the  Industrial Medical  Inspectorate  (Section 33).  These  are  to be  carried out 
at  the  expense  of  the  employers,  who  are  free  to  appoint  for  the  purpose  doctors 
and  medical bodies of  their own  choice.  They  include  : 
- a  medical  examination on  recruitment,  for  purposes  of selection 
in accordance with medical criteria; 
- for  juveniles up  to 21,  medical  examinations at regular  intervals to 
test their fitness  for  work; 
- examinations  for  symptoms  of occupational diseases. 
a)  Selection of  workers  in accordance  with medical criteria. 
Pre-entry examination  is compulsory  for all juveniles up  to 21,  and  for 
older workers  applying for  employment  below ground or on  any  other job in 
connection with which  examination for  symptoms  of  occupational disease is 
obligatory  (Section 36).  The  examination must  be  carried out not  more  than 
three months  before  the  man  starts work.  (Section 37). 
The  order specifies the measures,  clinical observations  and  tests of 
which  the  examination must  consist  (Section 39). 
All juveniles and all workers  applying for  employment  below  ground  in 
coalmines  must  in addition undergo  a  pre-entry chest  X-ray  examination.  Pros-
pective underground  workers  also have  their stools examined  under  the micros-
cope  as  a  prophylactic measure  against  hookworm:  this examination  is subse-
quently repeated  twice,  first between  the  thirtieth and  fortieth days  following, 
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and  seco~d between  the ninetieth and  hundredth days.  It has also to be  repea-
ted after any  period spent  in certain foreign countries  (Sections  40  and  40,a) 
b)  Periodic fitness tests 
The  eriodic health checks  for juveniles follow precisely the  same  lines 
as  the pre-entry examinations  Section 45).  They  must  be  repeated each year 
until the subject reaches  the  age  of  21,  at  intervals not  exceeding thirteen 
months  (Section 43). 
Examinations  for  symptoms  of occupational diseases are carried out on  all 
workers  whose  duties do.definitely expose  them  to  the risk of contracting such 
diseases  (Section 47). 
In  the case  of  the  coalmines,  the  pneumoconiosis  hazard  affects all wor-
kers regularly employed  below  ground.  They  are  examined every  two  years.  Regu-
lar rescue  workers  and  rescue  guides  are  examined  yearly.  The  examination must 
include  radioscopy or radiophotography of  the  lungs,  supplemented if necessary 
by  a  standard-format radiography.  The  latter is compulsory  in  the  case of  res-
cue workers  (Sections  48  and  50). 
Workers  employed  on  the  maintenance  and  replenishment of paraffin  lamps 
and  other  lamps  are  examined  twice  yearly for  signs of poisoning,  by oil or 
coal distillates  (Section 51). 
Examination for other occupational diseases  is carried out,  where  warran-
ted by  the  nature of  the work  performed,  on  the surface premises of  the collie-
ry.  Thus  the  personnel of  hard-coal briquetting-plants are  examined  every six 
months  for  "epitheliomatous skin complaints  and  other dermatoses"  ("pitch can-
cer")  (Section 52). 
Employers  are  required to keep  a  register of  the  workers  due  for  the va-
rious medical examinations,  and  to see  to it that each does  in fact  undergo 
exam~nation at the  proper  time  (Section 61). 
Workers  may  opt  to  have  the  regulation examinations  made  by  a  doctor of 
their own  choice,  outside working  hours  and  at their own  expense,  provided 
the doctor  abides strictly by  the  rules laid down  concerning  these  examina-
tions  (Section 63). 
The  regulations  in force  do  not  insist that  the  prescribed examinations 
shall be  carried out  by  medical  services within  the enterprise.  Nevertheless, 
most  Belgian collieries do  in fact  have  a  medical  service to carry out  these 
examinations  and  also to give first aid  to  injured workers.  In addition,  there 
are  a  number  of  inter-colliery institutions at which sick and  injured can re-
ceive  the  necessary care;  there  are also sanatoria. 
The  Institut d'Hygiene  des  Mines,  at Hasselt,  studies all matters connec-
ted with mineworkers'  health,  both on  the  technological  and  on  the  medical 
side.  The  public authorities also contribute financially to the efforts to 
promote  the health  and well-being of  the miners,  by  way  of  the National  Mine-
workers'  Fund,  which  is administered by  a  Board  consisting of  representatives 
of  the employers'  and  workers'  associations. 
F.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Legally,  only persons under  the  age  of  18  are  obliged to undergo  a  full 
pre-entry medical  examination. 
However,  quite apart  from  any statutory obligations,  the National Coal 
Board  has  established medical  centres which  carry out  these examinations,  and 
also examine  on  the Board's behalf all other prospective entrants to the  in-
dustry. Miners  of  any  age  may  at any  time consult the Board's doctors  and  are 
offered  a  chest X-ray  examination at five  yearly  intervals. 
A miner  refusing this examination  is not penalized  in  any·way. 
Rescue  workers  undergo  medical  examinations  once  a  year  :  in  their case 
this is compulsory. 
II 
DUTIES  AND  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  COLLIERY  MEDICAL  SERVICES 
A.  GERMANY 
The  colliery medical  services deal only with  the  physically fit.  They 
are  responsible  for  pre-entry medical  examinations  and  for  the regulation health 
check-ups  on  juveniles under  18  and  o~ adult workers  (for further details see III 
below).  On  the  basis of  these examinations  they submit  recommendations  as  to  the 
type of  work  to which  the  man  in question  is medically fit to  be  assigned. 
They  do  not  provide medical  care for either workers or their dependents, 
even  in  the  case of  workers  suffering from  injuries caused  by  an  accident or from 
occupational diseases. 
The  chief colliery medical officer supervises the first-aid posts which 
all collieries are required  by  the  mines  regulations  to establish  (see  VI,  A,  2 
below).  Where  necessary,  the  medical staff themselves  give first aid  in accidents. 
As  soon  as  this has  been  done,  casualties are  removed  forthwith  to  a  Bergbau-
Berufsgenossenschaft  (employers'  liability association)  hospital;  if they  are not 
detained  there,  they are  then referred to  the Knappschaft  (the miners'  friendly 
society),  and  can  obtain treatment  from  any  Knappschaft  doctor practising in 
their locality. 
The  Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft  is an  inter-colliery association esta-
blished  to cover  the  insurance risk  in respect of accidents  and  occupational 
diseases;  it is financed entirely by  the employers'  contributions,  but both  the 
employers  and  the  workers  are represented  on  the  Board  and  at the General Meeting. 
The  Knappschaft  is responsible,  among  other  things,  for miners'  health insurance. 
The  employers  furnish  50%  of  the contributions,  and  both sides are represented 
on  its Board  of  Management.  The  Knappschaft  has  a  panel of doctors  in the pro-
portion of  one  per 900-1,000  insured miners  :  the  miner  who  becomes  a  casualty 
can  choose  his doctor  from  the panel,  unless  he  is detained for  treatment at a 
hospital of  the Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft. 
The  colliery medical  service is never called upon  to decide  whether  a 
man  is fit or unfit for  work,  or for  how  long  he  is to be  rated unfit.  Sick  and 
injured workers  are entirely out of its hands until such  time  as  they return to 
work  :  when  that  time  comes,  the medical service sees  to it that  the  man  is assi-
gned  to duties  in keeping with his state of  health,  and  if necessary gradually 
brought  back  to the point at which  he  can be  put on  to his original job. 
B.  FRANCE 
The  colliery medical services are mainly concerned with the routine side 
of  industrial ·medicine,  i.e.  pre-entry medical  examinations  and  periodic health 
checks. 
In  some  coalfields,  however,  medical  services have  also been organized to 
treat workers  for  industrial injuries or occupational diseases,  though  not  for 
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injuries or diseases  incurred  away  from  work.  As  a  rule  these services operate 
separately  from  the  regular colliery medical  departments;  they  are,  moreover, 
asked  to  take over only  where  the patient so desires,  as  the  latter is left en-
tirely free  to  choose  his  own  doctor.  He  can  therefore opt  to receive  treatment 
either from  the colliery's own  hospital or  from  any  other hospital or medical 
practitioner he  may  prefer,  within  a  reasonable radius;  should  he  or his doctor 
request  a  specialist opinion,  this is duly  arranged without  regard  to distance. 
Where  the colliery medical officer is in charge of  a  case,  he  assesses 
the  man's  fitness or otherwise  and  fixes  the  length of  time  for  which  he  is to 
be  rated unfit.  In  the  event of  the patient's disagreeing,  an  independent  exa-
mination  is made,  during  which  the patient has  the  assistance of  a  doctor  appoin-
ted by  the  social-s~curity authorities.  Where  permanent  disability has  been sus-
tained,  its degree  is established direct by  such  a  doctor. 
C.  ITALY 
The  colliery medical  services operate exclusively within  the enterprise. 
Their  functions  are  mainly  preventive  (pre-entry medical  examinations,  periodic 
health checks,  hygiene,  health education,  welfare);  they  also give first aid  in 
accidents. 
They  do  not  as  a  rule provide definitive medical  care  for  sickness or 
1nJury,  whether  occupational  in origin or not  :  the patient himself  freely  chooses 
his doctor or hospital.  The  only case  in which  they  do  give  treatment  is where  a 
man  continues at work  notwithstanding  a  minor  illness or  injury. 
D.  NETHERLANDS 
The  colliery medical  services concern  themselves  with  the  routine aspects 
of  industrial medicine  (pre-entry medical  examinations  and  periodic health checks), 
with first aid  in accidents,  and  with  the  treatment of  industrial  injuries and 
occupational diseases;  they never undertake  the  treatment of  injuries or diseases 
of  non-occupational origin. 
The  patient is free  to choose  his doctor,  and  may  decline  to be  treated 
by  the colliery medical  service.  He  must  of  course,  go'  to  a  doctor  approved  by 
the social-security authorities,  but  they will approve  any  practitioner of  reco-
gnized professional qualifications;  there  is no official limit as  to  the  number 
of  doctors  he  may  consult.  Where  he  is treated by  his family  doctor,  however,  a 
doctor  appointed by  the  Rijksverzekeringsbank must  decide  as  to whether  he  is un-
fit for  work,  and  if so,  for.how  long.  Where  he  is treated by  the colliery medi-
cal service,  the  fitness  assessment  may  be  made  by  the medical officer for  a  pe-
riod not  exceeding six weeks,  provided certain conditions are fulfilled and  with 
the reservation that if the patient does  not  accept  the  findings  the  assessment 
shall be  made  by  the  Rijksverzekeringsbank's  doctor. 
E.  BELGIUM 
The  position varies considerably  from colliery to colliery. 
In  small  and  medium-size  enterprises,  the medical  department  is often 
required  to carry out  the  routine examinations,  to give first aid  and  even  to 
undertake  the  further  treatment of  injuries not  requiring hospitalization.  At 
big collieries,  on  the other hand  there are usually  two  separate departments, 
one  to carry out medical  examinations  and  the other  to deal with casualties. 
The  arrangements  as  regards caring for  and  checking up  on  those  on  the 
sick list vary-according  as  the  case  is one  of  industrial injury or of occupa-
tional disease.  Where  the  employer or his  insurance  company  operate  a  hospital 
and  pharmaceutical service at their own  expense,  a  miner  injured at work  is,  in 
certain circonstances,  not entitled to choose  his  own  doctor or pharmacist,  nor, 
if he  has  to  go  into hospital,  to choose  his  hospital.  The  employer or  insurance company  must,  however,  designate at least three doctors not  working  for  them,  to 
whom  the  patient may  apply for  the  continuance  and  supervision of  the  treatment 
originally prescribed  and  applied,  and  for  assessment of his  incapacity for  work. 
Where  neither  the  employer  nor  his  insurance  company  has  any  sucn  arrangement, 
the patient  is free  to  choose  his doctor  and  pharmacist;  his choice of hospital 
is,  however,  limited  to  a  list approved  by  the  Government. 
If the patient  is not  free  to choose  his doctor,  he  may  nominate  a  doctor 
to keep  an  eye  on  his  treatment;  if he  is so free,  the  employer  or  insurance  com-
pany  have  the  same  right. 
Sufferers  from  occupational diseases  are entitled to choose  their doctor. 
F.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
The  National Coal  Board's medical  services are  concerned with  preventive 
medical  services  and  check-ups only  :  they  do  not  provide curative medical treat-
ment  of  any  sort other  than "first aid".  All  miners  injured  in occupational acci-
dents  immediately  come  under  the National  Health Service  :  either the  man  is put 
in  the  charge of his  own  doctor,  who  decides  whether  he  should be  sent  to hospi-
tal or not,  or  he  is sent direct to hpspital  and  the hospital authorities there-
upon  notify his doctor. 
The  certificate of  incapacity for  work  is given  by  the patient's doctor 
on  his  own  responsibility.  If dishonesty  is suspected,  the Ministry of  Health may 
have  the certificate investigated;  in practice,  however,  it does  so only if the 
patient appeals  against  the doctor's ruling. 
III 
NATURE,  SCOPE  AND  OBJECT  OF  EXAMINATIONS  EFFECTED 
It proved  somewhat  of  a  problem to define  the basic criteria adopted  for 
pre-entry medical  examinations. 
There  are  two  possibilities 
a)  the  examination  may  be  directed  to establishing whether  the applicant 
is medically fit for  a  particular job below  ground  to which  it is 
planned  to assign  him; 
b)  the  aim may  be  merely  to ascertain whether  the  man  is fit for under-
ground  employment  generally  (in which  case it remains  to establish by 
what  yardstick this general fitpess  is to  be  assessed). 
In any event,  of course,  it has  to be  determined whether  the applicant 
is sufficiently strong and well  to stand  up  to  the  work  below  ground. 
At  the  same  time,in addition to observing this fundamental  rule,  the  po-
licy adopted  by  the colliery medical  service  in  regar~ to its system of pre-entry 
examinations  has  necessarily to take  into  account  a  n~mber of points,  e.  g.  : 
a)  what  type of  work  is envisaged; 
b)  whether  the  applicant  has  ever worked  below ground before; 
c)  what  the enterprise's regular policy is regarding recruitment  and 
job assignment. 
Thus  where  the entrant is a  craftsman,  and particularly if he  already 
has  some  underground  experience,  it is easier to gain  a  clear  idea of  the  standard 
of physical fitness  he will require  in order.to do it. 
Where  apart  from  craftsmen the colliery is interested only  in recruiting 
men  for  actual coal-winning,  and  finally assigns  them to their jobs  some  time  after 
they  have  been  signed on,  the  medical service must  make  it a  rule  to assess 
13 applicants'  fitness with reference  to the  demands  of this particular type of work; 
where  men  are  not  being recruited for  coal-winning  and  assignment  takes place 
forthwith,  the  medical  service may  apply different criteria,  less strict on  some 
points,  and  more strict on others. 
The  following  subsection,  in addition  to listing various  prov1s1ons  which 
are obligatory  in all circumstances,  gives  a  few  particulars concerning the  ge-
neral principles usually  followed  in pre-entry medical  selection. 
A.  GERMANY 
1.  All  miners  are required  to undergo medical  examination  on  recruitment  and at 
regular  intervals thereafter.  Additional examinations  are  also carried out 
before  a  worker  is put  on  to certain special jobs. 
2.  The  pre-entry medical  examination  is not  made  with  a  view  to selection for 
specific  types of  work.  The  competent  authority's directives require  that 
applicants shall be  examined  as  to their constitution and  general health, 
and  that  in the  case of  juveniles due  account shall be  taken of  the fact 
that  they  are still in process of  physical development. 
In practice,  it is expected of all applicants  for  work  below  ground  that 
they should be  physically fit to be  employed  as  hewers  if necessary,  though 
exceptions may  be  made  in respect  of certain craftsmen. 
The  worker  has  to undergo  a  further special examination before he  is 
appointed  to be  for  example  a  winding  engineman,  engine-driver or  member  of 
a  rescue  crew,  or  is put  on  to  a  job requiring particular physical qualifi-
cations,  such as exceptionally good  colour perception or exceptionally quick 
and  reliable reflexes.  This special examination  is medico-psychological or 
psychotechnical,  and  is  intended to establish whether  the  subject possesses 
the requisite qualities for  the  work  in question. 
3.  The  pre-entry examination  includes  a  detailed clinical examination,  particu-
lar attention being given  to  the  blood  composition  and  sedimentation rate. 
4.  The  statutory routine  health checks  on  juveniles under  18  must  be  carried 
out  at least once  a  year;  adult workers  may  be  examined  at  intervals of  any-
thing between one  and  three  years  as  the medical officer may  see fit,  or,  in 
consideration of particular circumstances,  oftener. 
B.  FRANCE 
As  in Germany,  colliery medical services carry out  pre-entry examinations, 
periodic preventive checks,  and  where  appropriate special fitness  tests before 
assigning workers  to specific jobs. 
The  usual  yardstick  in pre-entry examinations  is whether  the  applicant  is 
physically fit for  employment  as  a  hewer  :  as  this is one  of  the  most  arduous 
of  the  underground  occupations,  any  worker  graded  as suitable for it may  be 
presumed  to be  in all probability physically able  to undertake  any  job under-
ground  which  does  not  demand  extra  individual faculties requiring to be  as-
certained by  special examination. 
C.  ITALY 
The  object of pre-entry medical  examination  is to establish whether  the 
applicant  is physically fit for  work  in  the pits  (Decree  of  April  9,  1959, 
Section 648).  The  examination  includes  thorough clinical examination;  addi-
tional examinations  may  be  prescribed by  the Mines  Inspectorate,  in addition 
to which  the Ministry may  require,  by  order,  that men  to be  assigned  to jobs 
demanding  special physical  and  psychical qualities  in particular types of 
mines  and  quarries shall undergo  a  psychotechnical  as well  as  a  medical examination.  The  nature of  the jobs  in question  and  the  form  to be  taken  by 
the psychotechnical examinations  for  them  are  to be specified by  the Ministry 
of  Industry after consultation with  the  Industrial Medical  Inspectorate. 
Miners  are subsequently  re-examined  annually  to check whether  they are 
still fit for  their particular jobs, 
D.  NETHERLANDS 
1.  The  pre-entry medical  examination is designed,  firstly,  to ascertain the ap-
plicant's state of health,  and  secondly,  to establish whether  he  is generally 
fit for  employment  at the  mines.  With  regard  to the  second aspect,  a  distinc-
tion is made  between  prospective underground  and  prospective surface workers 
The  General  Regulation governing medical examinations requires  that to be 
accepted for  employment  below ground  the applicant must  be  passed as fit for 
all underground occupations.  It is, of  course,  always possible thereafter to 
assign  him  to an  occupation which will  in fact not  demand  such a  testing 
standard of physical fitness. 
Where  a  surface worker  is transferred to underground duties,  he  has  to 
undergo  a  second  examination. 
2.  All  workers,  underground  and  surface,  undergo  an  X-ray examination at inter-
vals of  16-17 months. 
3.  Workers  on  jobs  involving special hazards or demanding special physical qua-
lities undergo additional examinations. 
E.  BELGIUM 
1.  Mineworkers  have  to undergo 
a)  a  pre-entry medical examination; 
b)  yearly or twice-yearly re-examinations; 
c)  where  appropriate,  special selective examinations  for specific jobs. 
2.  The  pre-entry examination is designed  to test the applicant's fitness for all 
types of underground  work  :  the  examining doctor may,  however,  grade  him  as fit 
only up  to a  point,  i.e. fit for  some  underground  jobs but not for all. 
3.  The  object of  the periodic check-ups  is to detect any  symptoms  of certain 
diseases such as  tuberculosis  and silicosis,  and  to establish whether  the 
subject  is still fully fit, or,  as  the  case may  be,  whether  he  is fit for 
particular types of  work  below ground,  with  a  view to reclassifying him  in 
a  more  suitable occupation. 
4.  Some  collieries arrange selective examinations for  men  whom  it is planned to 
appoint  to supervisory or safety posts.  Such examinations  always  take place 
quite  a  considerable  time after first employment,  since only miners of  some 
seniority are so appointed. 
5.  Some  medical services conduct  psychotechnical or psychological tests as part 
of  the selective examination.  Some  also have  apprentices  and  trainees from 
the  mining colleges so tested when  they start at the colliery. 
F.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
1.  The  only medical examination required by statute is the pre-entry examination 
of all young  miners  under  18  years of age.  Those  accepted are classified either 
as fit for  any  employment  at a  mine  or as fit for specific types of work  only; 
cases  in the  latter grade  may  be  reviewed after a  few  months  for possible 
upgrading. 
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2.  The  National Coal  Board  also arranges pre-entry examinations  for  new  entrants 
over  18,  though this is not  obligatory. 
3.  Similarly,  all miners  are offered  a  periodic chest  X-ray  examination,  at 
about  five  yearly  intervals;  about  95%  of  them  respond. 
4.  Annual  examinations  are  also conducted  for  purposes  of silicosis research 
the  subjects,, all volunteers,  number  some  35,000. 
Pre-entry examinations  are  always  carried out  with  an  eye  to  the  parti-
cular  type  of  work  for  which  the  entrant has  applied;  the  medical officer's 
assessment  may  vary considerably according  to  the  job concerned. 
Where  a  man  changes  his  job  and  the  new  assignment  may  involve  a  risk 
to others,  he  may  be  asked,  to  undergo  a  further  examination.  This  may  also 
be  done  during  the  training period  (which  extends  over  several  months)  if 
the  instructor considers  that  the  man  is not  up  to  the  standard of fitness 
required.  Such  examinations  are  compulsory,  but  those  refusing  them will not 
be  given  any  new  assignment  involving  a  risk to others. 
IV 
MINERS  REQUIRED  TO  UNDERGO  EXAMINATION 
A.  GERMANY 
All  applicants  for  employment  at collieries must  undergo  the  pre-entry 
medical  examination prescribed by  the Oberbergffmter  (Divisional Mines  Inspecto-
rates). 
All  mineworkers  also undergo  the  periodic  health checks  (under-18s 
yearly;  adults at  intervals fixed  by  the  medical  officer concerned  up  to  a 
maximum  of  three  years).  These  are  actually statutory only  in  the  case  of  under-
ground  workers  and  specified categories of  surface  workers,  including more  par-
ticularly men  whose  duties  have  to do  with  tar,  coke-oven  masons  and  screenman; 
regular medical  examination of other surface  personnel  is required  by  the  col-
lieries'  own  regulations. 
Workers ~nd applicants)  cannot  be  compelled  to undergo  these  examina-
tions,  but  anyone  refusing would  be  dismissed  (or  not  engaged). 
In  the  Saar all colliery personnel,  underground  and  surface,  are  me-
dically examined  every  two  to  three  years. 
B.  FRANCE 
The  examination  provided  for  by  law  (see  I  above)  are  compulsory  for all 
mineworkers  and  would-be  mineworkers,  both underground  and  surface.  Any  person 
refusing examination would  be  dismissed,  or  would  not  be  considered  for  employ-
ment,  as  the  case  might  be. 
C.  ITALY 
Since  January  1,  1960,  the  position  has  been  the  same  as  in France, D.  NETHERLANDS 
Pre-entry medical  examination  is compulsory  for all;  periodic check-ups 
are  compulsory  for all underground  and  some  surface workers.  This  regulation 
is not  as  yet statutory,  but stems  from  the collieries•  own  decision  not  to 
engage  or  continue  employing  any  person  refusing examination. 
E.  BELGIUM 
Pre-entry medical  examination  is compulsory  for all workers  whom  it is 
planned  to employ  below  ground,  and  for all those  under  2l,wherever  they  are 
to  work.  Examination  for  certain occupational diseases  is also compulsory  for 
the particular workers  concerned. 
F.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Applicants  for  work  at collieries declining to undergo  the pre-entry 
examination would  be  refused  employment. 
Miners  refusing  the  periodic .check-ups  (chest  X-ray examination)  are  not 
penalized  in  any  way;  no  action  is taken unless  they  are  actually  a  danger  to 
others,  as  for  instance  in cases  of  tuberculosis.  If  a  man  applies  to  the na-
tional  insurance  authorities claiming  to  be  suffering from silicosis and  his 
claim is accepted,  the  National Coal  Board  is notified  and  may  insist that  he 
be  medically  examined. 
v 
NUMBER  OF  DOCTORS  EMPLOYED 
A.  GERMANY 
The  medical  services  in  the  Ruhr  and  Aachen  coalfields employ  one full-
time  medical  officer for  about  4,000 underground  workers.  Some  small collie-
ries have  the  regulation pre-entry examination  performed by doctors  working 
for  them part-time. 
In  the  Saar,  where  the colliery labour  force  numbers  54,000.  (39 ,000 un-
derground  workers  and  15,000 surface),  there are  three  full-time  medical of-
ficers,  21  part-time colliery doctors  and  14  doctors  working part-time on 
preventive silicosis radiography. 
B.  FRANCE 
The  Nord/Pas-de-Calais  medical  services employ  43  doctors  for  a  total of 
about  120,000 workers;  wi~h a  few  exceptions,  however,  these doctors  deal pu-
rely with  the  occupational side proper.  The  proportion  in fact  works  out  much 
the  same  as  for  the  Ruhr  and  Aachen  coalfields. 
C.  ITALY 
Since  January  1,  1960,  all collieries employing  more  than  100 workers  on 
the main shift have  been  required  to run  medical  services of  their own  (usual-
ly on  a  part-time basis). 
Collieries employing  more  than  200  workers  on  the  main  shift or more 
than  500  living permanently  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  may  be  required  by 
the  Industrial Medical  Inspector  to  have  their doctor also living permanently 
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near  by,  which  may  result  in their setting up  a  full-time medical  service. 
D.  NETHERLANDS 
The  Dutch coalmining  industry has  a  full-time medical staff of  18  for  a 
total of  60,000 workers  (divided more  or less equally between underground  and 
surface duties);  of  these,  11  are  general practitioners  and  7  specialists,  in-
cluding 4  lung specialists.  It also  has  four  part-time consultant specialists. 
The  bigger collieries also  have  psychological services for  the examina-
tion of all applicants for  employment. 
The  proportion  is thus  one  full-time doctor  for  about 3,300 workers. 
E.  BELGIUM 
Considerable differences exist between  the Campine  and  the coalfields in 
the  south of  the  country.  The  latter are  worked  by  a  large  number  of  independent 
collieries,  most  of which  do  not  have  a  medical  officer actually on  their staff  : 
no  valid comparison  is therefore possible between  the  number  of doctors employed 
in their medical  services  and  the  numbers  indicated for  the Campine  and  the other 
countries surveyed. 
The  Campine  has  7  large collieries employing  a  total of  some  40,000 men. 
Their regular medical staff consists of  11  doctors  employed full-time,  including 
3  surgeons  and  2  specialists,  together with  9  doctors  employed  part-time,  whose 
combined services represent  approximately  the  work  of  three full-time  medical 
officers.  The  proportion  thus  works  out at one  doctor for  about  2 1800  workers. 
F.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
The  National Coal  Board  employs  80 full-time doctors  for  preventive medi-
cal work  only,  for  a  total labour  force  of  over  600,000  :  the  average  is thus  one 
doctor  for 8,000 workers. 
As  regards curative medical  treatment,  all mineworkers  are on National 
Health Service panels;  no  National  Health Service doctor is allowed  to accept 
more  than 3,000 panel patients. 
VI 
MATERIAL  MEANS  PROVIDED  FOR  DOCTORS 
The  particulars on  this subject are  in  the  nature of  the  case  very diffi-
cult to summarize.  To  give specialists the opportunity to compare  their own  various 
items of equipment  with those used  elsewhere,  these  would  have  to  be  described  in 
great detail.  The  Working  Party feels it preferable to confine itself to a  more  ge-
neral account,  further details to be  obtained by on-the-spot  inspection. 
Comparison  is rendered still more  difficult by  the differing extents to 
which colliery medical services are  able  to make  use  of equipment  available  in or 
near  the mining  areas or to refer to consultants possessing  the requisite equipment 
themselves,  and  also  the  fact  that  in some  cases outside doctors are allowed  the use 
of  medical  equipment  primarily provided for  the benefit of the collieries. 
Colliery medical  services  have,  moreover,  to be  equipped  in accordance 
with  the  laws  and  regulations  in force,  with  local conditions,  and  with  the special 
requirements  of  the  individual collieries. A.  GERMANY 
1.  Routine  occupational medicine 
a)  Ruhr  and  Aachen  coalfields 
Every  colliery of  medium  or  large size  (employing  3,000 - 10,000 men)  has 
a  health-service block,  comprising 
- offices keeping very  comprehensive  records  (X-ray files and  a  card-index 
with health-record card for  each worker); 
- changing-rooms; 
- examination  rooms; 
-X-ray equipment  for  large-format radiographs  (36  1/2  x  36  1/2 em.,  i.e. 
not  for  the  radiophotographic  process); 
- a  laboratory for  the  standard blood,  urine  and  excreta  analyses; 
- a  diagnosis section for  functional  exploration,  more  particularly by 
means  of  electrocardiograms. 
The  collieries  in  these  areas  do.  not  have  psychotechnical departments of 
their own,  but  there  is close co-operation between  them  and  the  psychotechni-
cal departments  of  the  social-insurance organizations. 
They  also maintain  close relations with  the  research centres run  by  the 
social-insurance  institutions,  especially with  the Silicosis Research Centre 
in Bochum,  and  also with research centres dealing with dust  and  its preven-
tion  and  suppression. 
b)  Saar 
The  Saar collieries do  not  have  these special health-service blocks.  Each 
pit has  a  dressing-station with  an  examination  room  and  equipment  for carry-
ing out  the  standard tests  and  analyses,  but  no  laboratory or X-ray  equipment. 
There  is a  mobile  X-ray unit with  a  10 x  10 em.  camera  and  a  mobile  medi-
cal unit equipped with  radiography electrocardiography and  laboratory facili-
ties. 
There  is also  a  central psychotechnical service;  psychotechnical tests are, 
however,  prescribed only  for  winding  enginemen. 
2.  First aid 
All districts below  ground  have  first-aid posts,  at which  the  necessary dres-
sing  and  bandaging kit,  together with splints,  blankets  and  stretchers,  must 
be  permanently available.  Men  specially trained by  the colliery medical offi-
cers  have  to  be  on  hand  on  every shift to give  first aid  and  get casualties 
to  the surface when  necessary.  Every pit has  a  dressing-station at the sur-
face;  the extent of  the  equipment  depends  on  the  number  of miners  employed. 
The  rule  is that  the dressing-stations are staffed by full-time medical-
room  attendants  :  these  must  either be  registered male  nurses or have  comple-
ted  a  three-month  training course  at  a  Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft hospital. 
The  dressing-stations  have all necessary  first-aid equipment,  ans  also 
artificial-respiration apparatus. 
The  Ruhr  and  Aachen collieries also have  their own  ambulances  to take 
casualties to hospital;  in  the  Saar  injured miners  are  transported  in ambu-
lances belonging to  the social-insurance institutions. 
Surgical cases are treated  in  the Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft's own 
hospitals or in hospitals under contract  to it. 
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Minor  casualties who  are  able  to continue at work,  or need  only  to  take 
it easy  for  a  few  days,  are  treated  in  the colliery's dressing-station or 
health-service wing.  The  medical  wings  also have  physiotherapy departments, 
with  balneotherapy and  ray-treatment sections attached,  and  with  a  staff of 
masseurs  and  masseuses,  for  the  treatment of casualties who  are still fit 
for  work.  In  the  Saar  there  are  no  such arrangements  :  physiotherapy is car-
ried out at the  local hospitals. 
In  the  Ruhr  rehabilitation of major  casualties  is mostly effected at 
hospitals of  the Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft or  the  social-insurance insti-
tutions.  Some  work  is,  however,  also done  in this connection  in collieries' 
own  health-service blocks,  which  have  very sizeable physiotherapy departments 
for  this purpose.  In addition,  the collieries organize occupational  therapy 
in cases where  the patient's condition permits. 
The  smaller Ruhr  and  Aachen  collieries have  no  medical  installations of 
their own,  all arrangements  in this connection being made  by  neighbouring 
hospitals.  The  hospitals  have  the  necessary equipment  for  carrying out  the 
regulation pre-entry examinations  and  periodic check-ups,  and  for  treating 
casualties. 
B.  FRANCE 
The  following  is an  account of  the position  in  the  Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
coalfield,  which  is taken  as  a  typical  example. 
1.  Routine  occupational medicine 
Each colliery group  in  the coalfield has  one  or more  "medical  and  social-
welfare centres".  These  vary  in size  and  number  according  to  the  geographi-
cal distribution of  the pits within  the  group  and  the  number  of  men  they 
employ. 
In addition  to  their administrative  and  records offices,  the  centres 
have 
- waiting-rooms  and  cubicles for  changing; 
- consulting-rooms equipped with all necessary medical  appliances,  in-
cluding radioscopic  apparatus; 
- a  central X-ray department  for  standard-size films,  as  required by  the 
decrees  on  prevention,  and  also for  tomography,  enlargement  and  other 
specialized processes; 
- a  functional-exploration  department  for  testing the  respiratory func-
tion at rest  and  during effort; 
- an electrocardiograph department. 
Most  groups  have  laboratories at which all the standard biological  and 
bacteriological  investigations can  be  made. 
The  psychotechnical services do  not  form part of  the  medical services, 
but  can  be  consulted  by  them at any  time. 
At  coalfield level,  there is the  Mining  Medicine  Research Centre,  which 
though primarily concerned with research does  also carry out  routine exami-
nations.  Among  other  things,  it is responsible  for carrying out X-ray  exa-
minations  for  the entire coalfield  :  once  a  year all personnel  are so exa-
mined,  by  a  mobile unit consisting of  a  van  equipped with radiophotographic 
apparatus  including  a  mirror-reflex camera  taking 2  3/4  x  2  3/4  in.  films, 
which  are  then  developed  by  the Centre.  The  results are read  and  interpre-
ted by  the colliery groups,  to enable decisions  to be  taken as quickly as 
possible. The  Centre  also  has  laboratories  in which,  quite ·apart  from research,  it 
is able  to carry out  sometimes  very highly specialized investigations  in con-
nection with biology, ·bacteriology  and  morbid  anatomy,  which  could not  be  per-
formed  in laboratories of  the ordinary kind. 
In addition,  the Centre  compiles  the dust survey  for  the coalfield  :  to 
it are  channelled all the results of  dust  sampling done  in  the  workings  of 
each colliery group  in  the coalfield. 
2.  Curative medical  treatment 
All  necessary first-aid equipment,  including artificial-respiration appa-
ratus,  is available  in  the workings. 
All  supervisory personnel  now  receive first-aid training;  in addition, 
each  team of miners  includes one or more  highly-trained rescue  men. 
At  every pithead  there  is a  dressing-station,  in  the  charge  of  a  quali-
fied  hospital attendant,  or failing that,  of  a  man  specially trained for  this 
duty  by  the colliery medical  service. 
There  is of  course also  an  ambulance  service.  Practically every group 
has  its own  hospital;  one  group  has  two.  The  two  groups  which  are not so pro-
vided  are both situated close  to  a  large city,  and  have  special agreements 
with municipal hospitals under  which sections are  reserved exclusively for 
mining casualties. 
Each  group has  one  or more  clinics at which  minor  surgery not necessita-
ting hospitalization can  be  performed. 
The  hospitals  and  clinics in question  have  rehabilitation departments 
for  the  less seriously  injured,  who  do  not  actually need  to be  hospitalized 
at  a  rehabilitation centre proper.  These  departments also begin  the rehabili-
tation of  more  serious cases  in the ward,  when  the partient's condition does 
not  allow  him  to be  transferred to  a  specialized centre.  · 
The  hospitals and  clinics also have  physiotherapy departments,  whose  ser-
vices  include electrotherapy and  all the  various other kinds of  physical 
treatment.  In  addition,  they  have  thoroughly up-to-date operative  and  X-ray 
equipment. 
There  are  a  nu1nber  of burns  sections which  take  cases of  medium  gravity 
and  cases not  in  a  condition to  be  moved  to  the ultra-specialized burns units. 
(Other  cases  are  flown  by  the  Air Force  to specialized units,  such  as  those 
at Lyons,  Paris  and  Merlebach).  There  are  four  burns  sections,  all attached 
to colliery hospitals;  they  are so  located that one  or other of  them  can be 
reached  quickly  from  any  point  in  the coalfield. 
A rehabilitation centre was  opened  in  1950  :  it can  take  90 patients, 
and  has  treated since its inception a  total of  approximately 2,000 cases. 
C.  ITALY 
The  medical facilities at the  larger collieries are usually as follows 
1)  a  waiting-room; 
2)  the secretariat of  the colliery medical  service,  which  is responsible 
for  assembling all data  and  keeping each worker's medical file up  to 
date.  The  file comprises  the card recording the man's  pre-entry medi-
cal examination,  a  register of his periodic check-ups,  and  the cards 
indicating the results of his X-rays examinations. 
In  the secretariat,  the medical officer makes  out certificates and 
compiles  the  accident  and  sickness returns.  Some  enterprises have  a 
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system of health record books  showing all details of  the worker's pre-entry 
clinical and  radiographical examination,  the  findings of his annual  check-
ups,  and  a  chronological  summary  of his  accidents  and  illnesses; 
3)  a  changing-room and bath or shower,  sometimes  necessary for  purposes of  me-
dical examination; 
4)  a  surgery with a  separate room  for  chemica-microscopic  analyses  and  X-ray 
equipment  for performing  the various supplementary examinations  in connection 
with  the pre-entry examination  and  subsequent  check-ups; 
5)  a  first-aid room  for casualties,  with operating facilities  and  all necessary 
first-aid equipment,  including artificial-respiration and  oxygen-therapy  ap-
paratus; 
6)  a  sick-bay to accommodate  casualties pending  removal  to  a  hospital of  the 
.social-insurance institutions; 
7)  an  ambulance  to take major casualties to hospital as  quickly as possible. 
These big health service blocks  are  sometimes  the size of  a  small  hospi-
tal;  the medium-sized collieries,  however,  have  only  a  first-aid station with 
surgical facilities and usually with  a  waiting-room and  consulting-room attached. 
Small collieries have  a  first-aid post with waiting-room. 
All casualties,  from  above  or below  ground,  go  or are  taken  to  the medi-
cal block or to the first-aid station.  Underground  casualties who  cannot walk 
are first taken  by stretcher to one  of  the first-aid posts which  are  located at 
various points below ground  :  these  have  medical kit and  collapsible stretchers 
available,  with a  qualified or at  any  rate  a  trained first-aid man  in charge. 
Where  the medical officer himself  is needed  below  ground,  he  goes  accompanied 
by  a  medical-room attendant  who  brings with  him  a  case containing the  necessary 
emergency  instruments  and  drugs. 
Many  collieries have  organized panels of  blood donors,  so  that  they  are 
able not  only  to have  serum and  human  plasma  permanently  available,  but  to per-
form  blood  transfusions more  quickly. 
In  addition to  these  health service blocks,  which  are  found  at all col-
lieries,  and  are  in  the  charge  of  a  doctor assisted by  not  less  than  three medi-
cal-rooms  attendants,  the  group of pits owned  by  the Montecatini  Company  has  mo-
bile teams  equipped for  radiological examinations  and  functional  tests of  the 
cardia-circulatory and  respiratory systems,  for  measuring  and  analysing gases 
and  dusts below ground,  and  recording temperature,  humidity  and  so on.  These 
teams,  which  are made  up  of specialists in  industrial medicine,  chemists  and 
doctors,  co-operate with  the collieries'  technical departments  and  safety  and 
health committees  in organizing their periodic medical  check-ups  and  inspections 
of working  conditions. 
As  was  explained earlier,  after first-aid has  been  provided  by  the  em-
ployer  the  care of both sick and  injured miners  is the responsibility of  the 
State social-insurance authorities,  who  arrange  for  the patients to be  given 
the necessary  treatment  in the  hospitals  to which  they  have  been sent. 
D.  NETHERLANDS 
The  colliery medical  services do  not  provide curative  treatment;  they 
are,  however,  equipped with  the  following  facilities 
- waiting-rooms; 
- first-aid  rooms  with sterilizing facilities; 
- rooms  set aside for  minor  surgery; 
- X-ray equipment  which  must  meet  specified requirements  (among  other 
things,  it has  to be  powerful  enough  to  take side exposures); 
- a  kinesi-therapy apparatus,  which  is particularly valuable  in rehabi-
litation. Blood  transfusions  and  oxygen  therapy can also be'provided. 
Very  bad casualties which  cannot be dealt with at the colliery are sent 
to hospitals  in  the district.  The  general hospital at Heerlen,· with 824  beds, 
has  a  main  section for  accident victims,  which  is under  the  Mines  Medical  Ser-
vice.  The  hospital  has all the facilities for full specialist treatment of 
injuries  (by  neurologists,  neural  surgeons,  etc.).  It also  has  a  health de-
partment,  one  of whose  main  functions  is audiometry,  and  which  is accordingly 
provided with soundproof  rooms. 
For  purposes of silicosis prevention,  periodic X-ray examinations  are 
carried out  with  a  70  nun.  camera  mounted  on  a  Philips-Monza  attachment.  This 
apparatus  can  be  quickly dismantled  and  reassembled  in  a  special room  pro-
vided for  the  purpose at every colliery;  by  this n1eans  it is possible to 
effect a  much  larger number  of examinations  in a  given  time  than with  the 
same  equipment  installed in a  van  (150 examinations  an  hour). 
All data concerning silicosis prevention and  preventive examinations  are 
assembled at  the medical centre at Heerlen,  and all films  are developed  there. 
These duties are performed  by  a  single  team,  in order  to avoid possible dif-
ferences  in  interpretation such  as  might  occur if larger numbers  of  investi-
gators were  employed. 
The  medical centre also examines miners suffering from silicosis to esta-
blish whether  they are fit to work.  These  examinations are  thus  the  responsi-
bility of  the  industry's medical  service and  of  the  Rijksverzekeringsbank;how-
ever  ,  only  the  latter decides  as  to  the  granting of  any disability pension. 
The  medical centre also examines  for allergies,  to check  how  the  indivi-
dual patient reacts  to silicosis. 
Finally,  the  centre  is equipped  to  investigate  the  curative potentiali-
ties of  the  treatment of  miners suffering  from  lung complaints,  and  to ascer-
tain which  complaints  are  in fact silicotic in character and  which,.  though  not 
actually silicotic,  are  akin  to silicosis or caused  by  the subject's occupa-
tion.  Aerosols  and  other equipment  are available. 
E.  BELGIUM 
Colliery health blocks  include  a  laboratory for  the  analysis of stools 
to check  for  hookworm;  in  most  cases  the  laboratory is also equipped  with 
a  standard-type spirometer.  If fuller spirometric exploration is necessary, 
the subject  is sent to one  of  the research establishments which  conduct 
comprehensive  examinations  (analysis of  blood gases,  respiration tests at 
rest  and  during effort).  This  is done,  in particular,  at the  Institut 
d'Hygiene  des  Mines  in Hasselt,  which  is at the service of all colliery 
medical officers. 
For  X-ray  examinations,  practically all collieries have either radiophoto-
graphic  equipment  or radiographic  apparatus  for  taking  large-format  films. 
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In  the Liege  area,  however,  most  collieries confine  themselves  to radioscopic 
examinations,  without  taking films,  though  some  do  have  radiophtographic 
equipment,  and  others practise large-format radiography. 
Most  of  the  radiophotographic  installations consist of G.E.C.  cameras 
producing  10 x  12  em.  films,  the  largest small-format  film  on  the market. 
The  present  trend,  however,  is towards  the  employment of  the  70  x  70  mm. 
mirror-reflex camera,  or better still the  100 x  100  mm. 
Some  medical centres also conduct psychological examinations,  but not 
systematically;  these  have  not  yet  become  standard usage. 24 
Some  centres make  it their regular practice to  have  audiometric  tests 
effected as part of  the  pre-entry medical  examination  and  periodic health 
checks,  to ascertain whether  the men's  hearing  is being  affected by  condi-
tions  on  their particular jobs. 
Belgium's  main  pneumoconiosis  research centre  is the  Hasselt  institut 
d'Hygiene,  which  possesses  the  very  latest equipment  and  is under  the  su-
perv1s1on  of  a  team of University professors of  medecine.  Its co-operation 
is always  available  to colliery doctors. 
2.  Curative medical  treatment 
As  a  general  rule,  curative  treatment of  the sick is at  the  expense  of 
the  social-security institutions,  and  is not  given  by  the colliery medical 
services  :  the  latter are  thus  to all intents  and  purposes  required only 
to give first aid  to  accident casualties. 
Below  ground  there are  always  rescue  men  and  rescuer's mates  trained to 
give  the  elements  of first aid. 
At  the  surface every colliery has  a  sick-bay with all facilities  for  the 
treatment of  injuries  and  for  first aid.  Casualties are  then sent  to  a  sur-
gical centre either run  by  the colliery or  serving several collieries 
simultaneously.  These  are  traumatological  centres with orthopaedic  surgeons 
in charge.  The  majority of  them  have  a  rehabilitation section staffed by 
masseurs  and  kinesi-therapists,  and  equipped  for  the  provision of  any  ne-
cessary physiotherapy. 
F.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
The  coalfields of  the  United  Kingdom  are  divided  into eight main Divi-
sions with approximately  100 collieries  in each. 
The  medical centre  in each Division  is in  the  charge of  a  Divisional  Me-
dical Officer.  Equipment  includes  fixed  X-ray  apparatus  and  mobile units 
taking  large-format  films.  There  are  also filing-cabinets  in  which all the 
X-ray  films  are  kept. 
The  Divisional centre works  in co-operation with  the  hospitals  and  Uni-
versities.  Centres  are responsible  only  for  carrying out  pre-entry medical 
examinations  and  keeping  records;  no  medical  treatment  is given. 
Each  centre covers  several  Areas;  these  are under  Area  Medical  Officers, 
and  each  is equipped  to  perform medical  and  clinical examinations,  but  not 
X-rays  or  laboratory analyses. 
Each  colliery has  its medical  block,  the  equipment  at  which  varies  accor-
ding  to  the  number  of  miners  employed.  At  collieries employing  800  men  or 
more  the  medical  block consists of  5-7  rooms;  a  State Registered Nurse  is  in 
charge,  and  there  are consulting-rooms  for  the  Area  Medical Officers,  There 
is no  X-ray  apparatus,  equipment  for  physiological examinations,  electro-
cardiograph or  laboratory. 
The  National Coal  Board carries on  extensive medical  research  :  by  mobile 
X-ray units,  one  major  project  now  in  hand  involves  the  annual  X-ray  exami-
nation of  some  35,000 miners  at  25  representative collieries in all parts of 
the  country,  and  the collection of detailed records,  in particular on  the 
conditions under  which each man  has  been  working  (dust  concentration,  etc,), 
This  research is to extend over  at least 10 years. Research  on  occupational diseases is also  in progress;  in addition,  the 
Coal  Board  makes  substantial funds  available for  this purpose  to the Uni-
versities  and  to various  private organizations. 
2.  Curative medical  treatment 
All collieries employing  100 or more  persons  below  ground  are  required by 
statute  to  have  a  medical  block with  a  specified minimum  equipment. 
On  all underground  shifts there must  at all.times be  at least one first-
aid  man  to  every  50 miners;  each first-aid man  must  be  provided with  a  case 
containing dressings  and  first-aid kit. 
Fixed  first-aid posts  have  also  to  be  provided every  100 yards or so;  at 
each  there  must  be  one  or  more  stretchers,  blankets  and  first-aid equipment, 
and  also  a  supply  of  morphine. 
The  Coal  Board  in fact  does  a  good  deal  more  than  the  law  actually re-
quires;  there  are,  however,  no  separate miners'  hospitals or rehabilitation 
units.  Rehabilitation  is organized  in  the hospitals  through  the National 
Health Service;  the  appropriate facilities are  always  available within rea-
sonable  reach of  every colliery.in all the coalfields. 
VII 
MEASURES  TAKEN  TO  ENSURE  GOOD  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  MEDICAL  AND  OTHER  SERVICES  OF 
THE  COLLIERIES  AND  BETWEEN  THE  MEDICAL  SERVICE  AND  THE  WORKERS  AND  WORKERS'  REPRE-
SENTATIVES 
We  are  not  here  concerned merely with casual  but rather with organized 
co-operation. 
A.  GERMANY 
1.  - a)  In  the  Ruhr  arid  Aachen  collieries contact  is maintained  between  the  ma-
nagement,  the  safety engineers,  the  medical  service  and  the  men's  repre-
sentatives.  (The  workers'  representative body  at enterprise  level  is the 
Betriebsrat,  which  consists exclusively of  workers'  delegates). 
These  contacts  do  not  take  the  form  simply of  regular meetings,  but also 
offer opportunities for  investigationg all practical problems  immediately 
they arise.  However  such  consultations  take  place  only  when  a  problem 
has  in fact  arisen.  For  example,  if the  medical  service advises  the  trans-
fer  of  a  worker,  for  reasons  of  health,  to  a  different section,  and  the 
management  transfers  him  without  comment,  the Betriebsrat does  not  have 
to  be  consulted;  on  the other hand,  if the  management  takes  the  view  that 
no  suitable job  is available  for  the  man  to  be  assigned  to,  the  case  is 
jointly investigated by  a  representative of  the management  and  a  repre-
sentative of  the Betriebsrat  (the  chairman or  a  men1ber  deputed  to repre-
sent him). 
If at all possible,  the  man  is put  on  to work  which will  involve  no  de-
crease,  or at  any  rate  no  appreciable decrease,  in his earnings.  Where 
this  is not possible,  the  decrease  may  be  made  up  by  the social-insurance 
authorities. 
In  the  last resort  the worker  may  appeal  to  the welfare or  labour tribu-
nals,  in which  case  he  can secure  through his union  a  legal  and medical 
adviser.  This  procedure  is,  however,  very  seldom used. 
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b)  In  some  very  large enterprises,  such as Dortmunder  Bergbau  A.G.,  there 
is also an  Accidents Committee  consisting of  the colliery manager,  the 
undermanager,  safety engineers  and  workers'  representatives;  the collie-
ry medical service is,  of  course,  also represented.  The  Conunittee  meets 
regularly to discuss all matters arising in connection with safety. 
The  trade unions  are urging  that this arrangement  should  be  adopted  at 
all enterprises. 
c)  In addition,  union representatives  take part  in  the  examination of  sa-
fety  and  health problems  at  a  level  above  that of  the  individual collie-
ry;  instances are  the  fact  trade union representatives sit on  the  Board 
of  the Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft,  and  the  co-operation between  the 
unions  and  the Oberbergamter  (Divisional  Mines  Inspectorates). 
d)  Both  the  employers'  and  the  workers'  representatives are  agreed  that  the 
medical officer should  enjoy  the  fullest professional  independence. 
2.  The  position is different  in  the  Saar,  where  the part-time medical staff 
do  not  have  the  same  close contact with  the  management  and  men. 
B.  FRANCE 
No  specific prov1s1ons  are  laid down  in this connection,  either by  law, 
by  regulation or by  collective-bargaining agreement. 
The  medical service's relations with  the other departments  and  with  the 
workers  and  their representatives are generally good;  this is,  incidentally, 
favoured  by  the  fact  that most  of  the  medical staff are  employed  full-time 
and  play  a  real part  in  the colliery's affairs. 
Periodic meetings  are usually held with  the  board of  the colliery group, 
with  the  underground  manager  and  his staff,  and  with  the  personnel  and  welfare 
department  (in ascending order of  frequency).  On  specific cases  there is 
daily contact between colliery engineers  and  medical officers.  At  coalfield 
level regular  information  and  consultation meetings  are  held between  repre-
sentatives of  the coalfield board  and  the chief medical officers of  the dif-
ferent  colliery groups. 
Contact with  the  men  is maintained  through  the miners'  delegates,  who 
are  in almost all cases at the  same  time union representatives.  The  delegates 
can  and  do  approach  the  medical  service frequently  both on particular and  on 
general matters. 
Disputes  between  workers  and  medical officers are  very  uncommon,  as  the 
men  have  learned  from  experience  that  an efficient medical  service is in 
their own  interest quite as  much  as  in  the colliery's. 
Difficulties can,  however,  arise where  the doctor  finds  a  man  unfit to 
continue his duties,  or  recommends  that  he  be  put on  to different work.  In 
such cases  the  worker  has  a  number  of safeguards.  The  colliery medical ser-
vice usually asks  the  doctor handling  the  case  for  an  opinion;  the  worker  can 
demand  that this shall be  done,  and  under  the social-security arrangements  in 
force  can be  certain of  the doctor's full co-operation. 
There  is always  the possibility of  appeal,  by  requesting  a  special exa-
mination and  report with  the  agreement  of  the doctor  in charge of  the case. 
Where  the disability in question could  lead  to the man's  being actually dis-
charged  and  his own  doctor disagrees on  the subject,  the Miner's Code  provides 
that  an  expert opinion must  be  obtained  from  a  doctor designated by  the dean 
of  the nearest medical  faculty  (usually  from  among  the  members  of  the  faculty 
itself)  :  his decision  is final.  Appeals  of this kind are,  however,  exceptio-
nal,  as  the nationalized  industry does  its very utmost  to find  alternative employment  itself for  those  of its personnel  who  cannot  continue at their pre-
vious  jobs. 
In  some  coalfields,  including  in particular the Centre/Midi,  reassignment 
cooonittees  have  been  set up,  consisting of representatives of  the colliery de-
partments  concerned -(the operations branch,  the  personnel  department  and  the 
medical  service)  and  of  the  unions.  These  meet  monthly  to discuss all problems 
arising  in  connection with regrading -- always  a  supremely  awkward  field. 
Their  work  has  given entire satisfaction. 
It should  also be  noted  that union  representatives sit on  the coalfield 
boards,  and  that  the  administrative  bodies of  the  friendly societies  and  their 
regional  branches  consist  two-thirds of  workers'  representatives. 
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An  all-important  element  is,  of  course,  the  quality of  the  medical  officer 
himself,  since  he  needs  to  be  not  only  a  very  competent  doctor but also  a  first-
class psychologist. 
C.  ITALY 
The  medical  service is responsible  to  the colliery management,  and  so 
has  every opportunity for  keeping  in constant  touch with it. 
It is able  to maintain similarly close relations with  the  workers  through 
the colliery's safety  and  health committee,  which  in addition  to  the colliery 
manager,  medical officer and  technicians  includes elected workers'  representa-
tives,  and  to  which all health,  hygiene  and  safety matters are regularly re-
ferred  :  the  medical  officer,  in  consequence  of  his position,  carries  a  good 
deal  of  weight. 
D.  NETHERLANDS 
There  are  quite  a  number  of bodies representing the  two  sides of  indus-
try,  through  which  the  workers  can  make  their views  known  :  for  the  industry 
as  a  whole  there  is the  Mijnindustrieraad,  and  at enterprise  level  the  works 
council  and  the  "ringen"  (workers'  representatives). 
The  terms  of  reference  of  these bodies  are very  comprehensive.  Among 
other  things,  they  give  the  workers  the opportunity  to raise general  problems 
of  health  and  safety,  and  hence,  as  a  natural  consequence,  to express  their 
opinions  concerning  the  functioning of  the colliery medical  services. 
The  policy followed  regarding job assignment  and  any  individual problems 
arising  in  this connection  (workers  having  to  be certified unfit for particu-
lar jobs;  selection for  certain types  of  work)  are  always  discussed  between 
the  workers'  representatives,  the  management  and  the  medical officer. 
A special committee  exists  to deal  with all matters connected  with sili-
cosis  :  both  the  employers  and  the  workers  are  represented,  and  doctors sit 
in as experts.  The  committee  has  now  been  working  for  six or seven  years,  and 
has  gone  into all aspects  of  the  subject very  thoroughly  and  to  the satis-
faction of all concerned. 
The  medical officers are at the  same  time  in very close contact with  the 
management. 
The  professional contact maintained  among  the doctors  themselves  has 
also proved  extremely valuable.  First,  there  is the  consultation within  the 
medical services,  and  in particular with  the specialists;  then  again  there 
are  the close relations with  the  medical practitioners  in  the mining  areas; 
finally,  there is the· co-operation with  the  Rijksverzekeringsbank,  which  is 
responsible for  the.  implementation of the  Accidents  Act  and  through its own 
medical  service exercises  some  degree  of supervision over  the colliery medi-
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E.  BELGIUM 
Very  little provision  has  been  made  in legislation up  to  now  concerning 
relations between  the  medical  services  and  other colliery departments  and bet-
ween  the  medical services  and  the workers'  representatives.  One  enactment  which 
may  be  mentioned  is the  Royal  decree  of April  29,  1958,  concerning bodies res-
ponsible  for safety,  hygiene  and  amenities at workplaces  in deep  and  open-
cast mines  and  underground  quarries,  which  includes  a  provision to the effect 
that  the  medical officer,  the  nurse  and  the welfare worker of  the medical ser-
vice may  attend meetings of  the colliery safety and  health committee  in  a 
consultative capacity. 
The  Belgian authorities are  aware  that  the  present state of  the  law  is 
inadequate,  in  view of  the  rise  in  the  number  of  disabled mineworkers. 
An  amendment  of  July  15,  1957,  to  the  Mines  Acts  empowers  the  King  to 
take all appropriate steps concerning  the  supervision,  control  and  co-ordi-
nation of colliery medical  services,  which  he  may  insist shall be  instituted. 
In  this connection,  the  Industrial Medical  Inspectorate  is planning  to 
stiffen the  legal requirements  concerning check-ups  on  miners'  health,  more 
particularly by  arranging  that  these shall be  done  by  doctors  having  less 
connection with  the  employers,  and  making  it a  responsibility of  the  trade 
unions  to ascertain that  the  various examinations  which will be  provided  for 
are being effectively carried out. 
A number  of collieries do  insist on  regular contacts  between  the medical 
service,  the  personnel department,  the safety engineer  and  the welfare ser-
vice.  At  some  collieries a  psychotechnical  and  psychological  department  is 
attached  to  the medical  service  to assist with job assignment,  and  more  par-
ticularly with  the selection of supervisory  and  safety personnel. 
Disputes  very  seldom occur,  since  a  miner  refusing to  take  the  medical 
service's advice  (e.g.  that he  should  change  to  a  different job for  health 
reasons)  is not  penalized  in  any  way  :  the  Government  medical  inspector does 
not  intervene unless  the  man  is  a  source of  infection. 
The  Commission  expressed  the  view  that existing contact between  the  me-
dical services  and  the workers'  representatives  was  inadequate,  and  also 
that it was  a  pity that workers'  representatives did  not sit on  the  boards 
of  the  institutions concerned with industrial medicine. 
F.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
No  statutory provisions exist in this connection. 
In  practice,  contact between  the  workers  and  the  employers,  and  between 
them  and  the  medical staff,  is satisfactory. 
A miner's fitness  to  resume  work  after an  illness or  accident must  be 
certified by  his  own  (National  Health Service)  doctor.  The  colliery medical 
officer will not  contest this decision as  such,  but  may  consider that  the 
man  is not fit for  certain specific duties;  if in consequence  of  his opinion 
the miner  is not  allowed  to go  back  to work,  the  N.H.S.  doctor duly  supplies 
the  latter with  the certificate entitling him  to national assistance. 
The  colliery medical  officers maintain close relations with the national 
insurance doctors  who  conduct  the  initial and  subsequent periodic examinations 
of  miners suffering from silicosis,  and  with  the Ministry of  Labour  doctors 
working at the rehabilitation centres. VIII 
STATUS  AND  TERMS  OF  EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  MEDICAL  OFFICER  AND  OTHER  MEMBERS  OF  THE 
COLLIERY  MEDICAL  SERVICES;  ARRANGEMENTS  ENSURING  THEIR  PROFESSIONAL  INDEPENDENCE 
Two  points  emerge  from  the  foregoing  with special clarity; 
- the  importance  of  the  medical officer's personal qualities; 
- the  importance  of  his being able  to enjoy  complete  freedom  in his work. 
We  are  here  concerned  to examine  whether  medical officers'  terms  of  em-
ployment  (conditions  regarding engagement,  conditions  on  the  job,  conditions as  to 
dismissal)  take  proper  account  of  these  two  factors. 
A.  GERMANY 
1.  - a)  In  the  Ruhr  and  Aachen  coalfields,  colliery medical officers are  appoin-
ted  by  the  managements. 
b)  The  management  must,  however,. notify  the Betriebsrat  and  the  Government 
medical  inspector,  who  may  raise objections  as  regards either the  quali-
fications or  the  character of  the  doctor designated,  The  Betriebsrat may 
also allege difficulty  in  co-operating with  him.  The  management  must 
make  a  careful  assessment  of  such objections.  This  is the  legal position: 
in practice,  there  is prior consultation. 
In  addition to each pit's own  Betriebsrat,  companies  operating  two  or 
more  pits have  a  central "Gesamtbetriebsrat",  the  chairman of which  has 
to  be  consulted  by  the  management  before  the  final  appointment of  a  me-
dical officer for  any  particular pit.  If  he  objects,  efforts are first 
made  to reach  agreement,  either by  the  chairman's re-examining  and  with-
drawing  his objections or by  the selection of  another  candida~e.  If this 
proves  impossible,  the  management  may  proceed,  after notifying the  Be-
triebsrat accordingly  :  the Betriebsrat can  then  stand on  its rights un-
der  the collective bargaining agreements  in  force.  In practice,  however, 
this never  happens. 
c)  Before  he  can undertake  the statutory examinations  (pre-entry,  periodic 
and  special),  the  colliery medical officer must,  in addition,  be offi-
cially authorized  to  that effect by  the  competent  authority. 
The  regulations  concerning such authorization are  as  follows: 
1)  To  conduct  pre-entry medical  examinations,  the doctor must  have  com-
pleted not  less  than  three years'  hospital  training over  and  above 
the  prescribed  internship,  viz. 
- at  least  two  years  on  the  medical  side at  a  hospital dealing mainly 
with miners  or workers  from  other  industries where  silicosis is 
liable  to  be  contracted; 
- at least one  year  in  surgery and/or orthopaedics. 
2)  To  conduct  pre-entry examinations  and  periodic  check-ups,  he  must,  in 
addition  to  the  above,  have 
- at least  two  years'  practical experience  of  pre-entry examinations; 
- special training in silicosis detection,  received at the  teaching 
centre  in  Bochum  and  certified by  a  medical  committee  appointed  by 
the regional mines  inspectorate. 
d)  Colliery medical officers rank  as  executives,  and  as  such enjoy adequate 
independence,  material  and  otherwise.  Their  contracts cover all the usual 
items,  i.e.  salary,  holidays,  insurance,  etc. 
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e)  If a  medical officer's appointment  has  to be  terminated,  the decision is 
taken  by  the  management,  subject  to prior consultation with  the  Govern-
ment  medical  inspector  and  to  the  agreement  of  the workers'  representa-
tives. 
f)  The  other members  of  the  medical staff come  under  the  terms  of  the col-
lective-bargaining agreements  between  the  employers'  and  workers'  asso-
ciations. 
2.  - a)  In  the  Saar,  the  position of  the  full-time colliery medical officers is 
much  the  same  as  in  the  Ruhr  and  Aachen  coalfields. 
b)  Part-time medical  officers have  to be  approved  by  the  competent  authori-
ty,  and  must  fulfil certain requirements  as  to training.  Their colliery 
appointments  involve  them  in  from  30  to  50  hours'  work  a  month,  for  which 
they  are  paid  a  flat rate. 
B.  FRANCE 
Part-time doctors  doing  X-ray  work  must  have  received special training 
for  this. 
Colliery medical officers are  recruited  and  appointed  by  the Director-
General  for  the coalfield, 
There  are  no  st~tutory requirements  with respect  to such  appointments  : 
in practice,  candidates are expected  to  hold  diploma  in  industrial medicine 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Higher  Education  Act,  preferably also testimonials 
concerning hospital experience  and/or  additional university qualifications, 
and  if possible special training and  a  diploma  in pneuma-phthisiology, 
The  doctors  rank with the  members  of  the executive staff,  and  are  covered 
by  the Miner's Code.  Administratively,  they  come  under  the Director-General  for 
the coalfield,  but  they  are  allowed  the  fullest  independence  in  their profes-
sional work. 
The  medical  auxiliaries are also covered  by  the  provisions of  the Miner's 
Code  for  their particular grade, 
C.  ITALY 
No  laws  or regulations  on  the  subject exist at present,  but  a  Bill is in 
preparation. 
Full-time medical officers are  recruited  and  paid  by  the  management  of 
the colliery.  Their  terms  of  employment  are  fixed  by  a  national  agreement  : 
they are counted as  members  of  the executive managerial staff,  ranking e.g. 
with "heads of divisions" or with  "heads of sectors,"  according  to their qua-
lifications.  The  management  may  dismiss  them only  in  accordance  with  the 
rules contained  in  the collective-bargaining agreements. 
Part-time medical officers are  recruited and  paid by  individual contract; 
their appointment  may  be  terminated  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
contract. 
All colliery medical officers enjoy  the  fullest professional  indepen-
dence. 
On  engaging  a  medical officer,  collieries must register his name  with 
the  competent  authority,  which  is thus  able  to  inform  the  management  should 
he  be  deemed  insufficiently qualified for  the  appointment  (though  no  official 
definition has  been  issued of  the  necessary qualifications). Male  nurses,  medical-room attendants  and  so on  are  graded  according to 
their skill and  competence;  their rates of  pay  are  laid down  in their contracts 
of employment,  in  line with certain rules contained  in collective-bargaining 
agreements. 
D.  NETHERLANDS 
Colliery medical  officers are  employed  full-time  by  the enterprise.  Their 
appointment  must  be  approved  by  the  Rijksverzekeringsbank,  which  lays down 
certain requirements  in this respect. 
Section 80,  b  of  the  Accidents  Act  of  1921  contains various provisions 
for  ensuring  their professional  independence.  The  employer  must  not  intert·ere 
with  the  running of  the officially-approved medical service,  no1·  has  he  any 
say  in  the  treatment  given or  reconunended  by  it in respect of sick or injured 
workers. 
Similar arrangements  for  ensuring  the medical officer's  independence  are 
to  be  introduced with  regard  to regular health supervision  and  check-ups, 
and  a  general  regulation  is to be  issued specifying  the  requirements  to  be 
fulfilled  by  colliery medical  services. 
E.  BELGIUM 
Colliery medical  officers and  other medical  personnel  are recruited by 
the  management.  There  is no  specific statutory provision concerning  them.  They 
usually  have  a  contract of  service with  the enterprise,  and  their dismissal  is 
subject  to  the  normal  legal provisions on  the subject,  so their professional 
independence  is not  actually safeguarded  by  law;  in practice,  however,  it is 
respected. 
It should be  added,  that  the  new  amendments  to the  relevant legislation 
empower  the  King  to  lay  down  the duties of colliery medical services  and  the 
requirements  they  must  fulfil,  as  well  as  to insist that such services shall 
be  established.  A new  set of  regulations on  the subject  is  in preparation, 
which will  (l)  specify the professional qualifications  to be  required of doc-
tors before  they  can  be  appointed  to  the  medical staff of  a  colliery  (they 
must  be  practising industrial medical officers or hold  a  degree  in  industrial 
health  and  occupational  pathology),  and  (2)  seek  to promote  co-operation bet-
ween  the  management,  the  medical officer and  the delegates of  the safety, 
health  and  workplace  amenities  committee  (on  which  the  workers  are represen-
ted).  In  particular,  the  medical officer will  in future  be  appointed only 
following  consultation with  this committee. 
F.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Colliery medical officers are  appointed direct by  the National Coal  Board, 
which  is not  required  to obtain  the  Ministry's approval.  A high standard of 
professional attainment  i~ demanded,  and  preference  is given to candidates 
with  some  experience  of  work  in  industry.  The  terms of  employment  are much 
the  same  as  in  the  National  Health Service. 
Medical officers are responsible  in professional matters  to their senior 
medical  colleagues  :  their rulings are  never contested by  any  non-medical 
person. 
The  terms of  employment  offered to nurses  are fixed  by  an  agreement 
between  the  National Coal  Board  and  the  Royal  College of Nursing,  and  those 
for first-aid men  by  an  agreement  between  the  Board  and  the  trade unions. 
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IX 
OVERALL  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  CONTROL  OVER  THE  MEDICAL  SUPERVISION 
OF  WORKERS  AND  OF  THE  WORK  OF  COLLIERY  MEDICAL  SERVICES 
The  question has  been  asked  to what  extent  the  provisions  concerning 
control over  the  medical  supervision of  workers  are  being  implemented  in actual 
practice. 
The  Belgian workers'  representative  who  raised this question  has  made 
it known  that,  after studying  the situation currently prevailing  in  the  individual 
count~ies,  he  intends  to  move  that  the  Couwission  should  go  into  the  problem of  the 
type  of  measures  to be  proposed  to ensure  the  maximum  effectiveness of,  and  benefit 
from,  the  arrangements  introduced. 
X 
X  X DECISION  l) 
CONCERNING  THE  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE 
AND  RULES  OF  PROCEDURE 
OF  THE  MINES  SAFETY  COMMISSION 
ANNEX  D 
1)  See  Journal  Officiel  de  la Communaute  Europeenne  du  Charbon et de  l'Acier 
August  31,  1957  (No.  28). TERMS  OF  REFERENCE 
Having  taken  note  of  the  recommendations  adopted  by  the Conference  on Safe-
ty  in Coalmines  and  of  the  proposals  submitted  by  the  High Authority in connection 
with  the Conference's final Report,  which  afford a  working basis for  the  improvement 
of  safety  in coalmines,  and 
having  regard to their Decisions at  the Council's 36th and 42nd sessions 
on  September 6,  and May  10,  1957,  setting up  the Mines  Safety Commission, 
the Representatives  of  the  Governments  of  the  Kember  States meeting at  the 
Special Council  of  Ministers 
- hereby  lay down  that  the  terms  of  reference  of  the  aforesaid Commission 
shall  be  as  follows: 
1.  The  Commission shall follow  developments  regarding safety in coalmines, 
including those  regarding the safety regulations  instituted by  the  public authori-
ties,  and  assemble  the  necessary  information concerning progress  and practical 
results obtained,  more  especially in the matter of  accident  prevention. 
To  secure  the  necessary  information,  the Commission shall  apply  to the 
Governments  concerned. 
The  Commission shall evaluate  the  information in its possession and submit 
to the Governments  proposals for  the  improvement  of  safety in coalmines. 
2.  The  Commission shall help the  High Authority  to work  out  a  method  of  com-
piling intercomparable  accident statistics. 
3.  The  Commission shall ensure  the  prompt  forwarding  to the quarters directly 
concerned  (including in particular·mines  inspectorates  and employers'  and  workers' 
associations)  of  relevant  information assembled by  it. 
4.  The  Commission  shall ascertain,  by  regular contact  with  the Governments, 
what  action is being  taken to  implement  the  proposals  of  the Conference  on Safety  in 
Coalmines,  and  such  proposals  as it may  itself draw  up. 
5.  The  Commission shall propose  such study  and  research as it deems  most  indi-
cated for  the  improvement  of  safety,  with  notes  as  to the  way  in which  these  can  best 
be  effected. 
6.  The  Commission  shall facilitate  the  exchange  of  information  aud  experience 
among  persons  responsible  for safety matters,  and  propose  appropriate measures  for 
this purpose  (e.g.  organization of  study sessions,  establishment  of  documentation 
services). 
7.  The  Commission shall propose  appropriate measures  for ensuring the  neces-
sary liaison among  the  rescue  services  of  the Community  countries. 
8.  The  Commission  shall  submit  annually to the Council  of Ministers  and  the 
High  Authority  a  Report  on its activities and  on developments  regarding safety in 
coalmines  in the  different  member  States.  In this connection,  it shall in particular 
examine  the statistics compiled on  accidents  and  incidents in coalmines. 
- The  Representatives  of  the  Governments  further  lay  down  that  the rules  of 
procedure  of  the Commission shall  be  those set forth in the Annex  to the  present 
Decision. 
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- The  Representatives  of  the  Governments  trust that  the  High  Authority 
will arrange  for  the Commission  to start work  at  the earliest possible moment. 
This Decision  was  adopted  by  the Council  at  its forty-fourth session,  on 
July  9,  1957. 
For  the Council, 
(sgd.)  J.  REY 
President. RULES  OF  PROCEDURE 
CHAIRMAN 
Article  1  ------
The  Chainnan of  the  Mines  Safety  Commission  shall  be  a  Member  of  the  High 
Authority  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel Community. 
Article  2 
The  Chairman  shall conduct  the  work  of  the  Commission  in accordance  with 
these  Rules  of  Procedure. 
MEMBE~S 
Article  3 
The  Commission shall consist  of  24  members  appointed  by  the Governments; 
each country  shall  have  four  members,  of  whom  two  shall  be  representatives  of  that 
country's Governments,  one  of  the  employers  and  one  of  the  workers. 
Each  Government  shall  send  in writing to the  Chairman  a  nominal  roll of 
the  members  appointed  by  it.  It shall notify  the  Chairman  of all changes  in  this. 
Each  Government  may  appoint  for  any  particular meeting  of  the  Commission 
one  or  two  advisers,  whose  names  it shall  send  to the  Chairman. 
I.L.O.  PARTICIPATION 
Article  4  -------
Representatives  of  the  International  Labour  Organization shall  be  invited 
to attend  the  proceedings  of  the  Commission  in  a  consultative capacity. 
U.K.  PARTICIPATION 
Article  5  -------
Delegates  appointed  by  the  Government  of  the  United  Kingdom  may  attend  the 
proceedings  of  the  Commission  as  observers. 
ORGANIZATION 
(a)  Restricted Committee 
Article  6  ------
A Restricted Committee  shall  be  set  up,  to consist  of  the  Governments' 
representatives  on  the  Commission. 
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Article  7  ------
The  Chairman  of  the Commisson  shall act as Chairman of  the Restricted 
Committee. 
Article  8  ------
The  function  of  the Restricted Committee  shall  be  to ensure  permanent  liai-
son  among  the  Governments  of  the  member  States and  between  them  and  the Commission, 
more  especially  for  the  purpose  of exchanging  relevant  information.  The  Restricted 
Committee  shall see  to the  preparation of  the  Commission's activities. 
Article  9  ------
The  Restricted Committee  shall  be  convened  by  the  Chairman. 
The  Chairman  shall  be  required  to convene  it when  asked  to  do  so  by  the 
representatives of  three or more  Governments. 
b)  Working Parties 
The  Commission of  the  Restricted Committee  may  set  up  working  parties of 
experts  to consider specific  technical matters. 
Article  11  --------
The  working  parties shall  decide  their  own  modus  operandi. 
Article  12  ---------
The  Restricted Committee  shall  be  given  reports  by  the  working  parties on 
the  results of  their proceedings,  which it shall  subnd  t  to  the  Commission  with  the 
comments  of its members. 
In  the event  of  differences of  op~n~on within  the  working  parties,  the 
views  expressed shall  be  given,  together with the  names  of  those  expressing  them. 
SECRETARIAT 
Article  13  --------
The  High  Authority shall  be  responsible  for  the secretarial arrangements 
in connection with  the  work  of  the  Commission,  the Restricted Committee  and  the  wor-
king parties. 
These  arrangements  shall  be  under  the  charge  of  a  High Authority staff mem-
ber  appointed  to act as Secretary. 
All  documents  shall  be  in  the  four  official  languages  of  the  Community. WORKING  PROCEDURE 
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The  Chairman  shall fix the  agenda  and  the  dates of meetings after consulta-
tion with  the  members  of  the Restricted Committee. 
The  Chairman  shall allow to speak any  n1ember  of  the Commission,  representa-
tive of  the  International  Labour  Organization or United  Kingdom  observer asking  to do 
so. 
The  Chairman  may  allow  advise1·s  to speak. 
Article  16  -------
The  members  of  the  High  Authority shall  have  the  right  to attend u1eetings 
of  the  Commission  and  of  the  Restricted Committee,  and  to speak  there. 
The  Chairman  may  bring with  him  advisers,  whom  be  may  allow  to speak. 
Article  17 
Where  the  Commission  or  the Restricted Committee  deems  it desirable  to ob-
tain  information concerning the  various aspects of safety in  coalmines,  it ·shall  l'e-
quest  this  from  the  Governments  of  the  member  States. 
Article  18 
Sixteen members  shall constitute a  quorum.  Conclusions shall  be  adopted  by 
majority of  the  members  present. 
Proposals  by  the  Commission  under  1,3 of its terms  of  reference shall, 
however,  require  a  vote  in favour  by  two-thirds of  the  members  present,  and  by  not 
less  than  thirteen members  in all. 
Any  dissenting opinions shall be  brought  to the attention of  the Govern-
ments  should  the  members  expressing  them  so request. 
X 
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5 THE  COMMISSION;  THE  RESTRICTED  COMMITTEE; 
THE  WORKING  PARTIES 
MEMBERSHIP 
MEETINGS  HELD 
1 
ANNEX  E A.- THE  COMMISSION 
a}  Membership of  the Commission 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  representatives 
Herr Ministerialrat  GECK 
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium 
B  0  N  N  11 
Herr Ministerialdirigent Dr.  Ing.  HELLER 
Ministerium fur Wirtschaft  und  Verkehr 
Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen 
D U E  S  S  E  L  D 0  R F 
am  Karltor  8 
Employers'representative 
Herr C.  ERLINGIIAGEN 
Bergassessor a.D. 
Steinkohlenbergbauverein 
E  S  S  E  N 
Friedrichstrasse 2 
Workers'  representative 
Herr Wilhelm  BLUME 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau 
BOCHUM 
Hattingerstr.  19 
Technical  advisers 
Herr Oberberga.mtsdirektor  LATTEN 
Ministerium  fUr  Wirtschaft  und Verkehr 
Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen 
D U E  S  S  E  L  D 0  R F 
am  Karltor  8 
Herr Walter  GROSS 
Bergwerksdirektor und  Bergassessor a.D. 
Ministerium fur Wirtschaft,  Verkehr 
und  Landwirtschaft 
S  A A R B R U E  C K E  N 
Hardenbergstrasse 
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BELGIUM 
Government  representatives 
Monsieur  A.  VANDENHEUVEL 
Directeur General  des  Mines 
Ministere  des Affaires Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  Georges  LOGELAIN 
Inspecteur General  l  !'Administration des  Mines 
Ministere des Affaires Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  DESSALLES 
Administrateur des  Charbonnages  Andre  Dumont 
et de  Houthalen 
10,  Avenue  Reine Astrid 
H A S  S  E  L T 
Workers'  representatives 
Monsieur Nicolas DETHIER  +) 
Secretaire General  de  la Centrale Syndicale 
des Travailleurs des  Mines  de  Belgique 
24,  rue Mathieu 
BEYNE-HEUSAY 
L  I  E G E 
Monsieur  Joseph  DEDOYARD  +) 
Secretaire General  de  la Centrale Syndicale  des 
des Travailleurs des  Mines  de  Belgique 
201,  rue  de Gilly 
C H A T  E L  I  N E A U 
Technical  advisers 
Monsieur  Mathieu THOMASSEN 
President  Na tiona.l  de  la Centrale 
des  Francs-Mineurs 
36,  Montoyerstraat 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  Lucien  BOULET 
Directeur General  du  Fonds  National 
de Retraite des Ouvriers  Mineurs 
Ministere du Travail et de  la 
Prevoyance  Sociale 
6,  Place Stephanie 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
+)  M.  Dethier  was  succeeded  by  M.  Dedoyard with effect  from  March  15,  1960. FRANCE 
Government  representatives 
Monsieur  J.N.  PROUST 
Ingenieur en Chef des  Mines 
Ministere de  l'Industrie 
97,  rue  de  Grenelle 
P  A R  I  S  VII 
Monsieur  COLAS 
Chef  du Service Hygiene et 
Securite Minieres 
a la Direction des  Mines 
Ministere de  l'Industrie 
P  A R  I  S  VII 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  R.  VEDRINE 
Directeur General-adjoint  des  Houilleres 
du  Nord  et du  Pas-de-Calais 
20,  rue  des  Minimes 
D 0  U A  I  (Nord) 
Workers'  representatives 
Monsieur Florent LAUPIN  +) 
Federation Nationale Force-Ouvriere des  Mineurs 
198,  Avenue  du  Maine 
P  A R  I  S  XIV 
Monsieur  CHAUVEAU  +) 
Federation Nationale des  Syndicats Chretiens des  Mineurs 
88,  rue  Pernes 
ST.  PIERRE-LES-AUCHUL  (Pas-de-Calais} 
Technical  advisers 
Monsieur  CHAUVEAU  ++) 
Federation Nationale des  Syndicats Chretiens des  Mineurs 
88,  rue  Pernes 
ST.  PIERRE-LES-AUCHUL  (Pas-de-Calais) 
Monsieur  Roger  TOURET  ++) 
Force Ouvriere  des  Mineurs,  Miniers et Similaires 
Ing6nieur  de  la Securite aux Houilleres de Lorraine 
M E  R L  E  B A C H  (Moselle) 
+)  M.  Lampin  was  succeeded by  M.  Chauveau with effect  from 
June  15,  1960. 
++}  M.  Touret succeeded  M.  Chauveau  as  technical adviser with effect 
from  June  15,  1960. 
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ITALY 
Government  representatives 
Ing.  Giovanni  GIROLAMI 
Ispettore generale delle Miniere 
Ministero dell'  Industria e  Commercia 
Via Veneto,  33 
R  0  M E 
Marchese  Ignazio SANFELICE  DI  MONTEFORTE  +) 
Consigliere di Legazione 
Servizio Stampa 
Ministero Affari Esteri 
R  0  ME 
Dott.  Italo PAPINI  +) 
Direzione Generale dell'  Emigrazione 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri 
R  0  M  E 
Employers'  representative 
Prof.  Mario  CARTA 
Istituto Arte Mineraria 
Piazza  d'Armi 
C A G L  I  A R I 
Workers'  representative 
Dott.  Dionigi  COPPO 
Vice Segretario Generale della 
C.I.S.L. 
Via Po,  21 
R  0  ME 
Government  adviser 
Dott.  Rosario  PURPURA 
Direttore Generale al 
Ministero del  Lavoro 
Via Flavia,  6 
R  0  ME 
Technical adviser 
Dott.  Augusto  PAROLI 
Direttore di Divisione  per  la Sicurezza 
e  Igiene  nel  Lavoro  del 
Ministero del  Lavoro 
R  0  ME 
+)  Marchese  Sanfelice was  succeeded  by  Dr.  Papini with effect  from 
April  2,  1960. 
\ LUXEMBOURG 
Government  representatives 
Monsieur  Fran~ois HUBERTY 
Ingenieur-Directeur  du  Travail et des  Mines 
Inspection du  Travail et des  Mines 
19,  Avenue  Gaston Diderich 
L U X E M B 0  U R G 
Monsieur  Leon  SUTTOR 
Conseiller de Legation au 
Ministere des  Affaires Etrangeres 
L  U X E M B 0  U R G 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur Albert  RAUS 
Ingenieur  en Chef  de  !'Administration Centrale 
de  l'ARBED 
L  U X E  M B 0  U R G 
Workers'  representative 
Monsieur  Nicolas  MANNES 
President  de  la Delegation Ouvriere 
pres  ARBED/Mines 
Cite Leesberg 
E S  C H - S  U R - A L  Z E  T  T  E 
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NETHERLANDS 
Government  representatives 
De  Hoogedelgestrenge Heer 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS 
Inspecteur-Generaal der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op  de  Mijnen 
Dautzenbergstraat 46 
HEERLEN 
De  lloogedelgestrenge Jleer 
Mr.  L.G.  WANSINK 
Hoofd  van de Directie Mijnwezen 
Ministerie van  Economische  Zaken 
Bezuidenhoutseweg 30 
THE  HAGUE 
Employers'  representative 
De  Hoogedelgestrenge  Heer 
Ir.  C.E.P.M.  RAEDTS 
Directeur Oranje-Nassau  Mijnen 
H E  E  R L  E  N 
Workers'  representative 
De  Heer J.  PALMEN 
Secretaris van  de  Ned.  Katholieke 
Mijnwerkersbond 
Parallelweg  12 
H E  E  R L  E  N 
Technical  adviser 
De  Heer H.L.  GROND 
Katholieke Vereniging 
van  Mijnbeambten 
Schelsberg  202 
H E  E  R L E  R H E  I  D E  (L) UNITED  KINGDOM 
Government  representatives 
Mr.  A.M.  RAKE,  C.B.E., 
Under-Secretary 
Safety  ans Health Division, 
Ministry of  Power, 
Thames  House  South 
7,  Millbank, 
L  0  N  D  0  N,  S.W.  1 
Mr.  T.A.  ROGERS,  C.B.E. 
Chief  Inspector of Mines 
Ministry of Power 
7,  Millbank 
Thames  llouse  South 
L  0  N D 0  N,  S.W.l 
Employers'  representative 
Dr.  H.L.  WILLETT, 
Deputy Director-General of Production, 
National  Coal  Board, 
Hobart  House, 
Grosvenor  Pla.ce, 
L 0  N D 0  N,  S.W.  1 
Workers'  representative 
Mr.  Ted  JONES 
Vice-President  of  the National  Union 
of Mineworkers, 
5,  Westminster Bridge  Road, 
L  0  N  D  0  N,  S.E.  1 
I.L.O.  representatives 
Monsieur  Marcel  ROBERT 
Chef  de  la Division de  la 
Securite et de  l'Hygiene  du Travail 
Bureau  International du Travail 
154,  route de  Lausanne 
G E N E V A 
Mr.  J.E.  WHEELER 
Membre  Principal de  la Division 
de  la  Securite et de  l'Hygiene du  Travail, 
154,  route de  Lausanne, 
GENEVA 
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b)  Meetings 
The  Commission met  five  times,  on 
1)  April 7,  1959; 
2)  July 7,  1959; 
3)  December  1,  1959; 
4)  April  8,  1960; 
5)  December  20,  1960. B.- THE  RESTRICTED  COMMITTEE 
a)  The  Restricted Committee consists of  the Government 
representatives  on  the Commission. 
b)  It met  five  times,  on 
1)  April 6,  1959; 
2)  July 6,  1959; 
3)  November  30,  1959; 
4)  April  7,  1960; 
5)  December  19,  1960. 
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C.- WORKING  PARTIES  ON  TECHNICAL  PROBLEMS 
I.- WORKING  PARTY  ON  ELECTRICITY 
a)  The  Working  Party  is made  up as  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Herr Oberbergrat EPPING 
Oberbergamt 
D  0  R  T  M U  N  D 
BELGIUM 
Monsieur  Georges  LOGELAIN  +) 
Inspecteur  G~n~ral  ~  l'Administration 
des  Mines 
Minist~re des Affaires Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la  Science 
B  R U 8  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  STENUIT 
Directeur Divisionnaire 
a  !'Administration des  Mines 
6-8,  rue de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  COOLS 
Directeur Divisionnaire 
a !'Administration des  Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
FRANCE 
Monsieur  COEUILLET 
Ing~nieur en Chef  au  Service Exploitation 
des  Charbonnages  de  France 
9,  Avenue  Percier 
P  A R  I  S  VI II 
Monsieur  FLINOIS 
Houilleres  du  Bassin du  Nord 
et du  Pas-de-Calais 
Service Technique  du  Fond 
20,  rue  des  Minimes 
D 0  U A  I  (Nord) 
ITALY 
Dott.  Ing.  Luigi  VENTRELLA 
Direttore dell'Istituto Italiano 
del  Marchio  per  i  material!  e  le 
apparecchiature elettro-teniche 
Via Misurata 61, 
M I  L  A N 
+)  Sits as  representative of  the Restricted Committee. LUXEMBOURG 
Monsieur Albert  RAUS 
Ingenieur en Chef  des  Mines 
a !'Administration de  l'ARBED 
LUXEMBOURG 
Monsieur  Ed.  MULLER 
Ingenieur des  Mines 
a !'Administration des  Mines 
luxembourgeoises  de  l'ARBED 
E  S  C H - S  U R  - A L  Z  E  T  T  E 
NETHERLANDS 
De  Weledelgestrenge Heer 
Ir.  A.F.P.H.  BLOEMEN 
Inspecteur der  Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op  de  Mijnen 
St.  Antoniusweg  7 
H E  E  R L E  N 
De  Weledelgestrenge Heer 
Ir.  OMERS 
Oranje-Nassau Mijnen 
H E  E R L E  N 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Mr.  J.E.  COWAN, 
H.M.  Principal Electrical  Inspector 
of  Mines  and Quarries, 
Ministry of  Power, 
Thames  House  South, 
7,  Millbank, 
L  0  N  D  0  N,  S.W.  1 
b)  The  Working  Party  has  three Sub-Committees. 
aa)  Sub-Committee  on Testing of Electric Cables 
for  Non-Flammability. 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Herr Oberbergrat  EPPING 
Oberbergamt 
DORTMUND 
Herr Dr.  Ing.  BUSS 
Felten und  Guillenume  A.G. 
KOELN  - MUELHEIM 
BELGIUM 
Monsieur  GOBBE 
Chef  de  3ervice a la Division 
Cablerie des  ACEC 
C H A R L E  R 0  I 
13 14 
FRANCE 
Monsieur  NICOLAS 
Ingenieur en Chef  des 
"CAbles  de  Lyon" 
170,  Avenue  Jean Jaures 
L Y 0  N I  R H 0  N E 
Monsieur  OSTY 
Directeur Technique  a la "SILEC" 
Societe  Industrielle de  Liaisons Electriques 
64  bis,  rue  de  Manceau 
P  A R  I  S  VIII 
Monsieur  VIN 
Ingenieur  au  CERCHAR 
35,  rue  Sainte Dominique 
P  A R  I  S 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  GOEDBLOED 
Nederlandse  Kabelfabriek 
D E  L  F  T 
Ir.  W.L.  BAER 
N.V.  llollandse Draad- en Kabelfabriek 
A M S  T  E  R D A M 
P.O.B.  1013 
bb)  Sub-Committee  on  High-Tension Circuit-Breakers 
Monsieur  Georges  LOGELAIN 
Inspecteur  G~n6ral h  !'Administration des  Mines 
Ministere des Affaires  Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  STENUIT 
Directeur Divisionnaire 
a  !'Administration des  Mines 
6-8,  rue de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Herr Oberbergrat  EPPING 
Oberbergamt 
DORTMUND 
Monsieur  FLINOIS 
Houilleres  du Bassin du  Nord 
et du  Pas-de-Calais 
Service Technique  du  Fond 
20,  rue  des  Minimes 
D 0  U A  I  (Nord) 
De  Weledelgestrenge  Heer 
Ir.  OMERS 
Oranje-Nassau Mijnen 
H E  E  R L  E  N cc)  Sub-Committee. on Protection of Electric Networks  Below  Ground 
Monsieur Georges  LOGELAIN 
Inspecteur General a l'Administration des  Mines 
Ministere des Affa.ires  Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  COOLS 
Directeur Divisionnaire 
a  l'Administration des Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  COEUILLET 
Ingenieur en  Chef  au  Service Exploitation 
des  Charbonnages  de  Fra~ce 
9,  Avenue  Percier 
P  A R  I  S  VI II 
Herr Oberbergrat  EPPING 
Oberbergamt 
DORTMUND 
De  Welede1gestrenge  Heer 
Ir.  OMERS 
Oranje-Nassau Mijnen 
II  E  E  R  L  E  N 
c)  The  Working  Pa.rty  and  Sub-Committee  met  on  the  following dates: 
1)  Janua.ry  20,  1959; 
2)  March  10,  1959; 
3)  March  24,  1959; 
4)  May  26,  1959; 
5)  September  29,  1959; 
6)  October  20,  1959; 
7)  November  24,  1959  (at  the  TREMONIA  experimental pit,  Dortmund); 
8)  December  17,  1959; 
9)  February  26,  1960; 
10)  April  26,  1960; 
11)  June  22,  1960  (at  the  CERCHAR  headquarters,  Verneuil); 
12)  May  31,  1960; 
13)  June  28,  1960; 
14)  September  27,  1960. 
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II.- WORKING  PARTY  ON  FIRES  AND  UNDERGROUND  COMBUSTION 
a)  The  Working  Party  is made  up as  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Herr Ministerialrat GECK  +) 
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium 
B 0  N N  II 
Herr Dipl.  Ing.  Ernst  BREDENBRUCH 
Leiter der Hauptstelle fUr  das Grubenrettungswesen 
E  S  S  E  N - K R A Y 
Dortmunderstrasse,  209 
BELGIUM 
Monsieur  VANDENHEUVEL 
Directeur G6n6ral  des  Mines 
Ministere  des  Affaires Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  Georges  LOGELAIN 
Inspecteur General  a !'Administration 
des ·Mines 
Ministere  des  Affaires  Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R  U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  STENUIT 
Directeur Divisionnaire 
a !'Administration des  Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U  S  S  E  L  S 
FRANCE 
Monsieur  CHAMPAGNAC 
Directeur aux Houilleres  du 
Bassin de  Lorraine 
M E  R L  E  B A C  H  (Moselle) 
Monsieur  FOMBONNE 
Directeur aux Houilleres  du 
Bassin du Centre-Midi 
2,  Place  Jean Jaures 
ST.  E  T  I  E  N N E  (Loire) 
LUXEMBOURG 
Monsieur  Fran~ois HUBERTY 
Ing6nieur-Directeur  du Travail et des  Mines 
Inspection du Travail et des  Mines 
19,  Avenue  Gaston Diderich 
L  U X E  M B 0  U  R G 
Monsieur  LEINEWEBER 
Controleur  au Service de  !'Inspection 
du Travail et des  Mines 
19,  Avenue  Gaston Diderich 
L  U X E  M B 0  U R G 
+)  Sits as  representative of  the Restricted Committee. ITALY 
lng.  Achille  PELLATI 
Miniera Ribolla 
G R 0  S  S  E  T  0 
Ing.  Vincenzo  BUSONERO 
Direttore Miniera 
Societa Carbosarda 
C  A R B 0  N  I  A  (Cagliari) 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir. D.J.  KNUTTEL 
Hoofdinspecteur  der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht  op  de  Mijnen 
H E  E  R  L  E  N 
Dautzenbergstraat  46 
Ir.  de  ZEE 
Chef  van  de  Veiligheidsdien3t 
van  de  Staatsmijnen in Limburg 
H E E R L  E  N 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Mr.  R.  BELL, 
Production Department, 
National  Coal  Board, 
Hobart  House, 
Grosvenor  Place, 
L  0  N D 0  N,  S.W.l 
b)  The  Working  Party  ha.s  a  Sub-Committee  on  Spraying  of Shafts 
Herr Ministerialrat  GECK 
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium 
B  0  N  N  11 
Herr Dipl.  Ing.  Ernst  BREDENBRUCH 
Leiter der Hauptstelle fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen 
E  S  S  E  N - K R A Y 
Dortmunderstrasse  209 
Monsieur  CHAMPAGNAC 
Directeur aux Houilleres  du 
Bassin de  Lorraine 
M E  R L  E  B A C  H  (Moselle) 
Monsieur  STENUIT 
Directeur Divisionnaire 
a  !'Administration des  Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Herr Dr.-Ing.  RENNER 
Forschungsstelle fur  Grubenbewetterung 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins 
E  S  S  E  N 
17 18 
Herr Dr.-Ing.  GREUER 
Forschungsstelle fur Grubenbewetterung 
des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins 
E  S  S  E  N 
c)  The  Working  Party and  Sub-Committee  met  on  the  following  dates: 
1.  October  30,  1959  (at Bottrop); 
2.  November  17,  1959; 
3.  December  18,  1959  (at Essen); 
4.  January  22,  1960  (at  the  Tremonia experimental pit); 
5.  November  28,  1960. 
d)  Joint meetings  with  the Working  Party  on Co-ordination of 
Rescue Organizations 
1.  November  18,  1959; 
2.  January  28,  1960; 
3.  February  18,  1960; 
4.  March  17,  1960; 
5.  June  9,  1960; 
6.  July 8,  1960; 
7.  October  7,  1960. 
e)  Meetings  of  the Editorial Committee  of  the  Working  Parties 
on Fires and Underground  Combustion  and  on  Co-ordination of 
Rescue Organization 
1.  January  27,  1960; 
2.  April  28,  1960; 
3.  August  8/9,  1960; 
4.  November  14,  1960; 
5.  November  28,  1960. 
f)  The  Working  Party  has  an Expert  Committee  for  the  study  of 
criteria for  incombustible  lubricants.  The  Expert  Committee 
is made  up  as  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Herr Dipl.  Ing.  Ernst  BREDENBRUCH 
Leiter der Hauptstelle fur  das 
Grubenrettungswesen 
E  S  S  E  N - K R A Y 
Dortmunderstrasse  209 
Herr Dr.  Chern.  Hans  Willi  THOENES 
m.  Br.  Technischer Ueberwachungs  Verein e.V. 
~ S  S  E  N 
Steubenstr.  53 
Herr Dr.  Med.  ZIMMERMANN 
Hygiene  Institut des  Ruhrgebiets 
G E  L  S  E  N K  I  R C H E  N 
Rotthauserstr.  19 BELGIUM 
Monsieur  Edgar  DEMELENNE 
Administrateur Directeur 
de  l'Institut National  des  Mines 
PATURAGES 
FRANCE 
Monsieur  Ren~ LEFEVRE 
Ingenieur a la Direction Generale 
des Houilleres  du  Bassin du  Nord 
et  du  Pas-de-Cala.is 
20,  rue des  Minimes 
D 0  U A  I  I  Nord 
g)  The  Expert  Committee  met  on  the  following dates: 
1)  Ja.nuary  8,  1959; 
2)  Fe  brua.ry  26 ,  1959; 
3)  April  29,  1959; 
4)  June  19,  1959; 
5)  September  30,  1959; 
6)  November  26,  1959; 
7)  March  8,  1959; 
8)  April  13,  1960; 
9)  June  2,  1960; 
10)  September  20,  1960; 
11)  October  25/26,  1960  (a.t  Patura.ges); 
12)  October  27,  1960; 
13)  November  17/18,  1960  (a.t  Essen). 
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III.- WORKING  PARTY  ON  CO-ORDINATION  OF  RESCUE  ORGANIZATIONS 
a)  The  Working  Party is made  up  as  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Herr Ministerialrat GECK  (+) 
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium 
B  0  N  N  11 
Herr Carl  von  HOFF 
ehemaliger Leiter der Hauptstelle  fUr  das 
Grubenrettungswesen 
E  S  S  E  N - K R A Y 
Dortmunderstrasse  209 
Herr Dipl.  Ing.  Ernst  BREDENBRUCH 
Leiter der Hauptstelle  fUr  das 
Grubenrettungswesen des  Steinkohlenbergbauvereins 
E  S  S  E  N - K R A Y 
Dormunderstrasse  209 
Herr  Alex  VAN  GEMBER 
Erster Bergrat  a.D. 
Leiter der Grubensicherheitsabteilung 
der  Saarbergwerke A.G. 
S  A A R B R U E  C K E  N 
Triererstrasse 1 
BELGIUM 
Monsieur Louis  DE  CONINCK 
Directeur  du  Centre National Belge 
de Coordination des  Centres  de  Sauvetage 
17,  rue Puissant 
C H A R L  E R 0  I 
Monsieur  A.  HAUSMAN 
Directeur du Centre de Coordination 
des  Moyens  de  Sauvetage  de  Campine 
Kempische  Steenweg 
H A S  S  E  L  T 
FRANCE 
Monsieur  VANDERLEKEN 
Directeur du  Poste Central  de  Secours 
des  Mines  du Nord et du  Pas-de-Calais 
Rue  du Bois 
L  E  N S  (Pas-de-Calais) 
Monsieur  GRISARD 
Charbonnages  de France 
9,  Avenue  Percier 
P  A R  I  S  VIII 
(+)  Sits as  representative of  the Restricted Committee. Dott.  Ing.  Giorgio CARTA 
Vice Direttore Generale 
della Carbonifera Sarda 
11,  Via Napoli 
C A R 8  0  N I  A  (Cagliari) 
LUXEMBOURG 
lionsieur Albert  RAUS 
Ing~nieur des  Mines 
Chef  de  Service a l'ARBED  centrale 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
De  Weledelgestrenge Heer 
Ir.  P.F.  de  ZEE 
Chef  van de Veiligheidsdienst 
van  de  Staatsmijnen in Limburg 
H E  E  R L  E  N 
De  Weledelgestrenge Heer 
Dipl.  Ing.  F.A.F.  SIEVERS 
p/a Oranje-Nassau Mijnen 
HEERLEN 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Mr.  W.F.  RICHARDSON 
Chief Safety Engineer 
National Coal  Board 
Hobart  House, 
Grosvenor  Place, 
L 0  N D 0  N,  S.W.l 
b)  The  Working  Party met  on  the  following dates: 
1)  January  22,  1959 
2)  June  3/4,  1959 
3)  October 6/7,  1959 
4)  December  8,  1959; 
5)  March  4,  1960; 
(inspection of Dutch mine  rescue 
arrangements at Heerlen); 
(tour of  new  central rescue station 
at Mansfield,  Notts.,  and central 
rescue station at Doncaster,  Yorks); 
(tour of pits and  inspection of 
rescue  equipment  and  first-aid 
posts  in the Sulcis coalfield, 
Sardinia); 
21 
6)  May  3/4,  1960  (tour of  the Compine  rescue co-ordi-
nation centre at Hasselt  and of the 
central rescue station at Charleroi); 
7)  June  10,  1960; 22 
8)  July  26,  1960; 
9)  October 27/28,  1960; 
10)  November  30,  1960  (tour of  new  central rescue station at 
Merlebach,  France). 
c)  It met  jointly with  th~ Working  Party  on Fires  and Underground 
Combustion  on 
1)  November  18,  1959; 
2)  January  27,  1960  (Editorial Committee); 
3)  January  28,  1960; 
4)  Februa.ry  18,  1960; 
5)  March  17,  1960; 
6)  April  28,  1960  (Editorial Committee); 
7)  June  9,  1960; 
8)  July 8,  1960; 
9)  August  9/10,  1960  (Editorial Committee); 
10)  October  7,  1960; 
11)  November  14,  1960  (Editorial Committee); 
12)  November  28,  1960. IV.- WORKING  PARTY  ON  WINDING  ROPES  AND  SHAFT  GUIDES 
a)  The  Working  Party is made  up  a.s  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Herr Dipl.  Ing.  Kurt  DUWELL 
Leiter der Seilprufstelle 
der Berggewerkschaftskasse 
BOCHUM 
Hernerstrasse 43  - Postfach392 
Herr Dr.  Ing.  Richard MEEBOLD 
Leiter. der technischen Ueberwachungsstelle 
Saarbergwerke  A.G.  . 
SAARBRUECKEN 
Triererstrasse 1 
BELGIUM 
Monsieur  Georges  LOGELAIN 
Inspecteur General a !'Administration 
des  Mines 
Ministbre des  Affaires Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  STENUIT 
Directeur Divisionnaire 
a !'Administration des  Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
FRANCE 
Monsieur  PICHOT 
lngeriieur  en Chef a la 
Direction Generale  des 
Houilleres  du  Nord et du  Pas-de-Calais 
20,  rue  des  Minimes 
D 0  U A  I  (Nord) 
Monsieur  Paul  TEISSIER 
Ingenieur en chef  au Service Exploitation 
des  Charbonnages  de  France 
9,  Avenue  Percier 
P  A R  I  S  VIII 
ITALY 
Prof.  Dr.  Ing.  Lelio STRAGIOTTI 
Direttore dell'lstituto 
di Arte Mineraria del  Politecnico 
di Torino 
Via s.  Quintino  24 
T  0  R  I  N 0 
23 24 
Prof.  Dr.  Ing.  Carlo MORTARINO 
Istituto di  Meccanica applicata del 
Politecnico 
di 
44,  Corso Duca  degli Abruzzi 
T  0  R  I  N  0 
LUXEMBOURG 
Monsieur  Albert  RAUS 
Ingenieur  en Chef  de 
!'Administration Centrale de  l'ARBED 
L  U X E  M B 0  U R G 
Monsieur  Ed.  MULLER 
Ingenieur  des  Mines 
a  la Division des  Mines  luxembourgeois.es 
de  1 'ARBED 
E  S  C H /  A L  Z E T  T  E 
NETHERLANDS 
Ir.  A.H.W.  ·~RTENS  +) 
Inspecteur Generaal  der  Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op  de  Mijnen 
Dautzenbergstraat  46 
H E  E  R L  E  N 
Ir.  A.F.P.H.  BLOEMEN 
Inspecteur der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op de  Mijnen 
H E  E  R L  E  N 
Ir.  SMULDERS 
Laura en Vereeniging 
E  Y G E  L  S  H 0  V E  N  (Limburg) 
UNI1'ED  KINGDOM 
Mr.  A.E.  McCLELLAND 
Safety  in Mines  Research Establishment, 
Portobello Street, 
S  H E  F  F  I  E  L  D 
b)  The  Working  Party has  a  Sub-Committee  on Electromagnetic 
Testing of Winding  Ropes 
Herrn Dipl.  Ing.  Kurt  DUWELL 
Leiter der Seilprufstelle 
der Westflilischen Berggewerkschaftskasse 
B  0  C  H  U  M 
Hernerstrasse  45 
Herrn Dipl.  Ing.  GRUPE 
Seilprufstelle der Westfalischen 
Berggewerkschaftskasse 
BOCHUM 
Hernerstrasse 45 
+)  Sits as 1·epresentative of  the Restricted Committee Monsieur  STREBELLE 
Association des  Industrials de Belgique 
29,  rue A.  Drouard 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  BURGUIN 
Association des  Industrials de France 
14,  rue  de  Londres 
P  A R  I  S  IX 
Monsieur  SIDO 
Association des  Industrials de France 
14,  rue  de  Londres 
P  A R  I  S  IX 
c)  The  Working Party  a.nd  Sub-Committee  met  on  the  following 
dates: 
1)  January  28,  1959; 
2)  April  11/12,  1959  (at the Rosenblumendelle colliery, 
MUhlheim,  Ruhr,  Germany); 
3)  April  25,  1959  (at  the  Andr~ Dumont  colliery, 
Waterschei,  Belgium); 
4)  May  14,  1959  (at  the A.I.B.,  Brussels); 
5)  June  10,  1959; 
6)  June  21,  1959  (at  the Freyming colliery,  Merlebach, 
France); 
7)  September  17,  1959  (at Lens,  France); 
8)  October  3,  1959  (at  the  Rosenblumendelle colliery, 
MUhlheim); 
9)  October  14,  1959  (at  the rope  testing station,  Bochum); 
10)  November  4,  1959; 
11)  November  5,  1959; 
12)  December  15,  1959; 
13)  February  3,  1960; 
14)  March  25,  1960; 
15)  May  17,  1960; 
16)  July 5,  1960; 
17)  September  28,  1960; 
18)  October  25,  1960  (meeting of experts at Leicester). 
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V.- HIGH  AUTHORITY  COMPETITION  FOR  THE  IMPROVEMENT  OF  SAFETY 
EQUIPMENT  IN  COALMINES 
a)  The  panel of  judges is made  up  as  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Herr Prof.  Dr.  Ing.  E.  LINSEL 
Steinkohlenbergbauverein 
E S  S  E N - K R A Y 
Dortmunderstrasse  151 
Herr  LATTEN 
Oberbergamtsdirektor 
Ministerium fur Wirtschaft  und Verkehr 
des  Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen 
D U S  S  E  L D 0  R F 
am  Karltor  8 
Herr Dipl.  Ing.  Ernst  BREDENBRUCH 
Leiter der Hauptstelle fur  das  Grubenrettungswesen 
E S  S  E N - K R A Y 
Dortmunderstrasse  209 
FRANCE 
+)  Monsieur  CHERADAME 
Directeur General  au  CERCHAR 
35,  rue  Sainte Dominique 
P  A R  I  S  VII 
Monsieur  TERRIER 
Directeur aux  Charbonnages  de France 
S~rvice de  l'Exploitation 
9,  Avenue  Percier 
P  A R  I  S  VIII 
Monsieur  COLAS 
Chef  du  Service Hygiene et Securite Minieres 
a la Direction des  Mines 
Ministere  de  1' Industria et du  C01mnerce 
97,  rue  de Grenelle 
P  A R  I  S  VII 
BELGIUM 
Monsieur  Edgar  DEMELENNE 
Administrateur Directeur 
de  l'Institut National  des  Mines 
60,  rue Grande 
PATURAGES 
NETHERLANDS 
De  Beer Dr.  de  BRAAF 
Directeur van het Proefstation der Staatsmijnen 
T  R E E  B E E  K  (Limburg) 
+>  Chairman of  the panel. ITALY 
Ing.  Paolo CERULLI 
Ispettore Generale delle Miniere 
Ministero dell'  Industria e  Commercia 
33,  Via Veneto 
R  0  M  E 
b)  The  panel met  on  the  following dates: 
1)  September  17,  1959; 
2)  October  22/23,  1959; 
3)  January  14,  1959; 
4)  March  18,  1960; 
5)  April 4/5,  1960  (at the Central Testing Station of the 
·Netherlands State Mines,  Treebeek); 
6)  June  23,  1960;  • 
7)  November  3,  1960. 
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D.- WORKING  PARTIES  ON  HUMAN  FACTORS 
I.  Restricted Working  Party  on  Human  Factors 
a)  The  Restricted Working  Party is made  up as  follows: 
Government :representatives 
Mr.  L.G.  WANSINK  +) 
Hoofd van  de Directie Mijnwezen 
Ministerie van Economische  Zaken 
Bezuidenhoutseweg 30 
THE  HAGUE 
Monsieur Georges  LOGELAIN 
Inspecteur General a l'Administration des  Mines 
Ministere des Affaires Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
8  R U S  S  E  L  S 
Dott.  Augusto  PAROL! 
Direttore di Divisione per la Sicurezza 
e  Igiene nel Lavoro del 
Ministero del Lavoro 
R  0  ME 
Employers'  representatives 
Herr  ERLINGHAGEN 
Bergassessor a.D. 
Steinkohlenbergbauverein 
E  S  S  E  N 
·Friedrichstrasse· 2 
Ir.  C.E.P.M.  RAEDTS 
Directeur Oranje-Nassau Mijnen 
H E E R L E N 
Workers'  representatives 
Herr  Wilhelm  BLUME 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau 
BOCHUM 
Monsieur  CHAUVEAU 
Federation Nationale des  Syndicate 
Chretiens  de  Mineurs 
88,  rue  de  Pernes 
ST.  PIERRE-les-AUCHUL  (Pas-de-Calais) 
b)  The  Working  Party met  on  the  following dates: 
1)  April  22,  1959; 
2)  May  27,  1959. 
+)  Sits as representative of  the Restricted Committee. II  ••  WORKING  PARTY  ON  MEDICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  SAFETY  POLICY 
a)  The  Working  Party is made  up as  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  representative 
Herr Oberbergamt  HUEBNER 
Oberbergamt 
SAARBRUECKEN 
Am  Staden 17 
Employers'  representative 
Herr Dr.  med.  SCHAEPER 
Dortmunder  Bergbau A.G. 
DORTMUNO 
Katharinenstrasse  9 
Workers'  representative 
Herr Karl-Heinz  VOLLMER 
GLAD BECK 
August Bruststrasse  13 
Medical  expert 
BELGIUM 
Herr Ministerialrat 
Dr.  med.  DIERKES 
Bundesministeriwn  fUr  Arbeit  und  Sozialordnung 
BONN 
Government  representatives 
Monsieur  A.  VANDENHEUVEL  +) 
Directeur G'neral des  Mines 
Ministbre des  ~ffaires Economiques 
6-8, ·rue de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E L  S 
Monsieur  VAN  MALDEREN 
Ingenieur en Chef, 
Directeur des  Mines 
A la Direction Generale des  Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la  Scienc~ 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  le Docteur  VAN  MECHELEN 
M'decin-Chef  de  l'Institut 
d'Hygiene  des  Mines 
24,  Marche  aux Avoines 
HASSELT 
+)  Sits as representative of  the Restricted Committee. 
29 30 
Workers'  representative 
Monsieur  L.  GILLOT 
Secretaire National de  la Centrale Syndicale 
des Travailleurs des  Mines  de Belgique 
8,  rue  Joseph  Stevens 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Medical Expert 
FRANCE. 
Monsieur  le Docteur  P.  KISTERS 
Inspecteur General 
Chef  de  l'lnspection Medicale  du Travail 
128,  avenue  de  Broqueville 
B R U S  S  E  L  S  15 
Government  representative 
Monsieur  COLAS 
Chef  du Service Hygiene et Securite Minieres 
a la Direction des  Mines 
Ministere de  l'lndustrie 
97,  rue  de  Grenelle 
P  A R  I  S  VII 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  le Docteur AUPETIT 
Medecin-Chef  du Groupe  d'Oignies 
des Houilleres  d11  Bassin du  Nord 
·  et du  Pas-de-Calais 
20,  rue  des  Minimes 
D 0  U A  I  (Nord) 
Workers'  representative 
Monsieur  CHAUVEAU 
Federation Nationale des  Syndicats 
Chretiens  de  Mineurs 
88,  rue Pernes 
ST.  PIERRE-les-AUCHUL  (Pas-de-Calais) 
Alternate:  Monsieur  SAUTY 
Federation des  Mineurs 
10,  rue Diderot 
L  E  N S  (Pas-de-Calais) 
Medical  expert 
Monsieur  le Docteur  JARRY 
Charbonnages  de  France 
9,  avenue  Percier 
P  A R  I  S  VIII ITALY 
Government  representative 
Dr.  med.  Carlo MICHELAZZI 
Ispettore Capo  del  Lavoro 
addetto alla Divisione Sicurezza 
e  Igiene del  Lavoro 
Ministero del  Lavoro 
R  0  M  E 
Employers'  representative 
Dr.  med.  Mario  BARSOTTI 
Societl Montecatini 
Via Turati,  18 
M I  L  A N 
Workers'  representative 
Sig.  Ettore AZAIS 
C.I.S.L. 
Via  Po,  21 
R  0  M  E 
Medical  expert 
Prof.  Pietro DIDONNA 
Ispettore Generale del  ~voro 
Capo  dell'Ispettorato Medico  del  Lavoro 
Libera docente di medicina del Lavoro 
nell'Universitl di  Roma 
Via  s.  Basilio,  41 
R  0  M  E 
LUXEMBOURG 
No  appointment. 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  representatives 
Mr.  L.G.  WANSINK 
Hoofd  van  de Directie Mijnwezen 
Ministerie van  Economische  Zaken 
Bezuidenhoutseweg,  30 
T  H  E  H A G U  E 
De  Weledelgeleerde Beer 
H.  ITALIE,  arts 
Medisch  Inspecteur der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op de  Mijnen 
H E  E  R L  E  N  (Limburg) 
31 32 
Employers'  representative 
De  Weledelzeergeleerde Heer 
Dr.  med.  A.V.M.  MEY 
Directeur Geneeskundige Dienst der 
Nederlandse  Steenkolenmijnen 
.Horizonstraat  75 
T  R E  E  8  E  E  K  (Limburg) 
Workers'  representative 
De  Heer  C.  FEENSTRA 
Voorzitter van de  Protestant-Christelijke 
Mijnwerkersbond, 
Burg.  de Hesselseplein  26 
HEERLEN 
UNITED  KINGDO.Pio 
b) 
Dr.  J.M.  DAVIDSON, 
Safety and Health Division, 
Ministry of  Power, 
Thames  House  South, 
7,  Millbank, 
L  0  N  D  0  N,  S.W.l 
The  Working  Party met  on  the  following dates: 
1)  October  12,  1959; 
2)  November  27,  1959; 
3)  February  12,  1960; 
4)  March  29,  1960; 
5)  May  20,  1960; 
6)  November  16,  1960. III.- WORKING  PARTY  ON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  SOCIOLOGICAL  FACTORS 
IN  SAFETY 
a)  The  Working  Party  is ma.de  up  as  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  representatives 
Herr Walter  GROSS  +) 
Bergwerksdirektor und Bergassessor a.D. 
Minister!~~ fur Wirtschaft,  Verkehr 
und  Landwirtschaft 
SAARBRUECKEN 
Hardenbergstrasse 
Herr  SANDERS 
Leitender Oberbergamtsdirektor 
Oberbergwnt 
DORTMUND 
Goebenstrasse,  25 
Employers'  representative 
Herr Bergwerksdirektor 
Max  OBERSCHUIR,  Bergassessor a.D. 
Ewald-Koble  A.G. 
R E C K L  I  N G H A U S E  N 
Lessingstrasse,  49 
Workers'  representative 
BELGIUM 
Herr Fritz POTT 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau 
BOCHUM 
Hattingerstrasse,  19 
Government  representative 
Monsieur Georges  LOGELAIN 
Inspecteur General  ~ !'Administration des  Mines 
Ministere des  Affaires Economiques 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Alternate: 
Monsieur  COOLS 
Directeur Divisionnaire  ~ 
!'Administration des  Mines 
6-8,  rue de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
+)  Sits as  representative of  the Restricted Committee. 
33 34 
Employers'  representative . 
Monsieur  ROYER 
lngenieur  en  chef a la S.A. 
des  Cha.rbonna.ges  de  Houthalen 
H 0  U T H A L E N 
Workers'  representative 
FRANCE 
Monsieur  E.  van  den DRIESSCHE 
5,  rue  de  Trazegnies 
C 0  U R  C  E  L  L  E  S 
Government  representative 
Monsieur  DAUNESSE 
Ingenieur  en chef  des  mines 
Rue  Charles Bourseul 
D 0  U A  I  (Nord) 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  VEDRIN:3 
Directeur General-adjoint  des  Houill~res 
du  Nord et  du Pas-de-Calais 
20,  rue  des  Minimes 
D 0  U A  I  (Nord) 
workers'  representative 
Monsieur  CHAUVEAU 
Federation Nationale  des  Syndicats 
Chretiens  de  Mineurs 
88,  rue  Pernes 
ST.  PIERRE-les-AUCHUL  (Pas-de-Calais) 
Government  representative 
Dott.  Augusto  PAROL! 
Direttore di Divisione per  la Sicurezza 
e  Igiene  nel  Lavoro  del 
Ministero del Lavoro 
R  0  ME 
Employers'  representative 
Avv.  Umber to  CU1'TICA 
Dirigente della Societa Nazionale  Cogne 
Via s.  Quintina 
T  U R  I  N 
Workers'  representative 
Prof.  Nicola DE  PAMPIIILIS 
C. I.S.L. 
Via  Po,  21 
R  0  M  E LUXEMBOURG 
Government  representative 
Monsieur FranQois  HUBERTY 
Ingenieur-Directeur du Travail et des  Mines 
Inspection du Travail et des  Mines 
19,  Avenue  Gaston Diderich 
L  U X E  M B 0  U R G 
Alternate:  Monsieur  Leon  SUTTOR 
Conseiller de Legation au 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres 
LUXEMBOURG 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  Albert  RAUS 
Ingenieur en Chef  de  l'Administration Centrale 
de  l'ARBED 
LUXEMBOURG 
Alternate:  Monsieur  Emile  SCHMIT 
Ingenieur principal pour  la securite 
a  l'ARBED 
L  U X E  M B 0  U R G 
Workers'  representative 
Monsieur Nicolas  MANNES 
President de  la Delegation Ouvriere 
pres ARBED/Mines 
Cite Leesberg 
ESCH-sur-ALZETTE 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  representative 
Ir.  Cbr.  PICKEE 
Inspecteur der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op  de  Mijnen 
HEERLEN 
Employers'  representative 
Ir.  C.E.P.M.  RAEDTS 
Directeur Oranje-Nassau Mijnen 
H E  E  R L  E  N 
Workers'  representative 
De  Heer  F.S.  DOHMEN 
Nederlandse Kath.  Mijnwerkersbond, 
Parallelweg,  12 
H E E R L  E N 
35 36 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Mr.  B.R.  HOUSTON, 
Safety and Health Division, 
Ministry of Power, 
Thames  Bouse  South, 
Millbank, 
L  0  N D 0  N,  S.W.l 
b)  The  Working  Party has  a  Sub-Committee consisting of  the 
following: 
Herr Walter  GROSS 
Bergwerkdirektor und Bergassessor a.D. 
Ministerium fUr  Wirtschaft,  Verkehr 
und  La.ndwirtschaft 
SAARBRUECKEN 
Ir.  C.E.P.M.  RAEDTS 
Directeur Oranje-Nassau Mijnen 
H E  E  R L  E  N  (Limburg) 
Herr  SANDERS 
Leitender Oberbergamtsdirektor 
Oberbergamt 
DORTMUND 
Goebenstrasse  25 
Dott.  Augusto  PAROL! 
Direttore di Divisione per la Sicurezza 
e  Igiene nel Lavoro del 
Ministero del Lavoro 
R  0  ME 
Monsieur  Emile  VANDENDRIESSCHE 
5,  rue  de Trazegnies 
COURCELLES  /  Belgium 
Monsieur  Emile  SCHMIT 
Ingenieur principal pour  la securite 
a  1 'ARBED 
LUXEMBOURG 
Monsieur  CHAUVEAU 
Federation Nationale des  Syndicats 
Chretiens  de  Mineurs 
88,  rue Pernes 
ST.  PIERRE-les-AUCBUL  (Pas-de-Calais) 
c)  The  Working  Party and  the Sub-Committee  met  on  the  fol-
lowing dates: 
1)  October  16,  1959; 
2)  November  23,  1959; 
3)  January  11,  1960; 
4)  March  3,  1960; 
5)  April  27,  1960; 
6)  June  13,  1960; 
7)  June  14,  1960. IV.- WORKING  PARTY  ON  EFFECTS  OF  WORKING  HOURS  ON  SAFETY, 
ESPECIALLY  IN  DIFFICULT  OR  UNHEALTHY  WORKINGS 
a)  The  Working  Party is made  up as  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  representative 
Herr  Berghauptmann 
Dr.  FUNDER, 
Oberbergrunt 
8  0  N  N 
Employers'  representative 
Herr Bergwerksdirektor 
Heinrich  MIDDENDORF,  Bergassessor a.D. 
Steinkohlenhergwerke Mathias  Stinnes A.G. 
E  S  S  E  N - W E  S  T 
Workers'  representative 
BELGIUM 
Herr  Wilhelm  BLUME 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau 
BOCHUM 
Hattingerstrasse  19 
Government  representative 
Monsieur  van  MALDEREN 
Ingenieur en Chef 
Directeur des  Mines  a la 
Direction Generale des  Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  J.  SAUCEZ 
Attache  au Centre  de  Formation 
Poste Universita.ire  pour 
lngenieurs  de  Charbonnages, 
14,  rue  de  l'Espinette, 
Q  U  A  R  E  G  N  0  N 
Workers'  representative 
Monsieur  Frans  BIJNENS 
Torenveldstraat  10 
8  E R  I  N G E N 
37 38 
FRANCE 
Government  representative 
Monsieur  SERVANT 
Ing~nieur des  Mines 
Cit~ Administrative 
2,  rue de  l'H8pital Militaire 
{Bas-Rhin)  S  T  R A S  B 0  U R G 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  BLACLARD 
Chef  du Service du Travail 
et des  Relations sociales 
aux Charbonnages  de  France 
9,  Avenue  Percier 
P  A R  I  S  VIII 
Workers'  representative 
Monsieur Florent  LAMPIN 
F~d~ration Nationale Force-Ouvriere des  Mineurs 
198,  Avenue  du Maine 
P  A R  I  S  XIV 
Alternate:  Monsieur  Andr~ AUGARD 
Secr~taire G~n~ral-Adjoint 
de  la F~d~ration Nationale 
Force Ouvriere des  Mineurs 
198,  Avenue  du  Maine, 
P  A R  I  S  XIV 
Government  representative 
lng.  Giovanni  BULGARELLI 
Capo  del Distretto Minerario di Padova 
Via Baiamonti,  1 
P  A D U A 
Employers'  representative 
Prof.  Mario  CARTA 
lstituto Arte  Mineraria 
Societa Carbosarda 
C A G L  I  A R  I  {Sardinia) 
Workers'  representative 
Signore Giuseppe  BACCI 
U. I.L. 
6,  Via Lucullo 
R  0  M  E 
LUXEMBOURG 
No  appointment. NETHERLANDS 
Government  representatives 
+)  Mr.  L.G.  WANSINK 
Hoofd  van  de Directie Mijnwezen, 
Ministerie van  Economische  Zaken 
Bezuidenhoutseweg  30 
THE  HAGUE 
Ir. D.J.  KNUTTEL 
Hoofdinspecteur der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht 6p  de  Mijnen 
H E  E  R L  E  N 
Employers'  representative 
Ir.  F.W.  FENNELL 
Hoofdingenieur  van  de  Staatsmijnen 
in  Limb~rg 
p/a Staatsmijn Wilhelmina 
T  E  R  W I  N S  E  L  E  N 
Workers'  representative 
De  Heer  H.L.  GROND 
Katholieke Vereniging 
van  Mijnbeambten 
Schelsberg  202 
H E  E  R L  E  R H E  I  D E  (Limburg) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Mr.  R.  BELL, 
National Coal  Board, 
Hobart  House, 
Grosvenor  Place, 
L  0  N  D  0  N,  S.W.l 
b)  The  Working  Pa.rty  has  an Editorial Committee made  up 
as  follows: 
Mr.  L.G.  WANSINK 
Hoofd  van  de Directie Mijnwezen, 
Ministerie van  Economische  Zaken 
Bezuidenhoutseweg  30 
T  H E  H A G U E 
Berghauptmann 
Dr.  FUNDER 
Oberbergamt 
B  0  N  N 
Herrn Bergwerksdirektor 
Heinrich MIDDENDORF,  Bergassessor  a.D. 
Steinkohlenbergwerke Mathias  Stinnes A.G. 
E  S  S  E  N - W E  S  T 
+)  Sits a.s  representative of  the Restricted Committee. 
39 40 
Monsieur Frans  BIJNENS 
Torenveldstraat  10 
B E R I  N G E N 
Monsieur  Andre  AUGARD 
Secretaire General-adjoint 
de  la Federation Nationale 
Force Ouvriere des  Mineurs 
198,  Avenue  du Maine 
P  A R  I  S  XIV 
Prof.  Mario  CARTA 
Istituto Arte Mineraria 
Societa Carbosarda 
C A G L  I  A R  I  (Sardinia) 
c)  The  Working  Party  and  the Editorial Committee  met  on  the 
following dates: 
1)  October  27,  1959; 
2)  January  15,  1960; 
3)  May  16,  1960; 
4)  November  11 ,  1960. V.- WORKING  PARTY  ON  EFFECTS  OF  MODES  OF  PAYMENT  ON  SAFETY 
a.)  The  Working  Party is made  up  a.s  follows: 
FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 
Government  representative 
Herr Ministerialdirigent Dr.  Ing.  HELLER 
Ministerium  fUr  Wirtschaft  und  Verkehr 
Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen 
D U E  S  S  E  L  D 0  R F 
am  Karltor  8 
Employers'  representat~ve 
Herr Ministerialrat a.D. 
Walter  LUESEBRINK 
Markische Steinkohlengewerkschaft 
HE ESSEN/ Westf. 
Workers'  representative 
BELGIUM 
Herr Karl  POSTHOFER 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau 
B  0  C  H  U  M 
Hattingerstrasse  19 
Government  representative 
Monsieur  TONDEUR 
Ingenieur principal divisionnaire des  Mines 
a  la Direction Generale  des  Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  LELOUP 
Ingenieur en  chef a la S.A.  des 
Charbonnages  de  WERISTER 
BEYNE  - HEUSAY 
Workers'  representative 
FRANCE 
Monsieur  Joseph  DEDOYARD 
Secretaire General  de  la Centrale Syndicale 
des Travailleurs des  Mines  de  Belgique 
201,  rue  de Gilly 
C H A T  E L  I  N E  A U 
Government  representative 
Monsieur  DESTIVAL 
Ingenieur des  Mines 
3,  rue  du Palais de  Justice 
CHALONS-sur-SAONE 
41 42 
Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  MARSEILLE 
Houilleres  du  Bassin de  Lorraine 
M E  R  L  E  B A C H  (Moselle) 
Workers'  representative. 
ITALY 
Monsieur  LAMPIN 
Federation Nationale Force Ouvriere des  Mineurs, 
Minters et similaires 
198,Avenue  du Maine 
P  A R  I  S  XIV 
Government  representatives 
Dott.  Rosar~o PURPURA  +) 
Direttore Generale al Ministero del  Lavoro 
Via Flavia 6 
R 0  :td  E 
Dott.  Raffaele  ROSSANO 
Ispettore Generale 
Direzione Generale delle Miniere 
:tdinistero dell'Industria e  del  Co1runercio 
R  0  ME 
Employers'  representative 
Avv.  Luigi  PUCCI 
Dirigente della Societa Montecatini 
Via Turati no  18 
M I  L  A N 
Workers'  representative 
Sig.  Francesco BIAGIOLI 
C. I.S.L. 
2l,Via  Po 
R  0  ME 
LUXEMBOURG 
Government  representative 
Monsieur  Fran~ois HUBERTY 
Ingenieur-Directeur du Travail et des  Mines 
Inspection du Travail et des  Mines 
19,  Avenue  Gaston Diderich 
LUXEMBOURG 
Alternate:  Monsieur  Leon  SUTTOR 
Conseiller de Legation au 
Ministere  des  Affaires Etrangeres 
LUXEMBOURG 
+)  Chairman appointed  by  the Restricted Committee. Employers'  representative 
Monsieur  Albert  RAUS 
Ingenieur en Chef  de  !'Administration Centrale 
de  l'ARBED 
L U X E M B 0  U R G 
Al terna.te:  Monsieur Marcel  WAGNiR 
Ingenieur adjoint au Chef 
du  Personnel  ARBED 
Avenue  de  la Liberte 
LUXEMBOURG 
Workers'  representative 
Monsieur Nicolas  MANNES 
President de  la Delegation Ouvriere 
pres  ARBED/Mines 
Cite Leesberg 
ESCH-sur-ALZETTE 
NETHERLANDS 
Government  representative 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS 
Inspecteur-Generaal  der Mi'jnen 
Staatstoezicht op de  Mijnen 
Dautzenbergstraat,  46 
H E E R L E N 
Employers'  representative 
Ir.  F.J.C.  BIANCHI 
Hoofdbedrijfsingenieur van  de 
Oranje-Nas~au Mijnen 
H E E  R L  E  N 
Workers'  representative 
De  Heer J.  PALMEN 
Secretaris van  de  Ned.  Katbolieke 
Mijnwerkersbond 
Parellelweg 12 
HEERLEN 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Mr.  R.  BELL, 
National Coal  Board, 
Hobart  House, 
Grosvenor  Place, 
L  0  N  D  0  N,  S.W.l 
b)  The  Working  Party  has  a  Sub-Committee  ma.de  up  as  follows: 
Herr Dr.  lng.  Hans  WALTHER 
Leiter der Gedingekommission 
E  S  S  E  N 
Lindenallee  21 
43 44 
Monsieur  TONDEUR 
Ingenieur Principal divisionnaire des  Mines 
a  la.  Direction Generale des Mines 
6-8,  rue  de  la Science 
B R U S  S  E  L  S 
Monsieur  MARSEILLE 
Houilleres  du Bassin de  Lorraine 
M E  R L  E  B A C H /  Moselle 
Dott.  Ing.  Giorgio CARTA 
Vice Direttore Generale della Carbonifera Sarda 
11,  Via Napoli 
C  A R B 0  N  I  A  (Cagliari) 
Monsieur  Marcel  WAGNER 
Ingenieur adjoint au Chef 
.du  Personnel  ARBED 
Avenue  de  la Liberte 
L  U X E  M B 0  U R G 
Ir.  A.H.W.  MARTENS 
Inspecteur Generaal  der  Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op de  Mijnen 
Dautzenbergstraat  46 
H E E  R L  E  N 
c)  The  Working  Party  met  on October  26,  1959. 
+ 
+  + ·ANNEX  F 
RECOMMENDATIONS,  DIRECTIVES,  OPINIONS  AND  REPORTS  ADOPTED  BY  THE 
COMMISSION  IN  1958,  1959  AND  1960 
A.- Technical  Aspects 
1)  Recommendations  regarding replacement  of oil by  other  lubricants in elec-
trical apparatus  used  below  ground  (Commission  Report  1958,  p.  7). 
2)  Opinion  on  use  of  non-flammable materials for the manufacture of electric 
cables  and  leads  for  underground  use  (Commission  Report  1959-60,  p.  5). 
3)  Recommendations  for shotfiring leads  (Commission  Report  1959-60,  p.  9). 
4)  Recommendations  regarding protection of  underground distribution networks 
against  the danger  of causing electric shocks  (Commission  Report  1959-60, 
p.  12). 
b)  "~!!~~-~!!~-~!!~~!f!!~~!!~-~~~!?~~!!~!!" 
1)  Recommendations  regarding fire prevention arrangements  in shafts  (Conwis-
sion Report  1958,  p.  11). 
2)  Directives on  fighting fires  in shafts by  bringing in water  (Commission 
Report  1959-60,  p.  26). 
3)  Recommendations  regarding sealing-off of mine  fires  and underground 
combustion  by  dams  (Commission  Report  1959-60,  p.  53). 
4)  Report  (for reference)  on  the establishment  of criteria for fire-resistant 
hydraulic fluids  and  for tests of these  (Commission  Report  1959-60, 
Annex  A). 
c)  "Mechanization  and  locomotives" 
1)  Recommendations  regarding equipment  of  locomotives  (Commission  Report 
1958,  p.  20). 
2)  Recommendations  regarding neutralization of diesel-engine exhaust  ~ases 
(Commission  Report  1958,  p.  21). 
B.- Rescue  Arrangements 
- Report  on  tour of Central  Rescue Stations in the Community  countries and 
Great  Britain  (Commission  Report  1959-60,  p.  62  and  Annex  B). 
C.- Human  Factors 2 
1)  Recommendations  and  Report  on  pre-entry,  special and  routine medical  examina-
tions  (Commission  Report  1959-60,  p.  76). 
2)  Report  on colliery medical services in the Community  countries and Great 
Britain  (Commission  Report  1959-60,  Annex  C). 
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